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No one really wants to die, or do they? From classical times to our post-modern era 
of medical high tech, societies have struggled with the thorny issue of euthanasia, 
and what it entails. Who shall be entitled to a “good death” and in what form shall it 
arrive? This book provides the reader with insight and enlightenment on the medical, 
philosophical, social, cultural and existential aspects of “good death” amid our 
digitized, individualized and ageing society, hampered by rising health care costs but 
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Few issues in contemporary health care arouse so much controversy as does the 
problem of euthanasia. We appear to have quite different understandings of what a 
“good death” is, based on diverse value judgments. Euthanasia, however, does not 
tolerate moral indifference. The concept of euthanasia does not allow it to be glossed 
over apathetically. Regardless of the way it is used, the word euthanasia always 
evokes strong emotions. The source of such powerful emotions and the need to draw 
up potent rational arguments are derived from the heart of the matter: euthanasia is 
about life and death. In such an arena, the fight for liberty, dignity, autonomy and 
individual rights does not allow for passivity and a detached view, and tends to affect 
both sides of the controversy to the same degree. For both proponents and opponents 
alike it therefore becomes a matter of principle to decriminalize euthanasia on one 
hand and to halt its encroachment through restrictive legislation on the other hand. 
The root of the dilemma is that autonomy and individual rights have to be promoted 
so that an individual can make the choice about his/her own life and death while the 
right to life has to be strongly protected. For opponents of euthanasia, there exist some 
similarities between the present-day debates on euthanasia as a matter of life or choice 
(being a compassionate choice in the case of non-voluntary euthanasia) and the 
debates on abortion in the 1960s and 1970s as a matter of life (pro-life) or choice (pro-
choice). In both contexts “the issue” appears as a “matter of principle” and for those 
taking up such a stance, based on the fundamental sanctity of life, it is morally wrong 
to contaminate the principle itself; the principle has to be defended without any moral 
compromise. In contrast, as some people argue, dragging out a person’s death process 
so that it conforms to the value system of others, which he/she believes to be a terrible 
contradiction of his/her life values or aspirations, is a devastating and odious form of 
tyranny. 
While for some people euthanasia is a manifestation of the individual’s autonomy at 
par with a responsible control of one’s destiny, a compassionate responsiveness to 
someone’s immense suffering or a clinical imperative to act in the patient’s best 
interest, for other people euthanasia is tantamount to or merely a euphemism for 
killing, the violation of human life and an infringement of the human right to life, 
being contradictory to the sanctity of life doctrine and facilitating the abuse of 
vulnerable persons. Specific terms and arguments are used in euthanasia debates 
which have an immediate, universal appeal about them and seem to be desired, in 
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great demand and strike a chord with our sentiments. Human dignity, humaneness 
and compassion belong to the first order of such terms. Nobody would doubt that 
people who are terminally ill, who are dying or who want to die should be treated 
with compassion and with respect to their (human) dignity. At a closer look, however, 
there are diverse semantics rooted in these terms, allowing them to be used as both 
arguments for and against euthanasia – depending on the individual’s view. One 
could say that euthanasia is contrary to human dignity because the conduct of 
euthanasia would violate human dignity (of both persons involved), whereas one 
could also conclude that dying under horrible suffering would violate human dignity 
and therefore a request for euthanasia and its fulfilment are an expression of respect 
for human dignity and for a dignified death. 
As a result many euthanasia discussions lack a clear semantic common ground to 
serve as a rational starting point. Since there is no universally agreed upon definition 
of “euthanasia” per se, it is essential to clarify how the word is used with regard to a 
particular context. Otherwise confusion dominates the debate. Both in academic 
literature and in public debates euthanasia is often associated with “physician assisted 
dying” and mixed with “(physician) assisted suicide”. In some contexts euthanasia is 
simply assumed to refer to very general terms like “assisted death”, under which 
assisted suicide is also subsumed. Particularly in recent years, the term “euthanasia” is 
used more and more in the context of that as defined by Dutch and Belgian legislation, 
whereby euthanasia is understood to be “administration of lethal drugs by someone 
other than the person concerned with the explicit intention of ending a patient’s life, at 
the latter’s explicit request”. It is obvious that this definition is in need of some 
additional criteria specifying the conditions and situations under which euthanasia 
would be legal. 
When euthanasia is merged with “assisted death“, then under such a broader notion 
of “euthanasia” similar but distinct clinical situations such as medical futility, life 
sustaining treatment, the categorization of therapy, palliative care, and other end-of-
life decisions enter into the discussion. Here one should emphasize that the decisions 
in palliative and intensive care medicine include a much broader spectrum of ethical 
dilemmas than the issue of euthanasia alone. In order for the euthanasia discussion to 
be meaningful, clearly accepted concepts of the terminology have to be elaborated and 
established before any meaningful discussion about the morality and ethics of 
euthanasia is initiated. Failure to keep such a sequence results in frustration. It is one 
of the ambitions of this book to contribute to the semantics of euthanasia. This book on 
euthanasia distinguishes euthanasia from other forms of killing, such as self-killing 
(with or without assistance) or murder. So physician assisted suicide is not covered by 
this book.   
Euthanasia is a very old issue, with its roots in Classical thinking. Throughout the 
course of history, however, it has been understood differently. In recent times the 
concept of euthanasia has come increasingly under the spotlight due to the on-going 
technicization of medicine. There are several other compounding factors making the 
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issue of euthanasia a pressing problem for contemporary society. First there has been a 
shift in the perception and understanding of death; death, being technicized and 
depersonalized, is no longer a natural event at all. Human rights have become a 
cornerstone of modern medicine. Particularly in Western societies, personal autonomy 
and autonomous choice regarding health care became a significant characteristic of the 
post-war period. At the same time, a focus on human dignity and an 
acknowledgement of people’s mutual interdependency gave rise to new sensitivities 
in the form of an increased manifestation of solidarity and compassion for our fellow 
citizens. In light of these developments and the changes to civil institutions they 
brought with them, in certain situations, such as to prevent possible forensic 
consequences including law suits, physicians tend to overtreat patients, even those 
who are pre-terminally or terminally ill. This in turn has given rise to not only the 
question of distributive justice and just distribution of health care resources but also 
supports the idea of euthanasia as a switch from overtreatment to a “final treatment”, 
a means of restoring the clarity and finality of death that has been protracted by 
modern medicine. Another common and global factor is the increasing costs of health 
care. In particular in countries with very limited health care resources, but not limited 
to these alone (health care resources are limited in all countries), the issue of 
euthanasia has to be addressed within the reality of limited financial resources. In 
economic terms, one day in an Intensive Care Unit costs hundreds or thousands of 
euros; while a lethal dose of morphine costs just a few euros. Another economic factor 
is the demographic deficit being caused by an ageing society in some areas in the 
world like Europe. The current and future socio-economic consequences are evident. 
In response, three European countries (the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg) 
have legalized both physician assisted suicide and active euthanasia and the states of 
Oregon and Washington have passed legislation regulating physician assisted suicide. 
Drawing on the experience of these countries, it would be meaningful to examine how 
such proposals are affecting (and will affect) society as such and different members of 
society in particular, from the very young to the very old, from the healthy to the sick, 
handicapped and dying. It seems that the general public is more ready to embrace a 
compassionate approach to (physician) assisted suicide, if it is carefully managed and 
monitored, than to euthanasia. One can expect that the controversy surrounding the 
moral acceptability of euthanasia and its decriminalization will remain a challenge for 
our ageing societies in the twenty first century. 
What distinguishes this book from other books on euthanasia is, among others, the 
inclusion of euthanasia in animals. This could be perceived by some people as 
inappropriate. Is the euthanasia of humans the same as the euthanasia of animals? If 
not, where do the differences lie? Why do we euthanize animals worldwide but 
humans legally in just a few countries (and unofficially more so)? One should be 
aware that there are several types of euthanasia of animals. Every day hundreds of 
thousands or millions of small laboratory animals (predominantly mice and rats) are 
euthanized after undergoing scientific experiments. Euthanasia is also used as a tool to 
regulate the overpopulation of animals. In veterinary medicine euthanasia is routinely 
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used in the form of killing out of kindness severely injured and/or seriously sick 
animals. To not euthanatize a pet suffering from advanced cancer would be regarded 
as inhumane. But if this is so, why should we allow a terminally ill human cancer 
patient to “suffer until the end” and expect it to be regarded as humane? Why do we 
treat animals with compassion (euthanizing them), while not applying the same 
compassion to humans specifically asking for such mercy? While the book does not 
include a comparative and evaluative chapter which analyses the similarities and 
differences between the euthanasia of humans and animals outright, the material 
included herein will provide the reader with the sufficient grounding to make such 
comparisons and draw his/her own conclusions.  
This edition is a collection of 12 chapters, which are organized in four parts. 
The first part of the book is devoted to tackling what a confounding and intricate issue 
euthanasia really is, and how it can be understood. This part also provides a historical 
overview of euthanasia and the different meanings of the term euthanasia, with extra 
focus on the current debates.  
The second part consists of chapters dealing with the different arguments expounded 
regarding euthanasia and with different approaches to the issue. The focus is on 
voluntary active euthanasia, as employed in the Dutch and Belgian context. Some of 
the arguments used in euthanasia debates are presented and critically analyzed. 
The third part of the book is devoted to the aspect of public policy. The perceptions 
and attitudes of health care professionals to euthanasia are illustrated and the impact 
of the Dutch legalization regarding euthanasia as to the number of requests for 
euthanasia is presented.  
The fourth part deals with the euthanasia of animals – euthanasia as a form of 
controlling the dog population, as a method of zoonosis control and the euthanasia of 
laboratory animals. 
Hopefully, the present book will provide some insight and enlightenment into the 
intricate issue of euthanasia, both human and animal, inspiring readers to think 
critically about the medical, social, philosophical, cultural and existential aspects of 
“good death” in our technologized, individualized and ageing society burdened with 
rising health care costs.  
 
Josef Kuře 
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Good Death Within Its Historical Context and as 
a Contemporary Challenge: A Philosophical 
Clarification of the Concept of “Euthanasia” 
Josef Kuře 
University Centre for Bioethics & Department of Medical Ethics,  
Masaryk University, Brno 
Czech Republic 
1. Introduction 
The word euthanasia evokes emotions, regardless of the way it is used. When pronounced, 
instead of a rational discourse, separate camps of irreconcilable proponents and opponents 
are drawn up. Both fight for dignity, liberty, autonomy, rights and humaneness. Few 
debates in the area of health care result in such polarization of opinions as euthanasia. While 
for some people euthanasia is a manifestation of the individual’s autonomy equal with a 
responsible control of one’s destiny, a compassionate responsiveness to someone’s immense 
suffering or a clinical imperative to act in the patient’s best interest, for other people, 
euthanasia is tantamount to or merely a euphemism for killing, the violation of human life 
and an infringement of the human right to life, being contradictory to the sanctity of life 
doctrine and facilitating the abuse of vulnerable persons. The controversies surrounding the 
moral acceptability of euthanasia and its decriminalization are characteristic of the 
intellectual confrontations in medical ethics and in public debates during the last decades of 
the twentieth century and they remain a challenge for our ageing societies in the twenty first 
century. As Keown (2002, p. 9) points out, “given the absence of any universally agreed 
definition of ‘euthanasia’ it is vital to be clear about how the word is being used in any 
particular context. The cost of not doing so is confusion.“ This confusion is, among others, 
created by semantic substitutions in which euthanasia is not distinguished from “physician 
assisted dying”, from “assisted suicide” or from “physician assisted suicide” (Quill & Battin, 
2004; Young, 2007), or being simply replaced by very general terms like “assisted death” 
(Lewis, 2007; Lewy, 2011), under which not only euthanasia but also assisted suicide is 
usually subsumed. The general public, especially in countries other than ones such as the 
Netherlands or Belgium, use general terms such as “assisted death” or “assisted dying” 
while generally not differentiating between euthanasia and assisted suicide, not 
understanding euthanasia in the sense used by legislation in countries where euthanasia has 
been legalized. This use of a broad notion of euthanasia results in various clinical situations 
being discussed under the scope of “euthanasia”. 
Once euthanasia is merged with “assisted death“, then under the term “euthanasia” similar 
but distinct clinical situations such as medical futility, life sustaining treatment, 
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categorization of therapy, palliative care, and other end-of-life decisions are discussed (van 
der Maas, 1991; Onwuteaka-Philipsen, 2003). Decisions in palliative and intensive care 
medicine include a much broader spectrum of ethical dilemmas than the issue of euthanasia 
alone (Battin et al., 2007; Kinzbrunner & Policzer, 2010). Nevertheless it happens quite 
frequently that two people, discussing whether ‘euthanasia’ is morally good and/or right 
and whether it should be legalized or not understand two quite different things by the same 
term; they fail to connect, developing two parallel monologues. Such fruitless and 
frustrating occurrences are characteristic of many euthanasia debates. It was one such 
occasion that inspired the author to study the historical semantics of euthanasia, the results 
of which are presented below. 1 
Since the notion of euthanasia is loaded by strong feelings, many euthanasia discussions 
lack clear semantic ground as a rational starting point. So instead of semantic clarification 
(status questionis in the traditional philosophical discourse), euthanasia discussions are often 
limited to the justification of their arguments (regardless if pro or contra) and to the critique 
of the arguments of the other side as a matter of principle.  
This situation is further exasperated by both opponents and proponents of euthanasia often 
using the same arguments but with very diverse meanings. Based on the same argument, 
completely contrary conclusions can be drawn. Such is the case with arguments based on 
human dignity. One can state that euthanasia violates human dignity and therefore it 
should be prohibited. However, another can argue that not allowing legal euthanasia 
violates human dignity since one then has to die in a way which harms dignity; therefore 
euthanasia is a death which fully corresponds to human dignity (the law which regulates 
assisted suicide in Oregon State is entitled the Death With Dignity Act).  
Should the euthanasia discussion be meaningful, a conceptual clarification needs to be 
one of the primary conditions of such a discussion. I’m arguing that prior to any 
argumentation either for or against euthanasia, the semantics used in such 
argumentations has to be clarified. “It is important to understand what euthanasia is. No 
one disputes the fact that euthanasia is a form of killing; so too are murder, manslaughter, 
suicide, capital punishment, and war. To state that each is a form of killing warns us to 
                                                 
1 This chapter was written thanks to a well-known surgeon and distinguished professor’s contribution 
to euthanasia, a presentation at a conference called “The Philosophy of Euthanasia”, which both 
frustrated and challenged me. This motivated me to write an article in the form of a philosophical 
explanation of the notion of euthanasia (Kuře, 2007). The text provided here is an extended English 
revision. Here is a synopsis of his presentation, which took the form of a story and a conclusion. In the 
mountains lived a forester who lived a happy life up to the moment when he went down to a local 
hospital. Having been diagnosed with cancer, he returned back to his house in the forest and shot 
himself to death. Conclusion: euthanasia has to be legalized. So ends the surgeon’s contribution.  
A typical case of suicide. One isn’t able to bear a depressing and burdensome situation. Under intensive 
stress one sees the best way out of such a situation as one’s own death, accomplishing it by one’s own 
hand, without any external help (an unassisted death). Such a person did not ask for the termination of 
his life, no other person was involved. In was suicide, not euthanasia; not even assisted suicide. Besides 
cancer there can be many different reasons for which one might commit suicide. This story illustrates 
the kind of conceptual inaccuracy that can be in play. The forester was not suffering extreme pain, and 
he could possibly have been cured. If his story is an argument for euthanasia then any trying situation 
in life would qualify for euthanasia, leading euthanasia to be a first and not last resort. While most 
would argue that one is free to commit suicide any time he/she assesses his/her life as a burden and 
meaningless. But suicide has here nothing to do with euthanasia. 
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proceed with care, but it need not to be decisive in determining the rightness or 
wrongness of the act. We need, therefore, to address the question of what it is about 
euthanasia that distinguishes it from, or places it in a separate category to, say, self-killing 
or murder.” (Draper, 1998, p. 176).  
Even a discussion which distinguishes between euthanasia and suicide is not necessarily 
free of conceptual inexactitudes by using terms such as “active euthanasia”, “passive 
euthanasia”, “direct euthanasia”, “indirect euthanasia”, “help in dying” as synonyms for 
euthanasia, “mercy killing” (German “Gnadentod”) as another synonym for euthanasia, and 
other terms such as “voluntary euthanasia”, “involuntary euthanasia”, active action causing 
death (actio commissionis), passive action (non-acting) causing death (actio ommissionis), 
“killing”, “letting die” (“allowing to die”), usage of “ordinary”/”extraordinary” means, 
“intending death”, “foreseeing death” (to foresee that an unintended death will occur). Not 
only is the term “euthanasia” connected with considerable semantic unclearness, but it is 
also used and abused in various cultural and historical contexts – so for instance, in 
Germany the term “euthanasia” (Euthanasie) is used to refer to the abuse of the Nazi regime 
during that period (eugenic euthanasia), while the term “Sterbehilfe”2 is used in current 
euthanasia debates.  
This use of unspecified terminology - with the term “good death” being used to subsume 
many very diverse situations and meanings – and including the use of single terms with 
diverse connotations (e.g. “assisted death” or “dignity”) is quite common in these debates. 
So semantic clarifications are therefore a necessary prerequisite for any ethical reflection on 
euthanasia to take place. However one of the obstacles for a meaningful discussion of 
euthanasia is its semantic deficiency. The non-addressed polysemantism that is present 
hinders understanding, reinforcing superficiality and creating misapprehensions. For 
instance if one makes use of the old-fashioned “active” and “passive” euthanasia terms, 
which can still be found in the literature, then the use of one and the same denotation, 
namely “euthanasia”, for ethically entirely different situations (killing by high doses of 
opiates and allowing to die when the terminally ill person is dying, without causing 
dysthanasia) is considerably problematic – not only from the semantic point of view.  
The aim of this chapter is to contribute to the clarification of the concept of “good death” as 
it appeared throughout history; its goal is to clarify what was meant by the term 
“euthanasia” in various historical periods. The chapter does not seek to provide “a short 
history of euthanasia” but to show how differently and in which semantic, cultural and 
philosophical frameworks the term “euthanasia” has been used in the course of history. So 
instead of a comprehensive history of euthanasia, a search for diverse typologies of 
euthanasia through history will be conducted. It seems that it is necessary to start not with 
the 18th century and with the “right to die”3 as Ian Dowbiggin does (2007) but with Classical 
thinking. Nevertheless, Dowbiggin clearly demonstrates euthanasia‘s affinity to suicide, 
                                                 
2 The term ”Sterbehilfe“ is ambiguous in concept; it can be used in quite contrary meanings. In one 
meaning it is used as an equivalent term for active euthanasia (help to die) (Bobbert, 2003; Eibach, 1998; 
Eid, 1985; Müller, 1997; Ritzel, 1998). While in its other meaning ”Sterbehilfe“ refers to the active 
support of a dying person (palliative care, human accompaniment for the dying patient) (Michalsen & 
Reinhart, 2006; Kruse & Wagner, 1986; Pöltner, 2006; Simon, 2003; Sporken, 1988, 1990). 
3 Cf. Cavan, 2000; Downing & Smoker, 1986; Ferguson, 2007; Humphry & Wickett, 1986;  Sunstein, 1997; 
Wilshaw, 1974. 
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which can be conceptualized in many ways. There were times, particularly in Christian 
Europe, when the fear of Hell was far greater than the fear of death. He also demonstrates 
that distinctions are worthwhile in a historical approach to euthanasia.4 This chapter does 
not delve into the status quo of the current euthanasia debate, nor does it provide moral or 
ethical “for” or “against” arguments as used within euthanasia debates. Rather it tries to 
illustrate the diverse backgrounds of such debates.  
The methodology used in this chapter is not a pure historical overview of the notion of 
euthanasia. The purpose of the historical survey conducted here is to contribute to a better 
“contemporary reading” of the concept called “euthanasia”. This approach presumes that 
such a historical and semantic survey can help one to understand the contemporary 
challenges of the technified, highly advanced and dehumanized biomedicine of our post-
industrial and postmodern society. Euthanasia today is being discussed in the context of 
numerous other clinical and societal issues such as medical futility, patient autonomy, 
physician integrity, physician assisted suicide, terminal sedation, patient’s rights, social 
death preceding biological death, increasing health care costs and palliative care. Many of 
the present medical circumstances such as withholding or withdrawing treatment and other 
life sustaining treatments have created new therapeutic situations, questioning the 
traditional goals of medicine.  
Methodologically this chapter combines differentiated semantics with a critical history of 
philosophy. Within a historical survey it shows different meanings of the term 
“euthanasia”, from a peaceful and nonviolent death to death by request and unrequested 
mercy killing. The goal here is to demonstrate the broad semantic spectrum of euthanasia. 
The search for historical semantics will be governed by the idea of “good death“ and its 
relation to the present problems in health care, with a specific regard to current 
euthanasia issues. Once the notion of “good death” has been clarified, the ethics of 
euthanasia can be well-founded.  
As a result of the historical survey, the main semantic typologies of euthanasia will be 
presented, e.g. peaceful natural death (Suetonius), voluntary suicide (autothanatos, Stoa), 
medically accompanied dying without life prolongation (euthanasia exteriori), social 
euthanasia, eugenic euthanasia, “easy death” and in/voluntary euthanasia. Furthermore, 
the recent semantic and analytical discussions on euthanasia will be summarized and their 
implications for ethics discussions will be outlined. In addition, the importance of some of 
the philosophical background discussions for the conceptual understanding of euthanasia 
(e.g. human rights) will be highlighted. 
2. Common desire as the common ground 
In etymological terms, the word “euthanasia” in Classical Greek means “good death” (εύ = 
good, θάνατος  = death). With respect to the polysemantics of the adjective εύ, one could, as 
the proper equivalent to the term “euthanasia”, interpret it to mean not only “good death” 
but also expressions like “nice death”, “beautiful death”, “happy death”, “lucky death”, or 
in a tropological sense also “mild death”, “easy death”, “peaceful death”, “nonviolent 
                                                 
4 Notwithstanding the fecund contribution of Dowbiggin’s historical study (2007), it overlooks two 
needed aspects: clear distinctions and more distance in evaluation. One would expect from a historian 
that he would write in the sense of the old historians‘ rule sine ira et studio. 
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death” or “painless death”.5 From an etymological point of view, it is obvious that 
“euthanasia” is not primarily about something so specific as administrating a deadly 
injection upon a patient’s request but about the concept of a “good death”.  
There is a general consensus at this semantic level: as we are mortal, probably everybody, 
excluding those with psychopathologies, wishes to die a “good death”. From this 
perspective, the desire for εύ θάνατος is a panhuman one. It is difficult to imagine that 
someone without a pathological disorder would wish any other death than εύ θάνατος in its 
original meaning. What does vary, where we differ, and remaining a lasting subject of 
controversy, is the context of this εύ. All disagreements regarding euthanasia are disputes 
about the “good”, what kind of death is a good one, what are the characteristics of a “good 
death”. Why does the denotation “good” cause such a strong diversity of options, 
implacable contrapositions and ripples of emotions? There is an easy answer to this 
question: because such a denotation of “good” is related to the basic concepts of life, to the 
fundamental values, philosophical views, metaphysical and religious beliefs and a priori 
positions. Therefore the context of this “good” in its relation to death will be examined.  
3. Concepts of “a good death”: A historical overview 
First let’s look at how the concept of “a good death” has been understood over the history of 
philosophical thinking, which values, circumstances and actions have been assigned to this 
concept and how it has been conditioned by cultural, historical, social and religious factors. 
It is very important to note that the discussions about euthanasia in the 21st century and the 
good death controversy are nothing new and that these discussions have been going on 
within a historical context that started in the Classical era. (Brody, 1989). However, the 
current context of the euthanasia debate with regard to the present stage and form of 
medicine is new, different and peerless. (Vanderpool, 2004). The controversial concept of 
euthanasia has to be investigated not only with regard to what has been attributed to the 
adjective “good” but foremost with regard to attitudes towards death as such. The following 
research provides an overview of the different concepts of “good death” over the course of 
history, stemming from attitudes towards death in general, which, throughout our history 
and beyond the controversies about “good death”, has been a more common source of 
human angst.  
3.1 Antiquity 
The concept of euthanasia does not start with Bacon as some people believe but with ancient 
Greek thinking. The term εύ θάνατος first appears in Hellenic literature side by side with the 
term εύγίρια (giras = old age). Initially looming sporadically, later a similar concept called 
mors bona6 (good death) appears in Roman literature. The term mors bona denominates an 
honest and happy way of dying. Felici vel honesta morte mori (to die in a lucky and honest 
way) was an ancient ideal.  
Already in mythological times, sleep was regarded as the brother of death. In the Odyssey, 
Homer lets the healthy and old citizens of the utopian island Siri die in a painless and quick 
                                                 
5 In modern Greek εύθανασία not only means “mild death” or “painless death” but also “famous death” 
or “glorious death”. 
6 L. A. Seneca, Epistulae 67,9. 
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way: they are “saved” by the god Apollo, who kills them peacefully. In this way euthanasia 
was often perceived as the best gift that one could get from the gods. (Mystakidou et al., 
2005). In the Classical period, in some regions, Greek citizens used to end their lives after 
obtaining the consent of the community. As part of eugiria (to grow old in a “good” way) 
and to prevent a life of senility and weakness, illness and fragility, they used to prefer the 
abandonment of life en masse by drinking hemlock within a “last festivity”, being regarded 
in such as heroes by the community. (Mystakidou et al., 2005). In Ancient Greece there was 
generally a positive attitude towards suicide. 
When Plato describes the death of Socrates (Phaidon), who prefers hemlock to exile, he notes 
that Socrates‘ act was in fact a good death. In cases where abnormality was identified, for 
the good of the individual citizens and for the good of the polis (society), these sick citizens 
were left to die. Plato justifies this in Politeia7: those who have bad (unhealthy) bodies have 
to be abandoned to die, those who have a bad (unhealthy) and irremediable soul have to be 
killed.8 
In Antiquity, two traditions can be traced: one originating with Hippocrates and his school 
(Corpus Hippocraticum), and the other founded on Greek and Roman philosophy, in 
particular on the teachings of Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics. The Hippocratic tradition, 
whose core is the Hippocratic Oath, prohibits the killing of a human being, just as it forbids 
any aid in suicide (in present-day terminology in “physician assisted suicide”): “To please 
no one will I prescribe a deadly drug nor give advice which may cause his death.” 
Euthanasia as a direct killing of the patient, regardless if upon his/her request or without 
any request, is not forbidden by the Hippocratic Oath directly. But such a prohibition can be 
deduced, a fortiori, from the prohibition of any help in suicide. So euthanasia as the killing of 
a patient by the physician is not in accordance with either the Hippocratic Oath or the spirit 
of the Hippocratic tradition. Within this tradition, health is regarded as one of the highest 
forms of good. So the intentional termination of a patient’s life is discordant with 
Hippocratic medical practice, dedicated to caring for the health and life of people. Features 
typical of the Hippocratic tradition are a preventive and therapeutic approach to the medical 
art. Prevention has to protect and preserve the wellbeing of the healthy, while therapy has to 
return the sick to health. An integral part of this approach to the medical art is that of 
limitation, which has to be accepted: where no cure is available and where the patient has 
already been overwhelmed by disease, there no therapy should be attempted. In this case 
treatment should not be started, any protraction of the life of a deadly ill person was held to 
be inconsistent with the medical ethos.9 The Hippocratic tradition, based on a Pythagorean 
sect and on ancient Greek mythological polytheism in which the gods were both protectors 
and proprietors of human beings, later resonated with Jewish and Christian teaching 
according to which God is the master who possesses dominion over life; human beings 
receive life as a gift. The concept of “good death” in its original version as an ancient 
tradition is based on a mythological sacredness of life. A modified version of this concept 
survived not only to the Middle Ages but to Modern Era. 
The second source of the concept of euthanasia was philosophical tradition, which produced 
certain tension due to its contrast to the Hippocratic tradition. While the Hippocratic 
                                                 
7 Plato, Politeia (III), 410a (κατα τήν ψυχήν κακοφυεις ανιατους αυτοι αποκτενουσιν). 
8 Although this passage in Politeia is interpretatively disputable, one can educe from this passage that 
euthanasia as (regardless if merciful or pragmatic) killing could be morally justifiable. 
9 Hippocrates, Of Art (VI, 3). In: Hippocrates, 1923, Vol. 2, p. 193. 
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tradition prohibits euthanasia as a form of killing and likewise bans physician assisted 
suicide, philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics approved of the killing of 
seriously and/or incurably sick patients who consume the resources of the community 
(polis); either the community should abandon care of them or they should be killed outright. 
A similar destiny, for the good the community, they held, should encounter handicapped 
and seriously ill children. This can be seen in the practise of the laws of Sparta: newborn 
children were brought to an examination which had to prove the viability of the child; any 
child evaluated as non-viable was killed. For Plato, a human being is the possession of the 
gods and suicide is a contradiction to this concept, but the gods approved of suicide in cases 
where the necessity to die is evident (e.g. the death of Socrates). The next sphere of 
exceptions which justify suicide is, according to Plato, the shame of extreme suffering, 
poverty, or disaster, akin to supreme deprivation and dishonour or irreversible disgrace of 
fate. Plato, in the Laws (Nomoi) exhorts to take flight from a society of bad people and to 
appreciate everything that is beautiful and fair. And if one cannot escape from heavily 
incorrigible maleficence or from unredeemable crimes, then it is more beautiful to choose 
death and to depart from life.10 For those who find themselves in an incurable state which 
can be interpreted as “sickness of the soul”, it is better not to live any longer. By their 
departure from life they would benefit others twofold: first they would become an 
admonitory example which warns from doing injustice; secondly the community would be 
free of those people.11 The aforementioned tracts of Plato’s Laws refer to both suicide and to 
the capital punishment.  
For Aristotle death is the worst of all things. One can act towards death in a sublime and 
noble way, facing death courageously or spinelessly. Facing death, one also can commit 
injustice towards the community if one takes his/her own life. Moreover, according to 
Aristotle, the one who destroys him/her self suffers - as „state punishment“  - a certain loss 
of civil rights on the ground that he/she has treated the state unjustly. The justification of 
this punishment is the correlation between the individual and community: if an individual 
treats him/her self unjustly, simultaneously he/she also treats the community unjustly.12 In 
his treatise on courage Aristotle speaks about the beautiful death the courageous person 
faces without any fear.13 Beautiful death can also be death in which a person gives up his 
own life without fear but also death which a person faces stoutly; such death is 
simultaneously good (αγαθόν). However suicide seems to be contrary to such courage: to 
die to escape from a miserable situation such as poverty or pain is not the mark of a brave 
person, but rather of a coward. To fly from what is troublesome is softness and frailty. To 
                                                 
10 Plato, Nomoi (IX), 854c. 
11 Plato, Nomoi (IX), 862e. 
12 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V/15, 1138a. 
Aristotle’s argument about suicide as injustice towards the state (just acts are those in accordance with 
virtue prescribed by the law and since the law does not expressly permit suicide, and what it does not 
expressly permit it forbids, suicide is a violation of the law which harms others and therefore a person 
committing suicide is acting unjustly) was later adopted by Thomas Aquinas, who connected this 
argument with natural law. 
13 “Now death is the most terrible of all things; for it is the end, and nothing is thought to be any longer 
either good or bad for the dead. But the brave man would not seem to be concerned even with death in 
all circumstances, e.g. at sea or in disease. […] He will be called brave who is fearless in face of a noble 
death (καλον θάνατον), and of all emergencies that involve death.”  Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, III/9, 
1115a. 
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commit suicide does not mean to endure death because it is noble but because one is trying 
to escape from evil.14 
While for Aristotle suicide is a sign of weakness, for Seneca suicide is a mark of sublimity. 
Seneca equates death to non-being: mors est non esse15, holding as sublime the termination of 
life in the face of the cruelty of disease or of people. This is valid in particular for the elite of 
society: it is more appropriate to terminate one’s own life than to face humiliation, fear of 
the future, sickness or old age.16 The decision about autothanatos (suicide) is not a big 
decision, it is important to die in an honest, peaceful and courageous way. A substantial part 
of the stoical concept of a good death is serenity and equableness;17 one leaves composedly 
when the inevitable hour of death comes.18 Seneca also formulated a truth which is still 
valid and even more significant in our societies, where death has become taboo and 
something that has to be suppressed and curbed: Non mortem timemus sed cogitationem mortis 
(We do not fear death but the thinking on death).19   
An exemplary good death in ancient times was that narrated of the death of the Roman 
emperor Augustus, who died at 75, and can be given as it was described by the historian 
Suetonius (69–122): “Then, having admitted his friends to his presence, he asked them 
whether they thought he had acted well his part on the stage of life […]. After which, having 
dismissed them all, […] he gave up the ghost. […] Thus he died a very easy death, such as 
he himself had always wished for. For as often as he heard that any one had died quickly 
and without pain, he prayed that he and his might have the like euthanasia20, for that was the 
word he made use of.”21 Here in the term “euthanasia”, the whole concept of the good death 
as the desirable and covetable way of dying is concentrated. 
In this study Diogenes Laertius (3rd century) has been selected as the last ancient author on 
“good death”.22 Voluntary death (mors voluntaria) is for him the expression of a rational 
concept of life. The honest reasons for a suicide lead a wise human in a good and rational 
way (εύλογος) out of life, when life is loaded down by severe pain, mutilation or incurable 
disease.23 Although incurable disease was at that time something different from incurable 
disease today (e.g. diabetes), the concept of mors voluntaria grounded on a good rational 
deliberation is in principle the same which is used in contemporary discussions on 
                                                 
14 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, III/11, 1116a. 
15 L. A. Seneca, Epistulae 54,4. 
16 L. A. Seneca, Epistulae 58,36. 
17 L. A. Seneca, Epistulae 67,9. 
18 ”Magna res est […] cum adventat hora illa inevitabilis, aequo animo abire.” (It is a great thing to leave 
with a serene spirit when the inevitable hour comes). (L. A. Seneca, Epistulae 30,4). 
19 Seneca, Epistulae 30,17. 
20 In this passage, the original Latin text is interrupted and the Greek word euthanasia is inserted: “Nam 
fere quotiens audisset cito ac nullo cruciatu defunctum quempiam, sibi et suis euthanasian similem (hoc 
enim et verbo uti solebat) precabatur.” (Suetonius, De vitis ceasarum, II/99. Available at 
http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/suet.html, cited 20.03.2011.) 
21 Suetonius, Lives of the Twelve Caesars, II, 99 (Wordsworth Editions Limited, Ware, UK, 1997, p. 122) 
22 It has to be noted that from the 4th century, the way death and euthanasia were perceived changed 
after Christianity became the state religion. After this point, both suicide and euthanasia as they were 
understood in Classical times became incompatible with Christianity and its fundamental assumptions, 
such as life seen as a gift from God, the decision about the moment of death belonging exclusively to 
God, lead to euthanasia being considered as a terrible sin. 
23 Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum, VII, 130. 
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euthanasia – with the difference that mors voluntaria was understood as suicide. Arguments 
given in these ancient discussions for voluntary euthanasia (mors voluntaria) could be 
deduced by eulogos, by good rational considerations.  
The introduced examples demonstrate that euthanasia in Antiquity was understood in 
several distinctly diverse meanings. In one line, from Plato to Seneca, euthanasia is equal to 
a legitimate killing of unwelcome people, of those with incurable diseases or with severe 
handicaps who, for the good of society, have to be abandoned or directly killed. This form of 
“good death” can be called social euthanasia. Individuals with certain features become a 
burden on society and since the capacity of the society cannot bear such a load the life of 
these individuals will be taken, directly or indirectly. The justification of such killing is not 
to be found in the autonomous choice or the good of those individuals suffering, but in the 
best interest of the society as a whole. It is the good of the society and society’s best interest 
that constitutes the justification for such involuntary death. To them, this could be called “a 
good death” (εύ θάνατος) – despite the fact that involuntary death was not labelled as 
euthanasia as such in the Classical period. Therefore the term “social euthanasia” - whereby 
the good of the community overweighs the good of an individual – defines the good 
socially, not individually. Thus, such social euthanasia was perceived as a “good” death. 
One could argue that this is an ancient form of social utilitarianism. 
The next meaning of euthanasia in Antiquity was mors voluntaria, voluntary death. In certain 
circumstances it was regarded not only as morally permissible to die a freely chosen death 
but even as morally right and desirable to do so in such circumstances. In this second sense, 
as it was an imperative to demonstrate courage, bravery and moral excellence (αρετή) in 
one’s daily life, when faced with a situation of experiencing humiliation, inhuman suffering 
or inconclusiveness of a given situation (such as heavy doom, unbearable suffering, 
incurable disease) to choose death was an expression of human freedom, dignity and 
nobility. Such termination of life was even used as a preventive measure against foreseeable 
humiliation such as impending capture or future fate caused by the weakness of old age or 
by a serious disease. Voluntary death, an optional death which was chosen as a free choice 
from the heart and mind of the person, without any external pressure, force or violence was 
regarded as a good death. In such a way has mors voluntaria been understood, by the Stoics in 
particular. One can argue that this voluntary and rational suicide was simultaneously eu-
thanasia.  
The third meaning of euthanasia in the ancient period was a peaceful, quick, easy and 
painless death. The best example for this hermeneutics of euthanasia is the death of the 
emperor Augustus. One could argue that in this sense euthanasia is a way of dying that 
everybody would probably appreciate. 
Finally, we find the prohibition of euthanasia (induced death or assisted death) in the 
Hippocratic tradition. The reasoning for such a ban is the mythological understanding of 
human life: the gods are in charge of life and death, life is not completely at human disposal. 
More philosophical support for this idea would come from Plato’s metaphysics, where life is 
regarded as one of the important forms of good, which embodies elements from the world 
of ideas. The Hippocratic tradition can be regarded as the ancient version of the later 
doctrine of the sanctity of life. 
Compared to the ancient approaches to good death introduced here, euthanasia in our time is 
prevalently perceived as the painless termination of life (and suffering) by a physician. Today 
we distinguish euthanasia from natural death (the death the emperor Augustus died) and 
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from (physician) assisted voluntary suicide. Euthanasia in Antiquity was associated with 
peaceful death and with mercy killing as well, despite the fact that mercy killing was not 
referred to as such. Nevertheless the concept of voluntary death as it appears in ancient times 
and as defined by the ancient term mors voluntaria bears some kinship to in the contemporary 
discussion of euthanasia. The Platonic tradition, despite the fact that Plato also deemed life as a 
gift of the gods and therefore beyond human intervention, can be seen as very supportive of 
the contemporary idea of euthanasia, even for unrequested (non-voluntary and involuntary) 
euthanasia. Plato’s style of argumentation and decision-making is currently used not only in 
discussions but also in practise, such as the euthanasia of children or of incompetent patients. 
The Aristotelian tradition, however, is much more reserved about the rightness of suicide, 
focusing on the harm to society caused by a suicide. The Stoic tradition would fully support 
(assisted) suicide; and one can extrapolate that the Stoic tradition would also support 
contemporary (physician) assisted suicide and active euthanasia.  
In sum, just as most aspects of modern civilization can trace its roots to Classical times, so 
too can the philosophical foundations and rudiments of our contemporary discussions on 
euthanasia. It is not only the modern concept of autonomy but also a broader philosophical 
and cultural tradition which has further enriched our current discussions. And one should 
be aware that we are today discussing issues which are new for our advanced biomedicine 
and for our postmodern society. However at the same time they are very old, they are 
ancient, and they have already been discussed in similar forms throughout the course of 
history. One can hope that an awareness of such a greater historical context will improve 
our understanding.  
3.2 The Middle Ages 
In the Middle Ages a common concept of good death was shared. This concept came from 
Biblical literature, in particular from Decalogue and in connection with Augustine’s 
interpretation of the commandment “You shall not kill”24 where he equates suicide to 
homicide.25 Authors of the Middle Ages, for obvious reasons, do not deal with the issue of 
euthanasia as we handle it today. Yet they deal intensively with the question of killing, both 
the killing of another person (e.g. execution) or suicide. While in the first case, to 
differentiate, they allow killing in certain cases such as capital punishment (death as a 
penalty within retributive justice), in the case of suicide, they do not allow it, holding it 
unequivocally as morally wrong and sinful, and as fundamentally opposed to the Christian 
tradition.26  
Thomas Aquinas summarises the moral prohibition of suicide into the following three 
arguments:   
                                                 
24 “Quanto magis intellegendum est non licere homini se ipsum occidere, cum in eo, quod scriptum est: 
Non occides, nihilo deinde addito nullus, nec ipse utique, cui praecipitur, intellegatur exceptus!” (How 
much greater reason have we to understand that a man may not kill himself, since in the commandment 
“Thou shall not kill” there is no limitation added nor any exception made in favour, and least of all in 
favour of him on whom the command is laid.) – Augustinus Aurelius, De civitate Dei, I, 20. 
25 “Non occides, nec alterum ergo nec te. Neque enim qui se occidit aliud quam hominem occidit.” 
(Therefore you shall kill neither another nor yourself, for he who kills himself still kills nothing else 
than a human being.) - Augustinus Aurelius, De civitate Dei, I, 20. 
26 If suicide is a fundamental contradiction to the Christian tradition, then analogically such an 
evaluation is also valid for assisted suicide and about euthanasia as direct killing upon request. 
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1. Suicide is against the natural law and against love.27 
Suicide is not in harmony with the objective order, being in discrepancy to the natural law 
(lex naturalis). Therefore suicide is unnatural and naturally immoral. Moreover it is a 
vitiation of one’s relation to oneself; it is natural to love oneself, to take care of oneself, to 
keep oneself alive and to resist any loss of life. Suicide is contrary to this natural inclination 
of man to preserve one’s life. 
2. Suicide is against society.  
Building on Aristotle28, Aquinas, making use of the complexity argument, points out that 
suicide results in injury of the whole, i.e. society: every part, as such, belongs to the whole. 
As every human being is part of the community, and so, belonging to society. Therefore the 
one who commits suicide also injures the community (iniuriam communitati).29  
3. Suicide is against God and against justice.  
Because life is a gift from God, suicide means to take possession of life which is not owned 
and by nature cannot be owned by man. To usurp ownership of something that does not 
belong to one but that has been commended is an offence to justice. One can only decide 
about those things which belong to life but to decide about life as such is out of the scope of 
free human decisions. So no human can decide about departing from life.30 
One can conclude that suicide is the worst of all terrible wrongdoings, devastation on all 
three levels of existence: suicide is against one’s self (personal area), against society (societal 
area), and against the Divine order (transcendental area). So not only by Thomas Aquinas 
and other authors of the Middle Ages, but also by the later Christian churches, suicide was 
classified as one of the most grave of sins. Its gravity is based on the fact that it affects all 
areas, being an act “against all”, enhanced by the fact that the person is now dead, without 
the possibility to regret and rectify. So not only medieval theologians but also many 
Christians in the coming centuries were horrified by the idea of suicide. Within the 
mentioned paradigm, one was not able to imagine anything more terrible than suicide. 
Consequently a heavy penalty for suicide was inevitable. Ipso facto the heaviest “temporal” 
and “eternal” punishments were applied; the committer was to be excluded from society (in 
                                                 
27 “…naturaliter quaelibet res seipsam amat, et ad hoc pertinet quod quaelibet res naturaliter conservat 
se in esse et corrumpentibus resistit quantum potest. Et ideo quod aliquis seipsum occidat est contra 
inclinationem naturalem, et contra caritatem, qua quilibet debet seipsum diligere. Et ideo occisio sui 
ipsius semper est peccatum mortale, utpote contra naturalem legem et contra caritatem existens.” 
(Everything naturally loves itself, the result being that everything naturally keeps itself in being, and 
resists corruptions so far as it can. Wherefore suicide is contrary to the inclination of nature, and to 
charity whereby every man should love himself. Hence suicide is always a mortal sin, as being contrary 
to the natural law and to charity.) – Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II – IIae, q. 64, a. 5. 
28 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V/15, 1138a. 
29 ”Quilibet autem homo est pars communitatis, et ita id quod est, est communitatis. Unde in hoc quod 
seipsum interficit, iniuriam communitati facit.” - Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II – IIae, q. 64, a. 5. 
30 ”… quia vita est quoddam donum divinitus homini attributum, et eius potestati subiectum qui occidit 
et vivere facit. Et ideo qui seipsum vita privat in Deum peccat, sicut qui alienum servum interficit 
peccat in dominum cuius est servus; et sicut peccat ille qui usurpat sibi iudicium de re sibi non 
commissa. Ad solum enim Deum pertinet iudicium mortis et vitae.” (Life is God's gift to human beings; 
life is subject to God‘s power, only God kills and makes to live. So whoever takes his own life, sins 
against God, even as the one who kills another's slave, sins against that slave's master, and as the one 
who usurps to himself judgment of a matter not entrusted to him. For it belongs to God alone to 
pronounce sentence of death and life.) - Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II – IIae, q. 64, a. 5, ad 3. 
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space and time) and the church punishment of “excommunication” applied, which included 
burial extra murales, (out of the Christian cemetery), the suicide would then be punished by 
God with the committer excluded from heaven (out of space and time).31 From such 
criminalization of suicide, moral rigorousness and intransigence follows and hence the 
religious and social abhorrence of suicide characteristic of a large part of historical 
Christianity. One should add that to some extent, this form of moral terrorism still survives, 
albeit a Christian burial has been allowed for several decades now. This historical context 
has been mentioned because there are people even today (and not as very rare exceptions) 
who think in a very similar way as the very late medieval theologians.  
Paradoxically, within Aquinas‘ argumentation, contemporary involuntary euthanasia would 
be more justifiable than voluntary (active) euthanasia. For instance, the case of someone 
being sentenced to death for the good of society but who will receive a milder post-mortal 
punishment, contrasted to the suicide victim, who might deserve a “good death”, but by 
virtue of his/her “sin”, is condemned to the worst of all possible afterlives.32 The death 
penalty, avoiding a bigger “eternal punishment”, does not offend all beings, as much as 
voluntary euthanasia does. Then such involuntary “good death”, in the form of the death 
penalty, would be more compatible with the norm “You shall not kill” where exceptions 
such as “a just war” or “capital punishment” exist, than voluntary euthanasia, which 
assumes that the person requesting death freely would affront each and all. Within the 
Thomist framework, based on Aquinas theology, mercy related to death would take the 
form of the “mercy killing” of a serious criminal. This version of Christian theology does not 
have the same mercy with a human being suffering in a devastating and possibly 
unbearable way. 
Similar to Antiquity, with multiple viewpoints on what constituted a “good death”, the 
Middle Ages also held another view, one which was neither rapid nor painless, namely 
foreseen death: death which is expected in harmony with the following wisdom: mors certa - 
hora incerta (death being certain, but with an uncertain hour of arrival). Such death finds one 
waiting and expectant, ready to “go”. Such an expected death is peaceful because it has been 
accepted with equanimity. This emphasis on “good death” as a lifelong activity and 
continuously expected event, supported and potentiated by Christian Platonism and by the 
ethics of Stoa and adopted by Christianity (but “rid of” autothanatos) has markedly 
transformed the biblical message and this can be found in the Christianity of nowadays. In 
this approach the soul is in the body as if in a prison, all throughout life awaiting the 
moment of liberation, which coincides with death. There is a reciprocity of arts: the art of 
living well corresponds to the art of dying well (ars vivendi – art moriendi). Thus the art of 
dying (ars moriendi) is part of the concept of “good death”.  
                                                 
31 The theological penalization (“eternal damnation“) was followed by a secular penalization which 
spread extensively in the period from the 16th to 18th century. The medieval argumentation against 
suicide gained a simplified form: As suicide is a crime against God, against society, and against natural 
law, it is so against the king as well. Therefore it was up to the king (monarch) to introduce punishment 
for the crime committed against his majesty in the case of suicide. So suicide became a crime of great 
castigation such as the confiscation of the suicide’s property. It took a long time to revoke this crime of 
suicide. For instance in England, the penalty for suicide was suspended in 1823 with suicide ultimately 
decriminalized in 1961 (Markson, 1969).  
32 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II – IIae, q. 25, a. 6, ad 2.  
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While suicide was treated by the medieval authors mainly in abstract theological categories 
(and as a morally forbidden item), in the Renaissance attention in the evaluation of suicide 
shifted to empirical categories and to the situation of the individual suicide. The 
metaphysical psychology was replaced by an empirical one. As a result, it was determined 
that suicide is not the worst thing under the Sun and the morality of suicide was assessed 
differently from the model “sin against all”. Further developments in the understanding of 
suicide came with the Reformation33 and the Age of Reason. 
3.3 The modern era 
From the era of the Renaissance one particular thinker is worthy of mention in the context of 
euthanasia, namely the humanist Thomas More (1478-1535). In his Utopia (1516), he 
proposed euthanasia as an option for hopelessly sick patients. His concept of euthanasia is 
different from that used in Antiquity (and later by Francis Bacon) where euthanasia means a 
peaceful nonviolent death. For Thomas More, euthanasia was a kind of last option for 
patients without any hope of cure. Euthanasia was for the Lord Chancellor, also known as 
Saint Thomas More, a compassionate answer to human suffering and tragedy. Besides 
medical hopelessness, there were two other conditions for euthanasia. First, euthanasia has 
to be a “voluntarily death”, chosen by a person “with a torturing and lingering pain”34; a 
request for euthanasia can only be accepted in medically desperate situations where nothing 
has been left undone that can contribute to health (“they use all possible ways to cherish 
them and to make their lives as comfortable as possible”35). No one can be forced to ask for 
euthanasia, similarly no one can be killed against his/her will. It is regarded as legitimate to 
“choose rather to die since they cannot live in much misery”36. Persons in such misery are 
exhorted by priests and by magistrates, that, “since they are now unable to go on with the 
business of life, are become a burden to themselves and to all about them, and they have 
really out-lived themselves, they should no longer nourish such a rooted distemper”37. They 
can be persuaded to end their life but “if they cannot be persuaded to it, this does not induce 
them to fail in their attendance and care of them.”38 The second condition concerns approval 
by public authorities, both civil and religious. Then a death chosen voluntarily and “upon 
such an authority”39 is deemed very honourable. Failing in this public approval means 
violation.40 More’s concept of euthanasia includes both (assisted) suicide41 and intentional 
                                                 
33 Within the Reformation tradition, since approximately the 1930s, the intellectual streams which admit 
euthanasia as an act of mercy (mercy killing) have won recognition; clergy of diverse confessions played 
an important role in establishing associations which supported euthanasia. One of the most prominent 
proponents of euthanasia understood as mercy killing was (originally Episcopalian minister) Joseph F. 
Fletcher (1905–1991) –  see Fletcher, 1954, 1979. 






40 “If any man takes away his own life without the approbation of the priests and the senate, they give 
him none of the honours of a decent funeral, but throw his body into a ditch.” (More,  2011). 
41 “They starve themselves of their own accord, or take opium, and by that means die without pain.” – 
Ibidem. 
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killing.42 More believed that his concept of voluntary and involuntary death is legitimate: 
“They think they behave not only reasonably but in a manner consistent with religion and 
piety; because they follow the advice given them by their priests, who are the expounders of 
the will of God.”43 Fortunately enough for him the concept of euthanasia was a utopian 
concept appropriate for the best state in the new island Utopia.44 (How could More be 
canonized today as a public supporter of euthanasia?) Utopia literary means no-place, 
however More in the context of the English pronunciation of the word “utopia” is 
transforming “utopia” into “eutopia” (good place), a place of felicity.45 This concept of 
euthanasia inspired praxis of euthanasia in England in the 16th century (Graziani, 1969). It is 
difficult to extrapolate to what extent More would apply his euthanasia (with the semantics 
he used) – limited to fiction solely or into the real world of current biomedicine. One can 
guess that his esteem for autonomy, mercy and public approval would lead him to be 
supportive of active voluntary euthanasia. 
One of the first modern thinkers who significantly influenced later conceptions of science 
and scientific knowledge (scientia est potentia)46 and who came out with a new concept of 
euthanasia was the English late Renaissance philosopher Francis Bacon (1561-1626). His new 
understanding of science indirectly affected medicine as well: medicine should include both 
science and art, which enables a physician to help the patient to die in an easy and natural 
way. According to Bacon, medicine should include both scientific knowledge and practical 
skills that enable physicians to help their patients die an easy and peaceful death. When 
describing this medical art, he uses the term “euthanasia exteriori”47 (a good death coming 
from outside) (Bacon, 2000). Simultaneously a good death should come from inside 
(euthanasia interiori) in a form of a sweet and calm dying while the soul of the patient is 
being prepared (caring for the dying). Apparently Bacon makes use of the term 
“euthanasia” in the context used by Suetonius when he reported the death of the emperor 
Augustus.48 By euthanasia Bacon means the quiet peaceful death of a person who is 
expecting it. The sense of euthanasia is for him to die non-violently and painlessly, falling 
asleep. Sleep is to him, similarly to the ancient understanding, a metaphor for death.49 To 
aid such a peaceful death is an important task of medicine. The physician’s role is to 
                                                 
42 “… being assured that if they thus deliver themselves from torture, or are willing that others should 
do it.” – Ibidem. 
43 Ibidem. 
44 The full and original title of the book is “Libellus vere aureus, nec minus salutaris quam festivus, de optimo 
rei publicae statu deque nova insula Utopia”. 
45 In the addendum to his book, More proposed to change the semantics and to transform “utopia” to 
“eutopia”: “Wherfore not Utopia, but rather rightely my name is Eutopia, a place of felicity”. 
46 This aphorism can already be found in Bacon’s work Meditationes sacrae (1597); nevertheless this 
aphorism is well known from his later work Novum organum (1620) where it established what is known 
today as the Baconian paradigm. 
47 The original title of the work where Bacon deals with the medical art of “euthanasia exteriori” is Of 
the proficience and aduancement of learning, diuine and humane (English titled, written in Latin, published in 
London in 1605 by H. Tomes). Recently published under the title The advancement of learning (Oxford 
University Press, 2000). 
48 Of the Proficience and Advancement of learning, divine and humane, Book I, X/7. 
49 If Francis Bacon would have been writing his “Advancement of learning” today, he probably would 
include a passage about terminal sedation as a specific type of medical art that helps the patient to 
asleep/die peacefully. 
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accompany the patient in dying a painless and equable death.50 Bacon harmonized the 
medical good death in its ancient meaning (peaceful death) with the medieval concept of the 
ars moriendi and with care of the dying persons that we would refer to today as palliative 
care. Bacon’s concept of euthanasia as medical help in natural dying was the leading 
concept of euthanasia for medical practice until the 19th century. 
The development of views about euthanasia has been strongly influenced by social progress 
in opinions about suicide. Since the 16th century, within the mainstream opinion which held 
suicide as morally unacceptable, singular voices started to appear which held suicide as 
morally legitimate and justifiable in cases of serious illness. This meant a breach of the 
erstwhile dominant moral doctrine of Christianity. To this minority opinion belong the ideas 
of the French Renaissance philosopher Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592). De Montaigne 
claimed that God allows man to take life, if man is facing conditions under which it is worse 
to live then to die (de Montaigne, 1946, p. 338). Within such a statement, the ancient concept 
of good death which was held by the Stoics in particular can be found; if someone finds 
oneself in a situation of enormous suffering, then it corresponds more to human dignity and 
nobility to abandon such a situation, even if the price of departure entails one’s own life. De 
Montaigne, using the logic of the Stoics, provides a religious justification: in such a case, 
God does not oblige one to stay in such a situation at whatever the cost, instead allowing the 
person the possibility of choice; if one wants he/she is allowed to depart honestly, even at 
the price of his/her own (not another’s) life. His writings were very influential, being read 
by Shakespeare, Rousseau, Pascal, Emerson and Nietzsche. 
The Enlightenment, with its criticism, secularism and individualism, was a very powerful 
milestone in the development of opinions about suicide. Probably the most significant 
contribution of this period to the discussion of suicide comes from Hume’s aptly named 
essay On Suicide (published posthumously in 1783), which remains one of the most 
influential philosophical treatments of suicide in modern times. In this work, David Hume 
(1711-1776) criticises superstition and “false religion” (Hume, 1985, p. 579) which forces 
humans to prolong a “miserable existence” in order not to offend God.51 Hume turns the 
argument of the injustice induced to society by suicide around (Aristotle, Aquinas): the 
miserable existence is a burden for society, therefore an individual who chooses to exit from 
life in such a situation, provides benefit to society and his/her act is not condemnable but 
commendable.52  “A man, who retires from life, does no harm to society. He only ceases to 
do good, which, if it be an injury, is of the lowest kind” (Hume, 1985, p. 586). Suicide can be 
in harmony with the interest of the individual and with his/her commitment to him/her 
                                                 
50 “But the physicians contrariwise do make a kind of scruple and religion to stay with the patient after 
the disease is deplored; whereas in my judgment they ought both to inquire the skill, and to give the 
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miserable existence from a vain fear left he offend his Maker, by using the power, with which that 
beneficent being has endowed him.” (Hume, 1985, p. 583). 
52 “…suppose, that it is no longer in my power to promote the interest of the public: Suppose, that I am 
a burthen to it: Suppose, that my life hinders some person from being much more useful to the public. 
In such cases my resignation of life must not only be innocent but laudable. And most people, who lie 
under any temptation to abandon existence, are in some such situation. Those, who have health, or 
power, or authority, have commonly better reason to be in humour with the world.”- Hume, D. (1985, 
p. 587). 
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self. According to Hume, it is doubtless that the hardship of old age, suffering from illness 
or misery of fate can be even worse than annihilation caused by suicide.53 This argument 
certainly plays a role in the contemporary discussions of the morality of assisted suicide in a 
medical context. (Frey, 1999). For Hume, there are calamities of life, against which it is 
necessary to employ suicide as the fatal remedy. Hume is convinced that immense suffering 
and the wish to die can be understood as a challenge and invitation by which is one recalled 
from life. Hume, in concord with the ancient tradition, declares that suffering which does 
not have any positive social contribution, being in fact a burden, does not constitute any 
duty to prolong such life. Furthermore everybody has “native liberty” in which he/she 
arranges his/her own life. The same liberty provides the opportunity to shape a happy life 
(“chance for happiness in life”).54 Hume argues that suicide is no transgression of duty to God 
and everybody has the free disposal of their own life. Moreover, when pain and sorrow 
overcome the patience of a person and when consequently one is tired of life, it is a clear 
sign (“the clearest and most express terms”) that the person is recalled from the station, 
from life (Hume, 1985). To accept a voluntary death is equal to receiving death “from the 
hands of the Deity as if it had proceeded from a lion, a precipice, or a fever.” In line with 
some Classical authors, Hume thinks that there are many more things other than disease 
that can render life a burden. In such conditions he also considers suicide as a noble reaction 
to life: “If it be no crime, both prudence and courage should engage us to rid ourselves at 
once of existence, when it becomes a burthen.” (Hume, 1985, p. 588).55  
An antipode to Hume’s approach to suicide is that of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Kant 
criticises suicide heavily. His main argument against suicide stems from the Categorical 
Imperative: suicide cannot become a principle of universal legislation, being contrary to the 
natural law. The Categorical Imperative is for Kant the basic principle that is intrinsically 
valid, being good in and of itself and as such it must be obeyed by all and in all situations, 
without exception. This general imperative as an unconditional moral duty says that one has 
to act in a way that the maxim of his/her will can at the same time serve as the universal 
natural law, anytime manifesting the universal law through the maxims of the acting 
person. So the fundamental obligation is to follow the maxims.56 Then he immediately gives 
suicide as the first example of a duty toward oneself, concluding that by committing suicide, 
one would be completely inconsistent with the supreme principle of all duty.57 Similarly in 
                                                 
53 “That Suicide may often be consistent with interest, and with our duty to ourselves, no one can 
question who allows, that age, sickness, or misfortune may render life a burthen, and make it worse 
even than annihilation” (Hume, 1985, p. 588). 
54 Hume (1985, p. 588). 
55 “This is the only way, that we can then be useful to society, by setting an example, which, if imitated, 
would preserve to every one his chance for happiness in life, and would effectually free him from all 
danger of misery.” (Hume, 1985, p. 588). 
56 “Handle so, als ob die Maxime deiner Handlung durch deinen Willen zum ALLGEMEINEN 
NATURGETZE werden sollte.” Kant, I. (1996). Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 68. 
57 “A man reduced to despair by a series of misfortunes feels wearied of life, but is still so far in 
possession of his reason that he can ask himself whether it would not be contrary to his duty to himself 
to take his own life. Now he inquires whether the maxim of his action could become a universal law of 
nature. His maxim is: ‘From self-love I adopt it as a principle to shorten my life when its longer duration 
is likely to bring more evil than satisfaction.’ It is asked then simply whether this principle founded on 
self-love can become a universal law of nature. Now we see at once that a system of nature of which it 
should be a law to destroy life by means of the very feeling whose special nature it is to impel to the 
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the context of the Categorical Imperative formulated by ends (German Zweck), Kant again as 
a first example mentions suicide.58 “He who contemplates suicide should ask himself 
whether his action can be consistent with the idea of humanity as an end in itself. If he 
destroys himself in order to escape from painful circumstances, he uses a person merely as a 
means to maintain a tolerable condition up to the end of life. But a man is not a thing, that is 
to say, something which can be used merely as means, but must be in all his actions always 
considered as an end in himself. I cannot, therefore, dispose in any way of a man in my own 
person so as to mutilate him, to damage or kill him.”59 So suicide is a discrepancy to the idea 
of humanity understood as the human being both as an individual and as the whole of 
mankind as an end in itself (German Zweck an sich). One is not allowed to dispose of one’s 
own life in the sense of its termination. Everyone has a duty to maintain one’s own life, and, 
according to Kant, everyone also has a direct inclination to do so (Kant, 1996, p. 80). Kant‘s 
argumentation takes the approach that suicide as a violation of the duty towards oneself in 
the religious sense and therefore against God.60 So his argumentation is in line with the 
religiously justified prohibition of suicide. 
To provide an overview on philosophical approaches to death in the modern and 
postmodern period is beyond this study. However it is necessary to introduce one very 
influential author, namely Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900). Concerning suicide, Nietzsche 
held a position very similar to that of Hume: man is an autonomous being which has the 
capacity and moral right to terminate his/her own life which has become unbearable and 
worthless. Such an act is positive both for society and for the individual, in particular if it is 
done as the consequence of illness, suffering or misfortune when such an individual is not 
useful for society, instead being a burden on society. Nietzsche formulated the new idea 
about free death (frei zum Tode und frei im Tode);61 his leading idea being “Stirb zur rechten 
Zeit (die at the right moment) (Nietzsche, 1997, p. 35). He goes further than the Stoics did. 
For the Stoics it was an act of honesty and moral integrity to commit suicide under 
conditions of extreme hardship (serious illness, misfortune) or as a preventive measure in 
order not to be dishonoured (e.g. soldiers). For Nietzsche the “indication list” for suicide is 
broader; one has to determine the proper moment of death: to die in the right moment, to 
die when I want.62 Many of Nietzsche’s thoughts have inspired contemporary euthanasia: 
euthanasia is a free death. A good death is not only a desired and freely chosen one but also a 
quick death.63 In Zarathustra, the desire for death (Sehnsucht zum Tode) appears; so one can 
                                                                                                                            
improvement of life would contradict itself and, therefore, could not exist as a system of nature; hence 
that maxim cannot possibly exist as a universal law of nature and, consequently, would be wholly 
inconsistent with the supreme principle of all duty.” – Kant, I. Fundamental Principles of the 
Metaphysic of Morals. Available at http://www.gutenberg.org/. Cited 20.03.2011. (Kant, 1996, p. 69). 
58 “Handle so, dass du die Menschheit sowohl in deiner Person, als in der Person eines jeden anderen 
jederzeit zugleich als Zweck, niemals bloß als Mittel brauchst” (Kant, 1996, p. 79). 
59 Kant, I. Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals. Available at http://www.gutenberg.org/. 
Cited 20.03.2011. 
60 Cf. Kant, I. (1990). Die Metaphysik der Sitten, pp. 327-334. 
61 Nietzsche, F. (1997). Also Sprach Zarathustra. In: Werke, Vol. II, p. 36 (Essen: Phaidon). 
62 “Meinen Tod lobe ich euch, den freien Tod, der mir kommt, weil ich will.” (Nietzsche, 1997,  p. 35) 
63 “Möchten Prediger kommen des schnellen Todes! Das wären mir die rechten Stürme und Schüttler an 
Lebensbäumen! Aber ich höre nur den langsamen Tod predigen und Geduld mit allem ‘Irdischen’.” 
(Nietzsche, 1997,  p. 36) 
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say that with regard to Nietzsche’s leading idea, a good death is the desired death. For 
Nietzsche, the human being is something that has to be overcome.64 When man dies there is 
the possibility that the Superhuman (Übermensch) can live (Nietzsche, 1997). Thus death 
can be regarded as doom and as a transition.65 The fascinating aspect of Nietzsche’s 
thinking, concepts of extinction, doom, disappearance and “twilight”, expressed by the term 
Untergang and within the context of death, has to be contemplated. Consequently, according 
to Nietzsche, my I has to disappear, my I has to be overcome and death is the closest, most 
logical and natural way how my I can be overcome in space and time.66 Finally there is a 
correlation in Nietzsche’s thoughts between life and heaviness: life is a weight that is 
borne.67 Moreover, if one thinks of a very difficult situation in life such as disseminated 
carcinoma, more validity would be given to this statement. So it is not only the 
programmatic pessimism of Nietzsche’s world (Geist der Schwere) but also the desperateness 
of various situations in life which make the heaviness and onerousness of life even that 
much more a burden. 
Finally, in passing from the modern thinkers to the medical practice of the 20th century, 
Charles Darwin (1809-1892), the author of evolutionary theory needs to be mentioned. 
Evolutionary theory at the end of the 19th century had become a key concept for the natural 
and social sciences; applied to biology and sociology it gave rise to sociobiology, a very 
influential stream within the scientific community at the turn of the 20th century. 
Evolutionary theory brought new approaches to society such as concepts of development 
and progress, and how to deal with the problem of weak individuals, incurable patients and 
the handicapped accordingly. As the progress of society depends on strong individuals with 
appropriate features and the natural selection mechanism is the driving force of evolution, 
which in order to ascend further and further has to rid itself of everything that hampers this 
process, it was viewed that only those strong enough and properly equipped would be able 
to continue the evolutionary process. Contrariwise evolution frees itself of those who are 
weak, infirm and manifestly unfit. This evolutionary theory has been both used and abused 
by medicine – for instance within eugenic movements. In difference to the Kantian maxim 
(human being as the end in itself), within evolutionary approaches this anthropological and 
ethical premise has been replaced by an evolutionary maxim: evolution is the goal and the 
individual is a means to achieve this goal. This brings back Nietzsche’s words about humans 
having to be overcome by the Superhuman. Both Nietzsche’s philosophy and Darwinism in 
its reduced form contributed to the later concept of euthanasia (both as social and eugenic 
euthanasia) of the 19th and 20th century. Darwinians directly affected views on euthanasia, 
justifying euthanasia as a form of physician-induced painless death for “degenerates”, 
“cripples” and other “unfit” persons and arguing that the doctrine of evolution justifies 
shortening the lives of suffering people (Vanderpool, 2004). 
4. Euthanasia and medicine in the 19th and 20th century 
Within a history of the meanings of euthanasia, not only philosophical concepts - which as 
an integral part of the Western cultural heritage have been influencing social attitudes and 
                                                 
64 “Der Mensch ist etwas, das überwunden werden soll” (Nietzsche, 1997, p. 9). 
65 “Was groß ist am Menschen, das ist, daß er eine Brücke und kein Zweck ist, […] daß er ein Übergang 
und ein Untergang ist” (Nietzsche, 1997, p. 10).  
66 “Mein Ich ist Etwas, das überwunden werden soll” (Nietzsche, 1997, p. 20). 
67 “Ja, das Leben ist schwer zu tragen!” (Nietzsche, 1997, p. 87). 
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medical approaches to life and to the ending of human life - have to be introduced but also 
the changing modes of medical practice. These modes, which have also influenced the 
beliefs and actions of physicians and the social perceptions of issues such as eugenics, 
medical advancement or “death and dying” movements have to be taken into account. 
4.1 Euthanasia and the medical practice to 187068 
For centuries, the goal of medicine was to soften the symptoms of disease, to save and to 
preserve human life. From the beginning of the 17th century, euthanasia was understood as a 
science and art to soothe suffering, to accompany the dying patient and to help one to die 
easily and naturally. In this context, euthanasia was very similar to what we call palliative 
care today. It belonged to this realm, one of a capacity to soften pain (even at the cost of 
shortening life) and provide help which would change the inevitable moment of death into 
one of peaceful dying. In the context of Bacon’s notion of euthanasia, it was a physician’s 
duty to soothe the last moment of life, applying “that science, called euthanasia, which 
checks oppressing features of illness, relieves pain, and renders the […] inescapable hour a 
most peaceful one”69, as also the German physician Carl. F. H. Marx in 1826 exhorted his 
colleagues. It was also the physician’s task to recognize when the hope for a cure had 
become exhausted and it had become necessary to accompany the patient towards a 
peaceful death. Similarly, it was the physician’s duty with respect to the professional rules 
of nonmaleficence not to prolong life. To drag out life or to use life-maintaining treatment 
was held as inappropriate and wrong due to the harm and cruelty done to the patient. In 
contrast, the physician‘s presence at the bed of a dying patient was regarded as a physician’s 
duty as a part of proper professional conduct.70 Euthanasia only became a subject of 
controversy in the late nineteenth century. However, two well-known physicians, Carl 
Theodor Kortum (1765-1824) and Christian Ludwig Mursinna (1744-1823) had already 
publicly endorsed it at the beginning of the 19th century. (Stolberg, 2008). 
4.2 Euthanasia and the medical practice from 1870 to the World War II 
The intensive development of medicine from the late 19th century, with its increasing 
dependence on medical technology and institutionalization of health care, significantly 
affected the interpretation of good death. Since curative medicine started to exhaust more 
and more health care resources in terms of human resources, technical and economical 
means, the care for incurable and dying patients drifted out of the main focus of medical 
interest. Instead of the physician, it was the nurse who sat down at the bed of dying patient 
or this task was entrusted to clergy. Gradually physicians stopped to practise euthanasia as 
a way of accompanying a dying patient toward a peaceful and painless death. Furthermore, 
they started to apply the new possibilities of resuscitation (cardiopulmonary resuscitation in 
particular) to dying patients as well. A new treatment option appeared, namely the 
                                                 
68 The periodization proposed by Vanderpool (2004) has been adopted here. 
69 Marx, C.F.H. (1952). Medical Euthanasia, Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences, Vol. 7, 
No. 4 (April 1952), pp. 401-416. First published in Latin in 1826, English translation by W. Cane in 1952; 
quotation from Vanderpool (2004, p. 1425). 
70 The Percival standard of medical ethics (Code of Medical Ethics, 1803), adopted by the American 
Medical Association (AMA) in 1847, assigned a professional duty to physicians to not abandon 
incurable patients and those who are dying because they deserve the physician’s medical art in the 
easing of suffering and, in particular, the physician’s human support. (Chauncey, 1975). 
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possibility to prolong life by technical means. Such prolongation of life (and suffering), 
being contrary to the concept of a natural death, had been previously regarded as 
unacceptable; however, once technically possible, it began to be practised. (Stewart, 1918). 
This was further compounded by the idea of evolutionary theory based on natural selection 
as introduced previously in the chapter, becoming increasingly influential; with individual 
life losing its importance. These and other factors caused a fundamental turnaround in 
society’s understanding of good death; a new concept of good death arose, namely 
euthanasia as death induced by the physician for hopelessly sick patients. An important 
theoretical contribution to this change was the essay by Samuel D. Williams entitled 
“Euthanasia”, published in London in 1872. According to Williams, euthanasia is a painless 
death for incurably and hopelessly sick persons. He goes on to state that it is even a 
physician’s duty to recognize such a situation and if the patient wishes so, to administrate 
anaesthetics which would render the patient unconscious and proceed to terminate his/her 
suffering by a quick and painless killing.71  
A new interpretation of good death started at the beginning of the 20th century when 
euthanasia became a terminus technicus for the killing of undesirable and “unfit” persons, 
usually mentally or physically handicapped people.72 The theoretical background for 
euthanasia was an evolutionary approach to genetics73 which modified genetics in its 
application to become eugenics. Eugenics later became a tool for racial “purification”. So 
eugenics inspired by Darwinism was transformed into eugenic euthanasia, the elimination 
of those who are “unfit”74 (Weikart, 2002). 
                                                 
71 In his time, Williams’ concept of euthanasia caused great excitement for its culturally non-traditional, 
legally questionable and medically unorthodox approach. For physicians, such an approach was held to 
be contrary to medical praxis (against lex artis). So until now several medical professional associations, 
including the World Medical Association (WMA), have repeatedly proclaimed euthanasia as contrary to 
medical practice. (One should add that in 1949, in the most influential International Code of Medical 
Ethics, the World Medical Association proclaimed that abortion is contrary to medical practice. 
Nevertheless, such a position is no longer held by the WMA.) – See Policies available at 
http://www.wma.net/. Cited 21.03.2011.    
72 In 1920 in Leipzig (Germany), a slim booklet (62 pages) was published by jurist Karl Binding and 
psychiatrist Alfred Hoche. Its original title is “Freigabe der Vernichtung lebensunwerten Lebens: ihr Mass 
und ihre Form” (Unworthy life at free disposal for its annihilation: the measure and form of this 
annihilation). This booklet, dealing with the possibility to destroy unworthy low quality life, became the 
theoretical background for the subsequent eugenic euthanasia movement; in 1933 it became a manual 
for mass killing during the Nazi period. 
73 Indirect resources were used, such as the works by Francis Galton (Hereditary Genius. An Inquiry into 
Its Laws and Consequences, 1869; Inquiries into Human Faculty and Its Development, 1883). 
74 Darwin’s student Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919), looking for inspiration in Antiquity, proposed that 
German physicians should painlessly kill physically and mentally handicapped people. As a scientific 
justification, he looked to evolutionary anthropology (Anthropogenie oder Entwickelungsgeschichte des 
Menschen. Leipzig 1874).  
It should be noted that in Germany, during the Nazi era from 1933, the Law for the Prevention of 
Hereditarily Diseased Offspring was in force (Gesetz zur Verhütung erbkranken Nachwuchses). Based on 
this law, some 300 000 people were involuntarily sterilized (6 000 of them died as a result of the 
surgery). The indications for this involuntary sterilization were “a serious physical of mental hereditary 
handicap: congenital dementia, schizophrenia, manic-depressive syndrome, congenital epilepsy, chorea 
Huntington, congenital blindness, congenital deafness, serious hereditary physical malformation, 
serious alcoholism”. 
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On the first of September 1939, coinciding with the outbreak of the Second World War, the 
Reichchancellor Adolf Hitler issued a decree ordering that a “mercy death” (Gnadentod) be 
provided to those “incurably sick ones”.75 As a result, more than 100,000 psychiatric patients 
and thousands of seriously ill children were killed. This eugenics programme was 
euphemistically termed “euthanasia”.76 Related to this “euthanasia” done by German 
physicians on the German population, racial euthanasia (“racial hygiene”) 77 focussed on the 
Jewish and Roma populations continued.78 
4.3 Euthanasia and medical practice after World War II 
During World War II and in the post-war period, several techniques were developed which 
provided new possibilities to prolong life (for instance antibiotics, pacemakers, 
defibrillators, dialysis) and several new fields such as transplantation or intensive care 
medicine arose. Advancements in cardiology made it possible to avoid a sudden death. 
Gradually it became common to replace the physiological functions of individual human 
organs with machines. With one exception (the brain), today we are able to substitute all the 
organs of the human body. Among many physicians, the approach requiring that 
everything be done that is technically possible and practically accessible to maintain the life 
of the patient - or more precisely, physiological functions of the human body - prevailed. 
Physicians became enthralled by the scientific and technological progress of medicine, even 
when applying it in clinically hopeless situations, unless they were stopped by 
multifunctional failure, by sepsis or by a clear-headed colleague. Later, depending on the 
concrete cultural context, this behaviour was later upheld by the courts or by the pressure of 
the patient’s family. As the actual practice derived from the medical goal of saving life, the 
following guideline was being applied: If it is not possible to cure the patient and to save life 
then at least extend life as long as possible (as if the longest prolonged life would be the 
greatest success of medicine). As a result, medicine became a victim of its own success 
(Krämer, 1997). Medicine’s task was to battle with the enemy beyond the door (death) for as 
long as possible. Logically the additional suffering of both patient and his/her family was 
produced in a non-natural way. Death ceased to be a natural event, instead a spiteful spoiler 
who in the end defeats a marvellous army equipped with the latest medical technology and 
science. This strategy of a prolongation of life also gave rise to the question of quality of life.  
The call for euthanasia as a mercy death was a reaction to this technologized and 
dehumanizing medicine (Lock, 1996). A new concept of euthanasia came into being: A good 
death is a merciful death (for technology does not know mercy). In this context so called 
“passive euthanasia” has been discussed; this “passive euthanasia” was understood as an 
option with or without the patient’s request not to use what has been called “extraordinary 
means” and by an “act of omission” (Husak, 1980; Kamm, 1994) to make it possible that a 
person in a terminal stage will die (McMahan, 1993). According to some people death is the 
                                                 
75 This one line order of Hitler’s can be found in books such as that by Urban Wiesing (2004, p. 60). 
76 Therefore it is understandable that in Germany the term “euthanasia” (Euthanasie) still evokes strong 
associations with Nazism.  
77 A theoretical handbook for racial hygiene is the study by F. Lenz “Menschliche Auslese und 
Rassenhygiene”, published 1923 in Munich (3rd edition in 1931, 593 pp.). 
78 The eugenic euthanasia as it was practised during the Nazi period is only mentioned here. For more 
detailed account see Michalsen & Reinhart (2006) and Vermaat (2002). 
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only mercy in life and it would be inhuman to deny such mercy to a person in a medically 
desperate situation. Moreover, to produce artificial and additional suffering by techno-
medical means would be contrary to human rights: “No one shall be subjected to torture or 
to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” (Art. 4, European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, 2000)  
The act of mercy, avoiding any further suffering caused by advanced medical technology, 
has been discussed in the context of withholding and withdrawing treatment. Once a 
competent patient can decide if he/she will accept or refuse any medical treatment and once 
medical treatment is based on the legal provisions specified by international conventions 
such as the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being 
with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine (Oviedo, 1997), it is obvious that a 
competent patient can refuse any life-saving treatment, regardless of whether it constitutes 
withholding or withdrawing, in a situation of medical futility. (Annas, 2005).There was (and 
still remains) a lot of haziness about the notion of euthanasia in this context. It is true that 
historically the term “passive euthanasia” has been used in this context. However I’m 
arguing that to use such a term today leads to new misapprehensions. Once the legal 
framework of advance directives (Cantor, 1993) and living wills have been established by 
the legislation of a particular country, it is meaningless to conclude that a person who has 
decided not to be treated by cardiopulmonary resuscitation or by other life supporting tools 
such as dialysis in terminal renal failure is requesting euthanasia!  
What the post-war development of medicine has brought to the concept of good death is 
that of mercy killing, death upon the patient’s request. (Behnke & Bok, 1975). Similarly there 
were many arguments brought forth to support mercy death as a refusal of dysthanasia 
(retention of death) or as an active voluntary termination of life.79 As a result of these 
developments, a number of associations for euthanasia were born.80  
The model of good death (mercy death) which arose in the 20th century also has another 
manifestation in the hospice movement, with different hermeneutics of mercy. 
Historically it operated on a certain modification of the model of good death as it was 
used in the Middle Ages and in Modern Times: mercy death meaning help and support in 
dying. Both the hospice model of good death and the model of good death as voluntary 
active euthanasia appeal to a respect of the dignity of the dying person, although the 
interpretation of dignity can differ considerably. The meaningless prolongation of life 
(and the related suffering) leads not only to a reappraisal of terms such as medical 
futility;81 it also challenges the notion of euthanasia as an active termination of life when 
the patient is physically not able to terminate his/her own life by him/her self (suicide or 
                                                 
79 Some of these arguments are discussed in the chapter “Everything under control: How and when to 
die. A critical analysis of the arguments for euthanasia”. 
80 The Voluntary Euthanasia Legislation Society (1930), The Euthanasia Society of America (1937, later 
Concern for Dying), Nederlandse Vereniging voor Vrijwillige Euthanasie (The Dutch Society for 
Voluntary Euthanasia, 1976), Deutsche Gesellschaft für humanes Sterben (German Society for Humane 
Dying, 1980), The World Federation of Right To Die Societies (l980) under which can be found almost 
all other similar societies and associations. 
81 The former distinction “ordinary means” and “extraordinary means” used for a moral appraisal of 
medical futility, in particular by theologians, is thanks to the rapid scientific and technological 
development of (not only intensive) medicine completely futile: what was considered “extraordinary 
means” yesterday has become “ordinary means” today. 
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assisted suicide). In the meantime useful distinctions have been established and one can 
discriminate between the intentional shortening of life as a by-product of the pain therapy 
(administration of opiates such as morphine), inducing terminal sedation, terminating of 
life (e.g. by administration of lethal doses of morphine) and the respectful allowance of a 
dying patient to die (Birnbacher, 1995; Illhardt et al. 1998; Schöne-Seifert, 1997; Spaemann 
& Fuchs, 1997). To allow a dying patient to die with the medical support of palliative care 
and with the human support of interpersonal relationships - which is more difficult to 
provide than medical comfort - is probably the latest task and new goal of contemporary 
medicine.82 Another problem is that biological death often follows the social death of the 
patient. 
In the period between the 17th and 20th century the understanding of good death underwent 
fundamental changes. Initially euthanasia was understood to be the active physician’s 
support for the dying patient within a natural death. In this model euthanasia is the good 
(complete) care of the dying.  
From approximately the 1880s, a concept of euthanasia was implemented which meant the 
termination of the life of a patient in a medically hopeless situation induced by the 
physician. In the period leading up to the World War II, euthanasia was understood as the 
(involuntary) killing of “unfit” people (eugenic euthanasia) which during World War II 
developed into racial euthanasia (the Holocaust). In the post-war period the concept of 
euthanasia as mercy (assisted) death arose; its two basic forms being “letting die” (to make 
possible a dignified dying) and “mercy killing” (killing upon request or without request). 
(Bishop, 2006). In contemporary discussions the focus is not on the “mercy killing” issue but 
on a rational and intersubjective-communicative framework for end-of-life decision-making 
regarding the support of human life in its final stages in an era of very technologically 
advanced medicine.  
5. Various historical meanings of the term ‘euthanasia’ 
As a summary of the previous research, the main typologies of good death as they appear 
through history are provided below.  
1. Easy, quick and serene (natural) death. 
Suetonius’ description of the death of Augustus serves as an example.  
This concept can be found from Antiquity to the present. However this understanding of 
euthanasia as a peaceful, painless and swift death is not the predominant approach in the 
present. Furthermore a contemporary medical death is no longer perceived as a natural 
death.  
Used in this sense, this euthanasia is at present perceived as an ambition and yearning 
which does not correspond to the present day medical reality of a prolonged and technified 
                                                 
82 Already in 1988 the American Medical Association set the following to be a standard: “…a physician 
may do what is medically necessary to alleviate severe pain, or cease or omit treatment to permit a 
terminally ill patient whose death is imminent to die. However, he should not intentionally cause 
death.” (AMA, 1992, p. 46). In 1987 the World Medical Association published the following: 
“Euthanasia, that is the act of deliberately ending the life of a patient, even at the patient's own request 
or at the request of close relatives, is unethical. This does not prevent the physician from respecting the 
desire of a patient to allow the natural process of death to follow its course in the terminal phase of 
sickness.” Available at www.wma.net. Cited 26.03.2011. 
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death with additional suffering. This typology of euthanasia represents rather an escape 
from a medico-technical death or an alternative to this medically prolonged and technically 
supported dying – far from a natural death. 
2. Voluntary termination of life by oneself in a situation when living holds no value or 
death seems to be the lesser of two evils (and the option to die seems to be the lesser 
evil). 
The classical example is suicide (autothanatos) as an expression of autonomy, control over 
one’s life, and responsibility towards oneself and towards society. 
This concept has been relevant in Antiquity (voluntary death), and in Modern Times 
(Nietzsche: quick and free death) including the present. (Engelhardt, 1989). This form of free 
autothanatos (suicide) is often understood as euthanasia in debates on assisted suicide; 
euthanasia in this sense is a suicide in fact, though medically assisted. In these debates, 
(assisted) suicide has often been semantically incorrectly replaced by euthanasia. Once 
replaced by euthanasia, the (medically) assisted suicide (A kills A) cannot be distinguished 
from euthanasia as the death of B by A upon the explicit request of B. So the term 
”euthanasia” used as a denotation for a peaceful and painless termination of life by means 
of assisted suicide is euthanasia rather in a metaphorical way. 
3. Medical accompaniment of a dying person (easing pain, human support, without the 
possibility to prolong life). 
As an example the euthanasia exteriori as proposed by Francis Bacon can be given. 
This concept can be found from Antiquity until the late 19th century, being the main concept 
of euthanasia in the period between the 17th and late 19th centuries.  
This typology of euthanasia can be used even today as an inspiration for palliative care for 
seriously ill and dying patients. One of the challenges of this model of euthanasia is the re-
humanization of technical medicine, well-rounded care for the dying patient and a rejection 
of prolonging the dying period. 
4. Involuntary termination of the life of unwanted people (incurably sick, handicapped) 
for the good of society (secondary for the benefit of the killed person). 
All cases of social euthanasia would come under this model. 
This concept was influential in Antiquity; in Modern Times it has been used in the period 
between 1870 and 1939. 
This form of euthanasia was in fact the elimination of persons suffering from serious 
incurable diseases and from physical or mental handicaps. Motivated and justified by mercy 
(mercy killing, Grandentod) this killing was a form of involuntary euthanasia, in some context 
even supported by law (e.g. in Germany by the Law for the Prevention of Hereditarily 
Diseased Offspring from the year 1933).   
5. Involuntary termination of life of “unfit” people (based on genetics or race).   
A specific example for this type of good death is the eugenic euthanasia as it was practiced 
under the Nazi regime during World War II.  
This form of involuntary euthanasia was extended to genocide, resulting in the killing of 
millions of people (Jews and Roma primarily). Beside such racial eugenic euthanasia, 
medical eugenic euthanasia was also conducted during the Nazi regime; the previous more 
socially identifiable conditions, based on physical and mental handicaps were extended to 
medical indications such as schizophrenia, cyclothymia, blindness, deafness, homosexuality 
and many others. All these medical conditions qualified for mercy death (eugenic 
euthanasia).  
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6. Inducing an “easy death” by sedatives (including terminal sedation) - shortening of life 
without direct killing,83 foreseen but nonintended death. 
This model of good death has been one of the forms of euthanasia discussed in the recent 
past and at present. 
Once the shortening of life became a de facto side-effect of pain therapy (e.g. administration 
of morphine), it was discussed whether and to what extent such an abbreviation of life is 
morally justifiable. Some authors have argued that foreseen and non intended death caused 
by pain therapy (administration of high doses of morphine) is acceptable while an intended 
death would be morally unacceptable, justifying this assessment by the double effect 
doctrine.84 (Boyle, 1991; Hawryluck & Harvey, 2000; Kamm, 1999; Klein, 2004). However, 
the application of the double-effect doctrine is highly problematic in this context (one has to 
take into account not only the real shortening of life but also the probability of death being 
caused by the pain killers directly). To call pain therapy which also includes the acceleration 
of the death factor “euthanasia” is not semantically and ethically meaningful. 
7. Physician assisted suicide 
Some people classify physician assisted suicide as euthanasia, subsuming suicide under 
euthanasia, which is confusing and out of the semantics proposed in this chapter (the killing 
of another person is fundamentally different from suicide).  
Historically this assisted suicide has a similarity to the ancient notion of autothanatos (e.g. the 
Stoics), however suicide as it has been known throughout history should not be 
intermingled with physician assisted suicide - as we understand it today as a very specific 
type of suicide and fundamentally different from (unassisted) suicide - for at least two 
reasons: first the aid to conduct suicide is solely help, not direct perpetration; therefore the 
modifier “assisted” is used, second the involvement of a physician, with regard to the 
medical profession as such and its therapeutic role, is of a specific moral relevance; this 
aspect is evoked by the modifier “physician”. (Deigh, 1998; van der Maas, 1996; Wolf, 2008). 
Should a clear semantical framework be used for euthanasia discussions, then physician 
assisted suicide has to be distinguished from euthanasia, and not subsumed under 
euthanasia. While in euthanasia the physician is the perpetrator of death, in physician 
assisted suicide it is the patient who causes death.  
8. No application of medically futile therapy which prolongs the life (and suffering) of the 
terminally ill patient: withholding life-sustaining treatment 
The typical situation is one of withholding life-sustaining treatment with or without the 
patient’s consent because the treatment would be medically futile for that patient.  
Some people consider the withholding of medically futile treatment as “passive” euthanasia 
while others do not call withholding of treatment “euthanasia” at all. If the withholding of 
                                                 
83 The fear of an abridgment of life (even that of a dying patient) is understandable, since such a 
shortening of life is in contrast to the general tendency to prolong life. However, such fear should be 
contextualized in the situation of a terminally ill and dying patient, where pain therapy (opiates) - 
which alleviate suffering, and support dignity in dying but often shorten the life of the patient- is 
arguable necessary.  
84 The doctrine of double effect, having been developed and applied to end-of-life decision making 
chiefly by various Catholic theologians as an authoritative tool for assessment of moral acceptability 
within moral absolutism, has been intensively criticized and refuted by many authors (Donagan, 1991; 
Kamm, 1991; Quill, 1997). It seems to be very helpful in contemporary debates focused on the 
shortening of life as a side-effect of pain therapy and in the context of euthanasia. 
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futile treatment, thus hastening the dying process, is held as euthanasia (even as “passive” 
euthanasia and therefore “not so bad” as the “active” one), then the withholding of 
medically futile treatment is morally wrong because such an act would be equated with 
(“passive”) euthanasia. Then two completely different notions of euthanasia have been 
applied in the form of a “good one” namely “passive” euthanasia (withholding, letting die) 
and a “bad one” namely “active” euthanasia (active killing). Thus two completely different 
situations have been denominated by one and the same term, then we have situations were 
euthanasia is “good” and “permissible” and situations where euthanasia is “evil” and 
“wrong”. In the end we have deeply confusing semantics which causes that euthanasia 
discussions will be meaningless.  
9. Termination of medically futile therapy which prolongs life (and suffering) of the 
terminally ill patient: withdrawing life-sustaining treatment 
This type of “euthanasia” coincides with withdrawing of medically futile therapy (including 
life-sustaining treatment) with or without the patient’s consent.  
Some people hold the withdrawing of medically futile treatment as „passive“ euthanasia 
while other people do not subsume the withdrawing of life-sustaining treatment in a 
situation of medical futility under euthanasia, arguing that euthanasia in the proper sense 
can be active (voluntary) only.  
Assuming that both killing and letting die are morally wrong, then any therapy (treatment) 
which has been started has to continue until the death of the patient because it would be 
morally wrong to withdraw (any) treatment. Then the morally right approach would be “to 
cure until death” and to put the patient under medically conducted torture. The only 
prevention of such a medically generated ordeal would be the patient’s timely refusal or late 
court decision. 
In conclusion both the withholding and withdrawing of medically futile treatment shall not 
be called euthanasia (even if it is considered “passive”). 
10. Painless termination of life of an unbearably suffering patient by the physician upon the 
patient’s request. 
This model is called voluntary (active) euthanasia,85 meaning that a clearly competent 
patient makes a voluntary and continuous request for death and the physician conducts the 
act of euthanasia (killing by medical means). This type of euthanasia is legally permitted in 
the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg. Within this typology, euthanasia, being clearly 
defined with specifying conditions (the Rotterdam criteria), can be called the “Dutch model” 
of euthanasia.  
It is obvious that unbearable suffering is too subjective (only the suffering person can decide 
if the suffering is “unbearable”) and to difficult to be grasped and objectified. The criterion 
“unbearable suffering” does not seem to be in accordance with our objective (evidence 
based) medicine. Moreover this criterion could also qualify psychiatric patients (especially 
those suffering from depression) and somatically healthy persons suffering from “tired of 
life” and other states of existential suffering such as meaningless and pointlessness to 
request death. 
11. Painless termination of life of a terminally ill patient (terminal stage of life) by a 
physician upon the patient’s request. 
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This model is also called voluntary (active) euthanasia. It differs from the previous one by 
the primary criterion: here the primary qualifying condition is terminal illness (terminal 
stage), in the previous model it was unbearable suffering. It should be noted that the Dutch 
model does not include terminal stage as a criterion for euthanasia.  
Euthanasia as the painless termination of the dying patient (with or without request) is 
practised in the grey zone void of regulation (beside the eventual agreement between the 
two actors, patient and physician or relatives and physician). If conducted without the 
competent patient’s request, such type of euthanasia belongs to the next category.  
12. Painless termination of life of a terminally ill or unbearably suffering patient by the 
physician without the  patient’s request (the patient is incompetent).86 
This model, called nonvolutary euthanasia, combines two previous typologies (euthanasia in 
terminal stage of illness, euthanasia in unbearable suffering) with the significant difference 
that it is conducted without the patient’s request. In this model of euthanasia one of the two 
criteria (terminal stage of illness or unbearable suffering) must be met and the decision to 
conduct euthanasia is made by the physician, without any patient’s request, consent or 
approval (the patient is unable to give their informed consent).  
13. Painless termination of life of a terminally ill or heavily suffering competent patient by 
the physician without patient’s request or against patient’s will. 
This model is called involuntary euthanasia; euthanasia of a competent patient against their 
will. Involuntary euthanasia is a crime. Some people argue that crime does not refer to a 
“good” death and therefore it should be not called euthanasia. 
14. (In)voluntary painless termination of life of a person other than a terminal patient. 
This type of euthanasia would for instance include quadriplegic or psychiatric patients. 
(Sheldon, 1994).  
15. (In)voluntary painless termination of life of a terminally ill or unbearably suffering 
person by someone other than a physician. 
This type of euthanasia differs from all other conceived forms, being that of it being 
conducted by any other person other than a physician, ergo euthanasia by a nurse or 
another health care professional or by a person who does not even belong to the health care 
staff, e.g. a relative. 
It has been stressed that semantics is a necessary starting point for any discussion on 
euthanasia; it is crucial to clarify what exactly is understood by the term “euthanasia” before 
any argument for or against will be used. It became clear that euthanasia is not an end in 
itself with intrinsic value but a means to realize the end of a good death, or more precisely, a 
quality dying experience. (Emanuel, 1999).  
Among the fifteen aforementioned typologies, one in particular should be emphasised, 
number eleven, which seems to be the most appropriate semantic tool for the concept of 
euthanasia. According to this definition, euthanasia, being different from assisted suicide 
(Beech, 1995; Watts & Howell, 1992) and from other scenarios of end-of-life decisions such 
as withholding, withdrawing or terminal sedation, is a deliberate act of termination of the 
life of a competent (autonomous) patient in the terminal stage of illness by a physician 
                                                 
86 Specific attention should be given to the problem of the euthanasia of children, which would fall 
under typology 14 (newborn children with abnormalities) or older children under the legal age 
(typology 12 and 14) and to the issue of euthanasia in geriatric patients (with diminished cognitive 
capacities including conditions such as dementia). 
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futile treatment, thus hastening the dying process, is held as euthanasia (even as “passive” 
euthanasia and therefore “not so bad” as the “active” one), then the withholding of 
medically futile treatment is morally wrong because such an act would be equated with 
(“passive”) euthanasia. Then two completely different notions of euthanasia have been 
applied in the form of a “good one” namely “passive” euthanasia (withholding, letting die) 
and a “bad one” namely “active” euthanasia (active killing). Thus two completely different 
situations have been denominated by one and the same term, then we have situations were 
euthanasia is “good” and “permissible” and situations where euthanasia is “evil” and 
“wrong”. In the end we have deeply confusing semantics which causes that euthanasia 
discussions will be meaningless.  
9. Termination of medically futile therapy which prolongs life (and suffering) of the 
terminally ill patient: withdrawing life-sustaining treatment 
This type of “euthanasia” coincides with withdrawing of medically futile therapy (including 
life-sustaining treatment) with or without the patient’s consent.  
Some people hold the withdrawing of medically futile treatment as „passive“ euthanasia 
while other people do not subsume the withdrawing of life-sustaining treatment in a 
situation of medical futility under euthanasia, arguing that euthanasia in the proper sense 
can be active (voluntary) only.  
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which has been started has to continue until the death of the patient because it would be 
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cure until death” and to put the patient under medically conducted torture. The only 
prevention of such a medically generated ordeal would be the patient’s timely refusal or late 
court decision. 
In conclusion both the withholding and withdrawing of medically futile treatment shall not 
be called euthanasia (even if it is considered “passive”). 
10. Painless termination of life of an unbearably suffering patient by the physician upon the 
patient’s request. 
This model is called voluntary (active) euthanasia,85 meaning that a clearly competent 
patient makes a voluntary and continuous request for death and the physician conducts the 
act of euthanasia (killing by medical means). This type of euthanasia is legally permitted in 
the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg. Within this typology, euthanasia, being clearly 
defined with specifying conditions (the Rotterdam criteria), can be called the “Dutch model” 
of euthanasia.  
It is obvious that unbearable suffering is too subjective (only the suffering person can decide 
if the suffering is “unbearable”) and to difficult to be grasped and objectified. The criterion 
“unbearable suffering” does not seem to be in accordance with our objective (evidence 
based) medicine. Moreover this criterion could also qualify psychiatric patients (especially 
those suffering from depression) and somatically healthy persons suffering from “tired of 
life” and other states of existential suffering such as meaningless and pointlessness to 
request death. 
11. Painless termination of life of a terminally ill patient (terminal stage of life) by a 
physician upon the patient’s request. 
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This model is also called voluntary (active) euthanasia. It differs from the previous one by 
the primary criterion: here the primary qualifying condition is terminal illness (terminal 
stage), in the previous model it was unbearable suffering. It should be noted that the Dutch 
model does not include terminal stage as a criterion for euthanasia.  
Euthanasia as the painless termination of the dying patient (with or without request) is 
practised in the grey zone void of regulation (beside the eventual agreement between the 
two actors, patient and physician or relatives and physician). If conducted without the 
competent patient’s request, such type of euthanasia belongs to the next category.  
12. Painless termination of life of a terminally ill or unbearably suffering patient by the 
physician without the  patient’s request (the patient is incompetent).86 
This model, called nonvolutary euthanasia, combines two previous typologies (euthanasia in 
terminal stage of illness, euthanasia in unbearable suffering) with the significant difference 
that it is conducted without the patient’s request. In this model of euthanasia one of the two 
criteria (terminal stage of illness or unbearable suffering) must be met and the decision to 
conduct euthanasia is made by the physician, without any patient’s request, consent or 
approval (the patient is unable to give their informed consent).  
13. Painless termination of life of a terminally ill or heavily suffering competent patient by 
the physician without patient’s request or against patient’s will. 
This model is called involuntary euthanasia; euthanasia of a competent patient against their 
will. Involuntary euthanasia is a crime. Some people argue that crime does not refer to a 
“good” death and therefore it should be not called euthanasia. 
14. (In)voluntary painless termination of life of a person other than a terminal patient. 
This type of euthanasia would for instance include quadriplegic or psychiatric patients. 
(Sheldon, 1994).  
15. (In)voluntary painless termination of life of a terminally ill or unbearably suffering 
person by someone other than a physician. 
This type of euthanasia differs from all other conceived forms, being that of it being 
conducted by any other person other than a physician, ergo euthanasia by a nurse or 
another health care professional or by a person who does not even belong to the health care 
staff, e.g. a relative. 
It has been stressed that semantics is a necessary starting point for any discussion on 
euthanasia; it is crucial to clarify what exactly is understood by the term “euthanasia” before 
any argument for or against will be used. It became clear that euthanasia is not an end in 
itself with intrinsic value but a means to realize the end of a good death, or more precisely, a 
quality dying experience. (Emanuel, 1999).  
Among the fifteen aforementioned typologies, one in particular should be emphasised, 
number eleven, which seems to be the most appropriate semantic tool for the concept of 
euthanasia. According to this definition, euthanasia, being different from assisted suicide 
(Beech, 1995; Watts & Howell, 1992) and from other scenarios of end-of-life decisions such 
as withholding, withdrawing or terminal sedation, is a deliberate act of termination of the 
life of a competent (autonomous) patient in the terminal stage of illness by a physician 
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upon an explicit and persistent request of this patient and for his/her sake. Thus under 
the term “euthanasia” so called active voluntary euthanasia is understood. Should these 
criteria not be met, a good death can be discussed within a different framework, defined 
by different criteria such as involuntariness, other than terminal stage of illness (e.g. 
psychiatric patient), another person than the physician administrating the lethal dose, and 
other parameters. 
6. The meaning of euthanasia in current discussions 
In the next section, the conceptual understanding of euthanasia in current discussions will 
be examined. As it follows from the previous typology of euthanasia, the current debates on 
euthanasia are mainly based on typologies 10 through 14; some people also include 
typology 8 (withholding treatment) and typology 9 (withdrawing treatment) under 
euthanasia, under the guise of “passive euthanasia”, and thereby, in a misleading way, 
calling the reduction or termination of medically futile treatment “euthanasia”. So attention 
will first be given to the distinction between “passive” and “active” euthanasia. 
6.1 Euthanasia as active voluntary death 
If under the term “euthanasia” are included scenarios of withholding and withdrawing 
treatment, medical futility and terminal sedation, then to end medical futility or even not to 
start medically futile treatment is euthanasia; thus to avoid such meaningless (medically 
futile) treatment is euthanasia. So euthanasia is omnipresent in these end-of-life decisions. If 
everything is considered euthanasia then we lose our ability to correctly administer (or not) 
treatment. Therefore what is crucial is the art of distinguishing between treatment options 
while maintaining an unbiased and level semantic playing field, which allows to make the 
dying process as humane and as dignified as possible, without applying every kind of 
treatment that is technically possible, but medically futile and humanely problematic (to be 
rather euphemistic). That’s why such care cannot be called (any form of) euthanasia! 
Despite the fact that so called “passive euthanasia” has appeared in the literature and in 
euthanasia debates for several decades and continues to appear in both the literature and in 
public debates - one can understand when, why, and under which circumstances this term 
was developed – but if euthanasia is understood as the killing of B by A upon an explicit 
request of B, then the term “passive euthanasia” remains semantic nonsense and a source of 
many misunderstandings, emotions and frustration. What has been called “passive 
euthanasia” (A allows B to die without undertaking all technically possible but medically 
futile steps) should rather be called “letting die” or “allowing to die” since the life of the 
dying person cannot be saved. This “allowing to die” is in line with the respect for human 
dignity and could be labelled as a “good death” but not as “euthanasia” is the sense 
described above. The former distinction “active” and “passive” euthanasia aimed to 
distinguish morally acceptable “passive euthanasia” as a form of non-obligatory passivity 
(omission), which did not apply so-called “extraordinary means” which had been 
previously regarded as morally obligatory to use, from morally unacceptable “active 
euthanasia” consisting of killing a person (homicide).87  
                                                 
87 In the late 1960s and early 1970s both bioethicists and national medical associations started to 
approve, under specified conditions, “of some kinds of instances of what is called ‘passive’ euthanasia” 
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The cessation of the employment of extraordinary means to prolong life when there is 
irrefutable evidence that death is imminent is the decision made primarily by the patient 
and/or by the family and/or by physicians. But such a decision and such cessation of 
medical treatment is very different from what is at present considered “euthanasia”. The 
doctrine establishing an important moral difference between “commission” and “omission”, 
between “active” and “passive”, between “ordinary means” and “extraordinary means” 
became useless and misleading when applied to euthanasia as it was understood in the 
1970s and 1980s (Husak, 1980; Jonsen, 1998; Kamm, 1994; Walton, 1976). It follows that in 
one case, euthanasia is sometimes permissible, while in another case always forbidden. This 
doctrine, based on the distinction between act (commission) and omission, and adopted by 
the American Medical Association in 1973, was very soon challenged, as this would lead to 
decisions on life and death being made on morally irrelevant grounds (Rachels, 1975), at 
present not recognized by most philosophers. Moreover, active euthanasia (the “bad” one) 
would be in many cases more humane than passive euthanasia (the “permissible” one). So 
later, when medical associations issued guidelines for withholding and withdrawing 
treatment and for palliative and terminal sedation, they often stressed that this policy is not 
identical with active euthanasia, without declaring that they are authorizing “passive” 
euthanasia. 
From the present perspective, the former distinction of “active” and “passive” euthanasia as 
established in the 1970s, with the aim of helping physicians adapt to the new situations they 
were finding themselves in and to move from a curative paradigm to a palliative paradigm 
(the shift from “cure” to “care”) and to provide a moral rationale for the dignified treatment 
of terminally ill patients is a good illustration of the changes taking place and serves as an 
appropriate departure point to clarify terminology and then to discuss ethics. At the 
beginning of the 21st century, not only philosophers but physicians from palliative care units 
have argued that so-called “passive euthanasia” is a contradiction in terms, reasoning that 
palliative care which saves the dying patient from extreme pain, protects human dignity 
                                                                                                                            
because there was an acute need for some regulatory tools for the newly arisen “very pressing, 
widespread problems introduced by recent developments in medical technology”(Walton, 1976, p. 343). 
So in the case “of a terminally ill patient, who is in great pain and who is known to be about to die with 
overwhelming probability in a few days or a few hours, and shows symptoms of immediately imminent 
death” a new medical paradigm emerged, namely the option not to use all medical technology 
currently available to prolong life. As part of this new medical paradigm, the ideas such as “not to 
prolong the patient's life for a short and excruciatingly painful time” and not to use the available “active 
emergency methods of resuscitation” (e.g., defibrillators or heart massage) and not to “do what would 
constitute extreme cruelty” asserted themselves. (Walton, 1976, p. 343). Douglas Walton summarizes the 
debates of that time in the following way: “What is the physician to do? It has seemed to many that 
heroic measures should, under certain conditions, be waived. But does not such a waiver constitute 
‘killing’ the patient? On the other side, is not a too-strenuous interference in the course of nature equally 
morally abhorrent, cruel, and inhumane? The latter course may not seem to serve the interests of the 
patient, if unthinkingly or automatically always applied.” (Walton, 1976, p. 343) As a possible basis for 
resolving these problems the distinction “active” and “passive” euthanasia has been often cited. “The 
former entails active interference in the course of natural events, the taking of steps through positive 
action. Passive euthanasia carries with it no such requirement but only failure to institute positive 
action, letting nature take its course, so to speak. Thus it is sometimes felt that passive euthanasia is 
morally acceptable, under certain conditions, but that active euthanasia is never morally acceptable 
under any conditions.“ (Walton, 1976, p. 343). 
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upon an explicit and persistent request of this patient and for his/her sake. Thus under 
the term “euthanasia” so called active voluntary euthanasia is understood. Should these 
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by different criteria such as involuntariness, other than terminal stage of illness (e.g. 
psychiatric patient), another person than the physician administrating the lethal dose, and 
other parameters. 
6. The meaning of euthanasia in current discussions 
In the next section, the conceptual understanding of euthanasia in current discussions will 
be examined. As it follows from the previous typology of euthanasia, the current debates on 
euthanasia are mainly based on typologies 10 through 14; some people also include 
typology 8 (withholding treatment) and typology 9 (withdrawing treatment) under 
euthanasia, under the guise of “passive euthanasia”, and thereby, in a misleading way, 
calling the reduction or termination of medically futile treatment “euthanasia”. So attention 
will first be given to the distinction between “passive” and “active” euthanasia. 
6.1 Euthanasia as active voluntary death 
If under the term “euthanasia” are included scenarios of withholding and withdrawing 
treatment, medical futility and terminal sedation, then to end medical futility or even not to 
start medically futile treatment is euthanasia; thus to avoid such meaningless (medically 
futile) treatment is euthanasia. So euthanasia is omnipresent in these end-of-life decisions. If 
everything is considered euthanasia then we lose our ability to correctly administer (or not) 
treatment. Therefore what is crucial is the art of distinguishing between treatment options 
while maintaining an unbiased and level semantic playing field, which allows to make the 
dying process as humane and as dignified as possible, without applying every kind of 
treatment that is technically possible, but medically futile and humanely problematic (to be 
rather euphemistic). That’s why such care cannot be called (any form of) euthanasia! 
Despite the fact that so called “passive euthanasia” has appeared in the literature and in 
euthanasia debates for several decades and continues to appear in both the literature and in 
public debates - one can understand when, why, and under which circumstances this term 
was developed – but if euthanasia is understood as the killing of B by A upon an explicit 
request of B, then the term “passive euthanasia” remains semantic nonsense and a source of 
many misunderstandings, emotions and frustration. What has been called “passive 
euthanasia” (A allows B to die without undertaking all technically possible but medically 
futile steps) should rather be called “letting die” or “allowing to die” since the life of the 
dying person cannot be saved. This “allowing to die” is in line with the respect for human 
dignity and could be labelled as a “good death” but not as “euthanasia” is the sense 
described above. The former distinction “active” and “passive” euthanasia aimed to 
distinguish morally acceptable “passive euthanasia” as a form of non-obligatory passivity 
(omission), which did not apply so-called “extraordinary means” which had been 
previously regarded as morally obligatory to use, from morally unacceptable “active 
euthanasia” consisting of killing a person (homicide).87  
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The cessation of the employment of extraordinary means to prolong life when there is 
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between “active” and “passive”, between “ordinary means” and “extraordinary means” 
became useless and misleading when applied to euthanasia as it was understood in the 
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one case, euthanasia is sometimes permissible, while in another case always forbidden. This 
doctrine, based on the distinction between act (commission) and omission, and adopted by 
the American Medical Association in 1973, was very soon challenged, as this would lead to 
decisions on life and death being made on morally irrelevant grounds (Rachels, 1975), at 
present not recognized by most philosophers. Moreover, active euthanasia (the “bad” one) 
would be in many cases more humane than passive euthanasia (the “permissible” one). So 
later, when medical associations issued guidelines for withholding and withdrawing 
treatment and for palliative and terminal sedation, they often stressed that this policy is not 
identical with active euthanasia, without declaring that they are authorizing “passive” 
euthanasia. 
From the present perspective, the former distinction of “active” and “passive” euthanasia as 
established in the 1970s, with the aim of helping physicians adapt to the new situations they 
were finding themselves in and to move from a curative paradigm to a palliative paradigm 
(the shift from “cure” to “care”) and to provide a moral rationale for the dignified treatment 
of terminally ill patients is a good illustration of the changes taking place and serves as an 
appropriate departure point to clarify terminology and then to discuss ethics. At the 
beginning of the 21st century, not only philosophers but physicians from palliative care units 
have argued that so-called “passive euthanasia” is a contradiction in terms, reasoning that 
palliative care which saves the dying patient from extreme pain, protects human dignity 
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and the patient from additional suffering and medical torture does not amount to 
euthanasia (Riley et at., 2009). The European Association of Palliative Care consistently 
refuses to call any of the following clinical procedures euthanasia: withholding futile 
treatment, withdrawing futile treatment or terminal sedation, emphasizing that euthanasia 
can be active in nature only (Materstvedt, 2003, p. 98). 
In my judgement to use the term “euthanasia” within palliative care provided lege artis is an 
expression of disrespect and a violation of the efforts of palliative medicine and the health 
care staff who accompany the dying persons, alleviating pain, providing both human and 
medical comfort in dying. Naturally they cannot agree to such human support being called 
euthanasia, using the same word as “mercy killing” does. There is a huge difference in the 
“good death” of palliative care: the patient dies due to the disease, not to the physician or 
attending personnel who kill the dying (terminally ill) patient (Callahan, 1999). 
Fortunately enough the distinction “active” and “passive” euthanasia has gradually been 
abandoned since the 1990s (Brock, 1992, 1993; Campbell et al. 2005; McLachlan, 2008; 
Warnock & Macdonald, 2008). However, not having disappeared completely, they can still 
be found among some authors. When for instance John Keown defines euthanasia as “the 
intentional termination of life by act or omission” (Keown, 2002, p.12), he bases his concept 
of euthanasia on the distinction “active” and “passive”, holding “omission” for “passive 
euthanasia”. Recently Gesang (2008), insisting on the distinction “active” and “passive”, has 
proposed specified conditions to be met so as to be considered passive euthanasia, 
classifying many cases as such.88 And so we are returned to “moral” and “immoral” 
euthanasia. Gerrard and Wilkinson (2005) examined the permissibility of so-called “passive 
euthanasia”, emphasizing the possibility to soften the term euthanasia as a whole by 
including withdrawing or withholding life-prolonging treatment, as a result of their greater 
moral acceptance. 
The important difference - not in euthanasia per se but in all acts conducted by human 
beings as human beings (actus hominis)– is the matter of intent, which is often confused with 
motive (Campbell, 2005). If euthanasia is defined as “intentional or foreseen life-shortening” 
(Keown, 2002, p.15), then the administration of morphine, which in addition to serving as 
pain therapy objectively shortens the patient’s life, is euthanasia as well. If not only an 
intentional termination of life but also pain therapy falls under euthanasia, then it is really 
difficult to discuss euthanasia. In a similar vein Moody (2003) requires the critical attribute 
“foreseen and intended death”, however as concurrent and simultaneous conditions. “It may 
be optimistic to expect the emergence of common definitions, at least in the near future, not 
least as the different definitions reflect different underlying moral presuppositions whose 
resolutions is a prerequisite to definitional consensus. Until such consensus is achieved 
participants should at least be open and clear about which definition they are employing 
and why.” (Keown, 2002, p. 17). Obviously, one has to attempt to start a discussion with 
clarified semantics but it is also a matter of preconceptions that determines which definition 
is being used and why.  
                                                 
88 “Passive euthanasia occurs if the general conditions for euthanasia are fulfilled and if letting it 
happen leads to death. If it is a case of letting it happen leads to death only those actions may be 
involved that withdraw a medical measure that a doctor started previously. Every other form of 
euthanasia is active.” (Gesang, 2008, p. 179). 
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6.2 Euthanasia – a core definition and the specifying criteria 
Within the conceptualization of euthanasia, the core notion of euthanasia as the primary 
definition and the set(s) of secondary criteria have to be distinguished. If for instance 
someone defines euthanasia as “the termination of life of an incurable patient” then any 
incurable diseases such as diabetes would qualify for a request for euthanasia. Obviously 
some additional specifying criteria should be applied. Or if euthanasia is described as “the 
active, intentional termination of life” (Keown, 2002, p. 10), then any suicide is at the same 
time euthanasia. Withal both the termination of life of an incurable patient and active 
termination of life apply for euthanasia, belonging to the essential conceptualization of 
euthanasia. If the definition proposed by Brock (1999, p. 298) – under which euthanasia is 
defined as “deliberate killing of an innocent person”– then some people, presuming that a 
late foetus is a person, could argue that there is little difference between euthanasia and 
abortion. The deficiency of such a definition is that not every “killing” is ipso facto 
euthanasia.  
This conceptual diversity of the core definition of euthanasia has been recently shown by 
Quaghebeur et al. (2009). Based on this review of argument-based ethics literature, it is 
evident that many imprecise definitions of euthanasia can be found in the literature over the 
last three decades. The mentioned study demonstrates that there is a growing tendency in 
the preciseness and accuracy in the definition of euthanasia; while in the late 1980s and in 
early 1990s euthanasia was often defined as “mercy killing”, “allowing to die or helping to 
die”, “killing a patient”, “bringing about of death through lethal drug dose”, “taking active 
steps to end a patient’s life”, “an intentional, causally significant (either through omission or 
commission), foreseeable, and direct action undertaken for the purpose of ending life a 
person, for whatever reason”, in the late 1990s and in 2000s more precise definitions such as 
“direct termination of a competent patient’s life at the patient’s request”, “beneficent active 
voluntary euthanasia” and “deliberate action to terminate life by someone other than, and at 
the request of the patient” can be found (Quaghebeur et al., 2009). The said study also shows 
that more and more authors make use of the definition of euthanasia as it has been 
established by Dutch and Belgian legislation which defines euthanasia as “administration of 
lethal drugs by someone other than the person concerned with the explicit intention of 
ending a patient’s life, at the latter’s explicit request” (Belgian Ministry of Justice, 2002; 
Leenen, 1998; van der Heide et al., 2003, 2007; van der Wal & Dillmann, 1994).  
Within the overview of definitions provided by Quaghebeur (2009, Table 1, 2, 3) two 
different types of core definitions with regard to exactness can be found. One type of these 
essential definitions is based on “killing the patient” (“a death brought about by someone 
else”, “purposeful shortening of human life through active or direct assistance”, “killing 
someone at the end stages of life”, “interrupt the patient’s ability to sustain life”, “causing 
the death of an innocent person”, “ending the life of another person on the grounds of 
unworthy living”). It has been already argued that such a definition is insufficient. Another 
type of these essential definitions is based on “voluntary active euthanasia” (“the direct 
termination of a competent patient’s life at the patient’s request”, “the intentional bringing 
about of person’s death at their own request in the absence of coercion”). This definition 
based on the concept of voluntary euthanasia (voluntary euthanasia, by definition, can 
never be a “passive” one) is much closer to the situations which are covered by the term 
euthanasia. However there are some strategies which change or manipulate the concept of 
euthanasia. (Campbell, 1999). So for instance if the focus is on “activeness” in euthanasia as 
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and the patient from additional suffering and medical torture does not amount to 
euthanasia (Riley et at., 2009). The European Association of Palliative Care consistently 
refuses to call any of the following clinical procedures euthanasia: withholding futile 
treatment, withdrawing futile treatment or terminal sedation, emphasizing that euthanasia 
can be active in nature only (Materstvedt, 2003, p. 98). 
In my judgement to use the term “euthanasia” within palliative care provided lege artis is an 
expression of disrespect and a violation of the efforts of palliative medicine and the health 
care staff who accompany the dying persons, alleviating pain, providing both human and 
medical comfort in dying. Naturally they cannot agree to such human support being called 
euthanasia, using the same word as “mercy killing” does. There is a huge difference in the 
“good death” of palliative care: the patient dies due to the disease, not to the physician or 
attending personnel who kill the dying (terminally ill) patient (Callahan, 1999). 
Fortunately enough the distinction “active” and “passive” euthanasia has gradually been 
abandoned since the 1990s (Brock, 1992, 1993; Campbell et al. 2005; McLachlan, 2008; 
Warnock & Macdonald, 2008). However, not having disappeared completely, they can still 
be found among some authors. When for instance John Keown defines euthanasia as “the 
intentional termination of life by act or omission” (Keown, 2002, p.12), he bases his concept 
of euthanasia on the distinction “active” and “passive”, holding “omission” for “passive 
euthanasia”. Recently Gesang (2008), insisting on the distinction “active” and “passive”, has 
proposed specified conditions to be met so as to be considered passive euthanasia, 
classifying many cases as such.88 And so we are returned to “moral” and “immoral” 
euthanasia. Gerrard and Wilkinson (2005) examined the permissibility of so-called “passive 
euthanasia”, emphasizing the possibility to soften the term euthanasia as a whole by 
including withdrawing or withholding life-prolonging treatment, as a result of their greater 
moral acceptance. 
The important difference - not in euthanasia per se but in all acts conducted by human 
beings as human beings (actus hominis)– is the matter of intent, which is often confused with 
motive (Campbell, 2005). If euthanasia is defined as “intentional or foreseen life-shortening” 
(Keown, 2002, p.15), then the administration of morphine, which in addition to serving as 
pain therapy objectively shortens the patient’s life, is euthanasia as well. If not only an 
intentional termination of life but also pain therapy falls under euthanasia, then it is really 
difficult to discuss euthanasia. In a similar vein Moody (2003) requires the critical attribute 
“foreseen and intended death”, however as concurrent and simultaneous conditions. “It may 
be optimistic to expect the emergence of common definitions, at least in the near future, not 
least as the different definitions reflect different underlying moral presuppositions whose 
resolutions is a prerequisite to definitional consensus. Until such consensus is achieved 
participants should at least be open and clear about which definition they are employing 
and why.” (Keown, 2002, p. 17). Obviously, one has to attempt to start a discussion with 
clarified semantics but it is also a matter of preconceptions that determines which definition 
is being used and why.  
                                                 
88 “Passive euthanasia occurs if the general conditions for euthanasia are fulfilled and if letting it 
happen leads to death. If it is a case of letting it happen leads to death only those actions may be 
involved that withdraw a medical measure that a doctor started previously. Every other form of 
euthanasia is active.” (Gesang, 2008, p. 179). 
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6.2 Euthanasia – a core definition and the specifying criteria 
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the request of the patient” can be found (Quaghebeur et al., 2009). The said study also shows 
that more and more authors make use of the definition of euthanasia as it has been 
established by Dutch and Belgian legislation which defines euthanasia as “administration of 
lethal drugs by someone other than the person concerned with the explicit intention of 
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someone at the end stages of life”, “interrupt the patient’s ability to sustain life”, “causing 
the death of an innocent person”, “ending the life of another person on the grounds of 
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critique or objection to so-called “passive” euthanasia then the distinction “voluntary” and 
“involuntary” (resp. “non-voluntary”) can be cloaked and also involuntary euthanasia can 
be also covered by the term “euthanasia” which is obviously contradictory to the standard 
definition (“termination of patient’s life upon their explicit request by a physician”). Only 
few of the definitions based on the “voluntary active euthanasia” concept include additional 
criteria such as physician’s activity or suffering. The lack of these secondary or additional 
criteria demonstrates the problem we still have with the basic understanding of euthanasia 
in the professional literature, not to mention the perception of the general public. If we take 
the “better” set of essential definitions of euthanasia, understanding euthanasia to be any 
medical killing upon the person’s own request, then any patient is eligible to request 
euthanasia. At the same time such a definition is of minimal help for any euthanasia 
discussion. 
In 1988 Michael Wreen attempted to provide an analytical definition of euthanasia. It was 
obvious for him that “someone must kill a live creature, or let her die, if euthanasia is to 
occur“ (Wreen, 1988, p. 637). According to Wreen (1998), person A committed an act of 
euthanasia if and only if the following conditions were fulfilled:  
1. A killed B or let her die. 
2. A intended to kill B. 
3. The intention specified in (2) was at least partial cause of the action specified in (1).  
4. The causal journey from the intention specified in (2) to the action specified in (1) is 
more or less in accordance with A's plan of action. 
5. A's killing of B is a voluntary action. 
6. The motive for the action specified in (1), the motive standing behind the intention 
specified in (2), is the good of the person killed. 
7. The good specified in (6) is, or at least includes, the avoidance of evil. 
This analytical definition of euthanasia, although staying within the former broad 
understanding of euthanasia which subsumes “letting die” as well, is more precise 
compared to other definitions. However, not specifying who decides about the good of B, 
this definition does not take into account the difference between voluntary and non-
voluntary (or involuntary) euthanasia, which is of crucial importance. So if groups 
committed to the fundamental belief that the intentional killing of another person is wrong, 
despite having deep sympathy for those people who are suffering, understand euthanasia as 
“the intentional killing by act or omission of a dependent human being for his or her alleged 
benefit” 89, then a hypocrisy of “double effect” doctrine comes into play and the “life-
saving” treatment in the form of medical torture have to continue which finally reinforces 
the argument for active euthanasia. 
Another analytical definition of euthanasia was proposed by Beauchamp and Davidson 
(1979)90 which is more focused on the causality and reasoning of killing then on its volition, 
                                                 
89 This definition can be found at one of the leading websites dealing with euthanasia at: 
http://www.euthanasia.com/definitions.html. Cited 26.03.2011. 
90 “The death of a human being, A, is an instance of euthanasia if any only if (1) A's death is intended by 
at least one other human being, B, where B is either the cause of death or a causally relevant feature of 
the event resulting in death (whether by action or by omission); (2) there is either sufficient current 
evidence for B to believe that A is acutely suffering or irreversibly comatose, or there is sufficient 
current evidence related to A's present condition such that one or more known causal laws supports B's 
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covering rather “mercy killing” by compassion than the autonomous choice of the suffering 
person.  
Yet in 1979 Beauchamp argued that “there are two distinctions which are commonly 
observed in the literature on euthanasia, and we assume that any definition which could not 
accommodate these distinctions is incorrect” (1979, p. 299). However in 2003 he gives a less 
analytical and much shorter definition of euthanasia: “Euthanasia is the act or practice of 
ending a person’s life in order to release the person from an incurable disease, intolerable 
suffering, or undignified death” (Beauchamp, 2003, p. 179). Instead of the distinction 
between “commission” and “omission” other secondary criteria are introduced (incurable 
disease, intolerable suffering, or undignified death) which seems to be more important than 
the former distinction. The rhetoric of killing and letting die is questioned (Beauchamp, 2003). 
However this definition, being too general, does not discriminate between voluntary and 
involuntary euthanasia, though Beauchamp makes use of the terms voluntary and 
involuntary euthanasia (2003, p. 180). 
Another definition of euthanasia has been suggested by Rosemary Firth. Her definition is 
more narrative then analytical. Euthanasia is (a) “the medical use of drugs to ease a painful 
and protracted, but inevitable death”, (b) “a deliberate attempt to bring about or to hasten 
one's own death in sickness or suffering”, (c) “actively assisting an aged, sick or 
handicapped person to a merciful death” (Firth, 1981). These suggested interpretations of 
euthanasia are rather more the phenomenology of good death. Assisted suicide comes 
under euthanasia (c), palliative care (a) would also come under euthanasia, the shortening of 
life by opiates (b) would also be considered euthanasia. Such a broad description has to be 
made more precise. Regarding free choice on euthanasia, Philippa Foot, already in 1977 
pointed out the difficulty: Even in the case of voluntary active euthanasia, “it would be hard 
to devise procedures that would protect people from being persuaded into giving their 
consent” (Foot, 1977, p. 122).  
6.3 A shift towards a more precise conceptualization of euthanasia 
Recently a certain shift in the conceptualization of euthanasia can be identified in bioethics 
literature. While at the end of the 20th century a rather broad description of euthanasia was 
prevalent, in the 21st century a tendency can be observed to conceptualize euthanasia in a 
more precise way by applying a tighter description. This shift was reflected in the change 
between the first and second editions of the Encyclopedia of Ethics (Becker & Becker, 1992, 
2001), which includes an article on euthanasia written by Marvin Kohl. In the first edition, 
Kohl (1992) tried to summarize the conceptualization of euthanasia in the following way: (a) 
euthanasia is “the act or method of painlessly inducing the death of a nonfetal sentient 
being“ which distinguishes euthanasia from abortion (nonfetal sentient being), while not 
                                                                                                                            
belief that A will be in a condition of acute suffering or irreversibly comatoseness; (3) (a) B's primary 
reason for intending A's death is cessation of A's (actual or predicted) suffering or irreversible 
comatoseness, where B does not intend A's death for a different primary reason, though there may be 
other relevant reasons, and (b) there is sufficient current evidence for either A or B that causal means to 
A's death will not produce any more suffering than would be produced for A if B were not to intervene; 
(4) the causal means to the event of A's death are chosen by A or B to be as painless as possible, unless 
either A or B has an overridding reason for a more painful causal means, where the reasons for 
choosing the latter causal means does not conflict with the evidence in (3b); (5) A is a nonfetal 
organism.” (Beauchamp & Davidson, 1979, p. 304). 
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6. The motive for the action specified in (1), the motive standing behind the intention 
specified in (2), is the good of the person killed. 
7. The good specified in (6) is, or at least includes, the avoidance of evil. 
This analytical definition of euthanasia, although staying within the former broad 
understanding of euthanasia which subsumes “letting die” as well, is more precise 
compared to other definitions. However, not specifying who decides about the good of B, 
this definition does not take into account the difference between voluntary and non-
voluntary (or involuntary) euthanasia, which is of crucial importance. So if groups 
committed to the fundamental belief that the intentional killing of another person is wrong, 
despite having deep sympathy for those people who are suffering, understand euthanasia as 
“the intentional killing by act or omission of a dependent human being for his or her alleged 
benefit” 89, then a hypocrisy of “double effect” doctrine comes into play and the “life-
saving” treatment in the form of medical torture have to continue which finally reinforces 
the argument for active euthanasia. 
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(1979)90 which is more focused on the causality and reasoning of killing then on its volition, 
                                                 
89 This definition can be found at one of the leading websites dealing with euthanasia at: 
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covering rather “mercy killing” by compassion than the autonomous choice of the suffering 
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the former distinction. The rhetoric of killing and letting die is questioned (Beauchamp, 2003). 
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involuntary euthanasia, though Beauchamp makes use of the terms voluntary and 
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distinguishing euthanasia in humans from euthanasia in animals; (b) euthanasia is “the act 
or method of directly causing or allowing the painless and quick death of a nonfetal being, 
so as to end suffering or an undesirable existence“ which places “passive” euthanasia 
(allowing the death) under “euthanasia”; while the stated conditions (suffering, undesirable 
existence) remain insufficient for a suitable and applicable definition of euthanasia. 
Furthermore, the criterion “undesirable existence” is highly problematic since it could be 
interpreted to cover many diverse forms of (involuntary) euthanasia such as eugenic or 
social euthanasia. No distinction between euthanasia and suicide was described. Additional 
specific criteria would be necessary here.  
It is both interesting and challenging to observe how in the second edition the same author 
changed his conceptualization of euthanasia: “An act of euthanasia is held to be voluntary 
only if there is full disclosure of relevant information to, and consent freely given by, the 
intended competent recipient of the act” (Kohl, 2001, p. 492).91 First he distinguishes 
euthanasia from suicide, establishing a specific category of physician assisted suicide. 
Moreover, his concern is primarily with voluntary active euthanasia, stating that “the lines 
between voluntary, involuntary and non-voluntary euthanasia are crucial in a society that 
values both self-determination and compassion” (Kohl, 2001, p. 492). This development in 
Kohl’s conceptualization of euthanasia demonstrates the general tendency to be more 
specific and not to subsume any form of killing under the term “euthanasia”.  
Even after such a shift to a restrictive description of euthanasia, further differentiations are 
necessary; the following aspects in particular have to be specified:  
1. The decision-making process (competent/incompetent, patient/nonpatient, patient as 
decision-maker, physician/family as decision-maker…) 
2. Clinical conditions (terminal stage of illness, enormous suffering, medical futility…) 
3. Social context (the presence or lack of human/psychological/spiritual support…) 
4. Motivation and purpose (of the persons involved). 
6.4 The philosophical concepts that form the background of the euthanasia 
discussion 
With regard to euthanasia in contemporary technologized medicine, at least three 
philosophical foundations can be identified that form the background of euthanasia 
discussions: a teleological, deontological and human rights approach. Each in turn has its 
respective schools of though, traditions and movements.  
The teleological approach, setting out to determine what the (good) goal would be, in the 
context of good death often emphasizes the quality of life concept as an important purpose 
of human endeavour. As a part of the quality of life, health and wellbeing, good social 
relations and the absence of suffering can be given. Such conceptualized human life holds a 
high value and is therefore inviolable. However once it heads for its inevitable end, it is an 
important challenge and goal to aim for a dignified ending. Then autonomy in which an 
individual shapes his/her own life and self-determination by which one controls the 
circumstances are of vital significance. Therefore, the shortening of life or termination of life 
(and of the related suffering) are justifiable goals worthy of acting upon and realizing. 
The deontological approach mainly seeks to determine our obligations towards our life and 
towards the lives of others. The basic obligation towards life is to care for it, to support it, 
                                                 
91 In 1974, Kohl defined euthanasia as “the painless inducement of a quick death” (1974, p. 94). 
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and not to destroy it. Therefore suicide and euthanasia are wrong, because they violate the 
fundamental duty not to intentionally take life. Euthanasia thus sacrifices a person’s value 
as a subject for the sake of his/her welfare (Luper, 2009). Since a moral obligation to 
terminate life cannot be positively justified, one cannot agree with the termination of life; 
moreover one has a duty to oppose such tendencies even against the will of the other person 
since the other is also bound by the duty not to take life nor to allow it to be taken. The 
deontological prohibition of killing is universally valid; the open question is if there are 
some justifiable exemptions, such as capital punishment, suicide or euthanasia.  
The approach based on rights, in particular on human rights, does not identify any positive 
(given) or natural right to die. Therefore one cannot call for such right directly. However the 
right to die can be derived indirectly (e.g. from the right to life). Contrarily, the right to life 
belongs to human rights but one may “waive” the right to life in the case of suicide or 
euthanasia. Nevertheless, one is not allowed to delegate the execution of this right to 
another person, to allow to be legitimately killed. To take human life is morally wrong 
because the fundamental right to life (which is at the same time a right not to be killed) 
would be violated. Within liberal political philosophy, with its focus on the rights of the 
individual, a competent person, freely requesting the termination of his/her life which is not 
perceived as good and valuable anymore and having become burden to that individual, can 
forego his/her right to life, rendering killing as morally justifiable. In difference to the 
deontological approaches, within the liberal notion of rights, the duty not to be killed is 
limited to those who wish to live.   
7. Conclusion 
Euthanasia is a highly emotive and sensitive subject, causing disputes and 
misunderstandings. As many authors have pointed out, the term euthanasia, despite its 
frequent exposure in public media and in academic literature, does not reflect a clear set of 
concepts and definitions to be used in euthanasia debates. Thus, such debates often wind up 
inadequately formed and ineffectual, causing more frustration than solutions. It has become 
clear that any euthanasia discussion should be preceded by clarifications of the terminology 
to be used; semantics followed by ethics. 
Nevertheless the concept of euthanasia is not a new topic; our interest in the issue has only 
been renewed due to the effects of contemporary medical technology. It has been 
demonstrated that both the concept of euthanasia and the euthanasia discourse have their 
roots in Antiquity. The diverse notions of euthanasia as they have appeared through history 
were described and their relevance to present day discussions was highlighted. Altogether 
15 diverse notions (typologies) of euthanasia have been identified by this study. Many of 
them can be found in contemporary euthanasia debates. 
Out of the many typologies of euthanasia, voluntary (active) euthanasia (typology 11) has 
been selected as the most relevant concept for the conceptualization of euthanasia to the 
current medical context. As the preferable concept of euthanasia the following definition 
was taken from this source: euthanasia is a deliberate act of terminating the life of a 
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distinguishing euthanasia in humans from euthanasia in animals; (b) euthanasia is “the act 
or method of directly causing or allowing the painless and quick death of a nonfetal being, 
so as to end suffering or an undesirable existence“ which places “passive” euthanasia 
(allowing the death) under “euthanasia”; while the stated conditions (suffering, undesirable 
existence) remain insufficient for a suitable and applicable definition of euthanasia. 
Furthermore, the criterion “undesirable existence” is highly problematic since it could be 
interpreted to cover many diverse forms of (involuntary) euthanasia such as eugenic or 
social euthanasia. No distinction between euthanasia and suicide was described. Additional 
specific criteria would be necessary here.  
It is both interesting and challenging to observe how in the second edition the same author 
changed his conceptualization of euthanasia: “An act of euthanasia is held to be voluntary 
only if there is full disclosure of relevant information to, and consent freely given by, the 
intended competent recipient of the act” (Kohl, 2001, p. 492).91 First he distinguishes 
euthanasia from suicide, establishing a specific category of physician assisted suicide. 
Moreover, his concern is primarily with voluntary active euthanasia, stating that “the lines 
between voluntary, involuntary and non-voluntary euthanasia are crucial in a society that 
values both self-determination and compassion” (Kohl, 2001, p. 492). This development in 
Kohl’s conceptualization of euthanasia demonstrates the general tendency to be more 
specific and not to subsume any form of killing under the term “euthanasia”.  
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necessary; the following aspects in particular have to be specified:  
1. The decision-making process (competent/incompetent, patient/nonpatient, patient as 
decision-maker, physician/family as decision-maker…) 
2. Clinical conditions (terminal stage of illness, enormous suffering, medical futility…) 
3. Social context (the presence or lack of human/psychological/spiritual support…) 
4. Motivation and purpose (of the persons involved). 
6.4 The philosophical concepts that form the background of the euthanasia 
discussion 
With regard to euthanasia in contemporary technologized medicine, at least three 
philosophical foundations can be identified that form the background of euthanasia 
discussions: a teleological, deontological and human rights approach. Each in turn has its 
respective schools of though, traditions and movements.  
The teleological approach, setting out to determine what the (good) goal would be, in the 
context of good death often emphasizes the quality of life concept as an important purpose 
of human endeavour. As a part of the quality of life, health and wellbeing, good social 
relations and the absence of suffering can be given. Such conceptualized human life holds a 
high value and is therefore inviolable. However once it heads for its inevitable end, it is an 
important challenge and goal to aim for a dignified ending. Then autonomy in which an 
individual shapes his/her own life and self-determination by which one controls the 
circumstances are of vital significance. Therefore, the shortening of life or termination of life 
(and of the related suffering) are justifiable goals worthy of acting upon and realizing. 
The deontological approach mainly seeks to determine our obligations towards our life and 
towards the lives of others. The basic obligation towards life is to care for it, to support it, 
                                                 
91 In 1974, Kohl defined euthanasia as “the painless inducement of a quick death” (1974, p. 94). 
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and not to destroy it. Therefore suicide and euthanasia are wrong, because they violate the 
fundamental duty not to intentionally take life. Euthanasia thus sacrifices a person’s value 
as a subject for the sake of his/her welfare (Luper, 2009). Since a moral obligation to 
terminate life cannot be positively justified, one cannot agree with the termination of life; 
moreover one has a duty to oppose such tendencies even against the will of the other person 
since the other is also bound by the duty not to take life nor to allow it to be taken. The 
deontological prohibition of killing is universally valid; the open question is if there are 
some justifiable exemptions, such as capital punishment, suicide or euthanasia.  
The approach based on rights, in particular on human rights, does not identify any positive 
(given) or natural right to die. Therefore one cannot call for such right directly. However the 
right to die can be derived indirectly (e.g. from the right to life). Contrarily, the right to life 
belongs to human rights but one may “waive” the right to life in the case of suicide or 
euthanasia. Nevertheless, one is not allowed to delegate the execution of this right to 
another person, to allow to be legitimately killed. To take human life is morally wrong 
because the fundamental right to life (which is at the same time a right not to be killed) 
would be violated. Within liberal political philosophy, with its focus on the rights of the 
individual, a competent person, freely requesting the termination of his/her life which is not 
perceived as good and valuable anymore and having become burden to that individual, can 
forego his/her right to life, rendering killing as morally justifiable. In difference to the 
deontological approaches, within the liberal notion of rights, the duty not to be killed is 
limited to those who wish to live.   
7. Conclusion 
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misunderstandings. As many authors have pointed out, the term euthanasia, despite its 
frequent exposure in public media and in academic literature, does not reflect a clear set of 
concepts and definitions to be used in euthanasia debates. Thus, such debates often wind up 
inadequately formed and ineffectual, causing more frustration than solutions. It has become 
clear that any euthanasia discussion should be preceded by clarifications of the terminology 
to be used; semantics followed by ethics. 
Nevertheless the concept of euthanasia is not a new topic; our interest in the issue has only 
been renewed due to the effects of contemporary medical technology. It has been 
demonstrated that both the concept of euthanasia and the euthanasia discourse have their 
roots in Antiquity. The diverse notions of euthanasia as they have appeared through history 
were described and their relevance to present day discussions was highlighted. Altogether 
15 diverse notions (typologies) of euthanasia have been identified by this study. Many of 
them can be found in contemporary euthanasia debates. 
Out of the many typologies of euthanasia, voluntary (active) euthanasia (typology 11) has 
been selected as the most relevant concept for the conceptualization of euthanasia to the 
current medical context. As the preferable concept of euthanasia the following definition 
was taken from this source: euthanasia is a deliberate act of terminating the life of a 
competent (autonomous) patient in the terminal stage of an illness, performed by a 
physician upon the explicit and lasting request of this patient and that patient’s sake. So 
euthanasia, being different from both assisted suicide and physician assisted suicide, also 
differs from other instances of end-of-life decisions such as the withholding or withdrawing 
of life support or terminal sedation.  
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Consequently the conceptualization of euthanasia in recent bioethics literature was 
examined. As one of the results, an increasing tendency to specify the notion of euthanasia 
using better and more homogenized semantic precision during the last few decades was 
identified. This has in turn been adopted more widely, resulting in our broader 
understanding of euthanasia being changed towards a more precise description which 
distinguishes between euthanasia, suicide and (physician) assisted suicide. There has been a 
tendency of more and more authors understanding euthanasia as voluntary (and therefore 
active) euthanasia. The Dutch and Belgian legal definition of euthanasia seems to have 
influenced the conceptualization of euthanasia in the 21st century. 
Furthermore, the most relevant philosophical approaches that form the theoretical 
background of stances towards euthanasia were presented (teleology, deontology, rights).  
Right from the beginning, i.e. since Classical times, there has been an implicit correlation 
between good death and good life. Death, being not an event of life, terminates life, 
delimiting its boundaries as do the banks of a river. A formal determination of both good 
life and good death in not problematic – everybody wants a good life, including a good 
ending. However there is a huge discrepancy as to how to determine the content of this 
„good“. This has led to many diverse understandings of good death existing, as the product 
of individual value systems and communal moralities.  
One can expect that the controversy surrounding good death as an existential, emotionally 
sensitive and morally contentious discourse will continue to be a serious social and political 
challenge in this age of ever increasing medical technology, aging populations and ongoing 
health care debates. 
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term euthanasia in the Modern Era is attributed to early 17th-century philosopher Francis 
Bacon, who wrote that euthanasia referred to “a fair and easy passage from life to death 
without pain and dolors” (Dick, 1955). Three centuries later, however, euthanasia took on a 
negative connotation with the introduction of Nazi “program euthanasia”, developed 
during World War II in order to eliminate “life unworthy of life”, including persons with 
illnesses and disabilities. In the 1960s, in reaction to the advances in medical technology and 
its intensive use, serious debate took place in the Netherlands (Kater et al., 2003). At that 
time, the term euthanasia was placed in the highly specific context of reaction against heroic 
treatment. Concerns focused on the best thing to do in a life-and-death situation where the 
patient’s wishes were central. Until the late 1970s, the term euthanasia designated a broad 
category of problems (for example, direct action, indirect action, refraining from action, and 
whether there was a request from the patient); since that time, however, it has been defined 
as “... the administration of drugs with the explicit intention of ending the patient's life at 
his/her request” (van der Mas et al., 1991). This is now the definition “officially” used in 
most industrialized countries. In particular, it served as a basis for regulating the practice of 
euthanasia in the Netherlands in the 1990s, when legislation was being amended in order to 
allow euthanasia in the Netherlands (2000), Belgium (2002) and Luxemburg (2009), and also 
for the systematic study of this practice. Thus we can see that the term euthanasia has been 
subjected to a variety of influences over time, and has recently been very strictly defined as a 
medical act that consists in intentionally bringing about the death of a patient at that 
person’s request. Practically speaking, euthanasia is usually accomplished by giving an 
injection of a barbiturate, combined with a neuromuscular relaxant which bring about the 
patient's death (Matersvedt et al., 2003). 
In order to better understand what euthanasia exactly means (or not means), we must put it 
in perspective with other end-of-life medical practices. In fact, there are conceptual and 
practical distinctions among end-of-life practices; in recent decades in a number of 
industrialized countries, these distinctions have made it possible to differentiate between 
what is considered legal and what is not. The objective here is not to pass moral judgement 
on whether this situation is acceptable or not, but rather to provide a factual description of 
the situation. First of all, withholding treatment means not initiating treatment that may 
maintain or prolong life (for example, cardiac resuscitation or blood transfusion); treatment 
withdrawal means interrupting or ceasing life-sustaining treatment (for example, a 
ventilator, artificial nutrition or hydration, dialysis). These decisions, made in accordance 
with the patient’s wishes, are considered as good medical practices in most industrialized 
countries. Recognizing this right of refusal protects patients from possible heroic treatment 
and flows from physicians’ duty not to harm (non maleficence). Previously, these medical 
decisions were sometimes labelled as "passive euthanasia" since, for some people, they 
considered that the result (death) was the same as in the case of active euthanasia (lethal 
injection with intent to induce death), even though the means to the end was different. That 
terminology is not only confusing but also semantically meaningless. 
A physician who respects a patient’s will to stop treatment that may prolong life, or that 
maintains life artificially, is not exonerated from the duty of providing the patient with 
adequate care to control pain and other symptoms. However, for some people, relieving 
pain with adequate doses of morphine may induce death and can therefore considered to be 
euthanasia. As a result, to ensure that patients receive the treatment needed for adequate 
pain relief, the principle of “double effect” was introduced. The “double effect” arises from 
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the fact that adequate pain relief sometimes calls for significant doses that could accelerate 
death as a side effect. In situations of this type, the intent is to relieve pain, not to induce 
death. Nevertheless, as we shall see, the results of recent research strongly challenge this 
principle of “double effect”, indicating that, on the contrary, administration of medication 
needed for adequate pain relief would have the effect of prolonging, not shortening, life. 
Furthermore, and still with the objective of controlling pain and other symptoms at the end 
of life, we see increasingly frequent references to terminal sedation since the last decade. 
This practice consists in inducing sleep until death in persons at the end of life who have 
treatment-resistant symptoms such as pain, respiratory disorders, moral suffering, or 
delirium.  
Relief of pain and other symptoms is one specific objective of palliative care. In fact, 
according to the World Health Organization definition: “Palliative care is an approach that 
improves the quality of life of patients and their families facing the problem associated with 
life-threatening illness, through the prevention and relief of suffering by means of early 
identification and impeccable assessment and treatment of pain and other problems, 
physical, psychosocial and spiritual.” (Sepùlveda et al., 2002). Dying with dignity is what 
palliative care professionals offer to persons at the end of life, but this is also the expression 
used by proponents of the legalization of euthanasia. Although the end is the same, in a 
number of countries euthanasia as a means to that end is considered irreconcilable with the 
concept of palliative care. In fact, palliative care is usually presented as antithetical to a 
debate on euthanasia: for example, persistent demand for euthanasia may be seen as a 
failure of palliative care; or palliative care may even be presented as the sole alternative to 
euthanasia. In endeavouring to counter the argument that better access to high-quality 
palliative care would eliminate the desire for euthanasia to end one’s life, Belgium 
simultaneously passed two pieces of legislation: one on euthanasia (Sénat de Belgique, 
2001a); and the other on palliative care, guaranteeing patients equal access to high-quality 
care (Sénat de Belgique, 2001b). In fact, access to palliative care is a major issue that must be 
addressed: for example, it is estimated that only between 16% and 30% of Canadians have 
access to palliative care, depending on their place of residence (Canadian Institute for 
Health Information, 2007), even though Canada ranks ninth out of 40 countries on a 
“Quality of Death” Index that takes into account factors including the availability of 
palliative care (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2010). 
In general, withholding treatment, treatment withdrawal, relief of pain and terminal 
sedation are medically recognized as good practices and are legal in most industrialized 
countries, when implemented in accordance with the patient’s wishes. However, except in a 
few European countries, euthanasia is still illegal, although its ethical justification is the 
subject of intense debate. Another practice usually considered to be illegal is physician-
assisted suicide, which is distinguished from euthanasia by the concept of the person 
performing the act: in assisted suicide, it is the patient who takes the action that will induce 
that person’s own death, while in euthanasia, it is the physician who assumes this 
responsibility. Three main concepts may be used to distinguish between these practices: 
intent; the act performed; and the person performing the act that results in death. 
In theory, the current definition of euthanasia and the distinctions applied to other types of 
end-of-life practices have been accepted in legislative, research and medical circles. This 
consensus notwithstanding, groups each have their own justifications for acceptance. In 
legislative circles, the objective is to distinguish between legal and illegal practices on the 
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basis of societal values. The medical associations, consistently following the Hippocratic 
oath, have a duty to determine what is acceptable in terms of medical practice and to ensure 
their members’ adherence to the profession’s code of ethics. In research circles and 
particularly empirical studies, the objective is to obtain sound internal validity by using a 
recognized definition of the concept being studied. On that basis, study results can be 
reproduced and compared with the results of former studies, for which studies conducted in 
the Netherlands have been a reference point. As presented in this part, then, distinguishing 
among end-of-life medical practices and making them operational is essentially utilitarian. 
3. Understandings of euthanasia 
Until now, there have been few specific studies on people’s understandings of euthanasia, 
and these few studies have specific angles of analysis that can be classified under 
three headings. First, there are studies, often using a qualitative approach, on what people 
spontaneously think euthanasia is or how they identify components of a definition of 
euthanasia. Second, there are other studies on people’s ability to distinguish between 
euthanasia and other end-of-life practices using vignettes. Third, there are studies on 
people’s knowledge of whether euthanasia and other end-of-life practices are legally 
accepted in their respective countries. Aside from these different angles of analysis, these 
studies also diverge in two significant aspects of methodology: the country of the survey; 
and the target population of the survey (members of the general public; patients; significant 
others or natural caregivers; physicians or nurses). As well, the methods of data collection 
varied, as the way questions were formulated. Taking into account these significant 
challenges to the comparability of results, we will present these studies successively by 
angle of analysis; we will then endeavour to draw some conclusions about the current state 
of respondents’ knowledge. 
3.1 Spontaneous definitions of euthanasia 
At a 1-day informative conference for Dutch medical students on the topic of “Dying on 
Request”, participants were asked, before and after the training activity, to define 
euthanasia (Muller et al., 1996). Although the objective was certainly to check the acquisition 
of knowledge after the training day, the results provide some indications of participants’ 
initial concepts. This study is interesting from two standpoints: theoretically, the 
participants should have had good knowledge of what constitutes euthanasia because their 
future profession would call upon them to address this issue ; as well, they lived in a 
country where (in the mid-1990s) euthanasia was already broadly debated, regulated in 
certain circumstances, but not yet legalized. In order to assess participants’ knowledge, the 
researchers used as a benchmark the definition adopted in 1987 by the Dutch State 
Commission on Euthanasia: “Active voluntary euthanasia is the intentional termination of 
life, by someone other than the patient, at the patient's request”. On that basis, the 
researchers were looking for three components of the definition of euthanasia: (1) intent to 
hasten death; (2) a person performing the act who is someone else than the patient; 
and (3) the existence of a request as evidence of compliance with the patient’s wishes. Of the 
137 student respondents, approximately two out of five initially provided the three expected 
components of the definition (41%; 39%; and 41% respectively, in regard to the 
components). Clearly the training day benefited participants, since most respondents’ 
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knowledge of what constitutes euthanasia in medical practice in the Netherlands improved 
significantly (90%; 89%; and 84% respectively, in regard to the component). Unfortunately, 
there is no indication of the number of persons who combined the three components in their 
definitions, either before or after the training activity. Nor is there any indication of other 
components spontaneously put forward by respondents, which might have made it possible 
to determine whether there was confusion with other end-of-life practices. Still, we may 
posit that, despite respondents’ special status and a context conducive to discussion of 
euthanasia, initial knowledge appeared to be limited. 
During the same decade, an Australian survey of 10 nurses was designed in particular to 
shed light on nurses’ understanding of euthanasia (McInerney & Seibold, 1995). When 
asked: “What is your understanding of euthanasia?”, six respondents spontaneously 
provided what the researchers considered to be an accurate definition, that is, involving 
intent to induce death. In fact, the researchers applied the distinction between “active” and 
“passive” to assess whether the definitions provided by the nurse respondents were 
accurate; when questioned, further, by far most respondents appeared to support this 
distinction. As well, nine out of the 10 respondents did not consider the “double effect” to be 
euthanasia, in particular because of the concept of intent. Interestingly, six of the 
10 respondents did not refer to the voluntary aspect of euthanasia; that is, they did not 
mention the importance of a request by the patient, as required by the Dutch definition of 
euthanasia. In conclusion, this study states: “It was conceded that the term passive 
euthanasia, particularly in relation to treatment withdrawal, has served to confuse the real 
debate centring around active euthanasia”; this debate did indeed take place in Australia at 
that time, and the 1995 legislative amendment allowing euthanasia in the Northern Territory 
of that country was overturned a few months after being effective (Dickinson et al., 1998). 
Participants in this study endorsed the idea of confusion created by the use of various 
adjectives with the term euthanasia, and appeared to distinguish readily between passive 
and active euthanasia. Nevertheless, one may wonder about the representativity of the 
findings of this study, since two broader surveys of nurses (Aranda & O'Conner, 1995; Davis 
et al., 1993) expressed significant reservations about the validity of their own results, 
specifically because of differing interpretations of the subject of the study. For example, in 
referring to euthanasia, nurses gave as examples of treatment withdrawal taking a patient 
off a respirator or withdrawing artificial feeding, and even pain relief through increased 
doses of morphine at the risk of hastening death. In short, even among professionals 
working with patients at the end of life, concepts of euthanasia do not appear to be 
altogether clear. 
A similar open-ended question about what constitutes euthanasia was asked of 236 persons 
with cancer in Australia (Parkinson et al., 2005). Main topics identified included: “assisted 
death” (44%), meaning that another person is involved in the process; “suffering” (41%), 
identifying the context in which euthanasia takes place; and “ending life” (39%), raising the 
issue of intent, but not indicating exactly what respondents meant. In fact, very few persons 
appear to have referred to the "methods" of ending life; under this heading, the researchers 
grouped all sorts of activities including not only euthanasia but also other end-of-life 
practices/terms (such as lethal injection, tablet, withdrawal or withholding treatment, and 
active or passive measures). According to the study, the fact that a personal choice is 
involved, and the fact that this choice has to do with one’s own death, were more frequently 
referred to than the concept of voluntary death, which was not often made explicit. 
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basis of societal values. The medical associations, consistently following the Hippocratic 
oath, have a duty to determine what is acceptable in terms of medical practice and to ensure 
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challenges to the comparability of results, we will present these studies successively by 
angle of analysis; we will then endeavour to draw some conclusions about the current state 
of respondents’ knowledge. 
3.1 Spontaneous definitions of euthanasia 
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country where (in the mid-1990s) euthanasia was already broadly debated, regulated in 
certain circumstances, but not yet legalized. In order to assess participants’ knowledge, the 
researchers used as a benchmark the definition adopted in 1987 by the Dutch State 
Commission on Euthanasia: “Active voluntary euthanasia is the intentional termination of 
life, by someone other than the patient, at the patient's request”. On that basis, the 
researchers were looking for three components of the definition of euthanasia: (1) intent to 
hasten death; (2) a person performing the act who is someone else than the patient; 
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knowledge of what constitutes euthanasia in medical practice in the Netherlands improved 
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During the same decade, an Australian survey of 10 nurses was designed in particular to 
shed light on nurses’ understanding of euthanasia (McInerney & Seibold, 1995). When 
asked: “What is your understanding of euthanasia?”, six respondents spontaneously 
provided what the researchers considered to be an accurate definition, that is, involving 
intent to induce death. In fact, the researchers applied the distinction between “active” and 
“passive” to assess whether the definitions provided by the nurse respondents were 
accurate; when questioned, further, by far most respondents appeared to support this 
distinction. As well, nine out of the 10 respondents did not consider the “double effect” to be 
euthanasia, in particular because of the concept of intent. Interestingly, six of the 
10 respondents did not refer to the voluntary aspect of euthanasia; that is, they did not 
mention the importance of a request by the patient, as required by the Dutch definition of 
euthanasia. In conclusion, this study states: “It was conceded that the term passive 
euthanasia, particularly in relation to treatment withdrawal, has served to confuse the real 
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altogether clear. 
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with cancer in Australia (Parkinson et al., 2005). Main topics identified included: “assisted 
death” (44%), meaning that another person is involved in the process; “suffering” (41%), 
identifying the context in which euthanasia takes place; and “ending life” (39%), raising the 
issue of intent, but not indicating exactly what respondents meant. In fact, very few persons 
appear to have referred to the "methods" of ending life; under this heading, the researchers 
grouped all sorts of activities including not only euthanasia but also other end-of-life 
practices/terms (such as lethal injection, tablet, withdrawal or withholding treatment, and 
active or passive measures). According to the study, the fact that a personal choice is 
involved, and the fact that this choice has to do with one’s own death, were more frequently 
referred to than the concept of voluntary death, which was not often made explicit. 
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However, the fact that a high percentage of respondents referred to personal choice (request, 
wish, choice, decision) suggests that euthanasia flows from compliance with “the patient’s 
request” as set out in the Dutch definition of euthanasia. In summary, on the basis of the 
results presented, it is difficult to ascertain whether respondents distinguish between 
euthanasia and other end-of-life practices. In fact, the researchers indicate that people 
instinctively use euthanasia to mean a range of situations that could be described as active, 
passive, voluntary or even involuntary. 
Lastly, respondents in a survey of 991 residents of Quebec, Canada, were asked: “In your 
opinion, what is euthanasia?” (Marcoux, 2003). First of all, one out of eight respondents 
indicated that they did not know what euthanasia is. Following an analysis of 825 codifiable 
definitions, nine initial themes were identified: (1) the type of subject (human or animal) to 
which the definition applied; (2) the intent underlying the act; (3) the act performed; (4) the 
person performing the act; (5) the existence of a request; (6) the existence of consent; (7) the 
presence of compassion; (8) the reasons underlying the act; and (9) the circumstances 
surrounding the act. However, in order to make people’s understanding of euthanasia 
operational and in order to compare the definitions, certain strongly correlated themes were 
combined (for example: act and intent; reasons, circumstances and compassion), and only 
some themes were selected, on the basis of the minimal semantic components inherent in 
the definition of euthanasia (intent; the person performing the act; and compassion). For 
example, for a definition to be classified as euthanasia, it had to include at least these 
three components, justified as follows: the intent is to induce death; the person performing 
the act is someone else; and indicators of compassion are present. When justification was 
used to cross-reference the response components, only 414 of the 825 definitions provided 
could be classified, under the following composite headings: (1) euthanasia (17.4%); 
(2) assisted suicide (4.2%); (3) treatment withdrawal (3.0%); (4) ambiguous practices, that is, 
those in which intent cannot be determined (17.1%); (5) suicide (4.3%); and (6) murder 
(4.3%). General observations are as follows: very few people spontaneously know what 
euthanasia is; over half have a fragmented understanding of the subject; and the rest appear 
to be confused about the difference between euthanasia, other end of life practices  such as 
treatment withdrawal, but also physician-assisted suicide and even suicide. Some 
respondents spontaneously indicated that euthanasia means murder, citing intent to cause 
death and the fact that the act is performed by someone else, but included no component of 
compassion in the definition. Still, care must be exercised in interpreting the scope of these 
results since the telephone survey method does not readily lend itself to questions of this 
type (attempting to identify people’s understanding of euthanasia using an open-ended 
question) . 
3.2 People’s ability to distinguish between euthanasia and other end-of-life practices 
The following studies used vignettes to focus on people’s understanding of euthanasia as 
compared with other end-of-life practices. The methodological details and brief results of 
these studies are presented in Table 1. As part of a public education event on death and 
dying, participants were asked first to complete a questionnaire on their knowledge of this 
subject (Gallagher, 2001: see box 1). Although a high percentage of participants already 
worked in palliative care (61 of 144 participants, or 42%), according to the results, 47% of 
participants thought that: “Euthanasia involves withholding life-sustaining treatments such 
as life support machines,” even though only 16% thought it is illegal to refuse treatment. 
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Although these results initially appear contradictory, they can be interpreted in two ways. 
First, it is possible that some persons think that the term euthanasia refers to a legal practice 
(which was not the case in Canada either when the study was conducted or when the book 
was published). Second, the lack of reference in the first vignette to a request by the patient 
could explain this variation between the two situations. Another interesting result of this 
study is the indication that 46% of participants believe in the principle of "double effect", 
that is, that pain relief using morphine may shorten a patient’s life and even precipitate 
death, which is often a source of confusion with euthanasia, as we shall see. 
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Withdrawing treatment 
is euthanasia: 66% 
“Double effect” is 
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Study Year of 
realization 





2007 Sweden a. Public 
b. Physician 
Mail a. 1202 (48%) 
b. 1200 (57%) 
Withdrawal of ventilator 
(no chance of improvement, 
but can live for many 
years) is considered as a 
type of euthanasia 
a. 16%            b. 26% 
Withdrawal of dialysis, 
depending of 
characteristics of the 
patients 
a. 16 and 17%    b. 8 and 
13% 
Table 1. Distinction between euthanasia and other end-of-life decisions 
 
Box 1. 
 "Euthanasia involves withholding life-sustaining treatments such as life support 
machines" 
 "It is illegal to refuse treatment if you have a life-threatening illness" 
 "Morphine doses sufficient to relieve pain may shorten the life of the person or 
contribute to their death" 
Gallagher (2001) 
 
Confusion between treatment withdrawal and euthanasia was shown among members of 
the population, and this confusion was even more widespread about various end-of-life 
practices (Marcoux et al., 2007). Vignettes of different end-of-life practices were used; for 
each vignette, respondents were asked to indicate whether the situation involves euthanasia 
or not (see box 2). Nearly three out of four respondents identified physician-assisted suicide 
as being euthanasia; 66% identified treatment withdrawal at the patient’s request as being 
euthanasia; 49% identified the “double effect” as being euthanasia; and 38% identified 
withholding life-sustaining treatment as being euthanasia. Although there was no specific 
question about knowledge of whether these acts are legal in Canada (euthanasia and 
assisted suicide were illegal when the study was conducted and when the book was 
published), one may nevertheless assume that the recurring public debate on the 
acceptability of legislative amendments to allow euthanasia has numerous connotations in 
the popular imagination. In short, how should the results of public opinion polls on 
euthanasia be interpreted when respondents think, for example, that taking a patient off a 
respirator at his or her request (treatment withdrawal ) is de facto euthanasia? 
 
Box 2 
 "A dying person asks his doctor to give him a lethal injection because he could no 
longer stand suffering from his illness. The doctor agrees and this causes the patient's 
death" [Euthanasia vignette] 
 "A doctor gives a terminally ill person medication the person can take to kill himself" 
[Physician-assisted suicide vignette] 
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 "At the request of a patient, a doctor disconnects machines which keep the person 
alive, for example, an artificial lung" [Treatment withdrawal vignette] 
 "At the request of a patient, a doctor respects the person's decision to refuse treatment 
which would prolong his life" [Withholding treatment vignette] 
 "A doctor gives a dying person drugs to relieve his suffering, but the drugs hasten his 
death" [“Double effect” vignette] 
Marcoux et al. (2007) 
 
In the next two studies, respondents were asked to choose, from among proposed 
definitions, the one that best reflected their individual definition of euthanasia. As a result, 
unlike the previous study, here the responses were mutually exclusive, which makes it 
impossible to determine whether there is juxtaposition of confusion. Neil et al. (2007) 
proposed three vignettes to a group of physicians (see box 3); 62% of respondents chose the 
statement emphasizing the intent of “hastening death” underlying the act performed as an 
inherent component of what constitutes euthanasia (an accurate definition according to the 
researchers), in comparison with two other statements that referred instead to the “double 
effect” (20%) and to withholding or treatment withdrawal (13%). Moreover, 4% of 
respondents wanted instead to suggest their own definitions, most of which emphasized the 
etymological meaning of the term euthanasia: “good death”. These results show that the 
term euthanasia can have different meanings even among physicians, 83% of whom have 
already cared for patients at the end of life. 
 
Box 3 
Which of the following do you regard as euthanasia? 
 Provision of medication or drug that doctor believes will hasten the patient's death 
 As well as taking active steps, withdrawing or withholding 
 Actions count as euthanasia only if acts with the primary intention of hastening death 
Neil et al. (2007) 
 
Unlike the study by Neil et al. (2007.), conducted in Australia where the legal status of 
end-of-life practices is the same as in most western countries, the study by Vilela & 
Caramelli (2009) was conducted in Brazil in 2003, a few years before that country’s Federal 
Council on Medicine published standards of practice on the withholding or withdrawing 
life-sustaining treatment at the end of life (personal communication with the author). The 
comparison of responses by physicians and caregivers of persons with Alzheimer disease 
leads to different conclusions about what members of each of these two groups consider to 
be euthanasia (see box 4 for wording). Although the response choices were mutually 
exclusive, there was no real consistency in the responses by caregivers, since between 15% 
and 25% of them chose statements identifying treatment withdrawal, assisted suicide, 
“double effect”, euthanasia, or “Don’t know/Other”. Responses by physicians were more 
limited, to statements identifying euthanasia (40%), treatment withdrawal (23%), and “Don’t 
know/Other” (23%). In this context, the confusion between euthanasia and other end-of-life 
practices may be understandable since their legal status was not explicit at the time the 
study was conducted. Nevertheless, in comparison with the previous studies, this one still 
shows evidence of the conceptual mixture between withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment 
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In the next two studies, respondents were asked to choose, from among proposed 
definitions, the one that best reflected their individual definition of euthanasia. As a result, 
unlike the previous study, here the responses were mutually exclusive, which makes it 
impossible to determine whether there is juxtaposition of confusion. Neil et al. (2007) 
proposed three vignettes to a group of physicians (see box 3); 62% of respondents chose the 
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Unlike the study by Neil et al. (2007.), conducted in Australia where the legal status of 
end-of-life practices is the same as in most western countries, the study by Vilela & 
Caramelli (2009) was conducted in Brazil in 2003, a few years before that country’s Federal 
Council on Medicine published standards of practice on the withholding or withdrawing 
life-sustaining treatment at the end of life (personal communication with the author). The 
comparison of responses by physicians and caregivers of persons with Alzheimer disease 
leads to different conclusions about what members of each of these two groups consider to 
be euthanasia (see box 4 for wording). Although the response choices were mutually 
exclusive, there was no real consistency in the responses by caregivers, since between 15% 
and 25% of them chose statements identifying treatment withdrawal, assisted suicide, 
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and euthanasia, much like the former terms active and passive euthanasia, which are a 
source of confusion in medical practice.  
 
Box 4 
"What do you understand by euthanasia?"  
 It is to let one die without any kind of medical assistance 
 It is to let one die without sophisticated medical assistance (mechanical ventilation, 
dialyse, feeding directly in the vein...) 
 It is to induce death by giving, for instance, a medication with lethal effect 
 It is the attempt to reduce patient suffering by giving medications that control pain but 
shorten life 
 It is to give the patient a lethal medication to let him/her take by himself/herself the 
decision to shorten his/her life 
 I do not know/free answer/more than one option 
Vilela & Caramelli (2009) 
 
Although the next study was not designed to identify specific knowledge or possible 
confusion about end-of-life practices, it does indicate that certain situations of treatment 
withdrawal are considered to be, not as “defensible acts”, but rather as a type of euthanasia 
(Lindblad et al, 2010). This is true among approximately 16% of respondents from the 
general public, regardless of the vignette presented (see box 5). The same vignettes were 
also presented to physicians, who appeared to interpret the content of the acts differently 
depending on the vignette presented. For example, 8% and 13% of physicians respectively 
considered withdrawal of dialysis (case 1 and case 2) as a form of euthanasia, while 
one physician out of four (26%) considered withdrawal of a ventilator maintaining life 
(case 3) to be “a type of euthanasia”. However, that wording may be criticized since in fact it  
 
Box 5 
 "A 77-year-old woman, who as a result of type 2 diabetes and chronic renal 
insufficiency is dependent on dialysis three times a week. In recent months she has 
repeatedly expressed a wish to terminate the dialysis treatment. The woman is tired of 
life, but cognitively clear and not suffering from any mental illness" (case 1). 
 "A 36-year-old man, who 5 years earlier attempted to commit suicide. He was saved 
without brain injuries, but as a result of a persistent chronic kidney disorder he is still 
dialysis dependent. Initially, he also received psychiatric treatment. The patient is in 
line for a kidney transplant. During the past 6 months he has repeatedly expressed a 
wish to decline the kidney transplant and to terminate the dialysis treatment. A 
psychiatric examination does not reveal any mental illness" (case 2). 
 "A 34-year-old competent man who is tetraplegic and ventilator dependent as the 
result of a car accident 5 years ago. There is no chance of improvement, but the patient 
may live for many years in his current state. During the past 6 months, the patient has 
repeatedly asked for the ventilator treatment to be discontinued. Neither the physician, 
who knows the patient well, nor a consultant psychiatrist regard the patient as 
clinically depressed" (case 3). 
Lindblad et al. (2010) 
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gives the impression that there are a number of types of euthanasia, and thus the wording of 
the question alone may create confusion. In the present state of affairs (when the study was 
conducted and when the book was published) in Sweden, treatment may be refused, 
although euthanasia is prohibited. The fact that more physicians considered treatment 
withdrawal in the case of a young quadriplegic man to be euthanasia provides food for 
thought. The possibility of this patient’s living for a number of years in this condition may 
have influenced the physicians’ interpretation of the request and invite us to reflect in 
greater depth on the balance between respect for the patient’s autonomy and the physician’s 
duty to do good. 
3.3 People’s knowledge about legal status of euthanasia and other end-of-life 
practices 
The following studies focus more specifically on whether people are aware of their rights in 
terms of end-of-life care under the legislation in force in their respective countries of 
residence. The methodology details and brief results of these studies are shown in Table 2. 
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and euthanasia, much like the former terms active and passive euthanasia, which are a 
source of confusion in medical practice.  
 
Box 4 
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dialyse, feeding directly in the vein...) 
 It is to induce death by giving, for instance, a medication with lethal effect 
 It is the attempt to reduce patient suffering by giving medications that control pain but 
shorten life 
 It is to give the patient a lethal medication to let him/her take by himself/herself the 
decision to shorten his/her life 
 I do not know/free answer/more than one option 
Vilela & Caramelli (2009) 
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gives the impression that there are a number of types of euthanasia, and thus the wording of 
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withdrawal in the case of a young quadriplegic man to be euthanasia provides food for 
thought. The possibility of this patient’s living for a number of years in this condition may 
have influenced the physicians’ interpretation of the request and invite us to reflect in 
greater depth on the balance between respect for the patient’s autonomy and the physician’s 
duty to do good. 
3.3 People’s knowledge about legal status of euthanasia and other end-of-life 
practices 
The following studies focus more specifically on whether people are aware of their rights in 
terms of end-of-life care under the legislation in force in their respective countries of 
residence. The methodology details and brief results of these studies are shown in Table 2. 
 
Study Year of 
realization 




the legal options 


























Kopp 2002 US 
(Arkansas) 
















Euthanasia – The “Good Death” Controversy in Humans and Animals 
 
56
Study Year of 
realization 




the legal options 
Morita et 
al. 








Withdrawal: 32 à 
45% 
“Double effect”: 50 
à 63% 
Euthanasia (illegal):  












(a & c)3 
In class 
(b) 
a. 120 (40%) 
b. 205 (80%) 





Table 2. Knowledge about legal options at the end of life 
One study was conducted among outpatients at university-affiliated clinics in Oregon, USA, 
in 1999, that is, approximately two years after the passage of legislation allowing the 
practice of physician-assisted suicide under specific conditions (Silveira et al., 2000). For 
each of a series of vignettes (see box 6), respondents were asked to indicate whether the 
practice was legal or illegal under legislation in force in Oregon. Of the 728 respondent, 69% 
appeared to be aware of their right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, and fewer than 
half (46%) appeared to be aware of their right to have this type of treatment withdrawn. 
Only 41% considered the “double effect” to be consistent with the legislation. Despite public 
debate in preceding years about the legislative amendments to allow physician-assisted 
suicide, only 23% of respondents were aware that they had the right to ask their physician 
for assistance in ending their life if their life expectancy was less than six months. A 
somewhat lower proportion (17%) however, erroneously believed that euthanasia was 
legally allowed in Oregon. Moreover, according to this study, nearly two out of 
three persons made no distinction between euthanasia and assisted suicide. Having 
personally experienced illness or the illness and death of a significant other, or having 
written an advance directive, were unrelated to greater awareness of one’s rights in terms of 
end-of-life care. Nevertheless, having acted as a proxy in health care decisions for a 
significant other apparently had a positive effect on greater awareness of these rights.  
 
Box 6 
 "In Oregon, does a patient like John, who has less than 6 months to live, have the legal 
right to refuse treatment that might cure him or save his life"? 
 "In Oregon, is it legal for a physician to turn off a ventilator when requested by a 
patient like John, with less than 6 months to live, even if it means the patient might 
die"? 
 "In Oregon, is it legal for a physician to inject a medication that would cause a patient's 
immediate death if a patient like John, with less than 6 months to live, requests it"? 
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 "In Oregon, is it legal for a physician to prescribe a medication and provide advice so 
that the patient can take the medication that will end his life if a patient like John, with 
less than 6 months to live, requests it"? 
 "In Oregon, is it legal for a physician to give patients like John, with less than 6 months 
to live, pain medications with the goal of relieving pain and suffering even if death 
may occur sooner as a result"? 
Silveira et al. (2000) 
 
That study was replicated a few years later in 2002, in Arkansas, USA, among a sample of 
300 persons (Kopp, 2008-2009). The results of this study differed somewhat from those of the 
previous study; possible explanations are the three-year time lag between the two studies, a 
difference in the type of respondents (outpatients at a medical clinic, as compared with 
respondents in households), sample size (728, as compared with 300), and the way the study 
was administered (a self-administered questionnaire, as compared with a mailed 
questionnaire). There was greater awareness in Arkansas whether euthanasia and assisted 
suicide are legal (79% and 71% respectively); both practices are illegal in that state. 
Nevertheless, for all practices there was a high percentage of “Don’t know” responses, 
varying from 18% for euthanasia, through 31% for treatment withdrawal, to 35% for the 
“double effect”. It should be noted that 21% of respondents believed they did not have the 
legal right to refuse treatment. A study conducted in Japan (Morita et al., 2006) also shows a 
great deal of uncertainty about the legality of certain end-of-life practices, and indicates 
confusion that is proportionally similar to that shown by Silvera et al. (2000). However, it is 
difficult to draw any formal conclusions since at the time of the study the actual status of 
end-of-life practices in Japan did not appear to be very clear and had to be ascertained 
through consensus among experts. Still, it can be stated that there is significant confusion, 
regardless of type of end-of-life practice, although confusion appears to be more marked 
about withdrawing artificial hydration and the “double effect” (practices "supposedly" 
legally permitted in Japan at this time) than about euthanasia (illegal practice). 
Mitchell & Owens (2004) focused on knowledge among physicians (n=120), students (n=205), 
and persons 55 and older (n=595) of whether acts of assistance in dying were legal in 
New Zealand. Four vignettes were presented, three of which showed situations of various 
levels of involvement in assisted suicide (supplying information; supplying drugs; assisting to 
take drugs) and one of which showed a situation involving euthanasia (see box below). 
Unfortunately, no situation involving treatment withdrawal was presented, which would 
have made it possible to compare knowledge of legal and illegal practices. According to this 
study, no physicians stated that it is legal in New Zealand to administer a lethal injection to 
a terminally ill person, at the patient's request, although 6% said they were not sure. This 
degree of uncertainty was even more marked among laypersons, who accounted for nearly 
one-third of respondents. Providing information on hastening death, and providing means 
to induce death, both at the request of a terminally ill person, were a particular source of 
confusion about the risk of legal action. In fact, in the first example, 18% of physicians 
believed that this practice is legal, while 26% were not sure. Among the two other 
respondent groups, not being sure about the legal status of these two acts ranged from 36% 
to 43%. In light of these few studies, then, we can see that awareness of legal rights in terms 
of end-of-life care is far from being optimal, among both physicians and persons who will 
eventually need to face these choices. 
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 "In Oregon, is it legal for a physician to prescribe a medication and provide advice so 
that the patient can take the medication that will end his life if a patient like John, with 
less than 6 months to live, requests it"? 
 "In Oregon, is it legal for a physician to give patients like John, with less than 6 months 
to live, pain medications with the goal of relieving pain and suffering even if death 
may occur sooner as a result"? 
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That study was replicated a few years later in 2002, in Arkansas, USA, among a sample of 
300 persons (Kopp, 2008-2009). The results of this study differed somewhat from those of the 
previous study; possible explanations are the three-year time lag between the two studies, a 
difference in the type of respondents (outpatients at a medical clinic, as compared with 
respondents in households), sample size (728, as compared with 300), and the way the study 
was administered (a self-administered questionnaire, as compared with a mailed 
questionnaire). There was greater awareness in Arkansas whether euthanasia and assisted 
suicide are legal (79% and 71% respectively); both practices are illegal in that state. 
Nevertheless, for all practices there was a high percentage of “Don’t know” responses, 
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difficult to draw any formal conclusions since at the time of the study the actual status of 
end-of-life practices in Japan did not appear to be very clear and had to be ascertained 
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regardless of type of end-of-life practice, although confusion appears to be more marked 
about withdrawing artificial hydration and the “double effect” (practices "supposedly" 
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Mitchell & Owens (2004) focused on knowledge among physicians (n=120), students (n=205), 
and persons 55 and older (n=595) of whether acts of assistance in dying were legal in 
New Zealand. Four vignettes were presented, three of which showed situations of various 
levels of involvement in assisted suicide (supplying information; supplying drugs; assisting to 
take drugs) and one of which showed a situation involving euthanasia (see box below). 
Unfortunately, no situation involving treatment withdrawal was presented, which would 
have made it possible to compare knowledge of legal and illegal practices. According to this 
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a terminally ill person, at the patient's request, although 6% said they were not sure. This 
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to 43%. In light of these few studies, then, we can see that awareness of legal rights in terms 
of end-of-life care is far from being optimal, among both physicians and persons who will 
eventually need to face these choices. 
 




 Patient B has a terminal illness (i.e. no hope of recovery), and pain is a constant 
problem, not alleviated by drugs. [...] The patient has difficulty swallowing and 
requests the doctor to administer a lethal injection to end the suffering. The doctor 
administers a lethal injection.       In your understanding, is this action legal in New 
Zealand? 
(Mitchell & Owens, 2004) 
4. Repercussions of confusion about euthanasia 
This confusion about what constitutes euthanasia and what are the distinctions among 
end-of-life practices necessarily has interpersonal, societal and political repercussions, 
depending on the roles of groups in society. As a result, our objectives are to review these 
studies and to discuss issues that characterize this societal debate from the standpoints of 
the various groups. 
4.1 Laypersons 
Public understanding does not appear to cover the subtleties of rights in terms of end-of-life 
care or the distinctions among end-of-life practices. In fact, when surveyed about these 
issues, people show a rather naïve approach: instead of distinguishing among end-of-life 
practices, often they consider all these practices to be euthanasia. In particular, many people 
appear to consider withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment to be an act of 
euthanasia (Gallagher, 2001; Marcoux et al., 2007), and appear to believe that they do not 
have the legal right to express that wish to a physician (Kopp, 2008-2009; Morita et al., 2006; 
Silveira et al., 2000). As well, in a context of public opinion polls, this confusion between 
treatment withdrawal and euthanasia appears to be associated with greater support for 
euthanasia (Marcoux et al., 2007). Similar conclusions were also shown in the study 
conducted by Kopp (2008-2009), which focused on the issue of physician-assisted suicide; 
the results of that study showed that greater awareness of the legality of certain practices, 
including treatment withdrawal and the “double effect”, was associated with lower support 
for physician-assisted suicide. In summary, caution is advisable in interpreting the results of 
public opinion survey about euthanasia: the questions asked must be valid, and the 
conclusions must take into account the undeniable effect of the wide range of ideas that the 
term euthanasia evokes. Of course, the media have a decisive role to play in disseminating 
accurate information and thus fostering enlightened debate. Nevertheless, the sensitive and 
at times sensational nature of this subject makes it a strong magnet for headline-grabbing 
reporting that does not always reflect reality (Schwartz & Lutfiyya, 2009; Seale, 2010) and 
that, regrettably, helps perpetuate confusion.  
Unfortunately, there are practically no studies on the actual ideas of what constitutes 
euthanasia, or on which end-of-life practices are legal, among persons directly concerned by 
these issues. Only the study by Parkinson et al. (2005) suggests that the expansive 
understanding of euthanasia, as compared with the “official” definition of this term, is found 
among patients suffering from cancer as well and influences their responses to questions on 
this subject. On the basis of this broader definition of euthanasia, encompassing both practices 
that are currently legal and those that are illegal in most countries, then, we can assume that 
opinions on the acceptability of euthanasia and support for its legalization both depend on a 
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desire for a good death. This desire is influenced in particular by fear of suffering, fear of 
heroic treatment, fear of not having one’s end-of-life wishes respected, and the wish to 
continue to be in control of one’s life until its end. These concerns are legitimate and deserve to 
be heard, respected and addressed, not only by medical practice but also by means of a clear a 
political will, ensuring that persons do not receive medical treatment against their wishes and 
that no one is left in pain and suffering, and in anguish of death and dying. In this debate, 
there appears to be a message for the medical community about the limitations of the medical 
role in patients’ lives; this message also raises questions about the changing therapeutic 
relationship between physicians and patients. 
4.2 Health care professionals 
Although most of the medical associations have adopted the “official” definition of euthanasia 
and proscribe this practice under their code of ethics (except in countries where euthanasia is 
legal), the delineation of what is or is not euthanasia is not always clear for physicians. In fact, 
some physicians appear to consider withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, including 
withdrawal of a respirator or dialysis, to be euthanasia (Lindblad et al., 2010; 
Vilela & Caramelli, 2009). In the opinion of other physicians, the “double effect” also appears 
to constitute euthanasia (Neil et al., 2007; Vilela & Caramelli, 2009). These findings corroborate 
the conclusions of studies indicate that the prevalence of deaths by euthanasia as revealed  by 
physicians may be inflated because of confusion, misclassification or misrepresentation of their 
actions (Emanuel et al., 1998; van der Maas et al., 1991), but also because of the wording of the 
questions (Seale, 2009; van der Maas et al., 1996). Thus we may question some physicians’ 
capacity for enlightened discussion of the options available to patients and patient's rights in 
terms of end-of-life care, and even some physicians’ comfort in providing appropriate patient 
care at the end of life. In fact, according to some studies, the principle of “double effect” is 
contested since increased doses of morphine might even prolong life (Sykes et al., 2003). 
Moreover, the unfounded fear of shortening life hinders good practices for appropriate relief 
of end-of-life symptoms (Bilsen et al., 2006). Among some physicians, then, this lack of 
awareness about what constitutes euthanasia and what distinguishes it from other end-of-life 
practices, and the resulting confusion between legal and illegal practices, leads to fear of legal 
action. As well, although according to some physicians their role includes providing assistance 
to die by euthanasia to patients who so wish, others see in that practice a risk of 
instrumentalization in which the patient’s autonomy would take precedence over physicians’ 
responsibility to do good. Clearly, this confusion about end-of-life practices is also found in 
some nurses and even among palliative care nurses (Aranda & O'Conner, 1995; Davis et al., 
1993). While nurses are not directly responsible for medical decisions, they play an important 
role in educating patients and significant others because of their special relationship with these 
persons, not only in terms of informing them of their rights, but also in terms of reassuring 
them that they will receive appropriate care and relief (within the options legally available in 
their country of residence). Specific training for all physicians and nurses on the features of 
palliative care appears to be an objective of the utmost importance that needs to be achieved in 
the very near future.  
5. Conclusion 
In conclusion, as is shown by the results of a few studies conducted in various countries, 
there does not appear to be consensus on the official definition of euthanasia, with its 
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desire for a good death. This desire is influenced in particular by fear of suffering, fear of 
heroic treatment, fear of not having one’s end-of-life wishes respected, and the wish to 
continue to be in control of one’s life until its end. These concerns are legitimate and deserve to 
be heard, respected and addressed, not only by medical practice but also by means of a clear a 
political will, ensuring that persons do not receive medical treatment against their wishes and 
that no one is left in pain and suffering, and in anguish of death and dying. In this debate, 
there appears to be a message for the medical community about the limitations of the medical 
role in patients’ lives; this message also raises questions about the changing therapeutic 
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responsibility to do good. Clearly, this confusion about end-of-life practices is also found in 
some nurses and even among palliative care nurses (Aranda & O'Conner, 1995; Davis et al., 
1993). While nurses are not directly responsible for medical decisions, they play an important 
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the very near future.  
5. Conclusion 
In conclusion, as is shown by the results of a few studies conducted in various countries, 
there does not appear to be consensus on the official definition of euthanasia, with its 
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objectives of making end-of-life practices operational and standardizing language. In fact, 
the meanings attached to the term euthanasia by various groups in light of their particular 
concerns appear to be sometimes incompatible. In this context, arguments for legislative 
amendments to allow euthanasia are perceived, particularly by laypersons, as reflecting a 
desire for a good death, something that is apparently inaccessible at present. A good death, 
then, is perceived to be tied to euthanasia, and legalizing euthanasia becomes the de facto 
objective. Nevertheless, it has been observed that, in the view of a number of patients, 
caregivers, nurses, physicians and even members of the general population, euthanasia goes 
well beyond the possibility of dying following a lethal injection when suffering is 
considered to be unbearable by the person, as defined in the Netherlands. Unlike the 
institutional community, many people consider euthanasia to be as defined in the 
17th century by Francis Bacon. If we want to have enlightened debate on this issue, then, 
would it not be appropriate to revisit the source of the present confusion and to opt for a 
term other than euthanasia to designate “... the administration of drugs with the explicit 
intention of ending the patient's life at his/her request”?  
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1. Introduction 
Voluntary active euthanasia refers to a clearly competent patient making a voluntary and 
persistent request for aid in dying (Brock 1999; Ogubanjo & Knapp van Bogaert 2008). In 
this case, the individual or a person acting on that individual’s behalf (physician or lay 
person, depending on the law of the country) takes active steps to hasten death (LaFollette, 
1997). That active step can be either the provision of the means (i.e. a lethal drug) for self-
administration (orally or parenterally), or the administration by a tier. The provision of the 
means to die is called assisted suicide, assistance in dying, or physician assisted suicide. The 
patient acts last. With voluntary active euthanasia the assistant acts last.  Doctor Jack 
Kevorkian’s (dubbed “doctor death”) “Mercitron” is an example of assisted suicide. The 
contraption is hooked to the candidate who initiates the delivery of the lethal drug. With 
voluntary active euthanasia the lethal drug needs to be administered by an assistant because 
the candidate is physically unable to proceed unaided. In both circumstances, the individual 
expresses a competent and voluntary wish to die, and the conditions that would make it 
right to allow or assist a suicide are satisfied. In both cases the aim is to spare that person 
pain, indignity, emotional and financial burdens. Yet, suicide is seen as morally 
reprehensible but is not prohibited by any law. Voluntary active euthanasia, on the other 
hand, is illegal in most countries and the object of conflicting and polarised moral debates. 
Physician assisted suicide involves an affirmative act, writing a prescription or providing 
the lethal drug. Voluntary active euthanasia requires the acts of providing and administering 
the lethal drug. In physician-assisted suicide, the individual who wishes to die poses the 
final act; in voluntary active euthanasia, because that individual is unable to pose the last 
act, a proxy acts on his or her behalf. The difference is about the person who acts last. The 
intention and motivation are the same. Therefore, one might wonder whether the distinction 
is not a kind of hypocritical hair splitting. It reminds us of the omission/commission 
debates and of the doctrine of double effect. 
The doctrine of double effect states that for an action with two consequences, one good and 
one bad, to be morally permissible the bad consequence may be foreseeable but not 
intended, and the bad cannot be used to achieve the good. The Dutch debate about indirect 
euthanasia is a case in point. “Terminal sedation” is legally permissible; it consists of 
administering large oral doses of barbiturates to induce coma followed by neuromuscular 
blocking agent to cause death on request of patients hoping their death to be hastened 
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(Veldink et al., 2002). Death is foreseen (and in fact wished by the candidate) but not 
intended. Furthermore, the candidate takes the first step actively; the second step inevitably 
requires the active intervention of an assistant. So, here we have two actors with the same 
motives. Both foresee the result. To claim that it is not intended is sheer casuistry. 
Many red tapes need to be overcome by those wishing to die. The main reason is to avoid 
the legendary “What if?” In spite of good evidence against it, the most commonly advanced 
reason is avoiding the slippery slope. For instance, in Switzerland, where assisted suicide 
and voluntary active euthanasia have been tolerated (though not legal it is not prosecuted if 
the assistant has no hidden agenda, i.e. personal interest in the death of the assisted person) 
since 1918, it accounts for 0.45 percent of deaths, only a little more than the 0.3 percent in the 
Netherlands (Veldink et al. 2002; Van der Heide et al., 2007). The candidate has to activate 
the “death machine” or has to swallow the lethal drug; in other cases the candidate first 
ingests the drug but the final blow is administered by a tier. The death is foreseen but not 
intended. Who is the actor? What is active (commission) and what is passive (omission)? 
Removing a feeding tube is an act of commission; since the intention is death it is killing. 
Not pouring sustenance in the tube is omission, letting die. The intention is the same; the 
type of action is different. Does it really matter? As pointed out by Sullivan (1999), the 
debate places the doctor at the centre instead of the applicant, it leaves out the good of the 
person who wishes to die, which is the purpose of end of life decisions. 
2. Facing death  
Etymologically, euthanasia means a good or happy death. Many might wonder if death 
could ever be a happy event. To be good, death should be desired and ought to be peaceful 
and painless. The concept of euthanasia would not apply to a person who slips away 
peacefully and painlessly without any intervention after a fulfilled life. Euthanasia requires 
an intervention by the person wishing to die or by a person acting on her behalf to hasten a 
wanted death. 
The word euthanasia has three meanings: 1) a quiet, peaceful, and painless death; 2) the 
means of procuring it; and 3) the action inducing it. What is missing is that the three 
definitions leave out the good of the person whose death is in question and that the death is 
desired by that person and for its own sake. Euthanasia cannot be morally justified unless it 
benefits the person who dies (Foot, 1996), and if no one else is harmed by it (Hook, 1995). 
Some might consider that death is welcome after a happy and fulfilled life. Others who had 
an unhappy life or who are burdened with sorrow and suffering view death as deliverance. 
It seems, though, that for many who are clinging to life death is the last thing on their wish 
list. In other words, death is inevitable and is either wished or feared. 
LaFollette (1997) has argued that we have not decided to enter life, but that we should be 
granted the right to choose to exit life. Such view, of course, is highly debatable and 
debated. Those who believe in the principle of sanctity of life argue that life is God given; 
therefore, God only can take it back. This argument does not hold for non-believers though. 
The principle that life is sacred, says Dworkin (1995), “that’s the easy part”; the crucial 
question is which decisions best respect it.  
One must respect the wishes of those, believers or not, who wish to stay alive no matter 
what. On the other hand, to what extent should one respect the wish to die? One answer 
would be allowing them to commit suicide. Every one has the right to commit suicide; no 
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single law prohibits suicide. However, one may not have the courage or the means to take 
that step. Considering suicide one may be discouraged by the impact it has on one’s loved 
ones. However, this argument is double-edged. The person who plans committing suicide 
may well make this decision because his entourage failed him. In that case, should he refrain 
from the act to avoid guilt feelings and remorse among the survivors?  
Is there a right to die? Is there a duty to die? If there is a right to die, is there a correlative 
duty of a tier party to assist in dying? 
In an attempt to answer these though questions the topic of euthanasia is riddled with 
inconsistencies and twists. Thou shalt not kill, of course, but it needs qualification: thou 
shalt not kill the innocent (Battin, 1995). It is legally and ethically impermissible to take some 
one’s life against her will. Mass murder in war, camps, or campuses is fittingly condemned. 
Even if this was labelled euthanasia by the Nazi regime, it was murder of innocent and non-
consenting persons. This is not negotiable. Then we have the debate whether killing and 
letting die are one and the same thing or not. Should active voluntary euthanasia be 
accessible only for intractable physical pain? What is the difference, if any, between early 
terminal sedation and terminal sedation? What is the difference, if any, between ordinary 
and extraordinary means to keep some one alive? And last but not least, what are the duties 
of health care providers towards terminally ill patients? As pointed out by Sullivan (1999), 
the euthanasia debate tends to place the doctor in the centre of the debate instead of the 
candidate. It too often leaves out the good of the person who wishes to die (Angell, 1998). 
All these queries illustrate our concerns with death, our own and the other’s. Death is 
inevitably part of life; we cannot avoid taking a moral position, because we can now choose 
to interrupt and delay nature’s progress (Gorsuch, 2006). Euthanasia claims Moreno (1995), 
“appears as the ultimate postmodern demand for personal dignity”. 
3. Euthanasia’s historical background 
Rachels (1993) has given a historical overview of euthanasia from which some of the 
following is borrowed. In Ancient Greece, there was nothing similar to the current view on 
the sanctity of life. Infanticide of deformed newborns and infants was seen as benefiting 
them by avoiding a miserable life. Currently, such practices would be regarded as offensive 
and a deep lack of respect for differently able persons. This is not to say that every one 
believes that non-existence might be preferable to existence with different abilities. Peter 
Singer (1994), notoriously, has argued in favour of the permissibility of infanticide in such 
circumstances. Needless to say that Singer’s view did provoke public outrage. 
Hippocratic physicians represented only a small minority of all self-proclaimed healers. 
Markel (2004) claims that it is doubtful that Hippocrates would recognise most pledges 
ascribed to him because many revisions of the oath were written under Christian influence 
during the Middle Ages. In those early times, it was not uncommon for physicians to 
recommend suicide to a patient with incurable disease.  
Even if great thinkers as Plato, Aristotle, and Pythagoras considered that suicide was mostly 
an act of cowardice, they admitted to exceptions. It should also be noted that the 
Pythagorean School of medicine did not follow Hippocrates’ teachings with regards to 
physicians’ duty to refrain from assistance in dying. Pythagoras of Samos (582-507 BCE) 
shifted philosophy from Asia Minor to Southwest Italy, where he founded a school, a 
religious and mathematical community where his intellectual and moral authority was 
absolute (autos ephê, ipse dixit, the master has spoken). Against the Homeric world-view, he 
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introduced features of the mystery religions. Pythagoras’ community was influenced by 
Orphic mysticism. Pythagoras believed in the immortality of the soul (“the body is a tomb”, 
just like later Plato’s “body the dungeon of the soul”). Therefore, one should strive to give 
priority to the soul and respect all living beings because they are all ensouled. Purity of the 
soul was important (because of his belief in metempsychosis) and can be only achieved 
through philosophy – the quest for knowledge, understanding, and competence. 
During the following twenty centuries, Western Europe was so much under the influence of 
Christianity that there was a silent condemnation of suicide and no discussion on euthanasia 
(Curzer, 1999). During the Enlightenment, Immanuel Kant clearly rejected the permissibility 
of suicide. His argument was rooted in the belief that persons have an incomparable worth. 
Suicide degrades humanity. Even during the Enlightenment, it would have been risky to 
express personal liberal view on any topic, in this case to contest the sanctity of life that 
would upset the Church’s fundamentalism. 
It was not until the twentieth century that the legal and ethical aspects of euthanasia came to 
the public fore. In 1918, a comment by the Swiss federal government on Article 115 of the 
first penal code stated (quoted in Hurst & Mauron, 2003):  
In modern penal law, suicide is not a crime … 
Aiding and abetting suicide can themselves  
be inspired by altruistic motives.  
This is why the project incriminates them only if the author has been moved by selfish 
reasons (Hurst & Mauron 2003). The act is called “murder upon request of the victim”, not 
euthanasia. De facto, a 1997 attempt to decriminalise euthanasia failed. The article does not 
require the involvement of a physician nor that the patient is terminally ill. Switzerland 
permits anyone to assist in another’s death regardless whether the candidate is terminally ill 
or not (Ziegler & Bosshard, 2007). The Swiss Academy of Medical Sciences states that 
assistance in dying is “not part of a physician’s activity”. Nevertheless, like any other 
citizen, a physician is allowed to altruistically assist in dying. 
The argument from palliative care (including pain palliation) is often used against assistance 
in dying because of excruciating pain. The promoters of the argument claim that no pain is 
beyond palliation. A survey in Switzerland showed that 73% of palliative care physicians 
opposed the legislation of euthanasia; however, 19% would practice euthanasia if it became 
legal (Hurst & Mauron, 2003). 
In the Netherlands, voluntary active euthanasia is “tolerated” since 1973 (it is not lawful but 
not a criminal offence) provided strict guidelines, called “due care criteria” (also referred to 
as careful practice, and standards of care) are adhered to: 1) the claimant must be sound of 
mind; 2) the request must be voluntary, independent, persistent and fully informed; 3) the 
pain endured must be intolerable and unresponsive to all pain relief methods; and 3) the 
physician must consult with another independent colleague (Battin, 2002; Sleeboom-
Faulkner, 2006). The physician is free to participate or not (conscience clause) (Sleeboom-
Faulkner, 2006). Note that, since the Brongersma case of “life fatigue or existential suffering”, 
the claimant needs not be terminally ill, and the pain must not be physical (Huxtable & 
Möller, 2007). The Netherlands since has formalised its policy in the Termination of Life on 
Request and Assisted Suicide Act 2001. The “due care criteria” including the intractable pain 
remain included. The Euthanasia Act was passed in 2003 to regulate ending of life by a 
physician at the request of a patient who is suffering unbearably without hope of relief. In 
2005, 1.7% of deaths were the result of euthanasia and 0.1% of physician-assisted suicide; 
80.2% of all cases were reported (vs. only 18.0% in 1990) (Van der Maas & Emanuel, 1998; 
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Van der Heide et al., 2007). Terminal sedation is legally permissible. It consists of the 
administration of a high dose of a sedative to relieve suffering without intending to hasten 
death, even if the patient might hope so (Quill, 2007). The Royal Dutch Association of 
Pharmacy technical guidelines of 1987 (revised in 1994 and 1998) recommend the oral 
administration of high doses of barbiturates to induce coma, followed by a neuromuscular 
blocking agent to cause death (Veldink et al., 2002). In the Netherlands, terminal sedation 
and the withdrawal of artificial feeding are regarded as “normal medical treatment” and 
thus different from euthanasia. Therefore, they cannot fall under the same legal regulation 
as euthanasia (Sheldon, 2003). 
Australia’s Northern Territory was the world’s first jurisdiction to legalise euthanasia in 
1996; four people were assisted under this legislation before the Australian federal 
government repealed it in 1997 (Parker, 2005). The Dutch practice is close to the 
requirements of the 1997 Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act, namely: 1) two oral requests 
separated by at least two weeks; and 2) a written request witnessed by two persons. From 
the part of the physician: the prescribing and the consulting physician must inform of 
alternatives such as pain control and hospice care (Dieterle, 2007). Note that in Oregon, the 
applicant must be at least 18 years old, competent, and suffering from a terminal illness with 
less than six months to live. As we know, this sort of prediction is alarmingly imprecise. 
Moreover, it might be tricky to determine one’s mental competency, but there is no 
obligation to get the opinion of a clinical psychologist or psychiatrist. Finally, any physician 
with a medical degree can assist. 
In 2002, Belgium passed a Euthanasia Law. It carries most of the requirements and restrictions 
as those in the Dutch law (Lemiengre et al., 2007; Quill, 2007). In Germany, there is a legal 
“inconsistency” in the sense that voluntary active euthanasia is illegal but assisting in dying is 
tolerated. The preconditions are that the applicant should be competent and free. The German 
Society for Humane Dying provides the needed support provided the following conditions are 
met: 1) at least one-year membership; and 2) at least two years without treatment for 
depression or psychiatric illness. If these preconditions are met, the applicant is supplied with 
a list of drugs and their dosage for producing certain and painless death. It is recommended to 
acquire the drug through prescription from a physician and to sign a form where the decision 
is signed. A lay companion to assist is provided on request (Battin, 2002). 
4. Definitions of euthanasia 
Euthanasia is subdivided into voluntary and involuntary, active and passive. Involuntary 
means not under control of the will, unintentional, forced. Some add non-voluntary when a 
person has not expressed a choice (Beauchamp, 1996). Involuntary active euthanasia is 
killing an innocent person against his will. Since it does not refer to a “good” death, one 
should avoid calling it euthanasia. 
There seems to be some confusion about the concept of active voluntary euthanasia, and its 
difference from physician assisted suicide. According to Dieterle (2007), in physician-
assisted suicide “the patient him or herself is the instigator of death”; in active euthanasia 
“the physician is the instigator of death”. Brock (1999) writes “with physician-assisted 
suicide, the physician administers a lethal dose often because the patient is unable to do so”; 
but he goes on with the example of Janet Adkins (see below) who acted last. Brock (1999) 
opposes this to (voluntary active) euthanasia, where “the physician acts last”. Rachels (1975) 
writes:  
 
Euthanasia – The “Good Death” Controversy in Humans and Animals 
 
68
introduced features of the mystery religions. Pythagoras’ community was influenced by 
Orphic mysticism. Pythagoras believed in the immortality of the soul (“the body is a tomb”, 
just like later Plato’s “body the dungeon of the soul”). Therefore, one should strive to give 
priority to the soul and respect all living beings because they are all ensouled. Purity of the 
soul was important (because of his belief in metempsychosis) and can be only achieved 
through philosophy – the quest for knowledge, understanding, and competence. 
During the following twenty centuries, Western Europe was so much under the influence of 
Christianity that there was a silent condemnation of suicide and no discussion on euthanasia 
(Curzer, 1999). During the Enlightenment, Immanuel Kant clearly rejected the permissibility 
of suicide. His argument was rooted in the belief that persons have an incomparable worth. 
Suicide degrades humanity. Even during the Enlightenment, it would have been risky to 
express personal liberal view on any topic, in this case to contest the sanctity of life that 
would upset the Church’s fundamentalism. 
It was not until the twentieth century that the legal and ethical aspects of euthanasia came to 
the public fore. In 1918, a comment by the Swiss federal government on Article 115 of the 
first penal code stated (quoted in Hurst & Mauron, 2003):  
In modern penal law, suicide is not a crime … 
Aiding and abetting suicide can themselves  
be inspired by altruistic motives.  
This is why the project incriminates them only if the author has been moved by selfish 
reasons (Hurst & Mauron 2003). The act is called “murder upon request of the victim”, not 
euthanasia. De facto, a 1997 attempt to decriminalise euthanasia failed. The article does not 
require the involvement of a physician nor that the patient is terminally ill. Switzerland 
permits anyone to assist in another’s death regardless whether the candidate is terminally ill 
or not (Ziegler & Bosshard, 2007). The Swiss Academy of Medical Sciences states that 
assistance in dying is “not part of a physician’s activity”. Nevertheless, like any other 
citizen, a physician is allowed to altruistically assist in dying. 
The argument from palliative care (including pain palliation) is often used against assistance 
in dying because of excruciating pain. The promoters of the argument claim that no pain is 
beyond palliation. A survey in Switzerland showed that 73% of palliative care physicians 
opposed the legislation of euthanasia; however, 19% would practice euthanasia if it became 
legal (Hurst & Mauron, 2003). 
In the Netherlands, voluntary active euthanasia is “tolerated” since 1973 (it is not lawful but 
not a criminal offence) provided strict guidelines, called “due care criteria” (also referred to 
as careful practice, and standards of care) are adhered to: 1) the claimant must be sound of 
mind; 2) the request must be voluntary, independent, persistent and fully informed; 3) the 
pain endured must be intolerable and unresponsive to all pain relief methods; and 3) the 
physician must consult with another independent colleague (Battin, 2002; Sleeboom-
Faulkner, 2006). The physician is free to participate or not (conscience clause) (Sleeboom-
Faulkner, 2006). Note that, since the Brongersma case of “life fatigue or existential suffering”, 
the claimant needs not be terminally ill, and the pain must not be physical (Huxtable & 
Möller, 2007). The Netherlands since has formalised its policy in the Termination of Life on 
Request and Assisted Suicide Act 2001. The “due care criteria” including the intractable pain 
remain included. The Euthanasia Act was passed in 2003 to regulate ending of life by a 
physician at the request of a patient who is suffering unbearably without hope of relief. In 
2005, 1.7% of deaths were the result of euthanasia and 0.1% of physician-assisted suicide; 
80.2% of all cases were reported (vs. only 18.0% in 1990) (Van der Maas & Emanuel, 1998; 
 
Voluntary Active Euthanasia: The Debate 
 
69 
Van der Heide et al., 2007). Terminal sedation is legally permissible. It consists of the 
administration of a high dose of a sedative to relieve suffering without intending to hasten 
death, even if the patient might hope so (Quill, 2007). The Royal Dutch Association of 
Pharmacy technical guidelines of 1987 (revised in 1994 and 1998) recommend the oral 
administration of high doses of barbiturates to induce coma, followed by a neuromuscular 
blocking agent to cause death (Veldink et al., 2002). In the Netherlands, terminal sedation 
and the withdrawal of artificial feeding are regarded as “normal medical treatment” and 
thus different from euthanasia. Therefore, they cannot fall under the same legal regulation 
as euthanasia (Sheldon, 2003). 
Australia’s Northern Territory was the world’s first jurisdiction to legalise euthanasia in 
1996; four people were assisted under this legislation before the Australian federal 
government repealed it in 1997 (Parker, 2005). The Dutch practice is close to the 
requirements of the 1997 Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act, namely: 1) two oral requests 
separated by at least two weeks; and 2) a written request witnessed by two persons. From 
the part of the physician: the prescribing and the consulting physician must inform of 
alternatives such as pain control and hospice care (Dieterle, 2007). Note that in Oregon, the 
applicant must be at least 18 years old, competent, and suffering from a terminal illness with 
less than six months to live. As we know, this sort of prediction is alarmingly imprecise. 
Moreover, it might be tricky to determine one’s mental competency, but there is no 
obligation to get the opinion of a clinical psychologist or psychiatrist. Finally, any physician 
with a medical degree can assist. 
In 2002, Belgium passed a Euthanasia Law. It carries most of the requirements and restrictions 
as those in the Dutch law (Lemiengre et al., 2007; Quill, 2007). In Germany, there is a legal 
“inconsistency” in the sense that voluntary active euthanasia is illegal but assisting in dying is 
tolerated. The preconditions are that the applicant should be competent and free. The German 
Society for Humane Dying provides the needed support provided the following conditions are 
met: 1) at least one-year membership; and 2) at least two years without treatment for 
depression or psychiatric illness. If these preconditions are met, the applicant is supplied with 
a list of drugs and their dosage for producing certain and painless death. It is recommended to 
acquire the drug through prescription from a physician and to sign a form where the decision 
is signed. A lay companion to assist is provided on request (Battin, 2002). 
4. Definitions of euthanasia 
Euthanasia is subdivided into voluntary and involuntary, active and passive. Involuntary 
means not under control of the will, unintentional, forced. Some add non-voluntary when a 
person has not expressed a choice (Beauchamp, 1996). Involuntary active euthanasia is 
killing an innocent person against his will. Since it does not refer to a “good” death, one 
should avoid calling it euthanasia. 
There seems to be some confusion about the concept of active voluntary euthanasia, and its 
difference from physician assisted suicide. According to Dieterle (2007), in physician-
assisted suicide “the patient him or herself is the instigator of death”; in active euthanasia 
“the physician is the instigator of death”. Brock (1999) writes “with physician-assisted 
suicide, the physician administers a lethal dose often because the patient is unable to do so”; 
but he goes on with the example of Janet Adkins (see below) who acted last. Brock (1999) 
opposes this to (voluntary active) euthanasia, where “the physician acts last”. Rachels (1975) 
writes:  
 
Euthanasia – The “Good Death” Controversy in Humans and Animals 
 
70
The important difference between active and passive  
euthanasia is that, in passive euthanasia, the doctor  
does not do anything to bring about the patient’s death.  
The doctor does nothing, and the patient dies of  
whatever ills already afflict him. In active euthanasia,  
however, the doctor does something to bring about  
the patient’s death: he kills him. The doctor who gives  
the patient with cancer a lethal injection has himself  
caused his patient’s death; whereas if he merely  
ceases the treatment, the cancer is the cause of death. 
This, again, is unhelpful. To die from any terminal illness is a natural death. Whether it is 
accompanied by intractable and untreatable physical pain or psychological suffering is a 
different matter altogether. Notice the vocabulary: the doctor is the “killer”. In the 
euthanasia debate, the use of the verb killing should be avoided because it refers 
conventionally to taking a person’s life against his will. The position of the American 
Medical Association, which Rachels tries to debunk, is “At stake is the intentional 
termination of life of one human being by another” (viz. of a person who did not express a 
consistent and free request of dying) (quoted in Rachels, 1975). 
It seems that the debate has been confused by the fact that in the Netherlands, it has become 
common parlance to talk of active and passive while omitting the fundamental qualification 
voluntary and involuntary. Active voluntary euthanasia refers to a person who makes the 
free decision to end her life and takes the necessary steps to achieve death. The typical 
example is that of Janet Adkins. She was diagnosed as in the initial stage of Alzheimer’s 
disease. She was devastated and wanted to die with dignity before the disease would take 
its full toll. At that time, she was a member of the Hemlock Society, and was living in 
Oregon where physician-assisted suicide and active voluntary euthanasia were then illegal. 
She flew to Michigan, where assistance in dying was not illegal. She went to Dr Jack 
Kevorkian who connected her to the “Mercitron”, a device composed of a pump containing 
a lethal substance connected to an intravenous line. The physician did install the IV-line but 
the candidate had to press the button to initiate the injection. In other words, Janet took the 
free decision to be connected to the contraption, and decided to initiate the procedure all by 
herself (Pence, 1995). The assistance provided by Dr Kevorkian was to make the device 
available. Although he was a physician and assisted by making the means available, this 
was not physician-assisted suicide but rather active voluntary euthanasia. It was voluntary 
and Janet executed the final act. 
Kevorkian was prosecuted for murder by the local district attorney. A local judge dismissed 
the case but ordered Kevorkian to desist from using the contraption. It is unclear on what 
grounds the judge’s ruling was based since assisting in dying was not against the law. In 
1992, the governor of Michigan signed a law making assisted suicide illegal. In 1994, the 
Michigan Court of Appeals overruled the state’s ban on assisted suicide on grounds of 
technicalities (Pence, 1995). 
The striking down of a Washington state law banning assisted suicide followed this. The 
federal judge Barbara Rothstein held that the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution 
that protects individual liberties was broad enough to cover women’s right to abortion and 
the right of the terminally ill to be assisted in dying. In Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d. Cir. 
1996), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals declared unconstitutional New York’s law 
against physician-assisted-suicide because it is a violation of the constitutional right of equal 
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protection under the law, since it denies help in dying to those without life-sustaining 
treatment, while permitting it for those receiving such treatment (Angell, 1998; Gorsuch, 
2006). 
In 1992, a referendum campaign aimed at toppling the California’s law banning assisted 
suicide failed. In 1993, a similar campaign was successful in Oregon; legal challenges 
delayed the implementation of Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act until 1997. Currently, in the 
vast majority of states’ statutes have been retained or enacted expressly banning assisted 
suicides. In Washington v. Glucksberg (1997), the justices made it clear that there is no 
constitutionally protected right to physician-assisted suicide. However, they expressed 
concern about the inadequacies of access to and delivery of palliative care (Quill, 2004). Terri 
Schiavo was in the same condition as Quinlan and Cruzan. In 1990, at the age of 27 she went 
into permanent vegetative state. In 1998, her husband petitioned the court to withdraw the 
feeding tube. Florida’s Supreme Court refused to hear appeals. A trial court judge ordered 
the removal. Terri’s Law (2003) gave Governor Jab Bush authority to order the feeding tube 
to be reinserted. The US Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal brought by Governor 
Bush. Despite the adoption by the senate of a bill For the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie 
Schiavo (2005), the tube was removed and Terri died (Annas, 2005). 
Passive voluntary euthanasia refers to a person who makes a fully voluntary and persistent 
request to put an end to life but demands assistance from a tier person, either because she 
does not have the courage to do the needful to achieve her goal, or because she does not 
have the physical ability to do it. This is the same as assistance in dying. However, here 
again, Brock (1999) has a different definition; for him passive euthanasia (he omits the 
qualification of voluntary vs. involuntary) consists of withholding or withdrawing life-
sustaining procedures. 
The first assisted death on public record was the Postma case in the Netherlands in 1971. She 
suffered a severe brain haemorrhage that left her partially paralysed, deaf, and with gross 
speech deficits. She repeatedly begged for death. Her physician daughter Geertruda injected 
morphine to induce unconsciousness and curare (an agent that paralyses all muscles 
including the respiratory ones) to kill her. She informed the authorities. She was found 
guilty of murder but was given a suspended sentence. In the aftermath, the Royal Dutch 
Medical association set down guidelines, the so-called “due care criteria”, that were 
accepted by the Dutch prosecutors. Eventually, passive voluntary euthanasia or assistance 
in dying became rechristened as “terminal sedation”, where deep sedation is induced to “an 
imminently dying patient”. It is deemed permissible if it does not hasten death significantly 
(Varelius, 2007). Cellarius (2011) has argued that terminal sedation differs from early 
terminal sedation. He defines early terminal sedation as “palliative sedation in which deep, 
continuous sedation is combined with cessation of nutrition and hydration, orally or 
parenterally”. Because it hastens death, he claims, it is “contentious but not unethical”. What 
is contentious is debatable, disputed. This is unhelpful in the debate. Cellarius (2011) 
contends that deep and continuous sedation is acceptable to treat “intolerable and 
intractable pain”, unless it hastens death. Sullivan (1999), on the other hand, states that a 
decision may hasten death, but that it does not follow from the fact that the intention is to 
bring about death that is intended. Death is only foreseeable. 
This debate illustrates the contentious old doctrine of double effect, now rechristened 
“principle of proportionality”. The doctrine states that if an action results in a foreseeable 
bad consequence (i.e. death), but that this end is not intended, it is morally permissible. It is 
quite clear that terminal sedation and early terminal sedation both aim at a single end, 
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The important difference between active and passive  
euthanasia is that, in passive euthanasia, the doctor  
does not do anything to bring about the patient’s death.  
The doctor does nothing, and the patient dies of  
whatever ills already afflict him. In active euthanasia,  
however, the doctor does something to bring about  
the patient’s death: he kills him. The doctor who gives  
the patient with cancer a lethal injection has himself  
caused his patient’s death; whereas if he merely  
ceases the treatment, the cancer is the cause of death. 
This, again, is unhelpful. To die from any terminal illness is a natural death. Whether it is 
accompanied by intractable and untreatable physical pain or psychological suffering is a 
different matter altogether. Notice the vocabulary: the doctor is the “killer”. In the 
euthanasia debate, the use of the verb killing should be avoided because it refers 
conventionally to taking a person’s life against his will. The position of the American 
Medical Association, which Rachels tries to debunk, is “At stake is the intentional 
termination of life of one human being by another” (viz. of a person who did not express a 
consistent and free request of dying) (quoted in Rachels, 1975). 
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free decision to end her life and takes the necessary steps to achieve death. The typical 
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its full toll. At that time, she was a member of the Hemlock Society, and was living in 
Oregon where physician-assisted suicide and active voluntary euthanasia were then illegal. 
She flew to Michigan, where assistance in dying was not illegal. She went to Dr Jack 
Kevorkian who connected her to the “Mercitron”, a device composed of a pump containing 
a lethal substance connected to an intravenous line. The physician did install the IV-line but 
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Michigan Court of Appeals overruled the state’s ban on assisted suicide on grounds of 
technicalities (Pence, 1995). 
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that protects individual liberties was broad enough to cover women’s right to abortion and 
the right of the terminally ill to be assisted in dying. In Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d. Cir. 
1996), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals declared unconstitutional New York’s law 
against physician-assisted-suicide because it is a violation of the constitutional right of equal 
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death. To argue that the aim is the relief of pain or suffering is hypocritical. It seems that the 
same sophistry is used to permit withholding of treatment, i.e. letting die. 
Passive involuntary euthanasia refers to a condition where the candidate is diagnosed 
irreversibly comatose. She either has a living will or not. If there is a living will that 
stipulates clearly the conditions in which she declines life-sustaining treatment, the decision 
should be respected. In the absence of a living will the decision has to be made by proxy. 
The proxy can be close relatives or friends who know what she would have chosen in the 
circumstances. In their absence, the decision is incumbent to the healthcare team and should 
be in the best interest of the patient. Now, this is more complex than it might appear. It 
raises the debate between killing and letting die. It raises the issue of the person’s best 
interest and the possible hidden agenda of the proxy decision maker(s). We will come back 
to these issues. 
Pickering (1993) has argued that an advance directive for “voluntary euthanasia” is a 
volatile combination. In brief, the argument stresses that the person who made advance 
directives was not psychologically the same at the time of the writing and at the time of the 
condition leading to coma. Perhaps, if she would regain momentary or permanent 
consciousness she would change her mind. One cannot foresee what type of condition one 
might be in and how one would judge it if one was conscious. It follows, so the argument 
goes, that advance directives should be respected only when the candidate is in a position to 
reiterate the decision made by advance directive. 
The argument is often presented that one has to be suffering from depression to consider 
suicide or assistance in dying. One cannot fully exercise one’s autonomy under the influence 
of depression. Therefore, one should never honour the request for assistance in dying. 
Along these lines, Brock (1999) discusses the “expressed-wishes euthanasia” based on what 
the patient would say if competent and rational. He contends that it is impossible to know 
what incompetent patients would choose if they were competent, even if they have 
previously expressed their preferences. 
All these arguments have some truth, but they boil down to the infamous slippery slope: 
what if? Granted, all life and death decisions are controversial and may be abused. None the 
less, one cannot negate the fact that life and its quality may degrade so badly that death is 
deemed a better choice. 
5. Killing and letting die 
The ethical dilemma is about the difference, if any, between killing and letting die. The legal 
conundrum shows that, mainly in the US, the legality of letting die is variously interpreted. 
Similar cases, such as Karen Quinlan (1975) and Nancy Cruzan (1990), were treated 
differently. Karen was in permanent vegetative state and on a respirator; she was fed 
through a naso-gastric feeding tube. The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled in favour of 
Karen’s parents’ request to disconnect the ventilator to let her die. The importance 
physicians placed on the distinction between withholding and withdrawing life support 
surprised the Court. The Court applied the right to privacy to allow proxy decision of letting 
die. The Roman Catholic nursing staff, unbeknownst to Karen’s relatives, implemented the 
weaning. Unexpectedly, Karen survived after having been weaned from the respirator. It is 
likely that without weaning she would have died when the respirator was disconnected. She 
ultimately died after 10 years in permanent vegetative state (Pence, 1995). 
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Nancy Cruzan was also in permanent vegetative state and fed through a naso-gastric tube. 
The Missouri Supreme Court overturned the probate court’s decision to allow the 
withdrawal of the feeding tube. This was because, in the eyes of the judiciary, there was no 
clear and convincing evidence about Nancy’s wishes not to be resuscitated if she were to be 
in permanent vegetative state. In reviewing the Missouri Supreme Court decision, the 
United States Supreme Court began to recognise a right of a competent patient to informed 
refusal. The tube was finally removed legally and Nancy died (Pence, 1995). 
The importance of the Quinlan and the Cruzan cases was that they brought about the legal 
permissibility of informed refusal and the right to proxy decision-making about 
withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining procedures. In both cases the issue was the 
artificial feeding. Since food and water are basic human needs, the controversy arose 
whether artificial feeding is an ordinary or an extraordinary means. In addition, it ignited 
the debate whether removing the tube would be an act of omission (letting die) or 
commission (killing). 
The legality of assistance in dying is mostly not recognised. The US state of Oregon, 
however, enacted the Oregon Death with Dignity Act. Oregon’s Department of Human 
Services has the task of auditing a sample of the records regarding each act of assisted 
suicide on a yearly basis. At variance with the Dutch medical guidelines, in Oregon the right 
to assistance in dying does not require the existence of any pain, treatable or not. The 
distinction between killing and letting die has connection with the elusive distinction 
between omission and commission, as well as with the hair splitting and hypocritical 
doctrine of double effect. 
In Active and Passive Euthanasia, Rachels (1975) has argued that there is no moral difference 
between killing (commission) and letting die (omission), but rather that it is “a grotesque 
perversion of moral reasoning”. He opposes the American Medical Association’s denial that 
the withdrawal of life-sustaining interventions equals the intentional termination of life.  He 
contends that it is “patently cruel” to withhold a treatment (letting die) because it results in 
a prolonged agony; therefore, it is more humane to inject a lethal drug (killing). The 
American Medical Association’s position is that in certain circumstances it is permissible to 
withhold treatment (letting die), but that in no circumstances a positive step can be taken to 
end a patient’s life (mercy killing). Note that what the American Medical Association talks 
about is the withdrawal (i.e. “cessation”, not withholding) of “extraordinary means” when it 
is clear that death is imminent. To withdraw is to discontinue something that was given; to 
withhold is to refuse to give. Rachels appears to be mixing both withholding and 
withdrawing treatment. 
Thought experiments are often used as a fictional situation to underpin a moral argument. 
In his paper, Rachels (1975) argues that there is no difference if a person who has a personal 
interest in the death of a child, either witnesses it drowning in the bath tub (letting die) or 
actively drowns it (killing). In both cases the motive and the end in view were identical. 
Therefore, killing and letting die are the same. Now, as Rachels (1975) acknowledges, this is 
irrelevant to the issue under discussion, namely withholding and withdrawing life-
sustaining procedures in medicine. If it is irrelevant to the issue under discussion, it should 
be omitted. He also points out that what matters in the moral judgement are the motives: 
personal gain or a humanitarian motive (which applies to the thought experiment he offers). 
The twist is that, as far as Rachels’ case study is concerned, the problem is about the social 
and parental acceptance of Down’s babies, rather than killing vs. letting die. 
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Now consider the following scenarios. Bill and his wife Nancy are clear about their mutual 
desire not to be resuscitated in case of irreversible coma. This is written down in their living 
will. Both drive weekly to their respective work place in two different and far away 
locations. Bill is involved in a car accident. He has a life threatening head injury and is 
treated by paramedics at the scene of the accident. He is put on emergency life-support and 
transported to the nearest hospital. On arrival, the casualty medical officer judges that Bill 
needs to be ventilated artificially to give him any chance of survival. Bill is intubated and 
connected to the ventilator. Nancy is informed about the situation and rushes to the 
hospital. She is told that the brain damage is most likely to be irreversible. She explains that 
Bill has a living will that is clear about “do not resuscitate” (DNR). The doctor acted 
according to his professional duty to preserve life. Nancy wants to respect Bill’s wishes, but 
the life-support procedures were initiated. There was no way the doctor could have known 
about Bill’s DNR wish. Now what would the decision to pull the plug be, killing or letting 
die? Bill had expressed the will to die if such foreseeable circumstances would occur. The 
life-sustaining procedure should not have been commenced if his DNR will have been 
known, but would it? Even if the doctor had known, would he have let Bill die? Let us now 
change the scenario. Bill and Nancy are driving on the highway to their log cabin at the lake. 
A drunk driver hits their car on the passenger side. Nancy suffers a life-threatening injury, 
but Bill is unscathed. The paramedics arrive on the scene. Bill tells them to desist from 
assistance. Bill lets Nancy die. This sounds similar to Rachel’s scenario where the person 
watches the child drowning in the bathtub. But is it? Nancy has no interest at all in Bill’s 
death. She only wants to respect his living will. However, it is doubtful whether she will be 
allowed. It is very likely that she would be charged of non-assistance to a person in danger. 
6. The right to die: The limits of autonomy? 
In 1973, an exploding gas line burned 67 percent of Donald (“Dax”) Cowart’s body. At the 
time, he was a healthy young jet pilot and amateur rodeo performer. At the scene of the 
accident, he begged for a gun to shoot himself when the emergency paramedics arrived. 
Dax’s prognosis for survival was approximately 20 percent, but his potential quality of life 
was deeply compromised. His request was denied. Against his will he underwent 232 days 
of treatment in Parkland Memorial Hospital in Dallas. Despite the fact that he was deemed 
competent, his repeated refusal of treatment and requests to die where consistently 
declined. Instead, the physicians honoured the wishes of his mother. The accident left him 
blind and gravely disfigured, with only partial use of his fingers. He later became a 
millionaire from an out of court settlement with the gas company. He graduated from law 
school in 1986 and got married. He also became a regular speaker for the Society for the 
Right to Die. His main argument has always been that his physicians had been morally 
wrong to treat him against his wishes (Andersen et al., 1996; Knapp van Bogaert & 
Ogubanjo, 2010). 
The question is: Would it be an act of commission, sanctioned legally and morally, to 
provide someone the means to commit suicide? Recall Kevorkian’s Mercitron. Janet Adkins 
did operate the device herself knowingly and willingly. At the time, assisted suicide was 
legal in Michigan. And still, Kevorkian was requested to desist from repeating assistance. 
Dax, however, was unable to get hold of a gun without assistance. Isn’t there an 
inconsistency? One tends to admit that a terminally ill person has the right to assistance in 
dying, especially if she is in excruciating pain. When burns cover 67 percent of the body the 
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pain is excruciating and there is generally little hope to survive. Dax was in excruciating 
pain (and remained in that condition for the 32 following weeks). And yet, assistance was 
denied. 
As we have seen, the US Supreme Court recognised the legal right to informed refusal of 
treatment or life-sustaining interventions. Unfortunately for Dax that was in 1993, twenty 
years after his ordeal began. 
The right to die from one’s personal perception of quality of life, as it was in Dax’s case, was 
brought to the fore with Larry McAffee in 1985. Twenty-nine years old McAffee became 
almost totally paralysed in a motorcycle accident. In 1989, he decided to file suit in court for 
the right to die because the institutions he was placed did not provide what he judged an 
acceptable quality of life. He designed a switch to be connected to his IV-line that would 
allow him to self-inject a lethal drug by blowing in certain ways into the ventilator. The 
County Superior Court ruled in his favour. McAffee did not commit suicide as he was 
eventually placed in an institution where his quality of life was improved (Knapp van 
Bogaert & Ogubanjo, 2010). 
As commented by Pence (1995), such cases suggest that society often gives severely disabled 
people only three limited, grim choices: to become a burden on their families or friends, to 
live miserably in a public institution, or to kill themselves. Even the last option is often 
denied. Is there any difference between a terminally ill patient requesting assistance in 
dying, given the hurdles of prognostication, and an almost totally paralysed person whose 
lack of quality of life is unbearable? Why would one oblige to the former’s wish and not to 
the latter? 
Like many others, Beauchamp and Childress (2001) remark that if autonomy is the corner 
stone of medical decision-making one has to admit that double standards regulate the 
granting and declining of patients’ autonomy. On the one hand, a patient’s informed refusal 
to life-sustaining interventions is viewed as an affirmation of and respect for his autonomy. 
That is the moral (and legal) permissibility of letting die. On the other hand, the right to 
assistance in dying by mutual agreement between the patient and her assistant is, with some 
exceptions mentioned above, unlawful and regarded morally impermissible. One does not 
always have the ability to commit suicide; for instance, if one is paralysed one cannot 
exercise one’s autonomy. So, killing is not the same as letting die. Rachels (1993) has argued 
that it is the same. If he is right, the mentioned inconsistency must be redressed. 
In the clinical context, autonomy and respect for patients are linked to the notion of 
informed consent or refusal. It is often regarded as a loose expression of patient’s right to 
choose; the health care provider has to comply with whatever the patient decides as long as 
she is deemed competent and properly informed about the alternatives, the risks and 
benefits. This view places the concept of autonomy and respect for autonomy in a narrow or 
minimal perspective. This, writes O’Neill (1988), is a minimal conception of autonomy that 
identifies autonomy with the requirements of informed consent and that regards respect for 
autonomy as a sufficient rather than necessary ethical justification. Instead, she argues, 
autonomy should be understood as a capacity for independent decisions and actions. 
Autonomy is not exercised in vacuo. One is autonomous from something and from someone 
(the health care team, the entourage). Autonomy is exercised in a relational (after 
consultation, exchange) rather than in an adversarial context. And, finally, there are degrees 
of independent decisions. The mere fact of being ill places us in a vulnerable situation that 
may affect our level of independence and degree of willingness to accept the health care 
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pain is excruciating and there is generally little hope to survive. Dax was in excruciating 
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professional’s plan of action. On the other hand, a stronger perception of one’s autonomy 
may easily conflict with the reasonable choices offered by the health care team. 
7. Euthanasia and the slippery slope 
One stands on the slippery slope when arguments against one position appear to equally 
apply to the counter position, leading to an undesired or undesirable situation. With 
euthanasia, it would mean that if assistance in dying becomes legally authorised the door is 
wide open to abuse. Corners will be bent so that euthanasia will be practised for other 
motives and outside of the requirements set by the law, let alone that people will be forced 
to die under false pretences. Granted that the risk cannot be denied, one should look 
whether the risk is real or of minimal magnitude. 
Pence (1997) distinguishes three different types of slippery slope: 1) generalising to other 
kinds of cases; 2) unleashing the dark side of human nature; and 3) consistency. According 
to the first one, you first withdraw, say, the respirator, then you stop parenteral nutrition, 
and finally you kill. The slope slips from terminally ill patients, to formerly competent ones 
(e.g. senile dementia), to never competent adults (e.g. brain damaged at birth), and to 
infanticide. It does only if competence is disregarded or misconstrued. The second slope 
slips when proxy decisions are made that are not in the best interest of dying or terminally 
ill patient be it for material sake (e.g. the cost of terminal care, or greed) or out of 
convenience (e.g. the financial and emotional burden of terminal care). In this case, the 
person may be competent or not but coerced into accepting that she has the duty to die. In 
other words, the slope becomes slippery only if one calls voluntary active euthanasia what is 
not a willing and knowing request for help in dying. 
The third slope slips if one uses criteria applicable in one case that are not applicable to 
another. This slippery argument, says Pence, is the weakest sometimes time and 
introspection will tell that criteria may have to change. 
It is unfortunate that the country with the longest “experience”, Switzerland, has no 
validated statistics. Estimates, however, suggest that only 0.45% deaths are assisted suicides 
and that two thirds of the requests are rejected. In Oregon 0.09% of deaths represent assisted 
death, and in the Netherlands they amount to 0.3% (Hurst & Mauron, 2003). These data do 
not mean that “assistance” is not given without the patients’ explicit request. In 1990, a 
confidential enquiry run in the Netherlands showed that 0.8% of deaths were initiated 
without the patient’s request. A similar enquiry was run in 1995 and resulted in a value of 
0.7% showing that toleration did not result in a ripple effect. The same questionnaire used in 
Australia estimated the occurrence of involuntary euthanasia at 3.5%. The difference 
suggests that different cultures may have different potential for misuse (van der Maas & 
Emanuel, 1998). As pointed out by Battin (1995), “It is unlikely that Americans can fully 
understand why the Dutch support their practice of euthanasia, and conversely it is unlikely 
that the Dutch will understand why the Americans are so ambivalent about its legalisation 
or why they are so likely to distort the Dutch practice, until these differences are 
incorporated into both sides of the debate”. 
One of the slippery slope arguments claims that legalising euthanasia will result in 
pressurising the weak and the elderly to accept dying. In Oregon, however, data show that 
those who choose euthanasia are younger, highly educated, and used to be in control of 
their lives (Branthwaite, 2005). 
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As Rachels (1993.) comments, there is no denying that there are abuses of virtually all social 
practices. The question is whether the abuses would be so numerous as to justify the 
banning of that specific practice. Furthermore, slippery slope arguments provide no moral 
basis for the conclusion that some acts are morally wrong (Beauchamp 1996). With regards 
to assistance in dying, Pence (1997) remarks that claiming that it is immoral “only begs the 
question, it isn’t an argument”. 
8. Conclusive remarks 
It appears that more is written and argued against than in favour of voluntary euthanasia. 
This is understandable since most people wish rather to live than to die. None the less, there 
are people who wish to die. Their voice must also be heard. The nagging question is why, 
when, and how? As emphasised by Tristram Engelhardt (1995), “to establish the wrongness 
of voluntary euthanasia would require a hierarchy of values that subordinates the value of 
individual liberty to other special values”. 
In this case, we encounter two potentially conflicting liberties: the autonomy of the person 
whishing to die, and the autonomy of the individual who is asked assistance in dying. 
Although Switzerland has, in my opinion, resolved that conflict by permitting legally any 
one who has no personal profit in assisting in dying, other countries like the Netherlands 
reserve this right strictly to physicians. The right to autonomy is equally applicable to 
physicians. Ann Davis (1996) contends that one cannot be autonomous if decisions can be 
overruled by people who do not share our values. Beauchamp (1997) asserts that to refuse 
assistance in dying is harmful because it denies a person’s autonomous wish. Self-
determination, as long as it does not harm the other(s), is one of the main cornerstones of 
ethics. If the exercise of autonomy relieves us from an unacceptable lack of quality of life, it 
should not be morally wrong. 
The legal and ethical permissibility of a patient’s right to withhold (not to allow) life-
sustaining interventions is widely accepted. In this case, that person knows and willingly 
accepts that this will result in dead. This has been dubbed “coming to peace with death” 
(Gorschung, 2006). It is the disease that kills (Callahan, 1999). 
In the case of withdrawing life-sustaining procedures that have been initiated (killing), the 
intention, malevolent or not, is death. The irony is that this fuels a sophistical debate on 
omission and commission. For instance, the removal of a feeding tube is an act, commission. 
To keep the tube but not supplying fluids and nutrients is omission. In both cases, the 
patient will die. In both cases this was the motivation. 
On the other hand, it is deemed legally and ethically impermissible to request assistance in 
dying (if one is unable to, say, press the button). It is killing if one is unable to press the 
button or suicide with some one’s assistance (otherwise called “mercy killing”) if one is the 
last person to act. 
The so-called “joint view” that justifies voluntary euthanasia is based on two ethical 
principles: respect for autonomy, and beneficence (Huxtable & Möller 2007,). Varelius (2007) 
argues that respect for autonomy trumps the principle of beneficence, because the latter 
results in harm even if requested. However, the twist is that the defenders of terminal 
sedation deem it acceptable if the harm is needed to reach the intended goal, pain relief. On 
the other hand, by limiting the right of assistance in dying to physicians, one creates a 
potential conflict between the physician’s duties to preserve life, and to alleviate pain and 
suffering. In the case of euthanasia, one of both duties must be prioritised. 
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By placing the doctor at the centre of the ethical dilemma, the patient’s request is often 
disregarded, minimised, or even put in jeopardy. Furthermore, the debate is all too often 
around generic patients, in ideal circumstances, where the arguments appeal to abstract 
principles (Donchin, 2000). In line with Beauchamp & Childress (1994), one should strive to 
reform ethics and the law to deal with an “apparent inconsistency” between affirmation and 
denial of autonomy. Autonomy is given to those who consciously and willingly refuse life-
sustaining interventions; but autonomy is denied to those who consciously, willingly, and 
repeatedly ask for assistance in dying. 
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1. Introduction  
In this article we will focus primarily on the ethical debate on euthanasia and will not 
approach the subject from the legal field. We also do ethical reflection from civic ethics, from 
a secular ethics and from civic minimums that human rights are. Civic ethic is the 
framework of a transnational bioethics; it is the best framework to ensure the peaceful 
coexistence of plural morals in public sphere. In public sphere there are morals for 
euthanasia and morals against euthanasia. So, if the ethics of public sphere, not of personal 
privacy, should be fair and respect the right to choose, both options are respectable and 
therefore a  legal level should decriminalize euthanasia. We discuss that euthanasia is a 
matter of personal moral and that both options, for and against euthanasia, are ethical. 
From civic ethics we merely talk about respect for the final decision of an autonomous 
person, because autonomy is the ethical basis that every moral has to respect.  
“Euthanasia” is Greek word composed by two parts: eu, good, and thanatos, death. Thus, the 
word simply means peaceful death. In technological societies, due to the success of 
medicine, it is possible to live a long time with a disease but without quality of life; in these 
societies it is possible to keep alive the biological life of a person   while  his biographical life 
has finished. In these circumstances some people demand to die with dignity, because they 
do not want to live without quality of life. In such a context, doctors don’t only have to cure, 
heal suffering but also help to die.  
2. On the right to die 
2.1 What is and what is not euthanasia? About words, things and laws 
There is a big confusion related to the end of live, so it is important to clarify what and what 
is not euthanasia. We must distinguish among five notions (Lorda et al; 2008): 
a. Euthanasia 
b. Assisted suicide 
c. Patient’s rejection of a treatment  
d. Physicians’ team withdrawal or withholding of a treatment 
e. Terminal sedation 
 
a. Euthanasia 
We speak about euthanasia when the following four conditions take place: 
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There is a big confusion related to the end of live, so it is important to clarify what and what 
is not euthanasia. We must distinguish among five notions (Lorda et al; 2008): 
a. Euthanasia 
b. Assisted suicide 
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e. Terminal sedation 
 
a. Euthanasia 
We speak about euthanasia when the following four conditions take place: 
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1. The patient clearly demands to die once the diagnostic and prognosis are known. 
2. The patient is under great suffering due to an incurable disease that deprives from 
living with the quality of life he wants. 
3. An action carried out by medical professionals that know the patient, respect his 
autonomy and accept his decision of dying. 
4. This medical action is the direct and immediate cause of death. 
So euthanasia is an action that directly affects two people, both professional and patient, but 
the patient is who has the last word. He is who, in total pain conditions with no hope of 
recovery, asks the doctor to help him to die. Nevertheless the patient's decision must be 
autonomous, i.e., with knowledge of his reality and his expectations, in coherence with his 
concept of quality of life, and his decision must be continuous and consistent. Certainly, to 
make a decision on euthanasia, the patient needs a good diagnosis and prognosis. The 
patient has to know the reality of his illness, because without good and understandable 
information, the patient can not be autonomous.  
The patient has to keep his decision in a consistent, persistent manner during a reasonable 
time, to avoid both the precipitation (as result of a moment of disorientation), as also to be 
influenced (result of pressure from other heteronymous factors). In fact the decision to end 
one’s life must be really one’s decision and not caused by other pressures or influences. The 
Patient will need the physician to take this decision. 
The physician’s role is necessary before, during and after the patient's decision to die: 
- Before the patient's decision, to know his physical conditions, to have true information 
about his diagnosis and prognosis:  
In the case of certain diseases which causes a progressive lack of health and autonomy, the 
doctor has to assume a special intimate relationship with the patient, for the control of 
symptoms, to let the patient know all the available possibilities, from the paradigm of 
autonomy and informed consent, but also to inform that it will be the patient, who will set 
the pace and make decisions. At this moment it is very important that the doctor knows 
how to accompany the patient to accept reality. 
- During the patient's decision, to be giving to the patient the dose of required 
information: 
At this point it is crucial that the doctor asks before reporting, because there is a right to 
know and there is also a right to not to know. It is important the doctor respects the patient's 
silence, his doubts; it is important that the doctor and his team have not only good technical 
skills, pain management, but also communication skills and skills with the biopsychosocial 
model (Engel, 1980), because the "total pain" is everywhere, and not only in the body. 
This means a deliberative process of the patient himself; it is an inner dialogue, very 
intimate and  deep one: he must make probably the hardest decision of his life, his final 
decision. 
Once the decision is taken, when the patient asks his doctor for euthanasia, is when a 
process of dialogue begins between them, in order that both following conditions are 
satisfied: 
It is an autonomous decision that persists in the patient for a certain period of time  
It is a decision consistent with the concept of quality of life of patient. 
Once verified these conditions, the patient decides when and under what circumstances he 
wants to die. 
- After the patient's decision, to carry out the euthanasia in coherence with the wishes of 
the patient:  
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Documents of advanced directives and informed consent should be signed; these 
documents are fundamental from an ethical point of view. These documents are the key to 
ensure, on one hand, that the process of dialogue between patient and doctor has taken 
place; on the other hand, that the patient's autonomous last decision has been observed. 
It is not euthanasia if the person is not competent and others decide for him. However, how 
important it is to have an advance directives document for ascertaining the wishes and the 
decisions that the patient would have made if he knew his circumstances in which he is due 
to illness. 
b. Assisted suicide 
The difference between euthanasia and assisted suicide is that the patient is who causes his 
death and the professional merely offers the lethal dose and other necessary means when 
the patient is physically incapacitated. 
There is no right to die without a duty of the doctor to help to die. But in this case it is a 
matter of dignity of life and dignity of death. Because only the doctor has the relevant 
expertise to ensure a good death; and this expertise is knowledge but it also implies 
attitudes and values.  
Doctors should have the following competences to help to die: 
a. Knowledge of diagnosis and prognosis. 
b. Knowledge of appropriate doses to ensure that the patient has no pain or suffering. 
c. Knowledge about the patient's competence in order to ensure that patient’s decision is 
autonomous 
d. Knowledge of consistency of the arguments that patient gives with regard to his scale of 
values and his notion of quality of life. 
e. Attitude of respect and empathy to accompany the patients in their last moments, 
because the doctor can do many ethically things, when nothing technically can be done. 
In this aspect it is very important to look carefully what the patient can need, for 
example, religious needs, spiritual care, or care for the patient’s family. It is also 
essential that the doctor and his team are friendly; they must make the patient feel that 
he has always dignity, and no a charge for anybody nobody. 
To clarify names we avoid adjectives such as voluntary, involuntary, passive or active 
euthanasia etc. Euthanasia is always voluntary, because the patient wants it; and euthanasia 
is always active because doctor’s act causes the patient’s death in a direct manner. 
Euthanasia is not only a matter of private moral; to respect these personal moral we should 
focus the question of euthanasia on civic ethics that defends its legalization. 
c. Patient’s rejection of a treatment 
Patient’s rejection of a treatment is not euthanasia: in euthanasia is the doctor who causes 
the death in a direct manner, but in the refuse of treatment, because the patient does not 
want to continue with the recommended therapeutic measures by the doctor, it is the 
disease that runs its course, to finally cause death. 
d. Physicians’ withdrawal or withholding of treatment 
Euthanasia is not either withdrawal or withholding of treatment. In this case we are talking 
of a medical decision, when doctors check the futility of the treatment and the great harm it 
can cause, to the patient violating the principle of non maleficence (primum non nocere). 
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decisions that the patient would have made if he knew his circumstances in which he is due 
to illness. 
b. Assisted suicide 
The difference between euthanasia and assisted suicide is that the patient is who causes his 
death and the professional merely offers the lethal dose and other necessary means when 
the patient is physically incapacitated. 
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matter of dignity of life and dignity of death. Because only the doctor has the relevant 
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c. Knowledge about the patient's competence in order to ensure that patient’s decision is 
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because the doctor can do many ethically things, when nothing technically can be done. 
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essential that the doctor and his team are friendly; they must make the patient feel that 
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is always active because doctor’s act causes the patient’s death in a direct manner. 
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c. Patient’s rejection of a treatment 
Patient’s rejection of a treatment is not euthanasia: in euthanasia is the doctor who causes 
the death in a direct manner, but in the refuse of treatment, because the patient does not 
want to continue with the recommended therapeutic measures by the doctor, it is the 
disease that runs its course, to finally cause death. 
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Euthanasia is not either withdrawal or withholding of treatment. In this case we are talking 
of a medical decision, when doctors check the futility of the treatment and the great harm it 
can cause, to the patient violating the principle of non maleficence (primum non nocere). 
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e. Terminal sedation 
Terminal sedation is not euthanasia either. Terminal sedation is consistent with the 
Hippocratic principle of non maleficence. When death is imminent, in order to avoid the 
pain and suffering, doctors give pharmacological doses (normally morphine), and the side 
effect of these high doses drugs is lethal. Doctors are not looking for to cause the death but 
to relieve pain. 
Sooner or later the result is the same, the death of the person, but not the way. To cause 
death trough euthanasia is different to allow deterioration. The patient has the last decision, 
and only he has it. 
In many countries where euthanasia and assisted suicide are illegal, the rejection of 
treatment is legal, because to respect the refusal of treatment, even effective treatment, is the 
consequence of taking seriously the principle of patient autonomy. It is interesting to note 
that the result is always the same, the patient's death, but euthanasia and assisted suicide 
are looking directly to cause death, and in the rest of circumstances, the rejection of the 
treatment, withdrawal or withholding of treatment and terminal sedation, death is not 
searched,  but a result of not acting. But in all these cases the ethical principles are the same, 
i.e., the principle to patient autonomy and the principle of non maleficence, of not harming 
or imposing life to the patient. 
2.2 In the name of autonomy: Live and die in a plural society 
Human rights are primary goods, in Kantian words, “transcendental” goods, i.e., the 
condition of possibility to choose other goods. Rights are the minimum goods that any 
person should be guaranteed in order to enjoy a decent life from which quality of life can be 
chosen. 
We are defending a right to die from the principle of respect to patient’s autonomy, because 
from autonomy the patient chooses his notion of quality of life. 
We make the difference between quality and dignity of life: dignity is essential for choosing 
quality; it is the minimum choice from autonomy. Thereby dignity is the conditio sine qua non 
in order to be able to take decisions, while quality depends on subjective, personal 
preferences. Good life is a purpose, a personal and subjective goal, but human rights are the 
conditions to look for it. A fair life must make the search for good life possible. 
People have the right to take decisions, among these, when to die, and this is a matter of 
dignity. Some people are for euthanasia and others are against euthanasia, this will depend 
on the meaning of their quality of life. Both options need the right to decide, and both 
options exist in a morally plural society. But a law against euthanasia doesn’t respect the 
right to take decisions; because a law against euthanasia doesn’t respect one of these 
options, it isn’t respectful regarding the dignity and quality of life of a part of this plural 
society. 
We can distinguish two concepts of autonomy:  
On the one hand, the Kantian concept as stated in the formulations of Categorical 
Imperative, e.g, act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will 
that it should become a universal law (Kant, 2002).  Kant grounded dignity on the autonomy 
of person and autonomy is the ratio essendi of morality: our duty is to become autonomous. 
On the other hand, the Anglo-Saxon notion of autonomy, as right to self determination   of a 
moral agent who is an independent and rational human being. This is the notion of 
autonomy of J. Bentham or J.S. Mill (Mill, 1989): "The only freedom which deserves the 
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name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to 
deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it".  This notion prevails in 
Bioethics. So the condition for being autonomous is having the ability to grasp reality and to 
have information in order to be able to take decisions, without obstacles or pressures 
(internal or external) and in coherence with the own scale of values (Beauchamps & 
Childress, 1989).  
Nevertheless autonomy is always a degree on a continuum, a process during which we can 
become more or less autonomous. People tend to lose autonomy at the end of their lives; 
most of them will become dependent as they grow older. However vulnerability and 
fragility are not shameful conditions but human conditions. Therefore we can talk about the 
right to be cared for until the end, even includes euthanasia. 
Bioethics has put too much stress on fostering and respecting autonomy, but it has not 
always outlined the kind of dignity that should be recognized for a person who is 
progressively losing autonomy (the elder, people with degenerative illness, etc.).  
We are all educated to become autonomous, but not to accept our dependence, not even to 
treat a dependent person. Furthermore, the traditional ways of dealing with dying people 
can become obsolete and ethically reproachable because they are based on charity, 
beneficence, goodwill or paternalism. 
Autonomy is hindered in elder persons. Precisely the people deserving care, like frail old 
people, have dignity but they are not autonomy, maybe they will be not it any more. Elder 
people with dementia, Alzheimer illness or people with serious intellectual disabilities are 
not autonomous but not due to that should they lack dignity and human rights.  
We are suggesting that, further than Kant, Mill and Beauchamps & Childresss, the concepts 
of dignity and human rights should be reconsidered in order to make a foundation of 
respect for people who are not autonomous in a great degree and who don’t want to live 
longer. We should complete the concepts of autonomy and dignity with the concept of 
vulnerability. 
Independently of if sick people are more or less autonomous; we are talking about dignity 
and rights: they are persons and they always have dignity. Most of them have finished their 
autonomous life project, most of them are at the end of their life; all of them are 
progressively losing degrees of autonomy; and some of them want to die because they 
consider that they do not have quality of life. But they want to die with dignity and they 
want quality of death. 
Thus, we suggest distinguishing between dignity in lax sense and dignity in strict sense. 
Dignity in lax sense is the dignity which everyone has as a person, someone that is an End in 
itself, an absolute value, the source of all other values. In Kantian words (Kant, 2000): “Act 
in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of 
another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means”. There is a great 
consensus in this meaning of dignity 
Dignity in strict sense is the dignity that only a moral agent can have. Dignity in strict sense 
would be the kind of dignity that is object of personal achievement, the purpose of the 
human life searching a personal identity, an ethos. This is the meaning of true autonomy for 
Kant, and it is a duty: become autonomous to be worthy.  
Thus, everybody all the people have dignity, also the most perverse murderer and the 
anencephalic child, but neither of them have dignity in the strict sense: the former because 
he abused his autonomy; the latter because he is unable to exercise his autonomy. But we, 
the ones who interact with them, gamble with our strict dignity if we, when treating them, 
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forget they are always people, despite the immorality of the former and the disability of the 
latter.  
We should fight against diagnostitis and determinisms that dictate that if one cannot live a 
normal life (what is a normal life?) and make a useful function in society, life is no longer 
worth it.  As long as there is someone who makes them feel, in their own way, they are 
worthy, they will find their quality of life.  
Who has reasons to live, finds the way. V. Frankl said it better: whoever finds a ‘why’ can 
stand any ‘how’ (Frankl, 2000). A society that treats frail and dependent people as worthy, is 
giving them a ‘why’ so all of us (we all are inter/dependent people) can discover how to live 
in a better way. 
Nevertheless the question of euthanasia is not antagonistic to that of palliative care. 
Euthanasia is not to kill people because it is cheaper than ensuring their care!. People who 
want more palliative care must be  respected . But we must also respect the decision of 
competent, autonomous people who do not want more care and want to die with medical 
help. We must ensure that euthanasia is also included among palliative cares. 
Kant always thinks in a rational and transcendental human being and this is not an embodied 
subject, mortal and vulnerable, as is the real subject. Autonomy is inseparable from 
vulnerability. Euthanasia is the unavoidable consequence of a society that has based its 
concept of dignity on autonomy of the individual, beyond the biological life or a religious 
sense of life. Beyond Kant and his concept of dignity based in autonomy, we try to maintain 
a normative level in making decisions. From Anglo-Saxon Notion of autonomy, everything 
is reduced to personal options, and all private options are respectful. However, we think, 
according with Kant and beyond Anglo-Saxon notion of autonomy that life is more than a 
preference; live is a duty as transcendental condition of searching of meaning.  
How to respect the autonomy of a person who is aware he will lose it due to the disease; 
how to respect the autonomy of a person who knows that his fate is to gradually lose 
autonomy but certainly not lose his life. Correcting Kant and his rejection of suicide 
(because such act can not become universal law), we are arguing that we should respect the 
final decision, the decision of a person to die, who knows he will never more be 
autonomous. 
On the other hand, two people should be taken into consideration concerning euthanasia, 
patient and doctor, one with a right to die, the other with a duty to help him to die. But the 
doctor also has his own autonomy, his own conception of quality of life; and there are 
doctors who do not agree with euthanasia. Two autonomies (self-determination) are at 
stake. 
The right to conscientious objection means that the doctor thinks it is wrong to help to die. 
So, for this doctor, to respect patient autonomy is something maleficent from his personal 
conscience.  
Society must respect all these decisions: the patient's right to die, the physician's duty to 
help, and the right to conscientious objection by doctor.  
Two conditions are needed in order to exercise the right not to act against the conscience: 
Ensure the patient's right to die, that means that another doctor will do what a conscientious 
objector does not want to do. 
Do not make any pressure on the patient (underestimating his autonomy) and do not make 
moral judgments about his decision.  
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This means that in morally plural societies, we must guarantee the rights of all, but the 
medicine is at the service of the autonomy of patients, and not at the service of the 
physicians; so, the right to conscientious objection has limits. 
2.3 Personal moral, professional ethics and civic ethics: Happiness, assistance 
quality and justice 
Civic ethics is world ethics, ethics of justice, because it has to promote respect to human 
rights (including future generations). The criterion for making decisions in this ambit is 
justice, which talks about the primary goods that everyone must have guaranteed, they are 
universal moral demands. This is a minimal ethics because it doesn’t talk about full life, how 
or why we should live. This Ethics is neutral regarding the way or style of life.  Civic ethics is 
world ethics; it has to promote respect for human rights. We need an ethics for global 
society, for a shared world with morally plural societies that don’t share the concept of good 
and the meaning of quality of life.  
We need minimal ethics for the global world that propose duties and rights for every 
person, including responsibilities for the other living beings or for planet Earth. In certain 
sense it is possible to defend not only a right to live and a right to die, but also a duty to die: 
because the Earth has limits and it can not support too many people. And this world ethics 
is civic ethics, ethics for every citizen in the world. It is also previous and a sine qua non 
condition for private Ethics. Personal Ethics has to cause happiness, not in any way, but in a 
legitimate and fair way. 
So we are defending that human rights are the content of justice; they cannot be only 
conventions out of random or cultural, economical or political interests. They should be 
defended as universal exigencies that enable us to talk about justice and to take rights 
seriously.  
The way a society treats its elder members says a lot of about the level of justice and 
solidarity in this society. J. Rawls in his work A Theory of Justice (1971) exposed the 
hypothesis of the veil of ignorance: if people are unaware of their biological-social lottery, 
they would choose to live in a fair society rather than a random society. In the former, each 
member is born equal in liberty, and the most fortunate ones in that lottery have to help 
minimize the disadvantages of the less fortunate ones. In contrast, the law of the jungle, an 
animal law, prevails in a random society. In that society natural selection is the only 
criterion, a survival instinct that doesn’t depend on our liberty. In that society it is stupid to 
speak about ethics, human rights or dignity, because in ethics we talk about what depends 
on us, about what we owe to each other; and justice depends on our management. 
Thus, we can conclude that the incidence of luck in a person is inversely proportional to the 
level of justice in the human society in which one lives. It is bad luck to become ill or 
disabled, but it is a good luck to live in a fair society that doesn’t leave one at his luck. For 
instance, aging is an unavoidable fact, but it is a good luck to become old person living with 
dignity and quality of life until the end; living in a society that respects the last personal 
decision about when and how to live and die. 
Civic ethics talks about two categories: truth and justice.  
a. We understand Truth as the validity of knowledge, a validity based on empirical 
proofs, on the evidence that we have at the moment.  
b. We speak about Justice considered as impartiality and as the consent of the affected 
parties by the decisions that must be taken.  
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We cannot take fair decisions without true knowledge, so we need science. From the same 
dignity for all, civic ethics is the frame in which dialogue takes place, with information, 
participation and deliberation of involved persons. Therefore we talk about the right to be 
informed, and that’s the reason for implementing the informed consent in health 
organizations. Civic ethics doesn’t talk about quality of life. We must be able to care with 
justice, the same for everybody (that is dignity), but from different approaches (that is quality). 
Physicians and caregivers should prioritize the civic values over their personal ones, 
because the patient has the last word (he has private, personal values) in decision making 
regarding his life. So we must ensure that in hospital or at home ill people eat, drink, bathe 
and take their medication, but depersonalization or homogenization must be avoided: every 
person has a private unique life and a personal ethics with his particular values. Thus, if  a 
person has decided that his life is meaningless because of his loss of autonomy; if this 
person wants to die, we must conclude that he has right to die and a doctor must help him 
to die without pain and suffer. The goals of medicine are save, take care, also at the end of 
life, also helping to die. Physicians must be trained to help to die. To allow euthanasia the 
physicians’ curricula should be improved, because physicians are trained to carry out actions 
against disease and death, to save lives, to care people: they must be trained also to attend 
dying people in a better manner, when nothing technically can be done, and to attend 
people who want to die. 
The patient is the ultimate responsible person for his own life. Respecting the patient’s 
autonomy also means respecting his values, also giving him the information of the process 
of his disease. Physicians and patients establish a moral contract. Physicians must inform 
patients about the time, the treatments, and expectations of recovery and future quality of 
life. This information process must be done with the adequate vocabulary according to the 
patient’s capacity. The relationship between Physicians patients is so important that it 
would be recommendable for Physicians to learn communicative skills, which aren’t taught 
at Universities. 
Information and communication often fail because the doctor is not aware of the different 
levels of knowledge patients have about disease and their conception of death. Sometimes it 
is even a mater of different cultures. The physician must always take care of the patient’s 
welfare and respect his customs. And here Physicians need pedagogical tools and, of course, 
ethical attitudes. 
Physicians should be with the patient during the decision making process; it’s not only a 
matter to respect the patient’s decision: a good decision will need information about 
benefits, risks, processes. Autonomy is the capacity to make decisions and it requires 
knowledge and responsibility until the end of life.   
As professionals in health organizations, with the leadership of civic ethics and its content 
(truth, justice, human rights and duties), we ought to make compatible the different ethics: 
the personal, the professional and the corporative ones. Dilemmas will surely arise: people 
have different interests, different cultures, and different scale of values; solutions will be 
found from the horizon of human rights. But if a person has good reasons, his reasons, to 
die, we should respect this decision and help him to carry out in the optimal conditions. 
3. On duty to live 
3.1 Autonomy: Personal preference or normative concept? 
Who should decide the end of life? The same person who lives, only this person can decide 
about this subject because his life is a private property. The individual has the last word 
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about his life. He is the only moral authority in his life, also even for religious people: God is 
a moral authority because they want so.The choice of living or dying is a very personal 
decision that should be respected when person is competent, autonomous.  
Our relation with life and death depends on our personal moral. Now we are discovering 
that it is possible to live without autonomy (Alzheimer, dementia, etc). It is our 
responsibility to guarantee that no people suffer and it is our obligation, if possible, to 
guarantee their quality of life. But if a person, before he loses his autonomy, decided not to 
live without autonomy, we have the duty to help him to die. 
But it is not the same to take a decision from autonomy than from arbitrary preferences. If 
we are talking about ethics, we are talking about normative concepts, not about arbitrary 
elections. Autonomy is something more than mere preferences. In this sense, from our point 
of view, Kantian concept of autonomy is better than the Anglo-Saxon one in order to reach a 
normative foundation: life is more than quality of life; life is something more than choosing 
pleasures 
We are talking about Ethics, not about morals. Ethics is moral philosophy, a critical and 
rational reflection about morals. Nowadays we need to engage in this reflection because we 
are living in a multicultural world, a morally plural world, where morals are changing 
depending on new technical challenges that evolves moral values. We must think which 
options are not respectful, which options are respectful and which among these are better 
because of their arguments.  
Kant, the author who made the concept of autonomy fashionable, reminds us that 
everything has its price, while people have their dignity. And this dignity causes in us the 
moral feeling of respect, from the Latin respicere, that means watchful look (in German, 
Achtung means both attention and respect). To respect people means to pay attention to their 
needs. Kant reminds us that dignity should be something sacred: humanity is worthy of 
respect, because humanity is an End in itself and implies rational competence, self-
determination and responsibility. 
To allow euthanasia is a matter of law and ethics; so we should think about life and the duty 
of live, not only about the pleasure of life. If we are rational beings, we should give reasons 
to live and to die: We have responsibilities and duties to ourselves and to others. Legalizing 
euthanasia requires social pedagogy about these subjects. 
Regarding the duty to live -we argue that ethics, as a philosophical discipline-,  it makes 
sense to propose universal obligations. Ethics is the discipline that reminds us the duty to 
make life something valuable and worthy, that is, the duty to construct a character, a 
meaningful life plan, an Ethos. 
To conceive life as a mere preference (as is the case for many utilitarian or hedonistic 
philosophers and from a negative concept of autonomy as self determination), 
misunderstands the concept of autonomy, because it deprives ethical, normative obligation. 
It is even difficult to understand the very existence of a discipline, ethics, dedicated to 
studying the criteria of what is a good, fair, decent life without a fundamental duty to live. If 
everything is a matter of mere choice, of mere preference, without having to give 
explanations for the decisions that someone makes, we talk of aesthetics, not of ethics, nor 
therefore, of bioethics.  
Regarding the reduction of autonomy to mere personal preference (the Anglo-Saxon notion 
of autonomy) , we are insisting that, in the question about euthanasia, the person must be 
competent and make decisions about his life and death only in the context of a disease that 
progressively robs his autonomy. If everything is based on the Anglo-Saxon concept of 
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autonomy (as a right to self-determination), the decision making is reduced to mere 
preferences of an individual, the pleasure of living or not. But in that case, we could fall into 
"the slippery slope". Actually, an individual who has lost interest in life and wants to die, he 
could ask the doctor to help him die. In this case the ethical reason to end his life is an 
exercise of self-determination, but not precisely autonomy in Kantian sense, e.g. to continue 
to exercise autonomy and no finishing with it. In our opinion this is the fundamental 
argument from which we defend the ethical legitimacy of euthanasia. In this case, we find 
someone who despises life: is this also respectable from a normative Ethics? 
From Kant, we said no; we think that there is a duty to live, to fight for life until the end. We 
can consider right the decision to die only in circumstances of progressive loss of the 
autonomy (Alzheimer, dementia, etc.) and in circumstances of a “total pain” caused by the 
disease. Thus, we want to go beyond Kant and his refusal to commit suicide and defend the 
possibility of the right to die, but we are precisely following Kant, that is, his concept of 
autonomy. So we agree with Kant's ethical foundation of the duty of living and his concept 
of autonomy: worthy life it is not a matter of preferences. 
The lack of interest in the life of a person because he is getting bored, or because his life has 
no meaning, but there is no disease or progressive loss of autonomy, undermines the 
principle of making one's life a meaningful project. It is a duty to live, we must seek a 
meaning, beyond the pleasure that life can generate. Beside the right to live and the right to 
die, there is also a duty to live with dignity until the end. 
4. An agenda for the future 
Euthanasia cannot be legalized without ethically thinking before what is at stake, and what 
is at stake in the issue of euthanasia is all of the following: 
4.1 The dignity and quality of life of people. We need a social pedagogy to live and to 
die 
The patient autonomy paradigm puts the person in the centre. To talk about of the principle of 
respect for the autonomy of the person means that he is the ultimate moral authority, he is 
who has the last word; he sets the pace, about his life ant death. The use of advanced directives 
and informed consent documents must be enhanced. These tools are much more than 
documents and papers; they are the logical result of the dialogue between the patient and 
professionals. They will be the proof that the respect to patient’s autonomy has taken place. 
Euthanasia requires competences and legislative changes. Regarding competences, it must 
be reminded that professionals cannot infantilise either mature minors or the elderly, who, 
despite their years, have not necessarily lost their maturity and who may feel humiliated. 
Professionals must always ask his permission, and when necessary, forgiveness if they are 
not right. However, autonomy often remains only in the speech, in the theoretical level; but 
the unique "autonomous” are usually the physicians, they are not serving the patient's 
autonomy, but for best performance of the professionals or institutions at which they work. 
With regard to legislative changes, the citizens’ participation in decision making must be 
improved, not only regarding their own individual health, but also on proposing public 
health policies. 
Even though bioethics should be a civic, secular ethics which respects personal options, it is 
difficult for several governments to maintain neutrality in its view of the world, as it should 
in a morally pluralistic society. Sometimes it even goes from secularity to secularism. 
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If in the welfare state the criteria were the supply and demand law and the populist policies; 
in the justice state the criterion must be the consent of involved people, that is, the citizens 
and the professionals. 
4.2 Credibility and confidence in the professionals and health organizations: Medical 
professionals to serve people 
The quality of professional and organisational service must be in accordance with human 
rights, and the right to healthcare is one of them; but quality of this service will also depend 
on the citizens’ use or abuse. It must be responsibly, in line with their needs, accepting that 
the system must satisfy rights, not individual preferences. And if a quality service is to be 
achieved, we all must feel part of a shared world. The four areas of ethics must be 
reconciled: civic ethics; organisational ethics; professional ethics; and the last, the personal 
ethics (ethics of professional and of the citizen whose service the professional is on). If 
professionals and organizations health services want to gain people’s confidence, they will 
need to begin to re-classify their decisions in the corresponding areas. This means not giving 
priority to personal preferences or the preferences of the “clientele” when making 
professional or organisational decisions, and weighing before-hand whether they are in line 
with the civic, organisational, and professional values. 
Healthcare professions must focus on the person: he is the subject of rights. It must be 
reminded again and again to those who are serving the professions and health 
organizations, what their mission is, their ultimate responsibility.  
4.3 The kind of world that humans construct, and the reasons to live: A normative 
solidarity 
Life cannot be underestimated; human life is the only chance on Earth: we must make with 
our lives something worthy. It is a matter of justice and solidarity to promote the research of 
a good life. Nevertheless, we are not talking about solidarity by compassion; we are not 
thinking in a utilitarian solidarity: “I should cooperate because maybe, one day, I could be in 
these circumstances”. No: it is not a contract; it is not a convenience or a matter of selfish 
interest. It’s a matter of normative solidarity; it is a matter of rights, justice and respect to 
humanity wherever and ever.  Life is the most important moral resource to do something 
worthy with it, also at the end of life. Anyway, it is also a way of dignifying life to decide the 
circumstances of death (Thomasma et al, 1998), when someone is loosing his autonomy, 
when to be able to decide is becoming more and more difficult. 
5. Conclusions 
This article has defended the following thesis on euthanasia: 
1. The issue of euthanasia depends on personal moral. It is from the concept of quality of life 
where the person decides whether to continue living or not. 
2. But it is a personal moral issue that must be supported by ethical reasons. This is not an 
aesthetic question of mere preferences, against the Anglo-Saxon concept of autonomy. We 
have therefore advocated a duty to live, to make life a meaningful project, from a Kantian 
concept of autonomy. It is in moments of loss of autonomy, not only of loss of pleasure, 
which it can be autonomously decided to not live longer. Precisely the autonomy that is 
being lost due to disease is the only cause that can legitimate to decide finishing life. This 
means that autonomy and ethics require biographical life beyond mere biological life. 
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3. Civic ethics does not speak of quality of life, which depends on personal moral, but of 
respect for the different options, and that's a matter of justice. It is fully consistent that an 
individual in his personal moral is against euthanasia and yet, from the civic ethic, the ethics 
of tolerance for morally pluralistic society, respects the choice by others with different 
personal moral in favor of euthanasia. 
4. Medicine has its social legitimacy, its “raison d’être”, in assisting people, but from the 
paradigm of autonomy and not from the paternalistic paradigm. Once people have made 
their choices from personal moral, physicians should remind from civic ethics the duty of 
hospitality, the duty of care to people in their concept of quality of life. 
 5. The doctor can be a conscientious objector. Of course the doctor, from his personal moral, 
can be against euthanasia. But his objection has limits: the physician cannot impose his own 
personal choice and must ensure always the care of the patient. If the objector doctor does 
not want to help the patient to die, he must find other doctors to do so. 
6. Open societies are free societies, that is its precious value; the price to pay is the greater 
complexity of its management. And our complex societies need more ethical reflection; they 
need more reflection on what we owe to each other and what we owe to ourselves. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Life awareness  
The world of life, is a world that precedes human existence, therefore it constitutes and 
projects us as human being, beyond men reflection allows to take it. Life itself was not men 
made, as a creative phenomenon it originated and per suited humanity. It is in its core 
substantially coated with dignity and respect, as well as that of the biological materia; in 
other words, body and soul are indeed equally precious (Cely, 2001, 2005; Gherardi, 2007) 
Human life is one of the best emergencies of life itself, and holds within all its multifactorial 
harmonious complexity. So complex that it has become in abstraction of its own realization, 
in its auto-recognition thinking process. From life’s fundamental nature emerged the 
spiritual essence of materiality and the profound giving of consciousness than allows the 
binomial energy-materia to appropriate of the existing reality. It corresponds to human kind 
the responsibility of humanizing life from our own cultures, by favoring thoughtfully 
reflexive processes with transcendental meanings on all forms of living existence (Cely, 
2001, 2004, 2005; Gherardi, 2007) 
Life could be defined as a sequence of moments that create the existence of a person, whose 
moral and cognitive development and evolution have been influenced by different socio-
cultural factors that characterize the configuration and structuring of attitudes and 
personality, as being part of a society. Common sense implies the acceptance of dogmas that 
although could be interpreted in various individual ways, however are accepted and 
followed by most member of a community; as epitomized by experiencing birth and death 
(Cely, 2001; Gherardi, 2007). 
Every human action is necessarily associated and related. This means that no one lives 
totally on its own; to enable the existence of each individual it must be articulated by needs 
and deliberation to other human beings and the natural surrounding environment, in a 
complex network of interactions. These connections respond to Ecological and Ethological 
links of reciprocity in manifold directions with chaotic and eventful energy exchanges of 
growing complexity that increases a higher new emergency in the ethos vital (Cely, 2001, 
2005; Gherardi, 2007).  
Nowadays Bioethics as a branch of applied ethics, new and required by the society of 
knowledge of the third millennium, proposes to take as a very serious matter all data that 
different sciences subsequently contribute with, from the beginning of life until its end, to 
distinguish this information with wisdom to all existence, doing so in the perspective of a 
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3. Civic ethics does not speak of quality of life, which depends on personal moral, but of 
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followed by most member of a community; as epitomized by experiencing birth and death 
(Cely, 2001; Gherardi, 2007). 
Every human action is necessarily associated and related. This means that no one lives 
totally on its own; to enable the existence of each individual it must be articulated by needs 
and deliberation to other human beings and the natural surrounding environment, in a 
complex network of interactions. These connections respond to Ecological and Ethological 
links of reciprocity in manifold directions with chaotic and eventful energy exchanges of 
growing complexity that increases a higher new emergency in the ethos vital (Cely, 2001, 
2005; Gherardi, 2007).  
Nowadays Bioethics as a branch of applied ethics, new and required by the society of 
knowledge of the third millennium, proposes to take as a very serious matter all data that 
different sciences subsequently contribute with, from the beginning of life until its end, to 
distinguish this information with wisdom to all existence, doing so in the perspective of a 
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scientific humanism which can attain responsibility for making moral consensus and 
prescribing binding actions to carry out this complex purposes (Cely, 2001, 2004; 
Albuquerque 2008). 
The two dilemmas at the endpoint of life have represented enigmas that men have sought to 
penetrate along human history. Conception and acceptance of pain and suffering seems to 
be inexorably linked to the beginning and end of human lifecycle, since they distinct not 
only the peaks of biophysical life; but perhaps, also the advent of a new spiritual dimension, 
yet to be explored, comprehended and known (Gherardi, 2007; Cely, 2004).  
Decision making for handling death and medical intervention has led civilizations to adopt 
different behaviors and cultural patterns at end-of-life, which have evolved over time, 
seeking to alleviate pain or suffering in cases where the patient's ill condition has taken to 
boundaries of where, may not be a health recovery. 
With no doubt biomedical scientific and technological progress, has led medicine to 
participate and to intervene in this biotechnical development, using utensils and medical 
apparatus that enable the maintenance of life even in artificial ways. 
The principles of bioethics and medical ethics arise to guide medical decision making and action 
taking, in a harmonious and concord approach, as a result of the agreement by consent 
between all members of a group or even among several groups. Behold, as occurs in doctor-
patient’s interaction, coming out as result of this relationship reciprocally exerted in an affective and 
effective interaction deriving to a medical care technically desirable, in the management of those who 
are in a terminal stage disease (Cely, 2001, 2004; Gherardi, 2007; Albuquerque 2008; León 1996; 
CENABI, 1999). 
These dissertations about biomedical sciences and technology’s contributions at End of the 
Life Decision Making (ELDM), demonstrates the need for a bioethical prosecution in the quest 
for these resolutions, under the scope that its complexities exceeds the competence of the 
medical profession, requiring the successful assembling of different disciplines; 
consequently there is an urgent need for consensus between medical doctors, ethicists, 
secular, lawyers, humanists and priests of various clergy, along with the whole society 
(Cely, 2001, 2004; Gherardi, 2007; Albuquerque 2008; León 1996; CENABI, 1999).  
The different aspects related to the approach of life’s end decision making, have to be 
analyzed from its various dimensions and in  recognition of its integrations into a dynamical 
socio-cultural framework, as is life itself; having diverse perspectives involved within each 
other. This new complex approach allows a closer look to the reality in the process of dying, 
in which the convergence of all aspects of the phenomenon and their mutual relations, will 
allow to come closer to the multidimensional true existence (Cely, 2001; CENABI, 1999). 
Bioethics brings a plural-dimensional view on reality concepts, creates an interwoven 
reciprocal and reflective connection that allows an altogether vision of dilemmas, re-
evaluating humanity at its whole, to place it as a cardinal axis of dignity and into a higher 
purpose of human being. Emphasizing that all things that can be scientifically man made 
possible are not ethical or bioethical acceptable to accomplished (Cely, 2001; CENABI, 1999). 
Death, once easy to identify by the cessation of breathing and heartbeat can be in our days, 
somehow more difficult to establish, as a result of the implementation of new technologies 
and procedures brought by biomedical sciences. The cease of organic functions, today only 
determines a state of “perceptible” death, as it may be resolved by resources of respiratory 
and/or hemodynamic support. Not even the irreversible damage of the neurorregulatory 
centers are enough to establish with accurate precision the time of death, when even under 
such circumstances, it is possible to maintain the visceral process unscathed. 
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As a result of this biomedical and biotechnology intervention, establishing the advent of 
death, nowadays appeals to a neurological refined approach, as in: brain death. This indeed 
is of complex concern especially in developing countries; therefore sanctioning death by this 
mean only, could become a decision mediated by increasingly sophisticated biomedical 
devices. Interestingly, it would be the sensitivity and appropriate management of this 
equipment which could authorize end of life decisions. In recent past, with a more human 
clinical approach and the help of few instruments, this pronouncement could be easily taken 
behold a closer interaction among the physicians as principal care takers, the patients and 
their families (Aguiar, 2003; Cely, 2005; Castillo, 2006). 
However, the fear of ethical, bioethical and legal implications, actually frequently become a 
limiting condition upon therapeutic measures in patients who need end-of-life care; all of 
these immersed in a framework surrounded by social, economic and cultural contexts 
distinctive of each moment in time, which restrict, stipulates and determines the most 
appropriate approach through the course of action, being as well responsible for caring of 
life in the planet and of human survival (Aguiar, 1997; Cely, 2001, 2004;).  
Different aspects of patients medical mediated death, have already engaged for decades 
scientific literature, with the emergence of new terminologies to distinguish the most 
frequent situations being discussed within the confines of human life. Declarations rights of 
the terminally ill patients have been bound-for to avoid any type of discrimination or abuse 
that could prejudice the patient’s sense of individual dignity and self-respect (Gherardi, 
2007). 
Clearly, the circumstances of medical mediated death have provided legitimacy to the 
claims for a "good death", leading the way to a movement that aims to create a forum for 
discussion of the various aspects that should be considered regarding the ethical-bioethical 
problems at the finale of human lifecycle, as well known as “Omega Dilemma” (CENABI, 
1999; Gherardi, 2007;). 
Terminally ill patients going through the process of dying need to be appreciated in their 
own conditions and therefore rights. Which can be summarized as follows: right to the relief 
of pain and other symptoms; right to remain vigilant; right to be informed truthfully; right 
to exercise its decision-making capacity; right to maintain affective human contact; right to 
be respected in their religious beliefs; right to “die in due course”; in other words, to be 
marginalized of excessive medical practices aimed to keep them alive (Cely, 2001, 2004; 
Gherardi, 2007).  
Nowadays new concepts as Euthanasia, Cripthanasia, Dysthanasia, Orthothanasia, 
Tachythanasia and Assisted Suicide are added to the terminologies used to refer end-of-life 
decision making within the terminally ill patient, brought by these novel spectrum of 
discussions being done by the reciprocal intervention of family members, legal 
representatives of patients, health care-takers and religious councils. 
Currently in some Nations such as Venezuela, there are actually undergoing a legal reform 
of laws known as Anteproyecto de Reforma del Código Penal Venezolano-New Project of the 
Venezuelan’s Penal Code, in which just few lawyers, members of the National Assembly have 
reviewed discussion, adoption and implementation of some of existing biotechnical 
interventions in medical-mediated death; which is described on text as the intentional 
physician’s delivered purpose of ending a terminally ill patient’s life, patient´s or family´s 
written consent and life testament; being both active and passive voluntary euthanasia, the two 
forms of execution. 
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As one would expect, in medical practice it is viable to identify different situations 
vulnerable of questioning and moral deliberation, in which are not always easy to 
complement the will of the patient, among the different treatment alternatives brought by 
the healthcare team, and at the same time, in the course of actions to be adjusted to the 
existing constitutional framework in every contextual location. In addition occasionally, 
some family members of the patients are those who inquire medical doctors to alleviate pain 
at all cost or in some way to bring to an end the suffering of their loved ones, regardless of 
the unwanted side effects. 
However, what is put into bioethical consideration are the possibilities of medical intervention and 
the legitimate moral behavior that will be decided during the process of dying, a succession of 
events which would have its point of departure at the time of diagnosing an incurable 
disease and envisage of death, and its finishing point in the clinical representation of the 
“apparent death” (Castillo, 2006). How to confront suffering, pain or a disease which could 
inexorably bring to death, are subjective and absolutely auto-determined decisions by 
patients, among their family group. 
Bearing agony and closure of lifecycle supported by medical conventional or palliative care 
is the reality that many of our Venezuelan’s patients either alone or with the company of 
their families face every day; in a heroic attempt to keep alive, not letting feelings of 
discouragement overcome their hopes by the added hardships of poor public health care 
services. There are not enough well medical equipped health care centers for patients in 
need, or in most locations where not only the access to public facilities are complicated, but 
yet to obtain medical disposable material and equipment is not feasible either.  
This scenery brings a more detail conflict into the bioethical discussion, reaching out-far the 
existing gap between developed and underdeveloped countries, which makes it impossible 
to mimic context of medical or legal situations; furthermore, embraces each national and 
regional context of its own proper deliberations. This is what makes bioethical dilemmas so 
significant and of a unique type, by considering in the consensuses of medical decision 
making a contextual reflection of a single kind. There are no “golden rules” to it, so all life 
human forces of every community parties need to be taken into account, within the 
introspection of their socials and cultural backgrounds (Bont, 2007; Castillo, 2006; León, 
1981, 1996). 
From an spiritual dimension, the topic of death can be tackled from the traditional dominant 
“dualism” of the west world, which sees the human being composed of two different reality 
matters, body and soul, irreducible one to the other, perishable the first and immortal the 
second. This anthropology, of Hellenistic and Christian origin, in which the majority of 
Venezuelans have been educated, currently receives deep questioning from sciences and 
contemporary humanities (Bont, 2007; Cely, 2004; Castillo, 2006). 
In the other hand, the modern theological hermeneutics reinterprets the sources of 
revelation, to make them understandable to men and women of our days. Another view of 
this spiritual dimension would be the “monist”, in which man is not divided between a body 
and a soul, but it sees as a “substantive unit”, a single vital substance, as conceive by 
Parmenides, Spinoza, Plotinus, Schelling, Hegel and Freud, among others philosophers. For 
whom reality is the unity of the essence and existence. The essence is not behind or beyond 
the phenomenon, but for this same reason the essence exists, the essence is specified in the 
phenomenon; realizing that the phenomenon is life itself, life turned-as energy emerged 
from the Cosmos in the infinity of ethos vital (Bont, 2007; Cely, 2004; Castillo, 2006). 
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Being understood as well, men would be a very complex structure of embodied vital energy, 
forming part of the biota as a whole, coming through an intimate relationship and 
reciprocity with the abiotic. Being Humanity an inside-out of creation as nature’s turned 
into the awareness of life, which means that we have become the consciousness of natures 
by itself (Cely, 2001, 2004). 
The two anthropologies have their strengths and their weaknesses. With either of two 
anthropologies, monist or dualist, men will reach the same goal: life after death, in theological 
propositions that provide wisdom to human reasoning to grant ourselves with dignity 
inside an ethos vital that nourish our hope for a spiritual life without suffering anymore pain 
or perennial death, by the promise of a supra-dimension of eternal life.  
Although different faiths believe also provide sense of binomial life and death. Religions, as 
part of the human spiritual dimension, are an attempt of civilized man to give an 
explanation to the emerge of life and its needed link relations, through enclosure devotion in 
a supreme being, endowed with all the wisdom, always eternal power, in its different forms 
of reflections, the only way to reach-out for salvation and allegory hope, beyond this earthly 
mortal abode (Cely, 2004).  
The Roman Catholic Church, representing the predominant religion in Venezuela, raises the 
permissibility of not using extreme biomedical measures to sustain life and expressively 
supports the relief of pain in terminally ill patients, justifying the fact that when you cannot 
be cured, the therapeutic goal is to relieve symptoms and improve as possible, the quality of 
life of the patient. For that reason it sustains, that palliative care can be considered an 
extension of medical practice that, given the impossibility of doctors to cure any given 
disease, they must promote and uphold patients leading one's life based on faith, which is 
above all gifted with dignity by itself (John Paul II, 2004; Del Prete, 2008). 
Christian Catholic anthropology interpretation supports respect for human life from its very 
conception known by the binding of the ovules and spermatozoids, through the fusion of 
gametes to produce a new organism, until life it-self with no extreme biomedical technology 
intervention comes to an end. In light of what the Scriptures say about the kind of care God 
wills that we provide to those who suffer and are facing death, rejecting such claims for 
active euthanasia and assisted suicide as neither compassionate nor caring (Bont, 2010; Cely, 
2004; León, 1981). 
Enlighten two major Biblical Principles to oppose euthanasia. The first is the sanctity of 
human life: Being a fault to voluntarily terminate a life, killing incurable physically or 
mentally ill patients, or commit assisted suicide, do to that life is taken only by God-given 
powers. The Christian faith cannot accept the argument that in such circumstances life has 
no value, so it must be finished (León, 1981; John Paul II, 2004).  
The second principle attaches meaning to suffering. “God is omnipotent; when there is 
suffering on earth it is intended that this happens. God has an intellect greater than man, so 
it is sometimes impossible to the human understanding to fully comprehend God’s 
purpose”. To sum up Catholic Church, standardizes medical mediated forms of ending 
human life by the patient’s voluntary decision, including passive euthanasia, with murder; 
considering them as a mortal sin. The reasons for this are based on the inviolability of 
human life and in human redemption suffering purposes, which lead men to Christ and 
heaven (Bont, 2010; León, 1981; John Paul II, 2004). 
To what Paul VI express: “medicine is required to fight overcoming of death with all 
available resources, but when the battle is unavoidably to be lost, there is not necessity to 
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use extreme resuscitation techniques. It is a useless torturing to maintain a person in a 
vegetative condition”. Euthanasia, in its proper sense, is a synonym for mercy killing, 
which involves suicide and/or murder. It is, therefore, contrary to God’s Law. 
When the God-given powers of the body to sustain its own life can no longer function and 
doctors in their professional judgment conclude that there is no real hope for recovery even 
with life support instruments, a Christian may in good conscience “let nature take its 
course” (Bont, 2010; León, 1981; John Paul II, 2004). 
Being Christian Roman Catholic, the dominant religious believe in Venezuela’s social 
context, discussions over medical handling and management of life’s end decisions, need 
yet a long way to go, especially if taken into consideration the constants disputes and 
confrontations undergoing between Government officials and cleric headquarters; leading 
this delicate topic to be devilish among general population, somehow as an intent of 
Government’s legislators to overlook and contravene Human Rights principles. Never the 
less, what is indeed most preoccupying is the lack of interest of official congresspersons to 
come out in the open and let all community living forces to give their opinions and promote 
participation, in a clear effort for consensus over this essential dilemma of life; letting people 
know about de currently discussions that are held regarding the intension of lawmakers to 
reform the Venezuela’s New Project of the Legal Code (Bont, 2010; Anteproyecto de Código 
Penal-República Bolivariana de Venezuela, 2000). 
National lawmakers have not done up-to date proper researches or open discussions about 
arguments to sustain these modifications and to include for the first time in the country’s 
history a new ruling, as in Article Nº 217 Dar muerte por piedad- Giving death by mercy. Do to 
the novelty of the topic in our socio-cultural framework, its new applications and 
implications especially for terminally ill patients and physicians; this important matter has 
to be debate within a broad participation of Venezuelan’s community members. 
Foreign experiences as the ones quoted at current text project, are far from our socio-
economic, cultural or religious reality, most of all if considering government’s poor coverage 
of adequate medical services wide across the nation, particularly of intensive care units. 
Furthermore, there is a considerable gap between those who living in the same geographic 
region, but with different economic holding, have access to a barely satisfactory health 
service. There are many issues to bring about before lawmaking over this delicate topic. 
Lawyer who favor article support arguments on current changes in developed countries like 
Spain, Netherlands, Germany and the United States, this point of view lacks of profound 
academic knowledge or empirical practices to be properly sustained (Anteproyecto de 
Código Penal-República Bolivariana de Venezuela, 2000). 
Some jurists consider that the whole writing of the article needs to be fully supervised anew, 
do to the insufficient clarification of the terminology implicit in it; which could lead to 
regretting misunderstandings on behalf of the medical care takers or even patients 
themselves. On the other hand, the Venezuelan Constitution as our maximum legal 
framework does contravene this proposal, as so does the Law of Medical Practice and the 
Deontology Medical Venezuelan Code followed by medical doctors. Never the less 
administering pain-killing medications is permissible, even at the risk of shortening life, 
since this does not entail the choice of death as either a means or an end (Piva & Pinto, 2003; 
Ley del Ejercicio de la Medicina en Venezuela, 1982; Código de Deontología Médica de 
Venezuela, 2003). 
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What is evident is the distance from general agreement that according to this matter we are 
about-of, for mediated medical end of life decision-making to be legally established, needing 
a meticulous debate yet to be done. Before, Government must guarantee all society members 
the benefits of being capable to receive appropriate, contemporary medical attention, 
distributed with justice and equitability in every nation’s state, regardless of any social-
economic or religious faith barrier. 
Complex thought and paradigm projected on the phenomenon of human care in dying, 
allows integrating different methods for relating scientific knowledge in problem-solving, 
which is based on dialogue and consensus of diverse perspectives to view in and out the 
dilemma, considering Social and Clinical Bioethics and the Bioethical Principles of autonomy-
respect for person, non-maleficence, beneficence and justice; on the common understanding 
by all parties involved, that is indispensable the adequate relief of pain, the emotional 
support on suffering, winding the patient’s and family’s anguish with affective and spiritual 
accompaniment.  
1.2 Methodological framework: A new comprehension 
Based on complex thought proposed by Edgar Morin, which serves as groundwork to the 
investigative episteme, researcher finds support in the paradigm of complexity from 
postmodernism, seeking to embrace and comprehend reality of patients and medical 
doctors at end of life decision management. On complex view the main purpose is to dialog 
in an interactive reciprocal relation among subjects participating in the phenomenon of 
study, rather than just determine or measure what happens under those circumstances. The 
investigators deepens on terminally ill patient’s death as a phenomenon of interest within a 
creative, genuine and holistic intention, in which might emerge novel theoretical constructs, 
than through reflexive thought and into practice permits a better medical management at 
end-of-life (Morin, 2003, 2004; Orcajo, 2000).  
The research is constructed considering postmodern anti-method, and method is structured 
on its way, to end-up on the conjunction of two investigative momentous, one of qualitative 
expression and a second one in quantitative terms. Guided by complex thought researcher 
adapts the method as a strategy resulting from the interaction between reality and its 
comprehension with the paradigm; in which each decision and procedure regenerates the 
method, not being applied as a pre-determined rigorous and unequivocal pathway to 
follow; allowing researcher to create new interpretative understanding and innovate 
strategies, relying on singular analytical and reflective investigative momentous connecting 
knowing, comprehension, and medical practice intended for intellectual enrichment and 
proper management of end-of-life decision making among doctor-patient’s interaction (Leal-G, 
2005; Morin, 1999, 2003). 
In postmodern comprehension the enormous fullness that surrounds us, encompass and 
challenges our capacity of knowledge, which can’t be established on a single rigid pathway 
method; perhaps, is the innovative result of such an effort, the only thing that truly appeals 
the attempt of learning new things by applying novel methodologies (Martín-F, 2006). 
Researcher’s view on a complex paradigm, is allowed to open to intuition and amusement 
(which is about freedom of thought and imagination), as the muse (from Latin Mūsa) or a 
source of inspiration that guides the meaning and essence of the exploration, using logical 
thinking in the investigation procedure, as well as letting passion inspire reasoning at the 
pursuit of learning the best way to come closer in reality’s interpretation; this gnosis allows 
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researcher to be an active participant subject in the development of the entire investigative 
process. This challenges the valuable sense of investigators, in the approximation of the 
living-dying phenomenon in a genuine, warm, imperative and provisional nature as is life 
itself. Giving this model its uniqueness, exhibiting its particular way, this is also 
fundamental in the generation of new overcoming knowledge (Leal-G, 2005, Martín-F, 
2006). 
Complex thought is a style of thinking and approaching reality. In that sense the complex 
thought generates its own strategy, indivisible of inventive participation of those who 
develop the research. Rationality is not the only mental process that guides the search and 
construction of an emerging understanding (Martín-F, 2006). 
It is also necessary to take into account that method and paradigm are inseparable. All 
methodical activity is based on a paradigm that directs a cognitive practice. Since the 
complex thought proposes a paradigm that interacts, articulates and understands, at the 
same time that can develop its self-criticism (Leal-G, 2005; Martín-F, 2006; Morin, 1999, 
2003).  
In a primary stage of research, the author recognizes the need to provide an original 
scientifically valid construct in close relation to the contents of the Venezuelan socio-cultural 
and economic contexts; into the different manifestations of faith and spirituality as part of 
our life experience. Taking into account the current review carried out by the Asamblea 
Nacional de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela-National Assembly of Venezuela’s Bolivarian 
Republic, about the Código Penal- Legal Code (Anteproyecto de Código Penal Venezuela, 
2000). 
The first quantitative language momentous approaches the phenomenon focused on an 
empirical-analytical basis research method, according logical positivism as the 
epistemological cornerstone, methodology research design is exploratory, transect of not-
experimental, with the main object of exposing the importance of the medical practice 
decision making et end of life based on the opinion, degree of information and training of 
doctors working in areas of Surgery, Internal Medicine, Intensive-Care Units, Oncology and 
Anesthesiology of the Servicio Autónomo Hospital Central de Maracay-Autonomous Central 
Hospital Service of Maracay, in Aragua’s State and the Hospital Central de Valencia-Carabobo 
“Dr. Enrique Tejera”- Central Hospital Service “Dr. Enrique Tejera” of Valencia-Carabobo (CHET); 
representing the 2 biggest middle states Medical Centers in Venezuela (Bont, 2007; Hurtado 
& Toro,1997; Hernandez & Fernandez 1991). 
From primarily empiric process of data, the population of study from which our sample is 
drawn was represented by 185 doctors, to whom were applied an anonymous 
questionnaire, of not probabilistic selection sampling (opinatic and volunteer sample), being  
finally constituted by 123 subjects, who agreed to freely participate in research throughout 
written informed consent. Obtained data was tabulated and coded in Excel in comparative 
tables, which subsequently formed sectorial diagrams (pie charts) in the same program, for 
statistical analyzing. The collected data then was triangulated to become innovative figures 
representations of reality in terminally ill patient life decision making. 
Depth perception of phenomenon led investigation to a second qualitative language 
momentous, within an inductive method, to come close and reconstructs the significance that 
terminally ill patients as subjects of study had regarded to the conscious decision making 
and action taking at the end of their own existence, which was accomplished through 
profound interviews by means of an intentional 5 patient’s sample. 
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Throughout qualitative language in which herméia and phenomenology recreates, actions are 
intervened in order to understand them, the author strives to give a general sense in the 
interaction of parties to get a proximate vision if it all. Hermeneutics in its desire of 
interpretation causes a constant return and sway from whole meaningful sense to each 
element interacting, as a perfect complement of complex thought (Martinez-Miguélez, 2004; 
Spiegelberg, 1975; Morin, 2000). 
Researcher’s strategy seeks for an interpretative perspective, mainstreaming as is 
phenomenology and hermeneutics, in which the purpose is to embrace what patients are going 
in the course of a comprehensive and explicative perspective of events, finally inserting this 
experience into learning about the caring in terminally ill patients. Allowing when 
necessary, emotional assistance from religious or spiritual leaders of patients’ creed.  
Textual data analysis theoretical considerations obtained from the primer quantitative 
investigation, as result of the medical experience in decision making at the end of human 
life, is also integrated as part of the second qualitative textual document evaluation. Being 
able to concatenate the product of the first momentous as an initial element in the second 
momentous of comprehension and redefinition of terminally ill patient’s reality. 
Under this intention researcher conducts in-depth interviews with no limit of time and in 
several meeting moments (when necessary), with each patient selected as a key-informant with 
a clinical diagnosis of malignant neoplasm (cancer); afterward all informants’ data collected is 
transcribed into a handwritten designed history profile, which is later transcribed in digital 
computerized Word format, to finally make a digital format makeover to a primary document, in 
the Atlas /ti textual data analyzing software (Muñoz, 2003; Glaser, 1992). 
In the means of the study, the process of dying is understood to begin from the moment a 
person losses health condition associated with a medical adequate diagnosis of incurable 
illness, that subsequently evolves on dying within days or weeks, which imminently entails 
patient’s envisage of death. 
Theoretical approaches to health care ethics have evolved in response to societal changes; 
evolution of health care can be traced form the “Hippocratic ethic” with emphasis on duty, 
virtue, and gentlemanly conduct, which emerged from relatively homogenous societies 
where beliefs were similar and the majority of societal members shared common values; 
through the “principlism” and into the current “antiprinciplism” movement. The theoretical 
model proposed in this research brings into reflection from a bioethical perspective an 
intercurrence of facts and the participant’s role at end of life decision making in medical 
death intervention, as the third millennium of humanity unfolds into biotechnological 
advances and challenges. Not rejecting principles but choosing to frame the use of values as 
standards to make them useful in a bioethical discussion. To construct this model, the 
author relies on broad and different referents theorists, who have sustained its investigative 
activity during the past years. 
Principles are too far removed from the concrete particularities of everyday human 
existence; therefore principles do not represent a theoretical approach. The anti-principlism 
movement has risen with the expansive technological changes and the tremendous burst in 
ethical issues accompanying these changes.  
1.3 Interaction of the research perspectives: Theoretical bioethical model 
As to the profile of physicians whom participated by consent agreement and filled out the 
questionnaires in this research were of 123 out of 185 medical doctors. Sample’s data 
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analysis demonstrated that majority correspond to females of 35 years old, with 15 years on 
average of graduated as medical doctors in Venezuelan Universities. All working at the moment of 
consultation in Public Community Healthcare Centers, in the fields of Surgery, Internal 
Medicine, Critical Care Medicine, Oncology and Anesthesiology of the Servicio Autónomo Hospital 
Central de Maracay-SAHCM in Aragua’s State (Autonomous Central Service Hospital of Maracay) 
and of Ciudad Hospitalaria “Dr. Enrique Tejera” of Carabobo’s State-CHET (Central Hospital 
Service “Dr. Enrique Tejera”), representing the 2 biggest and most important public 
medical centers of the middle region in the country. 
When asked about the knowledge of the content of Article Nº 217 Dar muerte por piedad-
Giving death by mercy of the preliminary draft partial reform of Venezuela’s New Project of the 
Legal Code, 90% of the surveyed doctors claimed to ignore it; 8% knew the undergoing 
reform and 2% did not response. As shown in this study most physicians surveyed had an 
important deficit of information or knowledge about the advance intention of Venezuelan 
Government on adding a new paragraph to our Legal Code: article entitled “Giving death by 
mercy”. Discussions are currently carried out in the Asamblea Nacional de la República de 
Venezuela-Republic’s National Assembly, which has a transcend impacts on medical decision-
making and action-taking at end-of-life (Anteproyecto de Código Penal de Venezuela, 2000). 
On this discussion about active and passive voluntary euthanasia legal forms, the most 
significant disagreement among the entire medical community is whether if the 
Government is also supporting all forms of medical suicide participation, including the 
executive ones.  
At the same time it was unclosed the insufficient information physician surveyed (74%) had 
about the improvement done in 2003 to the Código de Deontología Médica de Venezuela-
Deontology Medical Venezuelan Code, which included new definitions on medical concepts, 
supporting medical guidance in handling end-of-life care for terminally ill patients. The 
result of this research is undoubtedly preoccupying taking into consideration that the 
medical staffs participating are working directly in areas such as Surgery, Internal medicine, 
Intensive Care Units, Oncology and Anesthesiology, having to deal day by day with 
medical mediated death.  
On the other hand, 85% of physicians manifested to have cognitive theory criteria for 
terminally ill patients. And when they were asked about the behavior willingness to apply 
euthanasia to terminally patients 48% surveyed doctors responded affirmatively, the same 
number responded negatively while 4% decided not to respond. Also 54% of surveyed 
physicians claimed to theoretically know all different types of euthanasia that could be 
applied in terminally ill patients, while 41% thought they had lack of information; 5% did 
not provide their answers. Out of the data qualitative analysis it was shown that 69% of 
doctors declared to know the definition of assisted suicide, whereas 31% were not familiar 
with this concept. 
This poor groundwork of theoretic approach  has a direct negative impact on their 
knowledge and skills in medical practice; also established when taking into consideration 
the lack of interest expressed by medical doctors to know about our national legal regulations; 
possibly leading to the default in concepts and performance related to medical decision 
making at end-of-life, as demonstrated in this study; compromising the ethical and medical 
judgment and actions when managing patients in terminally ill stage disease. On the other 
hand, based on the results of this study, doctor’s surveyed have a considerable level of 
acceptance regarding the accomplishment of direct active voluntary euthanasia, while a broad 
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number of participants were favorable to facilitate death without pain to the terminal patients, 
being this another form of active voluntary euthanasia, but since there is no intention to cause 
death is indirect. 
The above shows the importance for the subjects of study to relief pain in dying patient, 
what resembles the Hippocratic Oath and the Oath’s evoking Dr. Luis Razetti, distinguished 
founder of Venezuelan Medical School and author of the Código de Deontología Médica de 
Venezuela-Deontology Medical Venezuelan Code. These Oaths are adopted as a solemn 
commitment in medical practice by physicians graduated at all Universities in Venezuela. 
There for with regards to the relief of pain and caring of the terminally ill patient known as 
Orthothanasia is favored by the majority (Aguiar, 2003; Castillo, 2006) 
In relation to the abolition of lives that doctors considered as a burden on society (Cripthanasia), the 
vast majority disapproved its application; from what we could deduct that medical 
participants in this research have highly appreciation for patients as persons and the dignity 
of the human life. This attest that surveyed physicians have the theoretical knowledge under 
which they cannot presuppose that upon medical reputation doctors have the moral or legal 
authorities to determine the value of a life worth living, thus taking into their own hands the 
action of killing another human being (León, 1975, 1981).  
Concerning the possible practice of physicians in Assisted Suicide, a high percentage of 
respondents were in disagreement; But it should not be underestimate that 25% accept to 
facilitate the means and resources available to patients in terminal stage to help them die. 
It is worth to highlight that these numerical results extracted from the quantitative phase of 
research about physician’s cognitive and practice skills, are consistent with those related to 
theoretical bibliographic background that they acknowledged to possess; bringing out the 
importance between gnosis and behavior/noemata and noesis in decision’s skill 
management, especially in medical assertive perform among life’s end. 
This amalgam between the theoretical constructs and humanistic principles within a 
reflexive attitude by physicians, leads to an assertive medical practice, impregnated with the 
value of humanist thought and the fondness for life, which comes evident in the discernment 
and performing of the health care team as a whole, especially for physicians who work at 
critical medical areas, where they have to deal with the process of perilously decision 
making, stating that train should be restrictively preceded by an adequate and followed 
theory learning process; assuring that when practitioners need to, they can relay-on a strong 
body of knowledge to guide them throughout the empirical experience.  
These integrated complex way of approaching end of life decision making in terminally 
ill patients is of special significance, highlighting the expected linkage between the 
awareness of self-been of a persons within their reflection on values and principles, that 
become as projections connecting noema and noesis for a right-doing. There is a higher 
level of consciousness lead by the analysis of theoretic construct which puts into context 
the fact of doing something with a superior humanistic purpose favoring the wellbeing 
of others, respecting Human Rights and the sense of spirituality on human conduct; 
favoring the knowing how-to do expressed as a proper approach on professional 
behavior. 
From de interrelation of the 2 investigative quantitative-qualitative perspectives 
accomplished throughout the research emerges an innovative approach of the physician-
patients-family auto-organizational systematic interaction.  
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2. Universe of cosmic dimensions, sub-dimensions and their emerging 
elements 
Out of this retroactive-recursive integrated universe, there are 3 main macro-dimensions to be 
discerned:  
1. One related to the patient, with a macrocosm and microcosm patients related sub-
dimension. 
2. A second macro-environmental dimension, in which 2 sub-dimensions intervene as 
well, represented by the patient’s family and friends and those who also work as part 
of the healthcare team of support, represented by nursery staff, lab personal, 
technicians and other hospital attendants who share the healthcare of patients. 
3. A third one related to the physician, as the leader of the healthcare team; relating their 
macrocosm and microcosm. 
Discourse and dialogue analysis of interviewed subjects allowed recognition of 2 sub-
dimensions: patient’s microcosm and macrocosm dimensions, in the spectrum of terminally ill 
patients. Patient’s microcosmic dimension reflects their interpretation of new reality, referring 
to the inner world of patients as a gravely ill subject, facing the odds constrained by health 
deterioration, forcing the consciousness of life’s end, which in turn has an impact in 
patient’s quality of life. 
 
 
Fig. 1.   
This sub-dimensional recognition proposes an inner reciprocal interaction about one self’s 
thinking regarding the health of the body-the health of the soul. In this personal way of insight 
patients will re-elaborate a new adjusted project of life, expressed in actions and re-
construction of their lifestyle. 
Through the understanding of the contents of the patient’s human consciousness, known as 
noema, researchers can achieve a better understanding of a person’s way of thinking and 
actions, which are projected as noesis. The contents and their projections are do to the 
dynamics of life and individual development. Therefore, by this approach it is possible to 
establish a relationship between a patient’s cognition and what will later be their behavior in 
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the process of adjusting life to a burst dynamic of changes in a survival environment. This 
deep cognitive reflection cannot be done in everyday life conditions, the notion of death, 
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Upon this self-knowledge, subsequently patients may materialize their modes of action, to 
establish behavior to confront life’s threaten circumstances re-balancing vital energy’s state 
of mind-soul-body, aimed to re-establish their health conditions and quality of life as 
possible; or instead, successfully adapt to a new circumstance for survival. 
In this sub-dimension were identified as emerging elements fear, repentance, guilt, depression 
and denial as negative elements, to the conscience of the incurable disease, the diagnosis of 
cancer or death’s despair. 
This is a process in spiral that changes permanently, which is given by a continuous, 
unfinished course of multiple interactions between the patient, his own capacity of 
internalization/learning, surrounding environment, self-spiritual and existence 
development and growth, with the main objective of achieving their personal fulfillment 
based on the moral values that the person possesses. 
All these recurrences allow the creation of a network of intimate exchange and 
multidirectional (retroactive-recursive), complementary between the microcosm of the patient 
and the macrocosm (such as an auto-eco-organizational process), with their eidetic content (from 
the Greek eidetic: eidētikos, which means “relating to or subject to such imagery”), 
eminently contemplative that define the spiritual world of the subject. 
1. First dimension: Terminally ill patient’s dimension 
a. Microcosm: dimension on their own health-disease process.  
 Interpretation of reality    INTEGRAL BIOETHICS  
 Management of emotions    PATIENTS’ RIGHTS 
 Self-knowledge  
 Quality of life in terminally ill patients 
 Patient’s Lifestyle  
b. Macrocosm: patient’s individual spiritual dimension of life. 
 Faith believe 
 Religious beliefs 
 Patient’s own conception of soul/spirit  
 Patient’s self-esteem 
Microcosm of patients’ interview is based on their own perception on health-illness process, 
sustained on emotions management, self-understanding of reality, self-knowledge and 
expectancy of lifestyle and quality. In which negative self-patterns as guilt, depression, fear to 
die, pain/suffering and self-meaning of cancer will contrast forces with positive conduct elements as 
acceptance and peacefulness. 
The macrocosm patient’s sub-dimension emerges from the way in which patients from their 
own moral and ethics principles seek an explanation of the universe at whole, and of 
Cosmo’s creation, constructing a frame of reference in the concepts and dogmas of their 
spiritual world. 
In their own ways as individuals decipher and seek to understand the meaning of life, insofar as it 
relates to an immensurable-inexplicable and infinite supreme order, which is expressed 
through beliefs and convictions of faith, giving it the properties of divinity and Holiness to 
his own life and life-extended forms in other creatures that accompany men on planet and 
into the fullness of the universe. 
Since this auto-perception of the macrocosm individuals creates their contemplative eidetic 
content, which they will have to pay worship and veneration; in view of these imaginaries 
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intellect constructs patients are to be founded in a superior belief, leading to the 
contemplation of the universe’s creation, which gives the appraisal of their own existence in 
the world and their mission in life, consequently influencing their self-esteem. 
Throughout this reflective process patients look for an explanation to their existence and all 
that is provided in their about, although still not understandable in some circumstances. But 
that in turn, allows the person to project itself beyond its biological and organic existence, 
becoming integrated to infinity, be no more death, in an always eternal supra-dimension. 
In this sub-dimension the patient sustains faith believes, which consequently have an impact 
on his lifestyle and quality of life, to reinforce the interdependencies between the conceptions 
of the microcosm and the macrocosm of the human systemic universe, auto-organizational 
and dialogic, of complex associations in necessary instances, obligatory combined in human 
existence, required in the development and process of the phenomenon of life and its 
terminal process in death. 
"I am, I exist and feel, I am undividable linked with what is, exists and feels to my around and also 
belongs to an eternal dimension", is a statement expressed in the context of the interviews 
conducted in the research, in which the terminal patient seeks to find a greater meaning 
than of finite biophysical worlds, provided within a non-perishable sensorial and existential 
dimension. Every intentional act has noetic content (or a noesis - from the Greek nous, 
"mind"). This noetic content, to which the noema corresponds, is that which gives meaning 
or sense to an intentional act. 
Discourse analysis of interviewed patients allowed recognition of sub-dimensions in the 
spectrum of terminally ill patient, given by microcosm-macrocosmic patient’s dimensions 
and understanding of reality based on their own perception of the health-illness process, 
sustained self-board of sentiment, self-understanding of reality, self-knowledge and 
expectancy of life; in which positive and negative self-patterns emerge as contrasting 
emotions and feelings to conduct their actions in the process of dying. 
There were defined as elements of microcosmic patient’s dimension in which interact the 
patients’ faith conviction, religious upbringing, personal conception of soul and self-esteem, 
to balance patients’ willingness to collaborate with treatment, to have confidence and relay 
on healthcare team work. 
2. Second dimension: Interactional environmental dimension 
a. Trans-disciplinary Healthcare team:  retroactive-recursive system 
 Justice and equity in health services for all patients in need 
 Effective Social Security                SOCIAL BIOETHICS 
 Intergenerational Social Security Plans for terminally ill patients 
 Suitable treatment 
 Care for patients with human kindness. 
In this categorization of items, this dimension refers to the care and treatment given to 
patients with a terminal illness by the healthcare team, led by physicians, but involving 
nurses, bioanalysts, lab and technical assistants; even including administration, maintenance 
and protection of safety personnel, of Healthcare Centers. 
The reification of the individual is considered by the patient, as the impersonal behavior, cold 
and distant towards them and their family. Not conceiving the idea that a patient could be 
treated as an object or a damaged “thing”. The terminally ill patients interviewed referred 
be treated and of feeling like an artifact, like if their sickened body was interpreted by the 
caregivers as a damaged machine with an irreparable injury. 
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The terminal patient referred to feel discriminated upon doctors and nurses misbehavior. As 
well, they expressed to suffer financial fragileness and vulnerability without an effective or 
reliable social security service, with a sense of hopelessness do to the lack of economic resources 
to fill the needs of their treatment expenses. This increases the sacrifices that they have to do, 
to pay for procedures and treatments required.  
One of the emerging elements in this sub-dimension also was the accompaniment, which is 
why each person who has contact and handles the terminally ill, are perceived by the 
patient as companions in their process of dying. 
Fear is a predominant element in speeches, as a result of the feeling of death and separation 
from their loved ones, which is intensified if the patient does not dare to ask doubts to 
doctors, therefore to evade reality or because he does not feel confidence and empathy with 
caregivers. 
In addition, patients recognize as important the following elements: 1. - simple and loving 
communication 2. - manage of symptoms and adjuvant treatment 3. - pain treatment and 
sedation 5.-accompaniment and a human warmth attitude related not only to the 
company of family members, in this case is extremely important to understand that the 
doctors along with the healthcare team, are a group of affective and emotional support for the 
patient and their loved ones. Unable to cure, the health-team can accompany and support the 
patient and their family group. 
b. Family and Friends Group of Support for Terminally Ill Patients 
 Economic livelihood 
 Care and affection  
 Solidarity 
 Travels and other needs for transportation 
This sub-dimension emerges in relation to the support of family members and friends of the 
critically ill persons, in which sickened patient’s finds support and solidarity in order to 
understand the decline of lifetime; in them they’ll seek for harbor to their feelings and the 
comfort to manage the emergency situation. 
They will be inclined to look for the family member that offer a sense of security and trust 
under such circumstances, and even will go to those who he thinks might offer financial 
support, to the huge costs of their disease. In some cases it was referred by patients with low 
incomes and no social security uphold end-up selling their few belongings in order to find 
required money to pay for expensive treatments; demonstrating the devastating economic 
consequences of life threating sickness in those who are out of the social security system, 
needing to provide themselves even with the most simples dispensable medical materials 
such as disposable syringes and cotton.  
Patients refer nostalgia, sense of loneliness and loss. They felt sadness because they were far 
from home country/home town, or dear somewhere, their house, family and friends. 
Speaking about their sentiment of melancholy, which came along with the memories of old 
times or people to whom they once felt linked emotionally, but that are not in present days, 
and perhaps the imaginary possibility or hope to be reunited again at a unknown 
dimension.  
As patients get closer to an end, some of family member who accompanied them, tend to 
retrieve exhausted by suffering and sense of impotency. Loved ones need to deal with 
sentiments of regrets and helplessness, as they watch their relative die. 
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which may not able to have in own location. This place shift creates primary a sudden 
change in the family and physical environment of the patient, which implies a detachment 
of their near loved ones, and having to get used to other home surroundings or to the 
development within this new community; secondly, with all the economic adaptation and 
unexpected modifications generated. 
The heated discussion about life’s end was paradoxically exempting increasingly needs and 
cries of the terminally ill patients. Little by little, as their lives were quenched, their voices 
were extinguished and silenced in stealth of their finale, as so their pain and fears. The life 
support machines replaced the caretakers in the accompaniment of the dying. 
The excessive maelstrom of biotechnology’s advances burst leaving behind the 
consideration of peoples Human Rights, principles and values, which should encourage 
civilized communities in the realization of a good modest life worth living for, what in 
consequence has a negative impact on a deserved worthy death (Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights-Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos, 1948). 
In an attempt to be heard, groups of terminally ill patients across the glove and 
professionals dedicated to take care of them, as in palliative care, aiming to ensure the 
correct medical exercise concerning the terminal sickened, with the support of international 
organizations, proclaimed their rights: Patient’s Right. Patients' rights vary in different 
countries and in different jurisdictions, often depending upon prevailing cultural and social 
norms; for instance WHO in Europe proclaimed a declaration on the promotion of patients' 
rights in Europe; in Latin America the Fundación pro Derecho a Morir Dignamente have 
declared: Terminally ill Patient´s Rights. Specifically in Venezuela there is Fundación Hospice 
Venezuela-Hospice Foundation Venezuela, in which they provide guidance for terminally 
ill patients. (Fundación Hospice Venezuela, 2009; Fundación pro Derecho a Morir 
Dignamente-Derechos del Paciente Terrminal, 1991; World Health Organization-Patient’s 
Rights, 1948; WHO-European consultation on the rights of patients, 1994) 
Still these rights were not enough, the medical scientific community highly mechanized 
imposed their dominance in the units of intensive care with new and sophisticated 
equipment and procedures; while this was the reality in some developed countries, not for 
underdeveloped ones, these new facilities just opened even more profound inequities in 
health care service, between these nations and those immersed in poverty. 
3. Thrid dimension: Physicians´ dimension 
a. Microcosm of physicians: Dimension that reflects the attitude of doctors on health-
disease process of terminal patients. 
 Human Rights and Terminally ill Patient’s Rights. 
 Respect for person’s Autonomy 
 Beneficence               CLINICAL BIOETHICS 
 Non-maleficence 
 Justice 
 Ethical and Deontological aspects of Medical Doctors’ Practice. 
 Approach between scientific and humanistic medical’s sense. 
 Attachment and self-conviction upon JURIDICAL NORM:  
VENEZUELA’S BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC CONSTITUTION 
VENEZUELAN’S PENAL CODE and its amendment.  
b. Macrocosms of Physicians: Spiritual dimension of medical specialists. 
 Religious belief:   dealing patients with affection and compassion.  
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 Conception of the Soul-Spirit  
 Confession of faith:  attachment to the values and principles of owns religion 
In the physicians’ dimension again there were acknowledged 2 sub-dimensions, one 
microcosmic physician’s dimension in which the professionals’ own understanding of 
Humans Rights, Medical Ethics, Bioethical Principles and legal framework regulations, will 
lead his conduct favoring respect for persons opinion, patients’ autonomy, benevolence and 
most proper communication and using best techniques available for the right treatment of 
terminally ill persons, in the sense of a Clinical Bioethical interaction inserted in the 
knowing how-to do   
Once again we see that in the way as a subject confronts the tensions that exist in the mode 
of conceiving his process of health-disease, in this specific case referring to the medical 
specialist, their position will be clearly expressed in their speech, conduct and actions 
(noema-noesis), with which they will have to deal and resolve the conflicts of life, especially before a 
big dilemma, such as death, seen through his patients. 
The projection of these noema in noesis will let glimpse the conception of its principles, 
values and the attachment to the legal regulations, as well as, their correct medical exercise 
in accordance with the professional conduct and ethics. From the microcosm doctors joint 
their technical knowledge (knowing), with his technical skills knowing-how, this will define 
their biotechnical knowing how-to do, in their professional environment. 
It is based on their own preconceptions about the health-disease process, as the specialist will 
feel motivated to enrich its values, principles and duties, supporting them on Human Rights, 
Social Bioethics and the Principles of Clinical Bioethics, and Medical Ethics and Deontology. 
From Social Bioethics guided by the Principles of a Clinical Bioethics and Human Rights, they 
strengthen the links between the parties involved in the medical-patient interaction, and will 
favor consensus decisions, allowing doctors gradually abandon paternalistic behavior 
traditionally imposed on patients, looking forward to encourage, direct and support them in 
the taking of autonomous, reasoned and informed decisions, of great importance into the 
finitude of life. 
On the other hand, macrocosmic physician’s dimension is related also to personal religious 
convictions, spiritual contemplation, life divinity and on physicians’ own perspective of 
existence, which leads to a beneficent human patient relationship submerged in kindness, 
solidarity and good willingness into physician-patients-family auto-organizational systematic 
interaction. It’s of special significance to accent the connection expected between self-being 
with oneself values, principles and spirituality belief, which together with the theoretical 
consciousness content will be expressed in high quality professional’s technique combined 
to the individual capacity of analysis, allowing a greater understanding in the knowing how-
to do. 
In this sub-dimension individuals combine the principles of faith and spirituality with 
which doctors contemplates the existence, in which religious beliefs will be fundamental 
mainstay to define actions, leading him to the knowing-how, as a result of the balance 
between knowing and doing from the humanistic point of view as in result, into a humane 
compassion behavior interaction, with quality and warmth inside their individual technical 
knowledge (knowing). 
In their macrocosm Galen will seek for dialogue and the emotional warmth in relationship with 
patients and their family members, encouraging linkages to strengthen solidarity, trust, 
honesty, harmony, flexibility and interaction. Is this sub-dimension doctor’s will project 
their personal skills using of simple, clear verbal language providing adequate information 
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to patients; as well as, they shall assume the importance of affective and proximate gesture 
language to patients and their relatives. 
Never the less, throughout the investigation patients perceived that physician-patient relation 
was classic and paternalistic, with a lack of effective and efficient communication between 
both parties. From physicians’ conduct towards critically ill patient, it’s manifest that based 
on their own knowledge of medical ethics, deontology and principles of Clinical Bioethics, the 
specialist who works in areas such as Surgery, Internal Medicine, Critical Care Units, Oncology 
and Anesthesiology, will feel motivated to enrich their moral values and principles to 
encourage the adequate conduct behavior and technical approach in proficient healthcare 
(Hernandez, 2001; Malpica, 2008).  
There was documented by the hermeneutic-phenomenological interpretation of facts, that 
terminal patients’ awareness of incurable disease, as negative-depressant conduct behavior 
can be more bearable when patient’s family and close friends support them by companionship, 
economic uphold and solidarity throughout these crucial circumstances. As well as the team 
of healthcare based on Social Bioethics and an Integral Bioethics ensure that each person in need 
will receive an optimal adequate treatment for their illness, with dignity, without 
discrimination of social status, age or gender.  
By systematic triangulation of all data information gathered the author proposes to 
reconstruct an approximation theory which enunciates that, in the process of decision 
making and action taking at end-of-life in terminally ill patients, physicians should take into 
consideration with each person first of all Human Rights, patients’ own values and believes, 
respecting their opinion as well as that of their families or surrogate representative, 
according to preserve everyone’s right to a dignified moment of death, being offered and 
receiving technically countable efficient resources in a caring and comfortable environment. 
Furthermore, doctors working in critical areas using life-support measures should make a 
constant update of the concepts and emerging procedures involved in the application of 
vital support effort; at the same time as taking awareness of changes done or yet close to 
come in the legal framework on our underdeveloped Latin-American countries, to provide 
patient appropriate and timely media in the process of dying. 
It is in this multiple humanistic movement towards life, in the reflection of Human Rights, 
through the caring of life and all its living components over the world, in which is validated 
an upcoming concept of Integral Bioethics. Without losing a specific perspective to be applied 
in every contextualized circumstance, as we have to deal in Venezuela. In view of the fact 
that Bioethics exhorts and promotes inclusion, solidarity, of profound depth in social, 
tolerance and respect, is that we can assume the center of attention in the use of new 
biotechnologies advantages, guiding their profits towards a vital preservation of the 
environment, heartfelt admiration for biodiversity, protection of life and living  (Lolas, 2008; 
Sass Hans, 2008). 
3. Conclusion 
Systematic generation of a theoretic approach from triangulating data as conducting 
research, follows construction of theory, enunciating that at end-of-life ethical and bioethical 
decision-making health care givers, led by physicians, must consider and respect the values 
and personal opinions of patients and family members to shelter terminally ill patients into 
the lifecycle dying process; therefore, medical doctors working in critical areas practicing life 
support measures should make a continuous update of theoretical concepts and emerging 
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technical procedures involved in the appliance or not of vital support, considering the 
current ethical,  socio-economical and legal framework in Venezuela and present-days 
changes, preserving in mind the maxima moral cognition and behavior to offer patients 
opportune-adequate means in the process of dying. 
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Model offers insight into how medical doctors think about the dilemma omega as care givers of 
terminally ill patients, provides a way to assort, real situation decision-making, by recognizing 
that adult development is linked to educational and work experiences and it is not just a 
reflection of socioeconomic status or degree of theory academic knowledge of physicians; by 
extent, working experience and degree of education may provide the stimulus for further moral 
development in health care gives. Highlighting the importance of the interaction between 
cognition-as how individuals think about moral dilemmas and behavior-what they would 
actually do in a particular decision situation. It emerges from this new complex and holistic 
thinking that given the impossibility of curing, might the ending be “caring” as an assemblage of 
coordinated actions of the health care team members, led by medical doctors, in a 
transdisciplinarity effort accompanied by the nursing and bioanalysis staff. 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a reflexion on euthanasia using personal experience 
and philosophical references. Our goal is to present some aspects of this topic but not to say 
what to think or what to do. We hope it will give the debate a good introduction1.  
In what follows, the term euthanasia must be understood as being the act of ending, at his 
request, the life of an adult (or emancipated minor), who is able to decide for himself, 
suffering from a serious incurable condition (illness or accident) and experiencing constant 
and unbearable physical or psychological suffering. This request will be repeated with calm, 
and without any external pressure. The act will be carried out by a third party, in the case 
considered here, a doctor. It is important to specify that the doctor can refuse to carry out 
euthanasia and that in addition no one is forced to participate if it is against his morals or 
conscience. 
The Belgian law of 28 May 2002, published at the same time as the law on palliative care and 
the law relating to patients’ rights, imposes more obligations (1). The most pertinent ones 
concluded in giving the patient all information, particularly in relation to palliative care, 
obtaining the opinion of a second or even third doctor (in the case of unforeseeable short-
term death), and making sure that all persons designated by the patient have been met 
beforehand. The legal text does not specify the practical medical methods (this is not its 
role), but these are accessible and have been published many times. It is useful to specify 
that the legal text avoids the notion of medically assisted suicide, and that the stage of the 
condition (“terminal phase,” “palliative phase,” “end of life”) has been removed. By 
adapting the second proposal, it echoes opinion issued by the Belgian Bioethics Consultative 
Committee on 12 May 1997 (2). As a reminder, the essential question posed by the BBCC 
was: “Is it appropriate to legislate on the subject of euthanasia?” which resulted in 4 
proposals: A complete decriminalisation of euthanasia (The practice of euthanasia is freely 
accepted), a “a posteriori” regulation (The act is declared after its completion),  a “a priori” 
regulation (A commission decides before if the act is legally acceptable) and a complete 
Status quo (no change of legal framework). 
                                                 
1 Some references are taken from book written in French or translated from other languages in French. 
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1 Some references are taken from book written in French or translated from other languages in French. 
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Since its implementation, the Federal Commission for Evaluation and Control has published 
the conclusions detailing the declarations of the doctors who have carried out euthanasia. 
All the data are available (3).  
We shall not go into details about the history of the Belgian legislation on this theme, but it 
should be remembered that we had to wait many years before the subject could be debated 
in Parliament, that it was needed a conversion of the majority so the historic veto be lifted. 
The debate was rich, contradictory, pluralist, with both sides being heard and many 
different opinions expressed, resulting in the present-day text. This text was based, should it 
be noted, on legal proposals such as those of Roger Lallemand or Edouard Klein (invariably 
rejected...) or on the texts of Professor Yvon Kenis, co-founder of ADMD (Association for the 
Right to Die with Dignity), who wrote about the legal proposal: “It is not ideologically 
oriented, as it takes no position about the direction of life or about the hereafter. It deals only 
with real cases of unbearable suffering and denounces the prejudice whereby death must be 
preceded by a long and cruel agony. (...) Should one not sacrifice the duration of life for its 
quality that a patient wishes to retain until the end?” Such foresight and such sense of the 
issue could only demand respect.  
Although some oppose euthanasia and palliative care (similarly to the therapeutic 
obstinacy), this Manichean position is absurd both semantically and in practice. How can 
we say that medicine is capable of alleviating all physical, mental or moral suffering? In 
Belgium, where, should it be noted, all euthanasia must be the subject of a declaration to a 
Control Commission, it can be observed that most of the patients having requested and 
obtained euthanasia had previously benefited from palliative care. A recent study by a 
VUB (Vrije Universiteit Brussel) team confirms that decisions, taken within a 
multidisciplinary framework regarding euthanasia and assisted suicide, did not restrict 
the practice of palliative care (4). Evidently, this will not doubt its qualities, but its 
limitations. We have many times received patients, referred by doctors working in 
palliative-care units, who maintained their request for euthanasia despite the efforts and 
undeniable competence of our colleagues. These patients recognised the quality of the 
care, the support, the listening, the appropriate monitoring of pain in these units, but 
could not tolerate to be made to feel guilty, either because their request was refused in the 
name of precepts to which they did not subscribe, or because a so-called “controlled” 
sedation was proposed to them as an alternative. This solution eludes both the patient’s 
request and the real meaning of the action that is carried out. In effect, far from being 
“controlled,” this sedation only prolongs the agony and if death occurs prematurely, some 
health professionals mention the double-effect phenomenon (result of an act that was not 
part of their intention). Of course, there are circumstances in which it would be better to 
sedate a patient in order to spare him a painful death, such as in the case of terminal 
dyspnoea or the threat of a haemorrhage. This ties in with both compassion and ethics. 
This is well described in the book “Principles of biomedical ethics of Beauchamp and 
Childress2, (5). By contrary, if this sedation is proposed as an “alternative” to euthanasia, 
it is an intellectually inappropriate process that is aimed merely at appeasing the 
practitioner’s conscience. To deliberately sedate a patient in the name of his comfort is not 
a harmless act. We know the risks involved in the administration of sedatives in the 
context of precarious medical situations. The side effects and complications inherent in 
                                                 
2 This book is a reference in terms of ethics and is highly recommended. 
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this practice are most often irreversible. To claim that, in this case, the sedation is 
“controlled” displays a lack of honesty, as death very often occurs within 72 hours (6), (7). 
From all the evidence, the “palliative filter” that some would impose on all patients 
requesting euthanasia is neither a medical nor an ethical guarantee... 
The other fear advanced by opponents is that of by-products, of the “slippery slope.” This 
would be nothing more or less than mass killings, carried out for social reasons (the poor), 
economic reasons (the elderly), or medical reasons (the very ill, the disabled, the mentally 
ill), implying that by legislating, and by legalizing euthanasia, the legislature would enable 
health professionals to feel free to act without constraint. By all evidence this is hugely 
contrary, as if a law would supplant all moral reflection, all ethical analysis. In effect, it is 
like saying that doctors generally work without “conscience” and that only the law (“which 
forbids euthanasia”) protects patients from arbitrary decisions taken by their doctors while 
at the same time these detractors, opposed to all legislation, claim for example that no 
doctor wants to carry out euthanasia. This is another undisputed manifestation of the 
manipulation of opinion and bad faith, based on lies. Neither Belgian nor Dutch 
experiences, which provide official data, have led to the by-products mentioned. On the 
contrary, since 2002, there has been no “explosion” of euthanasia or similar acts, in Belgium. 
All patients had a long and hard medical past, thus demonstrating their will to fight as long 
as possible against the disease. (For more details, see  reference 3) 
The approach adopted by Jean-Yves Goffi (pp 29-42) on the theme of the “slippery slope” is 
among the most interesting (8). For him, those who fear this ineluctable by-product “in fact 
demonstrate their inability to perceive the imperceptible, and their argument is made at the 
cost of a certain number of confusions regarding arbitrary attributions of causal 
relationships.” Their systematic references to Nazism is furthermore an error in evaluating 
the problem and the erroneous attribution of the same term (“euthanasia”) to two 
completely different situations, namely a political choice on the one hand and an individual 
choice on the other. Should we say that the Nazi Party usurped many symbols and themes, 
turning them away from their initial function. 
J-Y Goffi continues by clarifying “that we must revise downwards the claims of the 
argument (of the slippery slope), which is reduced to recording the fact...that the use of 
certain concepts in ethics is particularly delicate and can lead to abusive interpretations.” 
For our part, we would add that this “Newtonian” vision of risks (slope, etc.) is related to a 
heuristic sense of fear and has no place in rational medical practice. It eludes the moral sense 
of patients and doctors and at the same time condones the adherence of the masses to 
genocidal behaviour. 
The work of J-Y Goffi  certainly deserves paragraph, both for its originality and for its 
relevance. His chapter “Euthanasia and virtues” is in this case a very good demonstration 
on the subject, tackling it by means of virtues, of consequentialism, of aretism (virtue ethics). 
He concludes, but without really concluding: “In exceptional although inevitable 
circumstances, death can become a desirable end; and the most virtuous attitude consists of 
assisting others to pursue this end.”). 
Finally, it must be repeated that from what we know of the issue, carrying out euthanasia is 
not an ordinary act and is never done emotionless. No doctor desires to carry out 
euthanasia, but when his patient’s request is clear, when the issue is declared as unbearable 
for the patient, helping him to die without suffering, sparing him a painful and pointless 
agony, assumes such a human dimension that refusing to carry out this act would be still, 
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Since its implementation, the Federal Commission for Evaluation and Control has published 
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we say that medicine is capable of alleviating all physical, mental or moral suffering? In 
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Control Commission, it can be observed that most of the patients having requested and 
obtained euthanasia had previously benefited from palliative care. A recent study by a 
VUB (Vrije Universiteit Brussel) team confirms that decisions, taken within a 
multidisciplinary framework regarding euthanasia and assisted suicide, did not restrict 
the practice of palliative care (4). Evidently, this will not doubt its qualities, but its 
limitations. We have many times received patients, referred by doctors working in 
palliative-care units, who maintained their request for euthanasia despite the efforts and 
undeniable competence of our colleagues. These patients recognised the quality of the 
care, the support, the listening, the appropriate monitoring of pain in these units, but 
could not tolerate to be made to feel guilty, either because their request was refused in the 
name of precepts to which they did not subscribe, or because a so-called “controlled” 
sedation was proposed to them as an alternative. This solution eludes both the patient’s 
request and the real meaning of the action that is carried out. In effect, far from being 
“controlled,” this sedation only prolongs the agony and if death occurs prematurely, some 
health professionals mention the double-effect phenomenon (result of an act that was not 
part of their intention). Of course, there are circumstances in which it would be better to 
sedate a patient in order to spare him a painful death, such as in the case of terminal 
dyspnoea or the threat of a haemorrhage. This ties in with both compassion and ethics. 
This is well described in the book “Principles of biomedical ethics of Beauchamp and 
Childress2, (5). By contrary, if this sedation is proposed as an “alternative” to euthanasia, 
it is an intellectually inappropriate process that is aimed merely at appeasing the 
practitioner’s conscience. To deliberately sedate a patient in the name of his comfort is not 
a harmless act. We know the risks involved in the administration of sedatives in the 
context of precarious medical situations. The side effects and complications inherent in 
                                                 
2 This book is a reference in terms of ethics and is highly recommended. 
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much more painful. Refusal is in our view a desperate exhibition of the doctor’s existential 
anguish much more than a proof of respect for deontology and ethics. The only valid 
argument advanced is an argument with moral value, very often with religious 
connotations. But then, what value does it give to the suffering of the patient? How far must 
this suffering go so that the patient would be listened? For how long? 
A question remains unanswered: is it conceivable to consider that patients die without 
dignity when the euthanasia they requested is refused. In our opinion, undoubtedly yes. As 
long as a patient makes a request for euthanasia that complies with the legal framework 
(conscious and competent patient with incurable condition, suffering that cannot be eased, 
repeated request), to refuse him in the name of personal moral or philosophical principles 
without proposing a solution that satisfies the patient (suggesting another doctor for 
example, as set forth by law) consists of no longer recognizing the patient’s dignity and of 
protecting the doctor’s conscience, which takes precedence for him over the wishes of his 
patient. Although no doctor is constrained to carry out an euthanasia, to place the person 
who requests it in an impasse is an attack on respect for this person and his independence, 
using him as a tool for one’s own morals, for one’s own conscience, “denying” personal 
dignity. This argument is, in our view, fundamental for considering the act of euthanasia not 
only as a respectful act, full of humanity, but also as the unconditional recognition of the 
dignity of the patient.  
In a context of medical practice, respectful for the patient, the ethics in force take priority 
over the doctor’s personal morals, even if these are overturned. Despite the difficulty in 
transgressing certain moral concepts, in particular religious ones, health professionals 
must refer to the ethical values of the moment, considering that the decision to be taken is 
the “least bad” one for the patient. Paula La Marne (pp 116-117), in the conclusion of her 
book on “Ethics and the End of Life,” writes: “Nothing can prevent someone from choosing 
his death, provided that this choice is firm and clear, and that the doctor is sure of this.” 
(9) She insists on the importance of developing palliative care, and mentions the fact that 
patients requesting death are rare. But the notion of “rarity” is not synonym with 
insignificance. To help one, two or five patients has no countable value in my eyes. These 
are major events in the life of a doctor, events that cannot be neglected and that are more 
than simple statistics. It is at these moments that clinical experience, but also wisdom and 
respect for others, cannot be subjugated to a current of dominant thought, to diktats that 
suppress dialogue. The words used by Bernard Baertschi are clearly along these lines: 
“...euthanasia appears to be an ultimate means of satisfying the aims of moral enterprise: 
leading a happy life, or at least preventing it from becoming radically unhappy or even 
worse infra-personal.” (10)    
We have met many patients who have spoken  of their suffering, of their wish, not to go 
beyond a certain limit that they have fixed, who have asked us “calmly and repeatedly” to 
be present at the last moment and to help them to leave with dignity, their dignity. For all 
these people, we think that we have acted in the best way possible with the feeling that the 
act carried out was what had to be done. At this moment, concepts of dignity, independence 
and ethics were all present, but free of any passion or sterile rhetoric. In medicine, there is 
no “right time” to start asking questions about the meaning of what one is doing. It is a 
reflection of each moment which certainly becomes richer over time, but which can never be 
carried over to the next day. A little experience is worth much more than any blind 
certitude. 
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2. Dignity - morality 
An universal term, of which we speak a lot, but for which, when you think about it, there is 
no definition that really satisfies or at least for which there is no disagreement depending on 
points of view. 
Dignity is sometimes linked to virtue, to a certain social class (“dignitaries”), sometimes to 
an attitude, to a bearing (“a noble and dignified allure”), sometimes to respect for the 
autonomy of the person (“retaining self-esteem despite adversity”), sometimes to the 
inherited quality of the individual (“the fact of being simply a human being”). Among these 
different concepts, how do we interpret the notion of dignity in medical practice? For some, 
like Ruth Macklin, the notion of dignity appears even useless or at least should not be 
evoked in medicine. In an article published in 2003, she writes that it is a bad use of the 
term, in the place of “respect for individuals and their independence, which concerns 
essentially obtaining the informed consent, respecting the confidentiality, and the need to 
avoid abusive discrimination.” While radical, this argument should not be accepted as it is 
and should even be reassessed. (11) 
One can, according to Roberto Andorno, distinguish between an inherited, “static,” 
intangible, immutable dignity that is present in the “being,” and a “dynamic” dignity, which 
is present in the “acting.” (12) In any case, it can be seen that dignity remains an absolute 
concept that exists only because of what derives from it and therefore, because of its 
universal character, is unalienable whatever the circumstances. 
Consequently, expressions such as “a life worth living” or “a dignified death” are in 
themselves meaningless as dignity cannot be lost; this can depend only on the person 
(independence, respect). 
It can be understood that as a concept, dignity can be limited to one of these aspects alone 
and that a reductive approach leads to confusion. We must therefore be clear about the 
terms. In the opinion of Bernard Baertschi, it is possible to tackle the question as follows: 
dignity is a question of “morality” (what one does), a “personal” question (what one 
undergoes), and a “human” question (what one is). On the other hand, indignity is 
evidently related to humiliation and using people as tools. All these elements coexist in 
everyone, but without any one affecting the others. This ranges from self-esteem to the 
image that one projects of oneself to others. There is often a moral sense that will give either 
a respectable image, or a feeling of shame or remorse in relation to what one has done: theft, 
lies, insults. There is the personal dimension, which can be noble, but can also cause a 
feeling of debasement as is the case with mutilating or degenerative conditions, in the case 
of pain or when a patient is placed in a situation of inferiority with clear comparative 
strength: i.e. patients infantilised. These two dimensions do not relate to the third, the one 
that is most often the issue during ethical debates and that is at the centre of the Declaration 
of Human Rights. 
This is the human sense of the concept of dignity, which cannot in principle be lost, unlike 
the first two. That said, it is evident that there are no clear boundaries between moral sense, 
personal sense and human sense; on the contrary, the existing interconnections justify the 
term dignity as a concept. Thus an act that is undignified in the moral sense of the term will 
detrimentally affect human dignity: the act of one who lies or steals, or who uses others as a 
means in human experimentation without consent, or torture. However, nothing that 
anyone does or undergoes deprives him of his human dignity; but the latter may be violated 
or ridiculed. 
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A person physically and/or morally violated or ridiculed will feel humiliated, used as a 
tool, according to Kant’s first imperative: “Act so that you treat humanity as well in your 
person as in the person of all others always at the same time as an end, and never as a 
means.” This philosopher in his time discarded the foundations of contemporary morality 
and his works remain references for the occidental philosophy, particularly with regard to 
the human person, even if one could reproach him for imposing only reason as a 
fundamental element of morality. Kant ‘s “Categorical imperatives” remain the bedrock of 
many arguments. 
Using people as tools and humiliation thus represent major attacks on human dignity and 
are by their nature unethical. Can such attacks be observed in medical practice? 
Recent history has shown us the degree of ignominy that certain doctors have attained, 
especially during the Second World War: experiments without the aim of progress, without 
improving treatment, brutality, refinement of torture, contempt for humans in the name of a 
nauseating ideology.  
We think that one must consider dignity, in the sense of not using humans as tools or 
humiliating them, as an essential element enshrined in medical practice. These are nuances 
permitted by rhetoric, but in the particular case of a patient, these nuances appear highly 
relative. The feeling of humiliation in fact relates more to an attack on self-image - “personal 
dignity” - than an attack on “human dignity,” but for the person concerned there is no 
difference. He feels unbearably affected, which is how one measures that which degradates 
or injures. To tell him that his “dignity” is intact, that there is no reason to feel humiliated, is 
at the same time a semantic error and above all a clear lack of common sense. 
However, some would argue the contrary by claiming that one must make a distinction 
between relative (or moral or personal) dignity and absolute (human) dignity, as an 
alteration of the first does not affect the second, even going so far as to evoke camp 
prisoners to justify their suggestions: “...their immense eyes that truly express beauty, the 
dignity of the human being that no offence, no cruelty...can reduce.” These same arguments 
are sometimes used to claim that palliative care provides the only response that is humanly 
“dignified” in response to the “anguished claim for the right to die with dignity”! (13) It can 
be understood that this semantic game is not innocent, that it can serve as fertile ground for 
opponents of the decriminalisation of euthanasia and moreover that it is manipulative, 
removing the patient from the debate without telling him.  
In medicine, the respect must go beyond the patient’s independence, sparing him the 
shame, the humiliation, the feeling of being used as a tool, that is by recognizing his dignity 
as conceived by him.  
Dignity has a multidimensional value, which is part of the individual history of a person 
who cannot be understood by one of its aspects alone. By being rhetorical about a concept, 
the latter ends up being empty of meaning. In other words, we must consider the patient 
individually and assist him without imposing on him moral standards that do not stand up 
to reality and bring difficulties and conflicts when taking decisions.  
3. Independence - self-determination 
Absent from the Hippocratic Oath (it is interesting to note on this subject that Hippocrates 
did not take into account the patient’s point of view when drafting his oath), the patient’s 
independence is however part of the ethical code. This independence defines our capacity to 
choose our lifestyle, our behaviour and our values, but cannot be at the cost of moral and 
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ethical reflection. To respect individual independence is to respect the basis of free, 
informed, advanced consent, essential before any experimentation (the Nuremberg Code, 
the Declaration of Helsinki, the Belmont Report), is to ensure that the patient is involved in 
decision-making processes, that he understands the information given to him. 
The doctor cannot decide for the patient, even if the latter does not make the best choice 
from a medical point of view. A patient suffering from pancreatic cancer in an inoperable 
stage may, for example, refuse chemotherapy even if encouraging results are presented to 
him, and prefer exclusively palliative care. Treatment must be oriented in accordance with 
the patient’s objectives and priorities. The situation can be more complex in the case of an 
unconscious patient. If the latter was not able to make his wishes known beforehand 
(advance declaration), the doctor has to judge whether the care provided will bring relief, or 
even an improvement, of the clinical situation. Bioethical principles are then to be taken into 
account while obviously avoiding therapeutic obstinacy, which can be condemned as an 
unethical attitude. If arrangements have been made beforehand, they must be respected. 
In the case of a weakened patient, made vulnerable by illness or an accident, the situation 
also requires many precautions, mutual confidence and confidentiality. The patient goes to 
his doctor in the hope that the latter will act in his best interests and will respect his dignity. 
This is the case of patients suffering from a progressive disease of which certain 
complications may alter their judgement capacity.  
One can see independence as a risk of harming, if circumstances impair the patient’s full 
judgement, if his freedom to judge is no longer really so, hence the importance, in good time, 
of dialogue and expression of the wishes of the patient, who has furthermore been duly 
informed of his condition. It remains the question of free choice, of due abandonment of the 
paternalistic position of medical ethics in favour of an autonomist model. (14) (Marzano pp 
23-24) 
In a very complete work on ethics and the end of life, Paula La Marne (9) evokes the 
principle of independence by clarifying that this is the indispensable, reasonable condition 
of dialogue with the patient, the latter clarifying his conceptions of a valid existence in 
relation to his body and maintaining his life. The doctor’s benevolence, however noble, 
should not have a bearing on the patient’s freedom, which is nothing more or less than a 
fundamental right. “The duty of compassion (Agape, brotherly love), etc.) on the doctor’s part 
encompasses respecting the patient’s choices (respecting his independence). It is the patient 
who has the last word,” she writes in chapter II concerning “Face to face with therapeutic 
obstinacy and euthanasia.”  
In order for there to be independence, there must obviously be appropriate information, 
ensuring free, informed and conscious consent on the part of the patient. Consequently, the 
patient may choose what he sees fit: treatment, intervention (specific or experimental), or 
refusal of care.  
The patient’s independence is more a starting point than an end point, thus condemning all 
paternalism. The ever more frequent use of “information forms” in clinical studies, protocols 
or interventions is one of the most obvious manifestations of this. It remains to clarify what 
takes precedence depending on the case, taking into account that the doctor must respect the 
patient’s dignity as well as his independence (his self-determination), without forgetting the 
three other main principles of bioethics, namely: doing good, not doing bad, and 
(distributive) justice, as presented by Beauchamp and Childress.  
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A person physically and/or morally violated or ridiculed will feel humiliated, used as a 
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4. And to continue... 
In particular, it will be necessary to demonstrate that carrying out euthanasia, within an 
established framework as set forth by (Belgian) law, is neither an exception nor an ethical 
transgression. 
Opponents of euthanasia advance arguments rooted sometimes in 
1. religious precepts (“Thou shall not kill”), sometimes in  
2. Kantian categorical imperatives and deontologism, sometimes resting on  
3. the slippery slope argument (see above), or even on the fact that  
4. carrying out euthanasia is in total contradiction of practising the art of healing (“Killing 
a patient is immoral,” “I didn’t do my studies for that,” etc.), that it contradicts  
5. the Hippocratic oath “Do not prescribe or counsel a lethal product” Art. 4), that  
6. euthanasia is suicide in disguise. 
7. A law will give an absolute power to the doctor. 
While one can understand these arguments, again they must be considered at a supra-
personal level, which places the opponents in a decision-making impasse, obliging them 
literally to abandon the patient in need. We think that for each of these arguments, it is 
possible to demonstrate that they have been advanced wrongly or at least that they lie in 
the field of meta-ethics. So as not to lengthen the text, we propose to deal with each of 
them in the discussion by setting against them the counter-argument that I consider most 
relevant. 
1. The adage advanced is of course respectable, but it has never prevented anyone from 
killing his neighbour, nor prevented conflicts, nor of course religious wars. And here 
also, the word “kill” is loaded with meaning and does not relate to clinical reality. 
Moreover, we find in the founding texts writings that mention assistance to die with 
compassion... 
2. As mentioned earlier, the act of acceding to a request for assistance to die in a precise 
context is not in contradiction of a Kantian imperative. I will repeat in particular that 
not respecting a patient’s wishes is in itself an attack on his dignity.  
3. The “slippery slope” is an argument that has its limits and in this case is advanced 
wrongly. To mention the risk of the slippery slope is indirectly to demonstrate the 
inability to react faced with what would be ineluctable. Belgian experience 
demonstrates that there is no slope and that nothing slips... 
4. Assisting a patient until the end of his life is an integral part of care. Preferring 
“natural” death to medical aid that guarantees comfort is dubious. Imagining that 
nature will be more moral that health professionals shows a lack of grasp of the subject. 
In addition, the semantics used are among the most biased: “Put to death,” “Kill,” 
“Terminate,” etc.) 
5. The reference to the Hippocratic Oath is habitual but forgets that this text has been 
“transgressed” for a long time (abortion, surgery, etc.). Likewise its text must be read as 
a set of ethics for life and not for death. Furthermore, the recourse to “poison” concerns 
essentially suicide, condemned by the Pythagoreans, and not assistance to die. 
6. Analysis of actual cases experienced shows that a request for euthanasia is clearly 
different from suicide, in its conceptualisation by the patient, in what motivates the 
decision, and in its execution.  
7. Because of a law, discussion about end-of-life is now open without clandestinity and a 
law will never erase or avoid professional consciensciousness. 
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These various points are not exhaustive and should be subjected to more in-depth analysis, 
but that lies outside the scope of this work. 
5. Veil of ignorance... 
Every day brings its new set of declarations. On reading the “collective” work of Luc Ferry 
and Axel Kahn (16) one cannot help but be struck by the lack of acuity and even intellectual 
honesty with regard to the subject of euthanasia. Coming from such respectable and 
influential people, this is worrying. Ferry speaks among other things of a “supposed 
humanitarian act that consists of killing...” Kahn considers that “euthanasia is a 
transgression of the law,” and that “the “Leonetti law” avoids transgressive euthanasia.” 
Although in meta-ethical matters one must above all analyse statements logically and 
reflectively, abstaining from all moral judgement, such comments are in my view highly 
debatable and very far from an approach in line with cases actually experienced (casuistic 
ethics, etc.).  
After reading this work, we wondered whether one could not apply John Rawls’s famous 
theory of justice and the fiction of the veil of ignorance to reflect on the question of the 
decriminalisation of euthanasia (17). Of course, Rawls is thinking first of all of the 
functioning of institutions and the practices of contemporary societies. However, why not 
do the exercise of searching on the one hand for what represents an equal right for everyone 
to access the broadest set of fundamental liberties (compatible with a set of liberties for all) 
and on the other hand how to respect social and economic inequalities, and make it such 
that they are not an obstacle to personal choices. 
Still with Rawls, and considering his 1992 “u-turn,” the “consensus by overlapping” would 
also enable the various moral principles found in our plural societies to be brought together. 
As pointed out by Ludivine Thiaw-Po-Une (pp 1063-1071), “moral disagreements do not 
result from the irrationality of some or other persons. They are rather the inevitable result of 
the exercise of reason in conditions of liberty.” 
To resort to the fiction of the “veil of ignorance” does obviously not mean, “To veil one’s face.”  
Référence D before to conclude 
6. Conclusions 
We will say for the moment simply this, that to help a patient to die without suffering, 
respecting his philosophical, religious and spiritual choices, is an integral part of the role of 
the doctor and that to refuse the help requested at any level whatsoever is at best an error 
but above all a lack of respect for others.  
Euthanasia raises and will continue to raise many questions relating to ethics, spirituality or 
even ideology. 
Although it is not possible for everyone to adhere to the same single attitude with a 
universal value, it is however inappropriate to disdain the reflective work already 
accomplished. 
The subject tackled concerns everyone even if is the act only of “some” in practice. In 
addition, on this matter it is obviously not the numbers that count. 
Euthanasia must not be considered in terms of Good or Bad, Moral or Immoral, but in terms 
of what is right, both for the individual and for society, and it is there that the ethical 
approach comes into its own. 
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Finally, it would be useful if the opponents would familiarise themselves with the reports by 
the Federal Commission for Evaluation and Control before launching into alarmist speeches, 
mentioning by-products, clandestine euthanasia, elderly people fleeing abroad, etc. 
Although medicine cannot do without morality, ethics, deontology or law, it should be 
noted that it inevitably has the nature of philosophy, in its complexity but also in its 
relevance. Although one can philosophise without being a doctor, it nonetheless seems 
inconceivable to practise medicine without philosophical reflection.  
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1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an analytical overview of some of the arguments used 
in current discussions of euthanasia.1 Before doing this, however, several introductory 
remarks are necessary. First, the scope of the topic will be defined, as not all discussions 
which are related to “euthanasia” interpreted in a very broad and unspecified sense will be 
included. The second remark concerns the semantics to which the term “euthanasia” in this 
chapter refers. The third remark will deal with the methodology applied in this study. 
The debates about both the morality and legality of euthanasia have been a significant 
phenomenon of the last decades of the twentieth century and one can expect that they will 
remain a source of powerful controversies well into the twenty first century. Within these 
debates, euthanasia is often replaced by “(physician-)assisted dying” (Quill & Battin, 2004; 
Young, 2007), or extended to an “assisted death” (Lewis, 2007; Lewy, 2011), a broad term 
under which both euthanasia and assisted suicide are subsumed. The general term “assisted 
death” is not understood as euthanasia in the sense used both by legislation in the countries 
in which euthanasia has been legalized and by its debaters who use this quite precise notion 
of euthanasia. Finally the term “assisted death” is not conceived in the sense as the term 
“euthanasia” as being used in this article. The use of the broad notion of euthanasia leads to 
the fact that many diverse situations are discussed under the term “euthanasia”. So John 
Keown identifies the problem when he notes that “much of the confusion which besets the 
contemporary euthanasia debate can be traced to an unfortunate imprecision in definition. 
Lack of clarity has hitherto helped to ensure that much of the debate has been frustrating 
and sterile.” (Keown, 2002, p. 16). For its similarity with “assisted death”, euthanasia is 
being frequently discussed within similar but distinct contexts such as assisted suicide, 
medical futility, life sustaining treatment and (other) end-of-life decisions (Bauer-Maglin 
                                                 
1 The proposed title for this article was originally “Euthanasia pro et contra: Analytical synopsis of 
argumentations for and against euthanasia”. Its aim was to provide a synoptic and comparative 
analysis of both types of arguments used for support or refusal of euthanasia. However it soon became 
clear that such an approach transcends the format of one book chapter. So instead of a very short 
analysis of all arguments for and against euthanasia, only five leading arguments for euthanasia have 
been critically scrutinized. 
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death” is not understood as euthanasia in the sense used both by legislation in the countries 
in which euthanasia has been legalized and by its debaters who use this quite precise notion 
of euthanasia. Finally the term “assisted death” is not conceived in the sense as the term 
“euthanasia” as being used in this article. The use of the broad notion of euthanasia leads to 
the fact that many diverse situations are discussed under the term “euthanasia”. So John 
Keown identifies the problem when he notes that “much of the confusion which besets the 
contemporary euthanasia debate can be traced to an unfortunate imprecision in definition. 
Lack of clarity has hitherto helped to ensure that much of the debate has been frustrating 
and sterile.” (Keown, 2002, p. 16). For its similarity with “assisted death”, euthanasia is 
being frequently discussed within similar but distinct contexts such as assisted suicide, 
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1 The proposed title for this article was originally “Euthanasia pro et contra: Analytical synopsis of 
argumentations for and against euthanasia”. Its aim was to provide a synoptic and comparative 
analysis of both types of arguments used for support or refusal of euthanasia. However it soon became 
clear that such an approach transcends the format of one book chapter. So instead of a very short 
analysis of all arguments for and against euthanasia, only five leading arguments for euthanasia have 
been critically scrutinized. 
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&Perry, 2010; Onwuteaka-Philipsen, 2003; van der Maas, 1991). It is obvious that the 
decisions in clinical medicine- both in palliative and intensive care- encompass a much 
broader spectrum than just the issue of euthanasia (Battin et al., 2007; Kinzbrunner & 
Policzer, 2010; Wanzer & Glenmullen, 2007; Wennberg, 1989). As such, if two people are 
discussing whether ‘euthanasia’ should be legalized or criminalized and by the same word 
they understand two quite different things, their discussion will be fruitless and 
meaningless; they will be addressing each other without being able to reach any common 
ground, instead developing two distinct monologues.  
Although for euthanasia and assisted suicide the same or similar arguments can be used, for 
the purpose of this book it is held that euthanasia and assisted suicide are two diverse 
entities –from both a moral and legal point of view (Watts & Howell, 1992; Beech, 1995). 
Consequently in discussions on issues raised by those two concepts, two distinct notions 
should be used. To this effect, the debates on both assisted suicide and physician assisted 
suicide and the arguments used in this context will be not included in this chapter. The 
scope is demarked by the topic “euthanasia”, although the same or similar arguments are 
used in assisted suicide debates as well. 
Despite the fact that in some current debates taking place under the term “euthanasia”, 
“assisted suicide” is discussed, “euthanasia” in this chapter is semantically understood not 
as a notion common for both “euthanasia” and “assisted suicide”. The term “euthanasia” 
within this chapter means that one person brings about the death of another person because 
the first person believes that the life of the second person, who has asked for euthanasia, is 
so miserable that it would be better for him/her to be dead. More precisely, A kills B upon 
the request of B for the sake of B. The motive of A, who commits the act of euthanasia, is to 
benefit B. In contrast, assisted suicide is basically a suicide: B kills B; A is solely providing 
help, not taking the life of B. Albeit the help provided by A is an essential element in the 
death of B (B probably would be not able to kill him/her self without this help of A), B still 
has the possibility and freedom not to complete the act and not to kill him/her self. B 
remains the author and originator of his/her act even though his/her free volition may be 
diminished. 
Thus the term euthanasia is here understood as a deliberate act of termination2 of the life of 
B by A upon an explicit request of B. In addition to the benefit of B, a set of other criteria 
must be fulfilled so that one can use the term euthanasia in a precise sense: (a) person B 
must be suffering the terminal stage of an illness or undergoing unbearable suffering (the 
Rotterdam criterion for euthanasia); (b) person B, having an enduring, voluntary and 
competent wish to die, has expressed repeatedly this wish; (c) the act of euthanasia is 
performed by a physician. The last condition is naturally not a necessary condition – 
euthanasia can be conducted by anyone – however the fact that a physician is conducting 
euthanasia is of relevance as far as the medical profession is involved in the administration 
of euthanasia. The last condition is not often mentioned in the argumentations pro et contra.  
Since euthanasia in the countries where it has been decriminalized is administered by 
members of the medical profession, the participation of a physician in euthanasia is a 
relevant circumstance. The second condition introduced (competence) means that the term 
euthanasia is understood to refer to so-called “voluntary euthanasia”, i.e. a competent 
person makes a voluntary request (the repetition of this request serves as a guarantee of the 
                                                 
2 The term “termination of life” (instead of “killing”) has been used as a neutral description, which is 
open to diverse value-laden interpretations, including “taking life”, “killing” or “homicide”.  
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consistent and authentic will of the person wishing to die). It would be counterproductive to 
set a framework for the analysis of arguments of euthanasia if such a term were to include 
various imprecisely specified forms of assistance in dying. Therefore, for the purpose of this 
chapter, the term “euthanasia” will refer to “active voluntary euthanasia”. So-called 
“passive euthanasia” will not be included here in the term “euthanasia” even though one 
can repeatedly find such references in literature – fortunately less and less often. If 
euthanasia is defined in the above mentioned sense, then there is no point talking about 
“passive euthanasia”. We should not mix “killing” (an active action) with “allowing to die” 
(the deliberate lack of application of treatment that would only increase suffering and 
prolong dying, but not involving administration of drugs which causes termination of life).3 
Thus to refer to “killing” (active euthanasia) and “allowing to die” (passive euthanasia) by 
the same word (euthanasia) is semantic nonsense. Provided the term “euthanasia” is used 
within the introduced semantic framework, euthanasia can only be active by nature. 
The other two types of euthanasia, namely “non-voluntary euthanasia” and “involuntary 
euthanasia” are not prima facie included in the following argument survey; one of the 
main arguments for euthanasia (autonomy) would not be applicable to both types.4 Non-
voluntary euthanasia, the termination of the life of a non-competent person by someone 
other than that person or termination of the life of a person who is not able to express 
his/her will may be supported by a compassion argument, but not in conjunction with the 
autonomy argument. The question as to whether someone can authorize another person 
to make the decision about euthanasia on their behalf by making a request to be killed 
(the third person C is requesting euthanasia for person B and the physician A terminates 
the life of B upon request of C who has been authorized by B) is quite different from the 
question mentioned above (B requests euthanasia from A and A conducts euthanasia 
upon request of B). The issue of substituted judgement used in intensive care, where 
person C, as health care proxy, makes a decision for person B is quite different from the 
substituted judgement in the context of euthanasia for many reasons. First the rationale 
for the substituted judgement is to follow the authentic will of a non-competent person in 
health care and his/her individual (value-based) preferences regarding a particular 
treatment in the given clinical conditions as much as possible. Furthermore in intensive 
care a decision about treatment has to be made (one of the therapeutic options has to be 
decided upon and realized) in difference to non-voluntary euthanasia where there is not 
an objective necessity to conduct the act of euthanasia; a fortiori if the authentic will of the 
patient is not known. There is no imperative to follow the unknown will of the person in 
the case of euthanasia. In addition, in many cultural contexts, providing treatment (or 
either withdrawing or withholding treatment) in a non-competent patient is adopted not 
upon the request of one single person (health care proxy) but by all persons involved (i.e. 
relatives and the whole therapeutic team including nurses, psychologists, social workers 
and other non-medical staff).  
So within the following analysis of arguments, the focus is on active voluntary euthanasia. 
All sub-forms such as euthanasia of minors (e.g. terminal stage of cancer in small 
                                                 
3 The “passive action” of allowing to die can include not only passivity in the sense of diverse avoiding 
of treatment (e.g. withholding or withdrawing); it can also include “active actions” such as the 
psychological or spiritual accompaniment of a dying person or the support by those close to the patient. 
4 “Non-voluntary euthanasia” and “involuntary euthanasia” will be included mainly in the role of 
counter-argumentation. 
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children) or euthanasia of (extremely immature) newborn children with abnormalities has 
naturally to be discussed, however some of the arguments would have a different and 
modified form, taking into account the particular context (e.g. parents as decision-
makers), but maintaining a certain congruence. A distinct argumentative framework 
would be appropriate for involuntary euthanasia, also for killing a person despite an 
explicit expression of his/her opposition towards euthanasia. Such a framework is not 
elaborated in this chapter. 
The last introductory remark refers to the methodology of this chapter. During the last few 
decades several studies that (also) deal with the arguments concerning euthanasia have 
been published.5 They provide a valuable source of diverse views on euthanasia. The 
majority of studies about euthanasia have been written as manifestos which serve to support 
one side of the controversy. They are often intended as tools to be used by either the 
opponents or by the proponents of euthanasia, being akin to instruction manuals or 
catechisms: if you are against/for euthanasia, therein are to be found the arguments you can 
use in debates to support your position. In difference to many monographs on the ethics of 
euthanasia, this text strives to provide a critical analysis of the arguments for euthanasia 
only. An analytical and comparative synopsis of both types of arguments remains beyond 
the scope of this chapter.   
Various numbers of arguments for and against euthanasia are listed within current 
literature. Similarly, different categories of arguments are used in euthanasia debates - for 
instance arguments based on rights, philosophical arguments (the universality of moral 
rules vs. tolerable exceptions), practical approaches (regulation of euthanasia by law) or 
religious belief (only God can give and take life). It is practically impossible to list the 
arguments for euthanasia as pure arguments for euthanasia, while at the same time giving 
another inventory of arguments against euthanasia, as if both lists were mutually exclusive 
and reciprocally independent. The opposite is true. Many of the pro arguments can 
simultaneously be contra arguments and vice versa. So the resultant categorization of 
arguments derives from the precondition that the individual arguments can be assigned as 
to their prevalent use as arguments for (e.g. autonomy) or as arguments against (e.g. slippery 
slope). It has to be noted that some other arguments are so truly “ambidextrous” i.e. the base 
of the same argument can be used both for and against euthanasia, that assigning them 
according one camp is fleeting at best. Some aspects of the arguments can be utilized or 
even manipulated in different ways or have an inverse complement in the form of 
counterargument - for example autonomy as one of the primary arguments for euthanasia 
can be challenged by one of the serious counter-arguments, namely that of competence (to 
which extent a terminally ill or unbearably suffering person is competent to make an 
autonomous choice).  
The only alternatively appropriate option would be to go through the individual 
arguments and analyse them without labelling them as predominantly pro or contra 
arguments. This approach could be regarded as unbiased (or less biased) but at a cost 
where the individual arguments would be almost neutralized with regard to their stance 
on euthanasia, with the outcome and justifying power of the arguments being lessened 
                                                 
5 Beauchamp, 1996; Behnke & Bok 1975; Bernards, 1989; Biggar, 2004; Brody, 1989; Cohen-Almagor, 
2001; Dworkin, 1993; Dworkin et al. 1998; Engdahl, 2007; Gentles, 1995; Grisez & Boyle, 1979; Harris, 
2005; Keown, 1995, 2002; Leone, 1999; Medina, 2005; Moreno, 1995; Morgan, 1996; Oosthuizen et al., 
1978; Rachels, 1986; Roberts & Gorman, 1996; Snyder 2006; Torr, 2000; Wekesser, 1995; Young, 2007a. 
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considerably or disappearing altogether in the analytical critique. This would be contrary 
to real life application of these arguments used in euthanasia debates not as neutral 
arguments but as either pro or contra arguments. So the chosen general differentiation of 
arguments has to be taken rather as an auxiliary framework than as the final definitional 
scope. The following figure shows a matrix of the arguments,6 based on the prevalent 




Right to die Inviolability of human life – a human right 
Unbearable suffering Sanctity of life doctrine 
Compassion Prohibition of killing (Hippocratic tradition) 
Human dignity Risk of abuse 
Patient’s best interest Slippery slope 
Quality of life Quality palliative care – as a/the alternative to euthanasia 
Health care costs Patient’s good
7 – as an counterargument to 
the pure economical calculation 
Legalization The compromised role of the physician 
Transparency Vulnerability – social pressure 
Fig. 1. Synopsis of arguments for and against euthanasia 
Some of the arguments complement each other (e.g. autonomy and competence). Other 
arguments, located on the same line, illustrate the respective sides of a viewpoint. The 
added value of such a matrix is the emphasis on complexity. In euthanasia debates, 
arguments usually have an either/or, either for or against structure. This matrix seeks to 
“interweave” diverse arguments, putting them into a fabric of dualities. For instance, 
proponents would argue for the decriminalization of euthanasia in the following way: let us 
regulate what is being done anyway, regulated euthanasia is better then the grey zone in 
which it is occurring today. But the legalization of euthanasia would also affect the public 
role of the physician, who would become both healer and killer in the same person, with the 
potential to put vulnerable patients under social pressure. And these aspects have to be 
considered as well.  
2. The arguments for euthanasia 
According to the methodology described above, some of the main arguments for euthanasia 
will be analyzed. The remaining pro arguments will be scrutinized less intensively. It has to 
be highlighted that all arguments have their objections and counter-objections; so all of the 
pro arguments can simultaneously be used as contra arguments. Therefore, while dealing 
with the objections to the pro arguments, the contra argumentation is in fact scrutinized 
inherently. 
                                                 
6 For purposes of this study, only the first five leading for arguments have been examined.  
7 Misbin, 1992; Sullivan, 2005. 
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The following structure of analysis of the arguments has been adopted:  
1. Introduction  
2. Description 
The argument will be characterized by its most relevant features, and presented in a 
simplified version. The aim here is to provide a fair and well-balanced presentation of the 
argument (including diverse ways in which it is used). 
3. Contextualization  
The aim is to provide information about the background of the argument, placing it into a 
broader context, showing from where the argument is derived.  
4. Presuppositions 
In euthanasia debates, the precondition(s), as departure point(s) for the arguments are rarely 
stated. The aim is to clarify what the argument presupposes, what its preconditions are or 
which ethical theory are related to it.8  
5. Analysis 
In connection to the second step, an analytical and comparative explanation of the 
arguments is provided (how the argument is used in euthanasia debates); a critical analysis 
of both the argument and its objections is given. 
6. Evaluation  
The argument is assessed as to its strong and weak points, to its explanatory and 
justificatory power and coherence. The role and usage of the argument in euthanasia 
debates is addressed. 
7. Conclusion 
Within this structure the first five of the arguments listed for euthanasia have been critically 
analyzed. The analysis of the remaining five arguments have only (for the reason given 
above) been outlined.  
2.1 Autonomy  
2.1.1 Introduction 
Autonomy is frequently given as one of the main arguments for euthanasia (Achille & 
Ogloff, 1997; Begley, 1998, 2008; Brock, 1992; Quill et al., 1997; Smith, 1989; Tulloch, 2008), 
usually in conjunction with the right to die (Dworkin, 1993; Finkel et al., 1993; Ogden, 1994; 
Smook & de Vos-Schippers, 1990). As per its proponents‘ arguments, a ban on euthanasia 
imposes a considerable restriction on the options of an individual to govern his/her life, 
denying a competent individual’s ability to shape his/her own death. Opponents‘ 
arguments are based on different interpretations of autonomy and its role in the life of 
individuals: self-determination regarding one’s own death (euthanasia) would be a false 
autonomy. Other opponents argue that the positive principle of autonomy (and self-
determination) cannot outweigh the prohibitive (and therefore negative) principle of not 
killing. The essence of the euthanasia controversy is the tension between the values of life 
and individual liberty. 
                                                 
8 The vocalization of the presuppositions is of significance for mutual understanding in euthanasia 
discussions. Otherwise these starting points, often based not only on certain ethical theories but on 
personal beliefs, or on various dogmas and ideologies which (even as non-identified) play a pivotal role 
in the debate, if not revealed cannot be addressed, rendering the debate both more difficult and 
superficial and inconclusive. 
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Autonomy is certainly one of the essential values of Western societies and is therefore 
worthy of protection. The autonomy argument states that a person, while asking for 
euthanasia, expresses his/her personal choice, realizing his/her autonomy. The request for 
euthanasia is part of the human freedom to terminate one’s own life (Dworkin, 1993; 
Russell, 1975). Thus the euthanasia request of a competent individual is a basic freedom to 
define the framework and conditions of his/her life, more precisely it is a decision about 
how that life should be lived and ended. To ask for euthanasia means to end one’s own life 
in a prearranged way, without loosing control over one’s own process of dying and death. 
From this point of view, euthanasia is the execution of control over one’s life and death. 
Therefore euthanasia can and has to be practiced and has to be legalized, because the 
legalization of euthanasia protects and promotes the autonomy of an individual. Euthanasia 
not prohibited by law or legislatively decriminalized is an essential element for the 
execution of autonomy. On the other hand the criminalization of euthanasia results in a 
restriction of autonomy. The legalization of euthanasia also eliminates unnecessary or 
inadmissible barriers to the right to die.  
The legalization of euthanasia argument has at least two forms, the two prime ones we will 
call liberal and libertarian respectively.9 Within the liberal approaches, individuals can 
express their autonomy by asking for euthanasia. However the physician, also having his or 
her own autonomy, is not obliged to administer euthanasia since the autonomy of the 
patient is not paramount to the physician’s autonomy. The moderate liberal approach tries 
to weigh the detrimental side-effects of the legalization of euthanasia vis-à-vis the benefit 
one can see in promoting autonomy (The Danish Council of Ethics, 2006). Such an approach 
would assess the importance of legal euthanasia for personal autonomy. All the necessary 
regulatory tools would have to be applied to avoid the abuse of autonomy by the 
heteronomy of others (including the abuse of legalized euthanasia in the form of non-
voluntary or involuntary euthanasia). Within a liberal framework, euthanasia is tolerated 
either as a form of individual preference (despite the fact of being a criminal act, euthanasia 
in practice is not legally prosecuted and such a “grey zone” is in practice tolerated) or as a 
form of societal free choice (the decriminalization of euthanasia – the model in the 
Netherlands, Belgium or Luxemburg). (Gomez, 1991; Muller et al., 1994; Thomasma, 1998). 
Thus the genuine autonomy of the individual requesting euthanasia in a specific clinical 
situation is crucial. 
Within the libertarian approach, decriminalization of euthanasia is an imperative of 
autonomy; euthanasia has to be legal, individuals have the right to request euthanasia, 
physicians have the duty to administrate euthanasia and in some radical approaches, 
individuals have not only the freedom but even a moral duty to request euthanasia in 
situations where the suffering is unbearable, the quality of life too low and dissatisfying and 
the dignity of person hurt, when in short to die is better than to live. Thus the demand of 
liberty would predetermine a call for euthanasia. The initiation of the use of force by one 
individual against another is contradictory to libertarian understanding. The libertarian 
approach would postulate the suspension of laws banning euthanasia. This radical 
(ideological) form of duty to request euthanasia (in certain situations) would be close to 
                                                 
9 This terminology is not usually used in euthanasia debates and it can rightly be criticized. For the 
purposes of this study, the terms liberal and libertarian have been used instead of saying ‘less liberal’ 
and ‘more liberal’. 
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The following structure of analysis of the arguments has been adopted:  
1. Introduction  
2. Description 
The argument will be characterized by its most relevant features, and presented in a 
simplified version. The aim here is to provide a fair and well-balanced presentation of the 
argument (including diverse ways in which it is used). 
3. Contextualization  
The aim is to provide information about the background of the argument, placing it into a 
broader context, showing from where the argument is derived.  
4. Presuppositions 
In euthanasia debates, the precondition(s), as departure point(s) for the arguments are rarely 
stated. The aim is to clarify what the argument presupposes, what its preconditions are or 
which ethical theory are related to it.8  
5. Analysis 
In connection to the second step, an analytical and comparative explanation of the 
arguments is provided (how the argument is used in euthanasia debates); a critical analysis 
of both the argument and its objections is given. 
6. Evaluation  
The argument is assessed as to its strong and weak points, to its explanatory and 
justificatory power and coherence. The role and usage of the argument in euthanasia 
debates is addressed. 
7. Conclusion 
Within this structure the first five of the arguments listed for euthanasia have been critically 
analyzed. The analysis of the remaining five arguments have only (for the reason given 
above) been outlined.  
2.1 Autonomy  
2.1.1 Introduction 
Autonomy is frequently given as one of the main arguments for euthanasia (Achille & 
Ogloff, 1997; Begley, 1998, 2008; Brock, 1992; Quill et al., 1997; Smith, 1989; Tulloch, 2008), 
usually in conjunction with the right to die (Dworkin, 1993; Finkel et al., 1993; Ogden, 1994; 
Smook & de Vos-Schippers, 1990). As per its proponents‘ arguments, a ban on euthanasia 
imposes a considerable restriction on the options of an individual to govern his/her life, 
denying a competent individual’s ability to shape his/her own death. Opponents‘ 
arguments are based on different interpretations of autonomy and its role in the life of 
individuals: self-determination regarding one’s own death (euthanasia) would be a false 
autonomy. Other opponents argue that the positive principle of autonomy (and self-
determination) cannot outweigh the prohibitive (and therefore negative) principle of not 
killing. The essence of the euthanasia controversy is the tension between the values of life 
and individual liberty. 
                                                 
8 The vocalization of the presuppositions is of significance for mutual understanding in euthanasia 
discussions. Otherwise these starting points, often based not only on certain ethical theories but on 
personal beliefs, or on various dogmas and ideologies which (even as non-identified) play a pivotal role 
in the debate, if not revealed cannot be addressed, rendering the debate both more difficult and 
superficial and inconclusive. 
Everything Under Control: How and When to Die -  




Autonomy is certainly one of the essential values of Western societies and is therefore 
worthy of protection. The autonomy argument states that a person, while asking for 
euthanasia, expresses his/her personal choice, realizing his/her autonomy. The request for 
euthanasia is part of the human freedom to terminate one’s own life (Dworkin, 1993; 
Russell, 1975). Thus the euthanasia request of a competent individual is a basic freedom to 
define the framework and conditions of his/her life, more precisely it is a decision about 
how that life should be lived and ended. To ask for euthanasia means to end one’s own life 
in a prearranged way, without loosing control over one’s own process of dying and death. 
From this point of view, euthanasia is the execution of control over one’s life and death. 
Therefore euthanasia can and has to be practiced and has to be legalized, because the 
legalization of euthanasia protects and promotes the autonomy of an individual. Euthanasia 
not prohibited by law or legislatively decriminalized is an essential element for the 
execution of autonomy. On the other hand the criminalization of euthanasia results in a 
restriction of autonomy. The legalization of euthanasia also eliminates unnecessary or 
inadmissible barriers to the right to die.  
The legalization of euthanasia argument has at least two forms, the two prime ones we will 
call liberal and libertarian respectively.9 Within the liberal approaches, individuals can 
express their autonomy by asking for euthanasia. However the physician, also having his or 
her own autonomy, is not obliged to administer euthanasia since the autonomy of the 
patient is not paramount to the physician’s autonomy. The moderate liberal approach tries 
to weigh the detrimental side-effects of the legalization of euthanasia vis-à-vis the benefit 
one can see in promoting autonomy (The Danish Council of Ethics, 2006). Such an approach 
would assess the importance of legal euthanasia for personal autonomy. All the necessary 
regulatory tools would have to be applied to avoid the abuse of autonomy by the 
heteronomy of others (including the abuse of legalized euthanasia in the form of non-
voluntary or involuntary euthanasia). Within a liberal framework, euthanasia is tolerated 
either as a form of individual preference (despite the fact of being a criminal act, euthanasia 
in practice is not legally prosecuted and such a “grey zone” is in practice tolerated) or as a 
form of societal free choice (the decriminalization of euthanasia – the model in the 
Netherlands, Belgium or Luxemburg). (Gomez, 1991; Muller et al., 1994; Thomasma, 1998). 
Thus the genuine autonomy of the individual requesting euthanasia in a specific clinical 
situation is crucial. 
Within the libertarian approach, decriminalization of euthanasia is an imperative of 
autonomy; euthanasia has to be legal, individuals have the right to request euthanasia, 
physicians have the duty to administrate euthanasia and in some radical approaches, 
individuals have not only the freedom but even a moral duty to request euthanasia in 
situations where the suffering is unbearable, the quality of life too low and dissatisfying and 
the dignity of person hurt, when in short to die is better than to live. Thus the demand of 
liberty would predetermine a call for euthanasia. The initiation of the use of force by one 
individual against another is contradictory to libertarian understanding. The libertarian 
approach would postulate the suspension of laws banning euthanasia. This radical 
(ideological) form of duty to request euthanasia (in certain situations) would be close to 
                                                 
9 This terminology is not usually used in euthanasia debates and it can rightly be criticized. For the 
purposes of this study, the terms liberal and libertarian have been used instead of saying ‘less liberal’ 
and ‘more liberal’. 
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authoritarian and totalitarian thinking. Ironically, these extreme perspectives on both sides 
are very close each other. 
2.1.3 Contextualization 
As a prerequisite to the concept of autonomy one of the central features of liberal political 
philosophy can be found: a commitment to respect the dignity of persons. This states that it 
is not sufficient to do good for patients and to forestall their harm. Doing good could 
endanger their dignity (Childress, 2000). Therefore the primary concern is that the persons 
are respected in their dignity; dignity is the base for autonomy, or in other words, dignity is 
expressed in the form of autonomy. From the respect for persons as the first principle, it 
follows that a person has the right to make his/her own life shorter in order to maintain a 
certain quality of life (shorter but better), while keeping or protecting dignity. Thus making 
life shorter is a necessary means of making it better as a whole (Velleman, 1999). James 
Childress describes this typical feature of Anglo-American thinking in the following way: 
“Autonomy does not imply that an individual’s life plan is his or her own creation and that 
it excludes interest in others. The first implication focuses on the source, the second on the 
object of autonomy. Neither implication holds. Autonomy simply means that a person 
chooses and acts freely and rationally out of her own life plan, however ill-defined. […] 
Thus, personal autonomy does not imply an asocial or a historical approach to life plans. It 
only means that whatever the life plan, and whatever its source, an individual takes it as his 
own”. (Childress, 2000, p. 149). With regard to death and dying, personal autonomy in the 
form of shaping one’s own life and imparting sense and meaning to it is even more relevant 
than in everyday life. “The way people die is of great importance to individuals' overall 
perception and understanding of their existence.” (The Danish Council of Ethics, 2006). We 
do not have any better alternative to autonomy in Western societies but we have diverse 
societal and cultural contexts in which autonomy is realized.  
2.1.4 Presuppositions  
Autonomy is regarded as not only for one of the primary values in Western societies but 
also for one of their fundamental rights. However the debates on autonomy and euthanasia 
presuppose that we have some notion (Vorverständnis) of what autonomy and self-
determination mean. Autonomy is certainly not a univocal concept in philosophy, having 
two main and significantly diverse expositions in European thinking.10 The prevalent notion 
of autonomy in euthanasia debates can be encapsulated as the following: I want to be the 
author of my life whose decisions have to be dependent on my will, I want to be the subject 
not an object (Berlin, 1969). One of the most influential concepts of autonomy in bioethics is 
the one of Principlism: “Personal autonomy is […] self-rule that is free from both controlling 
                                                 
10 Autonomy in the continental European tradition can be represented by Immanuel Kant (Grundlegung 
zur Metaphysik der Sitten). The notion of autonomy in the Anglo-Saxon tradition is based on authors 
such as Jeremy Bentham, John Start Mill or Isaiah Berlin. For Kant, autonomy is (a freely accepted) 
commitment to the universal law given by the maxim of the will (autonomy is expressed by the 
Categorical Imperative). For Kant, autonomy is the highest (and the only acceptable) principle of 
morality; any heteronymous morality has to be rejected. In contrast, autonomy is for Mill an individual 
free choice, free from any social or political control or constraint. Autonomy for Mill coincides with 
liberty and independence (On Liberty). For Mill, autonomy is an issue of (subjective) liberty; for Kant, 
autonomy is an issue of (objective) reason.  
Everything Under Control: How and When to Die -  
A Critical Analysis of the Arguments for Euthanasia 
 
135 
interference by others and from limitations, such as inadequate understanding, that prevent 
meaningful choice.” (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001, p. 58). However beyond the Western 
hermeneutics of autonomy, different presumptions could be identified in other cultures.  
Autonomy follows from liberal theories which put the individual, fundamentally free and 
rational, into the centre; the individual not state legislation knows better what is good for 
his/her life. The individual, not state institutions, has to decide in which way to die. The 
autonomy argument is based on the liberal notion of freedom: as long as one is not causing 
harm to another he/she can (and has to) exercise his/her freedom. Autonomy in euthanasia 
debates presupposes the following structure of argument: If an action does not violate the 
moral rights of another individual and promotes the good of the person concerned, then 
that action is morally good. Since euthanasia does not violate the moral rights of others and 
promotes the good of the persons concerned (of everyone involved) euthanasia is morally 
good. Thus euthanasia is not only an action which could or should be tolerated, it is much 
more so an action which has to be performed, promoted and protected. 
The sense of autonomy comes from the notion of positive freedom. Not only must I not be 
coerced by someone (negative freedom) but as an individual I want to be my own master: “I 
wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind.” 
(Berlin, 1969, p. 131) Once the right of a person to make his/her life shorter (and better) is 
recognized, the second presumption consists of being in favour of deferring to an 
individual’s judgement regarding his/her own good. This presumption means that an 
individual has the right to life and to die in his/her own way, by his/her own convictions 
about which life is better for him/her. (Velleman, 1999). In contrast “making someone die in 
a way that others approve, but he believes to be a horrifying contradiction of his life, is a 
devastating, odious form of tyranny” (Dworkin, 1993, p. 217). 
The next condition of autonomy is the freedom to choose between several options for an 
action. The patient (moral agent) has a preference for performing the elected act (preference 
autonomy). From this point of view euthanasia is a preferred autonomous choice, for instance 
the patient prefers euthanasia to palliative care and to suffering. The principle of autonomy 
as a basic faculty of self-determination presupposes that every moral agent is an 
autonomous agent. This means that not only the patient has his/her autonomy but so does 
the physician. To be autonomous agents is a precondition for the defence and protection of 
self-interests. Therewithal the principle of autonomy presupposes more than that an 
individual is an autonomous agent, but also a rational agent able of decision making and of 
(moral) action. The autonomy argument assumes that the individual is fully capable of 
autonomy. 
In summary autonomy presupposes capacities such as understanding, reasoning, 
deliberateness, freedom of choice and self-governance. 
2.1.5 Analysis 
As has been demonstrated, the core concept of the autonomy argument is based on freedom: 
one wants to be the author of his/her life, who in turn shapes his/her death and dying, 
while making an autonomous choice as to how to die (rational self-governance). A request 
for euthanasia is an expression of the fundamental value to have one’s own life and its 
circumstances under one’s own control. The contrary would be a fatalistic belief that 
delegates the right and duty of control over one’s own life and its course to some external 
power. Some people would argue that to repudiate control over one’s own life is 
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authoritarian and totalitarian thinking. Ironically, these extreme perspectives on both sides 
are very close each other. 
2.1.3 Contextualization 
As a prerequisite to the concept of autonomy one of the central features of liberal political 
philosophy can be found: a commitment to respect the dignity of persons. This states that it 
is not sufficient to do good for patients and to forestall their harm. Doing good could 
endanger their dignity (Childress, 2000). Therefore the primary concern is that the persons 
are respected in their dignity; dignity is the base for autonomy, or in other words, dignity is 
expressed in the form of autonomy. From the respect for persons as the first principle, it 
follows that a person has the right to make his/her own life shorter in order to maintain a 
certain quality of life (shorter but better), while keeping or protecting dignity. Thus making 
life shorter is a necessary means of making it better as a whole (Velleman, 1999). James 
Childress describes this typical feature of Anglo-American thinking in the following way: 
“Autonomy does not imply that an individual’s life plan is his or her own creation and that 
it excludes interest in others. The first implication focuses on the source, the second on the 
object of autonomy. Neither implication holds. Autonomy simply means that a person 
chooses and acts freely and rationally out of her own life plan, however ill-defined. […] 
Thus, personal autonomy does not imply an asocial or a historical approach to life plans. It 
only means that whatever the life plan, and whatever its source, an individual takes it as his 
own”. (Childress, 2000, p. 149). With regard to death and dying, personal autonomy in the 
form of shaping one’s own life and imparting sense and meaning to it is even more relevant 
than in everyday life. “The way people die is of great importance to individuals' overall 
perception and understanding of their existence.” (The Danish Council of Ethics, 2006). We 
do not have any better alternative to autonomy in Western societies but we have diverse 
societal and cultural contexts in which autonomy is realized.  
2.1.4 Presuppositions  
Autonomy is regarded as not only for one of the primary values in Western societies but 
also for one of their fundamental rights. However the debates on autonomy and euthanasia 
presuppose that we have some notion (Vorverständnis) of what autonomy and self-
determination mean. Autonomy is certainly not a univocal concept in philosophy, having 
two main and significantly diverse expositions in European thinking.10 The prevalent notion 
of autonomy in euthanasia debates can be encapsulated as the following: I want to be the 
author of my life whose decisions have to be dependent on my will, I want to be the subject 
not an object (Berlin, 1969). One of the most influential concepts of autonomy in bioethics is 
the one of Principlism: “Personal autonomy is […] self-rule that is free from both controlling 
                                                 
10 Autonomy in the continental European tradition can be represented by Immanuel Kant (Grundlegung 
zur Metaphysik der Sitten). The notion of autonomy in the Anglo-Saxon tradition is based on authors 
such as Jeremy Bentham, John Start Mill or Isaiah Berlin. For Kant, autonomy is (a freely accepted) 
commitment to the universal law given by the maxim of the will (autonomy is expressed by the 
Categorical Imperative). For Kant, autonomy is the highest (and the only acceptable) principle of 
morality; any heteronymous morality has to be rejected. In contrast, autonomy is for Mill an individual 
free choice, free from any social or political control or constraint. Autonomy for Mill coincides with 
liberty and independence (On Liberty). For Mill, autonomy is an issue of (subjective) liberty; for Kant, 
autonomy is an issue of (objective) reason.  
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interference by others and from limitations, such as inadequate understanding, that prevent 
meaningful choice.” (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001, p. 58). However beyond the Western 
hermeneutics of autonomy, different presumptions could be identified in other cultures.  
Autonomy follows from liberal theories which put the individual, fundamentally free and 
rational, into the centre; the individual not state legislation knows better what is good for 
his/her life. The individual, not state institutions, has to decide in which way to die. The 
autonomy argument is based on the liberal notion of freedom: as long as one is not causing 
harm to another he/she can (and has to) exercise his/her freedom. Autonomy in euthanasia 
debates presupposes the following structure of argument: If an action does not violate the 
moral rights of another individual and promotes the good of the person concerned, then 
that action is morally good. Since euthanasia does not violate the moral rights of others and 
promotes the good of the persons concerned (of everyone involved) euthanasia is morally 
good. Thus euthanasia is not only an action which could or should be tolerated, it is much 
more so an action which has to be performed, promoted and protected. 
The sense of autonomy comes from the notion of positive freedom. Not only must I not be 
coerced by someone (negative freedom) but as an individual I want to be my own master: “I 
wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind.” 
(Berlin, 1969, p. 131) Once the right of a person to make his/her life shorter (and better) is 
recognized, the second presumption consists of being in favour of deferring to an 
individual’s judgement regarding his/her own good. This presumption means that an 
individual has the right to life and to die in his/her own way, by his/her own convictions 
about which life is better for him/her. (Velleman, 1999). In contrast “making someone die in 
a way that others approve, but he believes to be a horrifying contradiction of his life, is a 
devastating, odious form of tyranny” (Dworkin, 1993, p. 217). 
The next condition of autonomy is the freedom to choose between several options for an 
action. The patient (moral agent) has a preference for performing the elected act (preference 
autonomy). From this point of view euthanasia is a preferred autonomous choice, for instance 
the patient prefers euthanasia to palliative care and to suffering. The principle of autonomy 
as a basic faculty of self-determination presupposes that every moral agent is an 
autonomous agent. This means that not only the patient has his/her autonomy but so does 
the physician. To be autonomous agents is a precondition for the defence and protection of 
self-interests. Therewithal the principle of autonomy presupposes more than that an 
individual is an autonomous agent, but also a rational agent able of decision making and of 
(moral) action. The autonomy argument assumes that the individual is fully capable of 
autonomy. 
In summary autonomy presupposes capacities such as understanding, reasoning, 
deliberateness, freedom of choice and self-governance. 
2.1.5 Analysis 
As has been demonstrated, the core concept of the autonomy argument is based on freedom: 
one wants to be the author of his/her life, who in turn shapes his/her death and dying, 
while making an autonomous choice as to how to die (rational self-governance). A request 
for euthanasia is an expression of the fundamental value to have one’s own life and its 
circumstances under one’s own control. The contrary would be a fatalistic belief that 
delegates the right and duty of control over one’s own life and its course to some external 
power. Some people would argue that to repudiate control over one’s own life is 
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irresponsible, while on the other hand to realize autonomy regarding the final stage of life is 
regarded as a form of responsibility. A petition for euthanasia would be an act of proper 
responsibility, being both within the faculty and quality of a person who attempts to 
influence the design of his/her life by making efforts in accordance with his/her best 
convictions. In his analysis of the right of self-termination, David Velleman, he himself 
suffering from cancer, argues that the person living his/her life is therefore the best judge of 
the value that its continuation would afford him/her — despite the fallibility of his/her 
judgement. A person’s judgement, being usually more reliable than anyone else’s, and based 
on his/her values, tends to be self-fulfilling because it can respond to its own set of values. 
The justification for deferring to a person’s judgment about serving his/her own good goes 
beyond her reliability as a judge. Respect for a person’s autonomy requires that we defer to 
the well considered judgment about his/her own good even when we have reason to regard 
that judgment as erroneous. Thus, if an individual is capable of making the autonomous 
choice of asking for the termination of life which he/she deems to be not worth living, then 
he/she has the right to be guided by his/her own judgment. (Velleman, 1999). The question 
of whether the person asked to provide euthanasia has therefore a duty to conduct 
euthanasia will be discussed later.  
Preference autonomy has been introduced as one of the conditions for autonomy. However 
many authors argue that preference autonomy is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
an autonomous action, emphasizing the relevance of preference building. The preference is 
very much influenced by society, by its dominant morality and by societal expectations, and 
by the stage of psychological and moral development of the concrete person. So preference 
autonomy could easily mislead the real and authentic preference of the person asking for 
euthanasia. Thus for some authors the determining condition for autonomy is dispositional 
autonomy:  the autonomous agent is able to reflect on his/her preferences, and be able to 
change his/her first-order preferences (Holm, 1998). “If disposal autonomy requires 
preferences that are fully self-chosen and authentic in the way described by Camus, Sartre, 
and other French existentialists, very few persons would ever be autonomous.” (Holm, 1998, 
p. 270) It can also happen that a person is autonomous in one area, while not being 
autonomous in another area. The autonomous person who has self-governing capacities 
sometimes fails to govern him/herself due to temporary constrains caused by illness, 
depression or other conditions that restrict his/her options (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001). 
Autonomy can also be understood as an ideal, something very important and worthy to 
possess that however, not everybody achieves in his/her lifetime. In euthanasia debates the 
autonomy argument is used as a non-idealist moral requirement, rather one based on real 
situations.  So as the decisive criterion for autonomy the following determiner has been 
proposed: autonomous is a person who is substantially autonomous; then autonomy is 
understood as substantial autonomy (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001, p. 60). Autonomy in 
these debates is also a faculty of a mature person who has the basic understanding of the 
circumstances of his/her life, who chooses and acts intentionally and who, free of 
constrains, is determining his/her life and death.  
With regard to some of the psychological concepts of personal development (J. Piaget, E. 
Erikson, L. Kohlberg), autonomy is taking various faces and roles during one’s life. In 
relation to developmental psychology, autonomy can also be understood gradualistically: 
autonomy is something what we progressively acquire, develop and lose. Then the question 
of to what extent a dying person has real autonomy is reciprocal to the question of to what 
extent has this person lost his/her autonomy (understood as full autonomy, as dispositional 
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autonomy or as substantial autonomy). Thus any claim of autonomy (autonomous choice) is 
valid only if the person concerned (patient) still posses the necessary degree of autonomy. In 
some clinical situations such as a terminal or pre-terminal stage, there is a high probability 
that the person does not possess full autonomy; the question which has to be clarified is 
whether there exists a dispositional or substantial autonomy.  
There are at least two main objections to the autonomy argument. The first objection, 
departing from the fact that not all persons in all situations have full autonomy, concludes 
that at a normative level with regard to life and death not everyone can be presumed able to 
make such an autonomous choice (some persons may have the full capacity of autonomy 
but on the policy level it is not feasible to distinguish full and partial autonomy and to 
discriminate persons, therefore the more practical conduct is to repudiate the autonomy 
argument as such). The second objection, departing from the fact that someone who is dying 
or in the (pre)terminal stage of disease (and life) is not a fully autonomous agent, invalidates 
the autonomy argument for a dying person.11  
The counter-objection to the objection which states that true autonomy of a dying person is 
not possible at all or rarely possible is the following: Even if the choices of many persons 
asking for euthanasia are psychologically and socially shaped and conditioned, they must 
be respected as real choices. (Battin, 2003). 
The other objection to the autonomy argument states that one cannot impose on another 
person a duty to do what the other person does not (subjectively) agree with or what is 
(objectively) morally wrong, even if the choice of the requesting person was made freely and 
rationally. (Battin, 2003). The counter-objection bases itself on the lack of sufficient proof that 
euthanasia as such is morally wrong and on the presumption that a well thought out 
decision done in accordance with the values, preferences and conscience of the person 
concerned, though being possibly wrong, is the best one can do and therefore it morally 
obliges the person concerned to act accordingly. Another counter-objection is based on the 
presumption that no one is obliged to do what the other person requests, especially in cases 
when there is a conflict in moral assessment regarding the requested action. (Battin, 2003). 
The autonomy principle does not insist that a free, well-considered choice of an individual 
must be respected. The person who is asked to perform euthanasia also has her autonomy 
which can prohibit or allow the requested act of euthanasia to be performed; in some cases 
the performer’s autonomy, guided by compassion, could even oblige the person to conduct 
euthanasia (with or without being requested).12 The next objection to autonomy states “that 
a decision about one’s own death is something fundamentally different from other life 
decisions and life choices” (The Danish Council of Ethics, 2006). Therefore it cannot be 
meaningfully said that a person’s own death is a subject of a free and autonomous choice. 
The next objection is built on the fact that “the concrete circumstances surrounding the 
choice scenario in the form of the role played by the doctor, society and the next-of-kin 
mean that the request for euthanasia will have arisen partly or wholly out of a situation in 
which autonomy cannot be practised, either because the person is not competent or because 
of direct or indirect pressure from their surroundings.”13 (The Danish Council of Ethics, 
2006). So the aforementioned circumstances in such a case, either partially or fully disqualify 
the autonomy argument and its legitimacy for euthanasia. 
                                                 
11 The competence of a dying person would be a part of the counter-argument. 
12 The compassion argument is discussed below. 
13 Social pressure as a negative consequence of legal euthanasia is a strong objection to this argument.  
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irresponsible, while on the other hand to realize autonomy regarding the final stage of life is 
regarded as a form of responsibility. A petition for euthanasia would be an act of proper 
responsibility, being both within the faculty and quality of a person who attempts to 
influence the design of his/her life by making efforts in accordance with his/her best 
convictions. In his analysis of the right of self-termination, David Velleman, he himself 
suffering from cancer, argues that the person living his/her life is therefore the best judge of 
the value that its continuation would afford him/her — despite the fallibility of his/her 
judgement. A person’s judgement, being usually more reliable than anyone else’s, and based 
on his/her values, tends to be self-fulfilling because it can respond to its own set of values. 
The justification for deferring to a person’s judgment about serving his/her own good goes 
beyond her reliability as a judge. Respect for a person’s autonomy requires that we defer to 
the well considered judgment about his/her own good even when we have reason to regard 
that judgment as erroneous. Thus, if an individual is capable of making the autonomous 
choice of asking for the termination of life which he/she deems to be not worth living, then 
he/she has the right to be guided by his/her own judgment. (Velleman, 1999). The question 
of whether the person asked to provide euthanasia has therefore a duty to conduct 
euthanasia will be discussed later.  
Preference autonomy has been introduced as one of the conditions for autonomy. However 
many authors argue that preference autonomy is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
an autonomous action, emphasizing the relevance of preference building. The preference is 
very much influenced by society, by its dominant morality and by societal expectations, and 
by the stage of psychological and moral development of the concrete person. So preference 
autonomy could easily mislead the real and authentic preference of the person asking for 
euthanasia. Thus for some authors the determining condition for autonomy is dispositional 
autonomy:  the autonomous agent is able to reflect on his/her preferences, and be able to 
change his/her first-order preferences (Holm, 1998). “If disposal autonomy requires 
preferences that are fully self-chosen and authentic in the way described by Camus, Sartre, 
and other French existentialists, very few persons would ever be autonomous.” (Holm, 1998, 
p. 270) It can also happen that a person is autonomous in one area, while not being 
autonomous in another area. The autonomous person who has self-governing capacities 
sometimes fails to govern him/herself due to temporary constrains caused by illness, 
depression or other conditions that restrict his/her options (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001). 
Autonomy can also be understood as an ideal, something very important and worthy to 
possess that however, not everybody achieves in his/her lifetime. In euthanasia debates the 
autonomy argument is used as a non-idealist moral requirement, rather one based on real 
situations.  So as the decisive criterion for autonomy the following determiner has been 
proposed: autonomous is a person who is substantially autonomous; then autonomy is 
understood as substantial autonomy (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001, p. 60). Autonomy in 
these debates is also a faculty of a mature person who has the basic understanding of the 
circumstances of his/her life, who chooses and acts intentionally and who, free of 
constrains, is determining his/her life and death.  
With regard to some of the psychological concepts of personal development (J. Piaget, E. 
Erikson, L. Kohlberg), autonomy is taking various faces and roles during one’s life. In 
relation to developmental psychology, autonomy can also be understood gradualistically: 
autonomy is something what we progressively acquire, develop and lose. Then the question 
of to what extent a dying person has real autonomy is reciprocal to the question of to what 
extent has this person lost his/her autonomy (understood as full autonomy, as dispositional 
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autonomy or as substantial autonomy). Thus any claim of autonomy (autonomous choice) is 
valid only if the person concerned (patient) still posses the necessary degree of autonomy. In 
some clinical situations such as a terminal or pre-terminal stage, there is a high probability 
that the person does not possess full autonomy; the question which has to be clarified is 
whether there exists a dispositional or substantial autonomy.  
There are at least two main objections to the autonomy argument. The first objection, 
departing from the fact that not all persons in all situations have full autonomy, concludes 
that at a normative level with regard to life and death not everyone can be presumed able to 
make such an autonomous choice (some persons may have the full capacity of autonomy 
but on the policy level it is not feasible to distinguish full and partial autonomy and to 
discriminate persons, therefore the more practical conduct is to repudiate the autonomy 
argument as such). The second objection, departing from the fact that someone who is dying 
or in the (pre)terminal stage of disease (and life) is not a fully autonomous agent, invalidates 
the autonomy argument for a dying person.11  
The counter-objection to the objection which states that true autonomy of a dying person is 
not possible at all or rarely possible is the following: Even if the choices of many persons 
asking for euthanasia are psychologically and socially shaped and conditioned, they must 
be respected as real choices. (Battin, 2003). 
The other objection to the autonomy argument states that one cannot impose on another 
person a duty to do what the other person does not (subjectively) agree with or what is 
(objectively) morally wrong, even if the choice of the requesting person was made freely and 
rationally. (Battin, 2003). The counter-objection bases itself on the lack of sufficient proof that 
euthanasia as such is morally wrong and on the presumption that a well thought out 
decision done in accordance with the values, preferences and conscience of the person 
concerned, though being possibly wrong, is the best one can do and therefore it morally 
obliges the person concerned to act accordingly. Another counter-objection is based on the 
presumption that no one is obliged to do what the other person requests, especially in cases 
when there is a conflict in moral assessment regarding the requested action. (Battin, 2003). 
The autonomy principle does not insist that a free, well-considered choice of an individual 
must be respected. The person who is asked to perform euthanasia also has her autonomy 
which can prohibit or allow the requested act of euthanasia to be performed; in some cases 
the performer’s autonomy, guided by compassion, could even oblige the person to conduct 
euthanasia (with or without being requested).12 The next objection to autonomy states “that 
a decision about one’s own death is something fundamentally different from other life 
decisions and life choices” (The Danish Council of Ethics, 2006). Therefore it cannot be 
meaningfully said that a person’s own death is a subject of a free and autonomous choice. 
The next objection is built on the fact that “the concrete circumstances surrounding the 
choice scenario in the form of the role played by the doctor, society and the next-of-kin 
mean that the request for euthanasia will have arisen partly or wholly out of a situation in 
which autonomy cannot be practised, either because the person is not competent or because 
of direct or indirect pressure from their surroundings.”13 (The Danish Council of Ethics, 
2006). So the aforementioned circumstances in such a case, either partially or fully disqualify 
the autonomy argument and its legitimacy for euthanasia. 
                                                 
11 The competence of a dying person would be a part of the counter-argument. 
12 The compassion argument is discussed below. 
13 Social pressure as a negative consequence of legal euthanasia is a strong objection to this argument.  
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Finally there is a fundamental objection to the autonomy argument: Based on the previous 
analysis of autonomy in the context of an autonomous request for euthanasia and despite 
the broad consent that autonomy is an essential value to person‘s life, it is not obvious that 
legalization of euthanasia would automatically promote the individual’s scope for practising 
autonomy as authentic self-determination. (The Danish Council of Ethics, 2006). 
Therefore, critics would re-qualify autonomy as something that not only has to do with self-
conception (as architect of one’s own life) but also with self-identity, interpersonal 
recognition and the vulnerability of a dying person. 
2.1.6 Evaluation 
In euthanasia debates, arguments based on autonomy often erroneously presuppose that we 
all use one and the same concept of autonomy; autonomy in these debates is predominantly 
identical with autonomy in the sense of Anglo-Saxon liberal political philosophy. However, 
there is a significant difference between the meaning (and history) of autonomy in moral 
philosophy and the appropriation of the term in euthanasia debates (Schneewind, 1998). 
This difference is frequently overlooked in euthanasia debates.  
Furthermore, an autonomy argument based on dignity (or related to dignity) implies a 
diverse notion of dignity (for example dignity characterized by empirical features as it is the 
case in philosophical Empiricism or dignity as it is understood in philosophical 
Personalism). Therefore some autonomy arguments are rather collateral discussions than a 
dia-logical enterprise. 
A specific category is built by the arguments based on an ideological concept of autonomy 
(Ells, 2001). Eventually the relationship between the meaning of autonomy in moral 
philosophy (ethics) and its usage in euthanasia debates is highly selective and tenuous 
(Jennings, 2007). The prevalent concept of autonomy used in euthanasia debates is the 
concept derived from Berlin’s negative liberty: negative liberty here being a necessary 
condition for autonomy, sometime identified with autonomous action. This approach 
mirrors the liberal individualistic culture of the Anglo-Saxon world, while relating less to 
other cultural settings and their respective philosophical traditions. Autonomy, a 
prerequisite for moral standing and basic moral values, has been criticized in particular by 
many European and other non-Anglo-Saxon authors, by feminists (e.g. Ethics of Care) and 
Communitarians. These authors criticize the emphasis on autonomy as a product of 
American society (different from values such as vulnerability or solidarity, as emphasized in 
the European tradition), the masculine tradition in moral philosophy, which neglects 
feminine moral experiences (the fact that less women than men ask for euthanasia) and its 
stress on atomic individualism (Communitarians).  
Respect for the autonomy of the individual has always been given as the principal argument 
for euthanasia, understood as an active medical intervention to intentionally terminate life 
at the explicit request of the patient in the Dutch debates (Gunning, 1991; ten Have & Welie, 
1992, ten Have, 2001). However, there have been a number of cases occurring without the 
explicit request of the patient (ten Have, 2001), without respect for the autonomy of the 
individual. So the theoretical autonomy argument is being invalidated by some instances of 
practice. 
Autonomy indisputably should be considered a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
a moral life (Callahan, 1984); what is needed as well is a broader perspective that includes 
interpersonal relations and interdependence (Christman & Anderson, 2009; Gaylin & 
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Jennings, 2003). These aspects are usually neglected in euthanasia debates that adopt 
autonomy as its main argument. 
2.1.7 Conclusion 
Despite the fact that no single concept has been more relevant in contemporary bioethics 
than the concept of autonomy and that the autonomy argument has played a pivotal role as 
the principal argument for euthanasia, autonomy can be used in euthanasia arguments in 
both support for and rejection of euthanasia. In this context the competence of the patient 
requesting euthanasia must be recognised as one of the main counter-arguments. 
2.2 The right to die 
2.2.1 Introduction  
Beside autonomy the right to die is usually given as the most common argument for 
euthanasia (Cavan, 2000; Dorman, 2010; Ferguson, 2007; Stefoff, 2009; Sunstein, 1997; Yount, 
2009). In recent times, many studies dealing with the right to die have been published and 
the ethics of the right to die has been reflected upon.14 In some cases euthanasia even is 
directly equated with the right to die (Humphry & Wicket, 1986; Jussim, 1993; Wilshaw, 
1974; Woodward, 2006). Euthanasia is not only the expression of a fundamental freedom but 
also a right one has. This right is understood as a moral right which can be claimed as a 
moral warrant or as a legal right supported by law which can be claimed in the legal sense. 
The simplified version of the argument states that every person has the right to die 
(whatever “right” means here). This right includes the power to specify the conditions and 
circumstances of one’s own death and dying so the right to die includes autonomous 
determination when and how the person wants to die. Opponents argue that the right to die 
does not exist and therefore cannot be claimed. 
2.2.2 Description 
The usual form of this argument is based on the moral fundament of the right to die 
(Feinberg, 1992). This moral right can be expressed as the right to control one’s own body 
and life and consequently to determine at what time, in what way, and with whose help one 
will die. The other form of the right to die is the right in a legal sense, a right which either 
exists (or should exist) as a specific right or can be derived from other rights such as from 
the right to life.  
In the debates about the right to die (euthanasia) one important distinction has to be 
made, namely between the positive and negative right to die (right to self-determination). 
“A positive right of self-determination implies that a person can demand to have 
euthanasia carried out, providing the criteria for being able to request euthanasia are 
otherwise met.” (The Danish Council of Ethics, 2006). Thus the positive right of self-
determination implies that there is an objective duty to conduct euthanasia if requested; B 
requesting euthanasia imposes an obligation to perform euthanasia on A. While a 
negative right does not imply any entitlement to demand to conduct euthanasia. 
“Legalization here would merely mean that euthanasia is an action that is not illegal. No 
                                                 
14 Bernards, 1989; Blocher, 1999; Cosic, 2003; Haley, 1999; Moreno, 1995; Ogden, 1994; Rebman, 2002; 
Russell, 1975; Scherer & Simon, 1999; Tada, 1992; Uhlman, 1998. 
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Finally there is a fundamental objection to the autonomy argument: Based on the previous 
analysis of autonomy in the context of an autonomous request for euthanasia and despite 
the broad consent that autonomy is an essential value to person‘s life, it is not obvious that 
legalization of euthanasia would automatically promote the individual’s scope for practising 
autonomy as authentic self-determination. (The Danish Council of Ethics, 2006). 
Therefore, critics would re-qualify autonomy as something that not only has to do with self-
conception (as architect of one’s own life) but also with self-identity, interpersonal 
recognition and the vulnerability of a dying person. 
2.1.6 Evaluation 
In euthanasia debates, arguments based on autonomy often erroneously presuppose that we 
all use one and the same concept of autonomy; autonomy in these debates is predominantly 
identical with autonomy in the sense of Anglo-Saxon liberal political philosophy. However, 
there is a significant difference between the meaning (and history) of autonomy in moral 
philosophy and the appropriation of the term in euthanasia debates (Schneewind, 1998). 
This difference is frequently overlooked in euthanasia debates.  
Furthermore, an autonomy argument based on dignity (or related to dignity) implies a 
diverse notion of dignity (for example dignity characterized by empirical features as it is the 
case in philosophical Empiricism or dignity as it is understood in philosophical 
Personalism). Therefore some autonomy arguments are rather collateral discussions than a 
dia-logical enterprise. 
A specific category is built by the arguments based on an ideological concept of autonomy 
(Ells, 2001). Eventually the relationship between the meaning of autonomy in moral 
philosophy (ethics) and its usage in euthanasia debates is highly selective and tenuous 
(Jennings, 2007). The prevalent concept of autonomy used in euthanasia debates is the 
concept derived from Berlin’s negative liberty: negative liberty here being a necessary 
condition for autonomy, sometime identified with autonomous action. This approach 
mirrors the liberal individualistic culture of the Anglo-Saxon world, while relating less to 
other cultural settings and their respective philosophical traditions. Autonomy, a 
prerequisite for moral standing and basic moral values, has been criticized in particular by 
many European and other non-Anglo-Saxon authors, by feminists (e.g. Ethics of Care) and 
Communitarians. These authors criticize the emphasis on autonomy as a product of 
American society (different from values such as vulnerability or solidarity, as emphasized in 
the European tradition), the masculine tradition in moral philosophy, which neglects 
feminine moral experiences (the fact that less women than men ask for euthanasia) and its 
stress on atomic individualism (Communitarians).  
Respect for the autonomy of the individual has always been given as the principal argument 
for euthanasia, understood as an active medical intervention to intentionally terminate life 
at the explicit request of the patient in the Dutch debates (Gunning, 1991; ten Have & Welie, 
1992, ten Have, 2001). However, there have been a number of cases occurring without the 
explicit request of the patient (ten Have, 2001), without respect for the autonomy of the 
individual. So the theoretical autonomy argument is being invalidated by some instances of 
practice. 
Autonomy indisputably should be considered a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
a moral life (Callahan, 1984); what is needed as well is a broader perspective that includes 
interpersonal relations and interdependence (Christman & Anderson, 2009; Gaylin & 
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Jennings, 2003). These aspects are usually neglected in euthanasia debates that adopt 
autonomy as its main argument. 
2.1.7 Conclusion 
Despite the fact that no single concept has been more relevant in contemporary bioethics 
than the concept of autonomy and that the autonomy argument has played a pivotal role as 
the principal argument for euthanasia, autonomy can be used in euthanasia arguments in 
both support for and rejection of euthanasia. In this context the competence of the patient 
requesting euthanasia must be recognised as one of the main counter-arguments. 
2.2 The right to die 
2.2.1 Introduction  
Beside autonomy the right to die is usually given as the most common argument for 
euthanasia (Cavan, 2000; Dorman, 2010; Ferguson, 2007; Stefoff, 2009; Sunstein, 1997; Yount, 
2009). In recent times, many studies dealing with the right to die have been published and 
the ethics of the right to die has been reflected upon.14 In some cases euthanasia even is 
directly equated with the right to die (Humphry & Wicket, 1986; Jussim, 1993; Wilshaw, 
1974; Woodward, 2006). Euthanasia is not only the expression of a fundamental freedom but 
also a right one has. This right is understood as a moral right which can be claimed as a 
moral warrant or as a legal right supported by law which can be claimed in the legal sense. 
The simplified version of the argument states that every person has the right to die 
(whatever “right” means here). This right includes the power to specify the conditions and 
circumstances of one’s own death and dying so the right to die includes autonomous 
determination when and how the person wants to die. Opponents argue that the right to die 
does not exist and therefore cannot be claimed. 
2.2.2 Description 
The usual form of this argument is based on the moral fundament of the right to die 
(Feinberg, 1992). This moral right can be expressed as the right to control one’s own body 
and life and consequently to determine at what time, in what way, and with whose help one 
will die. The other form of the right to die is the right in a legal sense, a right which either 
exists (or should exist) as a specific right or can be derived from other rights such as from 
the right to life.  
In the debates about the right to die (euthanasia) one important distinction has to be 
made, namely between the positive and negative right to die (right to self-determination). 
“A positive right of self-determination implies that a person can demand to have 
euthanasia carried out, providing the criteria for being able to request euthanasia are 
otherwise met.” (The Danish Council of Ethics, 2006). Thus the positive right of self-
determination implies that there is an objective duty to conduct euthanasia if requested; B 
requesting euthanasia imposes an obligation to perform euthanasia on A. While a 
negative right does not imply any entitlement to demand to conduct euthanasia. 
“Legalization here would merely mean that euthanasia is an action that is not illegal. No 
                                                 
14 Bernards, 1989; Blocher, 1999; Cosic, 2003; Haley, 1999; Moreno, 1995; Ogden, 1994; Rebman, 2002; 
Russell, 1975; Scherer & Simon, 1999; Tada, 1992; Uhlman, 1998. 
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one is obliged to comply with the request for euthanasia, but it is legal to carry out 
euthanasia if the individual meets the qualifying criteria for having euthanasia carried 
out.” (The Danish Council of Ethics, 2006). There are diverse practical implications if 
euthanasia is understood as a positive or negative right.  
2.2.3 Contextualization 
Historically the right to die has been recognized after World War II in the context of human 
rights development.15 Several factors, such as advances in medical science (by technological 
means, life can be significantly prolonged or continued almost indefinitely), reduced sudden 
deaths, greater incidence of death from degenerative diseases, greater incidence of 
becoming elderly, dispersed families (atomic family) and increased institutionalization of 
the elderly have led to the recognition of the right to refuse (futile) treatment or to 
discontinue treatment (withdrawing) in medically desperate situations. Since the 1960s, the 
right to die has been supported by human and civil rights movements that have emphasized 
the right of self-determination, individual empowerment, bodily integrity and the right to 
control end-of life decision-making. In the 1970’s and 1980’s, the right to die was used as an 
equivalent to voluntary passive euthanasia based on the patients’ right to refuse treatment.16 
The right to refuse treatment (and to die) being the precondition for the right to die being 
understood as an active termination of life (killing)17 (Matthews, 1987). Some authors 
associate the right to die with the right to physician assisted suicide but not with euthanasia 
(Sunstein, 1997). 
Two different settings of the right to die can be identified: a moral claim and legal claim. 
These two settings and two different forms of right are often intermixed in euthanasia 
debates. Therefore which type of reasoning used should be distinguished in euthanasia 
debates. There are at least four different types of reasoning based on the right to die: moral 
reasoning (euthanasia as a moral right), legal reasoning (euthanasia as a legal right), 
euthanasia as a positive right and euthanasia as a negative right.  
                                                 
15 The key declarations for the furthering of human rights development, which have been the 
background for euthanasia as the right to die, were The UN Declaration of Human Rights (1948), The 
European Convention of the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) and The 
International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and on Civil and Political Rights 
(1976). 
16 The “Patient’s Bill of Rights” (which includes the right to reject medical treatment even if such refusal 
causes death) was adopted by the American Hospital Association in 1973. The American Society for the 
Right to Die (the former Euthanasia Society of America) has promoted the legalization of a living will 
(1974) which includes refusal of treatment (called “passive euthanasia”). The Patient Self-Determination 
Act (1990) has implemented the right to die (refusal of treatment) by legally requiring all health care 
institutions to provide patients on admission with information regarding their rights to make decisions 
about medical treatment (to accept it or to refuse it); this right (to die) has been confirmed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court (1990) based on constitutional liberty rights. 
17 In this chapter only the right to die in the context of the right to be killed (active voluntary euthanasia) 
is discussed. The right to die as the right of a competent patient to refuse (futile) medical treatment even 
if it results in death (letting die) is not covered here as the right to euthanasia. The argumentations 
about passively hastening death, forgoing life-sustaining treatment as they have been discussed since 
the Karen Ann Quinlan case (1975), as well as the forgoing of artificial nutrition and hydration and 
legalisation of physician assisted suicide have not been included. The focus is on actively hastening 
death by (active) euthanasia.  
Everything Under Control: How and When to Die -  




The right to die presupposes that such a right exists and that this right can be exercised by a 
competent (autonomous) person who is terminally ill or who is suffering unbearably. The 
basic presumption is that in order to exercise the right, two conditions have to be met: an 
external and internal one. The first condition lies in the absence of any external pressure on 
the person exercising this right. The second condition is defined by the lucidity of the person 
concerned. This internal condition means that the person (patient) is fully competent with a 
clear intention regarding euthanasia. 
The right to die derives from the idea that humans should be as free as possible and as little 
suppressed as possible; unnecessary restrains on human rights are in principle bad. In 
contemporary euthanasia debates this link between right and freedom can be found very 
often, although not always in an explicit way. So the “right” argument and can be 
transformed into a “freedom” argument (autonomy) and vice versa. It is important to 
emphasize that one can acknowledge the right to die without necessarily agreeing to its 
legal codification. 
2.2.5 Analysis  
Within this chapter, if the right to die has been defined as the justifiable claim of a 
competent, terminally ill person to avoid excruciating suffering by embracing a timely and 
dignified death; then euthanasia is a moral right based on ordered liberty. 
There are diverse constructions how to derive the right to die (which does not exist as such 
in the form of a positive law) from the existing legal provisions. Some argue that the 
fundamental human right to life equally includes the right to die. So the right to die does not 
have to be created or acknowledged as a specific right. Insofar as human beings have the 
right to life, which is more than just a right to exist but also covers a minimum quality of 
life, then he/she has the right to influence the process of dying which, in difference to death, 
is part of life (active voluntary euthanasia) (Downing, 1970; Downing & Smoker, 1986; 
Wilshaw, 1974). Since dying, despite the tabooization of death and dying in our culture, is 
one of the most significant events in human life, one has the right to make his/her dying as 
good and meaningful as possible.  
Another attempt to deduce the right to die is to derive it from the rights to privacy and 
freedom of belief. However this deduction, using a specific concept of privacy which also 
encompasses the right to die as the private issue (under the presupposition that death is 
inherently a private issue) is more debatable than the deduction of the right to die from the 
right to life. 
Some people deduce the right to die from the worthlessness of life: on the grounds that life 
is not worth living one has the right to die. Opponents remind that such argument has been 
used for justification of eugenic euthanasia by the Nazis (lebensunwertes Leben). This 
deduction presupposes that life may be worth living in one case, being worthless in another. 
This results in the value of life becoming relative, depending on specific situations and 
changeable factors - as it was in the Nazi period. 
From another background comes the utilitarian argument, justifying the abridgement of life 
(and the dying process as part of life) if the dying process is unpleasant and exceedingly 
painful. By shortening the dying process then both the unpleasantness and suffering of this 
process are reduced. In this way the right to shorten one’s own life (dying) is established 
and justified. The utilitarian argument based on a reduction of unhappiness and suffering is 
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one is obliged to comply with the request for euthanasia, but it is legal to carry out 
euthanasia if the individual meets the qualifying criteria for having euthanasia carried 
out.” (The Danish Council of Ethics, 2006). There are diverse practical implications if 
euthanasia is understood as a positive or negative right.  
2.2.3 Contextualization 
Historically the right to die has been recognized after World War II in the context of human 
rights development.15 Several factors, such as advances in medical science (by technological 
means, life can be significantly prolonged or continued almost indefinitely), reduced sudden 
deaths, greater incidence of death from degenerative diseases, greater incidence of 
becoming elderly, dispersed families (atomic family) and increased institutionalization of 
the elderly have led to the recognition of the right to refuse (futile) treatment or to 
discontinue treatment (withdrawing) in medically desperate situations. Since the 1960s, the 
right to die has been supported by human and civil rights movements that have emphasized 
the right of self-determination, individual empowerment, bodily integrity and the right to 
control end-of life decision-making. In the 1970’s and 1980’s, the right to die was used as an 
equivalent to voluntary passive euthanasia based on the patients’ right to refuse treatment.16 
The right to refuse treatment (and to die) being the precondition for the right to die being 
understood as an active termination of life (killing)17 (Matthews, 1987). Some authors 
associate the right to die with the right to physician assisted suicide but not with euthanasia 
(Sunstein, 1997). 
Two different settings of the right to die can be identified: a moral claim and legal claim. 
These two settings and two different forms of right are often intermixed in euthanasia 
debates. Therefore which type of reasoning used should be distinguished in euthanasia 
debates. There are at least four different types of reasoning based on the right to die: moral 
reasoning (euthanasia as a moral right), legal reasoning (euthanasia as a legal right), 
euthanasia as a positive right and euthanasia as a negative right.  
                                                 
15 The key declarations for the furthering of human rights development, which have been the 
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very often used in euthanasia debates – not only to support the right to die (and the right to 
shorten one’s own dying/life) but also in arguments based on compassion and suffering. 
The utilitarian argument of a reduction of suffering provides the justification for the right to 
die. So the right to die is not solely the right of an individual to self-determination but also a 
right which affects the social benefits of all persons involved (relatives, health care 
personnel); it also reduces their unhappiness and suffering. Despite its social utilitarianism, 
the right to die does not imply a physician’s duty to kill the patient. As an individual right 
the right to die should be exercised solely by its bearer - that is to say by the person 
requesting euthanasia only. However the right to die (as an individual right) can be 
converted into a social right which empowers society to reduce unhappiness and suffering 
by administrating euthanasia without request. 
In difference to suicide where a person is killing him/herself, claiming he/she has the right 
to do so (and he/she certainly has the right to do so in the sense that he/she is at the same 
time the bearer of such right and the one who is exercising that right), the person who 
claims the right to be killed as the bearer of such right is not the person who is realizing this 
right. From this follows that no physician can be forced to administrate euthanasia on a 
patient who claims the right to be killed since such a claim does not constitute a duty of the 
physician to realize this specific right that the patient is claiming. If the patient’s right to be 
killed would be a standard patient’s right within the reciprocity of right and duty 
framework (A has a right, B has a duty towards A), then physicians would have an objective 
duty to administrate euthanasia in patients who claim this right (or possibly even in patients 
who do not claim this right but who fulfil the criteria for realization of this right, e.g. 
intensive suffering, futile clinical prognosis) (Smith, 2006). The only exemption from such an 
objective duty of the physician would be one of conscientious objection. One should 
distinguish whether euthanasia as the right to die belongs to the introduced right-duty 
framework or not. To avoid the right-duty framework some authors suggest distinguishing 
between rights/liberties and privileges. As such, then the right to die would be a specific 
form of privilege. A privilege does not imply a duty for anyone else (Williams, 1977).  
In some specific areas such as neonatal and child euthanasia, the right to die is especially 
problematic; as the origin, scope, justification and purpose of parental rights are unclear 
(Chervenak, 2006; de Vries & Verhagen, 2008; Lindemann, 2008; Moreno Villares, 2005; 
Schneider, 1988; Verhagen & Sauer, 2005). 
2.2.6 Evaluation 
The differentiation between euthanasia as a negative and positive right is crucial:  
“If arguing for the legalization of euthanasia as a negative right, the practical implementation 
of euthanasia will depend on there being some people among those able/entitled to carry out 
killing on request under such a law who are willing to do so. If arguing for the legalization of 
euthanasia as a positive right, a legitimate request for euthanasia will result in individuals or 
institutions being obliged to accommodate that request. But the positive right can be 
graduated in terms of the authorities or persons in whom that obligation is vested. In one 
radical variant, it is possible to envisage all doctors being obliged to carry out euthanasia. A 
less restrictive variant might mean that the health services as such were obliged to arrange for 
euthanasia to be carried out, while leaving the individual doctor free to choose whether he or 
she wishes to perform euthanasia. […] A positive right of self-determination regarding 
euthanasia cannot be introduced without simultaneously acknowledging that, in certain cases 
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provided for in law, society is duty-bound to take the life of a human being. A negative right 
of self-determination regarding euthanasia, on the other hand, can be introduced on the 
grounds that euthanasia, under certain circumstances provided for in law, is a matter for the 
judgement and conscience of the individual. The fundamental difference is that the first form 
of legalization, more so than the second, turns euthanasia into a communal, general matter, 
which must be acknowledged by society as a whole as being worthy of aspiring to ethically.” 
(The Danish Council of Ethics, 2006). 
Some authors reject the right to die argument on the grounds of benefit and harm 
(Velleman, 1999). The common religious counter-argument states that the right to decide 
when and how to die belongs to God. (Gill, 1998; Larson & Amundsen, 1998; Manning, 
1998). The common secular counter-argument is doubly based on obligation. First the right 
to die does not imply a legal obligation of another person to conduct euthanasia. Secondly 
our rights are limited by our obligations. One may have a right to die however one has also 
obligations to other people such as our partners, family, friends, healthcare professionals 
(Finkel et al., 1993). The enactment of the right to die (euthanasia) would affect other people 
so we must consider the consequences such an exercising of the right to die would have on 
them (grief, sorrow, guilt, anger). The enactment of the right to die could affect the 
professional integrity of the physician who would conduct euthanasia. All these 
consequences have to be measured against our right to die and the individual rights have to 
be balanced against the good/consequences of the community and society in general. 
(Sullivan, 2005). Regardless of the fact that these consequences might seem to be practical 
(the dying process of a person suffering extremely has been made easier), one of the 
negative consequences is the risk of vulnerable persons’ integrity being undermined, 
whereby the principal argument is switched from one of autonomy and right (voluntary 
euthanasia) to compassion (possible involuntary euthanasia). 
The limitations of the right to die are provided not only by the obligations to society but also 
by the rights and duties of other persons who are requested to provide euthanasia. There is 
not an evident moral right to kill a person even upon his/her explicit request. Likewise 
there is not an objective moral duty to conduct euthanasia upon explicit request. It is 
obvious that a legal obligation to administrate euthanasia does not exist; the establishment 
of such a legal obligation would require a substantial transformation of our democratic 
society, based on fundamental rights and liberties.  
2.2.7 Conclusion 
The right to die is one of the main arguments for euthanasia. It is closely related to 
autonomy and to the principle of respect for autonomy. So in some discussions both 
arguments (right to die and respect for autonomy) are intertwined into the right to 
autonomy. However, there is no unanimous consent that the right to die exists (that it can be 
derived from other rights such as from the right to life), and the right to die argument can 
also be used as an objection to euthanasia, in that this right does not exist. Despite its moral 
or legal appeal it serves poorly as a medium for debate as common argumentative precepts 
are difficult to establish. 
2.3 Unbearable suffering 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Unbearable suffering is one of the criteria required by Dutch and Belgian legislation on 
euthanasia. One would assume that the right to die argument is not a sufficient legal 
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requirement for the decriminalization of euthanasia since there is no broad consent that 
such right exists or that it can be derived from other rights in a very convincing way. 
Similarly the autonomy argument alone is not strong enough an argument to justify legal 
euthanasia. No doubt every competent person has his/her autonomy, however to justify 
autonomous choice in the case of euthanasia would require some additional conditions. 
Otherwise any competent person would be able to request euthanasia - regardless of the 
circumstances they find themselves in - as a legitimate tool to terminate his/her life. The 
only validator would be a reference to his/her autonomy. So when legislators were 
specifying some additional conditions under which the autonomous choice could be 
decriminalized there was the evocative condition “unbearable suffering”, which made 
sense, as all else being equal, no person in their right mind would prefer to die in a 
painful way or with immense suffering. So among the circumstances that could lead one 
to choose death for him/her self and/or for a loved one, unbearable suffering occupies 
the prime position. The expression “unbearable suffering” clearly states that not every 
painful process within health care entitles one to ask for euthanasia but only great 
ongoing pain and suffering which trespass one’s faculty to tolerate it can be a legitimate 
reason to request euthanasia. Proponents of euthanasia defend the decriminalization of 
killing on request in well defined situations as a kind of last resort and under serious 
conditions. 
It comes as no surprise that both proponents and opponents of euthanasia agree that the 
prevention and alleviation of people’s suffering has been one of the noble goals of medicine 
from ancient times and that compassion is a valued emotion in general and in health care in 
particular. However, they heartily disagree about the extent to which the means can be 
justified by the end (alleviation of pain and suffering). (The Danish Council of Ethics, 2006). 
While proponents argue that the alleviation of terrible suffering in desperate situations 
justifies killing a person on her request, opponents do not tolerate alleviation of suffering by 
removal of its cause (a suffering human being), arguing that pain and suffering have to be 
controlled medically (pain killers, terminal sedation), but not by killing. 
2.3.2 Description 
The suffering argument can be briefly described in the following way: Once a person is 
suffering to an extent which is beyond her will and capacity to tolerate such a degree of pain 
and suffering, having become “unbearable”, than he/she should not have to bear it. 
Moreover, all medical attempts to relieve this unbearable suffering have been unsuccessful 
and unsatisfactory to this person. Then the basic rule about impossibilities which do not 
establish moral commitment would apply: ad impossibilis nemo tenetur (no one is obliged to 
do what is not possible). Thus, as a last option, it is morally right to help this person not to 
suffer unbearably and on compassionate grounds to terminate her suffering and life. 
2.3.3 Contextualization 
With regard to suffering, it is a paradox of contemporary medicine that thanks to powerful 
technological advances the lives of many people have been saved but an additional 
suffering of many other people is being produced and prolonged. Despite the fundamental 
physicians’ obligation to relieve suffering, little attention is explicitly given to the issue of 
suffering in medical practice; it is not unusual for suffering to occur not only as an 
implication of disease but as a result of its treatment. (Cassell, 2004). 
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Suffering is usually associated with pain. However suffering is not identical to pain. Pain, 
being caused physically (e.g. by injury or metastatic cancer), can be onerously assessed: one 
cannot see pain, but feel its manifestation. As clinical findings demonstrate, the amount of 
pain a person reports is not directly related to the degree of disease. There are important 
psychological factors which help to explain why people perceive, report and give meaning 
to pain in different ways. Pain, perceived as hurt, is a highly subjective experience, affected 
by mood, morale and other conditioners. (Skevington, 2002). In spite of the fact that the 
current pain therapy can provide continuous pain relief up to the very end of life in more 
than 90% of cases, these new therapeutic tools are not yet widely known and practiced by 
physicians. In addition, suffering is much more difficult to treat than physical pain. Severe 
pain can lead to suffering which cannot be easily controlled. Paradoxically a patient whose 
pain is managed well may still suffer. The suffering, as an individual sensation of 
discomfort and malaise, may continue for a very long period of time without any specific 
correlation to the physical pain. Heavy suffering can violate one’s integrity as a person; the 
self may become unravelled, fragmented, and disintegrated by massive suffering (Ben 
Mitchell, 2010). There are feelings such as hopelessness, loneliness, alienation, pointlessness 
or unworthiness which may occur even if pain is being relieved properly, making suffering 
intolerable and unbearable. 
While pain is more related to a physical condition, suffering can be caused by both physical 
and non-physical factors. There is no consonant approach to pain and suffering. While some 
authors sharply distinguish suffering from physically caused pain, other authors regard 
physically caused pain as one of the many forms of suffering. Some people believe that 
suffering is person-centric (Cassell, 2004a). That suffering, dissimilar to the physical 
symptoms, is a personal phenomenon which cannot be accessed by a third-person view; 
suffering as the personal (subjective) phenomenon cannot be objectified. Other people 
believe that suffering has different forms which, in addition, can be objectively described. 
Since there is no consensus about the nature of suffering, diverse hermeneutics of suffering 
would have diverse consequences in an assessment of suffering.  
Within the biological model, suffering can result from disease; where pain is the source of 
the suffering. Suffering can also arise from the impact disease is having on the person’s life. 
This type of the suffering will depend on the attitudes and objectives of the suffering person 
– to what extent the person is able to modify attitudes and to adjust objectives to the new 
situation. Finally suffering can also be found on the existential level; some people reduce the 
existential level to spirituality (Peck, 1997), however it should be noted that not only 
religious persons have their existential needs- more precisely “non-believers” can have 
existential questions as well and do not call them “spirituality”.  
It is important in arguments based on suffering to distinguish between physical, 
psychological, social and existential (which includes spiritual) suffering. With regard to 
unbearable suffering it is important to distinguish if suffering is understood as a personal 
phenomenon (that only the person concerned is able to determine the level of “unbearable 
suffering”) or as an objective phenomenon (then “unbearable suffering” can be assessed by 
external criteria and by other persons). It is important to define “unbearable suffering”. 
Dutch law states as a criterion merely “unbearable suffering”, while Belgian law holds it to 
be “unbearable physical or mental suffering”. Besides suffering, similar specifications of 
other conditions related to suffering but distinct, such as being in a terminal stage of disease 
are relevant to warranting euthanasia. 
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The basic presupposition of the suffering argument can be found in the following axiom: 
unbearable suffering founds the (moral) right to ask for euthanasia. Justification of such a 
right can be found for instance in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights (2000), 
where Article 4 states that no one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. It could be argued that to subject a terminally ill person to 
medical treatment which produces horrible suffering goes against the aforementioned 
article. The suffering argument usually assumes that unbearable suffering is the only 
condition required for euthanasia. So unbearable suffering is simultaneously a sufficient 
condition for euthanasia.18 The person intolerably suffering induces compassion in the other 
person who then kills out of mercy. 
2.3.5 Analysis 
Suffering can be considered both an objective and subjective phenomenon. However the 
unbearableness of suffering is rather a personal phenomenon and therefore a subjective 
criterion. Once the suffering has become “unbearable” for an individual then this suffering 
is intolerable, insupportable and insufferable and only the suffering person can know at 
what point or when this state has been realised. No one acting as an external (and 
“objective”) observer can assign the unbearably suffering person to tolerate such suffering. 
If we would regard the unbearableness of suffering as an objective criterion then this 
threshold could only be determined after a palliative care trial or after a committee or 
inquiry, after which some group would have authority to say “You are entitled to die” or 
“You are not allowed to die”, which would be in contradiction both to autonomy and the 
right to die arguments. It seems that the praxis in the Netherlands tends to assume that the 
unbearableness of suffering is a subjective criterion which is validated by a longstanding 
declared wish to die rather than by some exact empirical tools. Furthermore it remains 
unclear if for instance the mental torment as documented in the Dr. Chabot case is included 
in unbearable suffering (Sheldon, 1994) or if suffering would also cover situations like “tired 
of life” which can be existential and very afflictive but not necessary qualifying as grounds 
for a euthanasia request (Sheldon, 2003). Surely it is easier to medically measure pain than 
suffering. The level of both pain and suffering can be measured – albeit such assessment is 
problematic if pain is not reduced to the physical entity and if suffering is taken in its 
complexity – while it can be taken for granted that “unbearable” suffering can be assessed 
by the individual concerned solely. Even two accounts of very heavy and awful suffering, 
which according to an external evaluation would be graded as almost the same could be 
perceived as “unbearable” for one person and as “bearable” by another person. 
Proponents of euthanasia argue that unbearable suffering is more that sufficient reason to 
request euthanasia. Their other supportive arguments are compassion, respect for human 
dignity, the patient’s best interest, quality of life, autonomy and the right to die. 
Opponents of euthanasia refuse the suffering argument as such, saying that suffering, even 
“unbearable “, is not sufficient grounds for killing a person. Their counter-objections mostly 
refer to compassion in the sense of psychological support, efficacious relieve of suffering, 
                                                 
18 “Suffering as a criterion for access to euthanasia is based on an approach that is taken for granted and 
regarded as self-evident” (The Danish Council of Ethics, 2006). 
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good palliative care and human proximity; to care in the sense of avoiding alienation, 
shame, helplessness, emotional and social burdens and dealing with needs, such as  
worthiness and being treated as a person- not as a non-person or as a no person anymore.  
Some authors argue that the desire for euthanasia cannot be interpreted at face value. The 
meaning of the desire for euthanasia is not related to the reality of physical disintegration or 
physical and psychological suffering from the effects of disease such as cancer, but includes 
anxiety, fears, existential concerns and desires for respect, care, and connectedness 
interpreted within the context of the patients’ whole lived experience. (Mak & Elvyn, 2005). 
For some adherents of euthanasia, unbearable suffering is a necessary but not the sufficient 
condition for a patient’s eligibility to request euthanasia. They argue that unbearable 
suffering is the minimal requirement and some objective criteria of the patient’s conditions 
must have been met before the desire to die can be fulfilled. Such additional and more 
objective criteria, such as being in the terminal stage of an illness, can be medically assessed 
more exactly than the subjective evaluation of unbearable suffering. 
Opponents of euthanasia point out the ambiguity of pain and suffering: “If the pain and 
suffering are by definition unbearable, then it seems clear enough that the decision to die is 
not freely chosen but is compelled by the pain. […] Under the conditions of unbearable pain 
and suffering, then, if the concern of the agent is to alleviate the pain it seems to be a mistake 
to speak of voluntary choices. The natural conclusion to draw from this is that there can be 
no such thing as voluntary euthanasia, or, at the very least, that we have no means to ensure 
that the patient’s request to die was not compelled.” (Campbell, 1999, p. 243). Thus in 
situations where the decision to terminate one’s own life is made while experiencing 
unbearable suffering, the possibility that such a choice was not made freely has to be taken 
seriously. Opponents also argue that effective pain control can alleviate the suffering. The 
counter-objection is focused on the fact that not all pain is manageable in terminally ill 
patients, stressing the difference between pain and suffering. Suffering is inevitably a 
solitary condition and always involves self-conflict, since, among others, the meaning is 
essential to suffering. (Cassell, 2004a). In addition, in cases where the disease is progressing 
and state of health worsening, even the best pain therapy can prove to be unsatisfactory, 
leaving the person suffering to an intensity that the other person, imagining such suffering, 
neither has suffered nor could possibly imagine suffering. 
Proponents argue that it is more in accordance with human dignity to relieve suffering by 
termination of life then to incapacitate the patient with high doses of drugs (analgesics and 
sedatives) and to keep the patient in a state of unconsciousness so that he/she does not have 
to consciously suffer (palliative sedation, terminal sedation). Then if there is an option 
between existence with suffering and unconsciousness without suffering, it is more 
appropriate to choose death instead of continuing such an unconscious existence (or choose 
life alternating between suffering and sleep). They conclude that such a way of living 
(caused by medical intervention) is pointless, harmful and inhuman and such “medical 
suffering” should be avoided.  
Some people, with reference to the fact that the full autonomy of a person requesting 
euthanasia may be doubtful, propose the use of a similar framework as the ones we use in 
other areas of end-of-life decision making, such as the withholding or withdrawing life 
support treatment for incompetent patients, in particular in the context where there is doubt 
as to the genuine autonomous choice of the terminally ill patient. This would involve a 
cascading process of assessment. Then the first condition would be a clear wish to die 
expressed in a qualified and authentic way repeatedly. The next condition would be the 
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assessment of the patient’s unbearable suffering as a reason for choosing death. Then the 
external social controls would apply (medical evaluation done by the therapeutic team, 
proxy evaluation). When all relevant facts and circumstances are weighted and assessed and 
all persons involved agree then choosing death at a chosen time is better option than 
continuing unbearable suffering. 
2.3.6 Evaluation 
Suffering is an ambiguous phenomenon in our contemporary world. On the one hand there 
is a strong tendency not only to avoid suffering but also to negate it as such since suffering 
does not fit into the picture of a young, healthy, wealthy and successful person. In current 
Western culture, pain and suffering as symptoms of disease and illness, are perceived as 
contrary to a healthy life, corporeal performance and the cult of youth. On the other hand 
suffering is glorified by some popular (and in fact unorthodox) versions of Christianity 
which can be characterized as “dolorous Christianity” (Christ has suffered, therefore you 
have to suffer; the more you suffer the more you are loved by God). Suffering, denied or 
glorified, overlooks the positive aspects of suffering as part of our personal development. 
However it is neither easy nor appropriate to say to the person suffering unbearably, who 
does not see any sense of such terrible suffering and of her destroyed life, that suffering has 
its place in the process of personal development. Whatever the case, a lack and/or 
superficiality of analysis from the patient’s perspective should temper calls to make 
euthanasia legal (Mak & Elvyn, 2005).  
The argument “unbearable suffering” should not be taken in its “simplified version”: they 
suffer unbearably, therefore let us legalize euthanasia. There are many hidden existential 
concerns of the terminally ill and horribly suffering patient’s that should be addressed and 
discussed. And the patient’s personal perspective has to be taken more into account. 
Some authors are hesitant to address suffering as a determiner for eligibility to euthanasia as 
they criticize the medical world’s objectification of patients. They believe our dominant 
biomedical model should be modified, improved and re-oriented to the patient’s 
personhood (Mak & Elvyn, 2005). It is not only the patient’s mental competency that is at the 
stake but also a new professional moral competency of health care personnel; such 
professional competency, not entirely fitting into the biomedical model, would ensure 
appropriate existential care, exploring the covert meaning of “a good death” and dealing 
with the authentic desires of patients rather than mechanically applying arguments of 
autonomy or suffering. As many studies demonstrate, the desire to die (due to unbearable 
suffering or due to personal preference not to have to go through the final, painful, hopeless 
and possibly meaningless passage of own life), in many situations, is not so much a request 
for death as a request for help (Lesley, 2006). 
With regard to the medical practice of euthanasia in the Netherlands, “the ethical 
justification has been shifting from respect for autonomy to relief of suffering. But this has 
created a tension within the justificatory strategies regarding euthanasia. The two 
arguments are mutually exclusive. It only makes sense to talk about respect for autonomy if 
a physician refrains from making judgements about the patient’s benefits.” (ten Have, 
2001, p. 477). 
Another question which has to be clarified is about “suffering” and “unbearable suffering” 
as the only criterion for euthanasia (the autonomy argument is very problematic in a 
situation of terrible suffering). There are two approaches to this question: either unbearable 
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suffering as a purely subjective phenomenon is understood in a broad sense, as any 
physical, psychological, social or existential suffering, and, once claimed as “unbearable” 
(and only the patient can decide whether his/her suffering has become unbearable) becomes 
the necessary and sufficient grounds for euthanasia (and any patient including psychiatric 
ones would have the right to euthanasia on the grounds of “unbearable suffering”) or 
“unbearable suffering” is a necessary but not self-standing condition and some additional 
criteria such as terminal stage illness or consent of all persons concerned would need to 
apply. 
2.3.7 Conclusion 
The unbearable suffering argument is based on the patient’s perspective and perception. 
Many feel that only the patient can assess his/her intolerable suffering. Unbearable 
suffering is in line with the right to die and with (one of the interpretations of) human 
dignity to ask for euthanasia in such a humanly devastating situation assessed as 
unbearable suffering. Regardless of whether one is able to determine where the suffering 
threshold is, and if that is therefore grounds for euthanasia, the issue of whether it serves as 
the sole ground for such also serves to divide opinion. 
2.4 Compassion 
2.4.1 Introduction 
While the suffering argument stems from the patient’s perspective, the compassion 
argument comes from the other person’s perspective. Compassion is a kind of external 
response to that devastating suffering. One feels morally obliged to help, to relieve such 
suffering and to save the intolerably suffering person (Begley, 2008). 
2.4.2 Description 
The compassion argument is usually used in euthanasia debates as “mercy killing”. Under 
the presupposition that no person should be obliged to endure interminable suffering 
perceived as pointless, and supposed that the intolerable suffering cannot be relieved by 
medical tools and the only way to avoid such suffering is by death of the patient, then such 
a death may be brought about as an act of mercy. (Battin, 2003). From this perspective, 
euthanasia is not to be applied based on an evaluation of the suffering by a second or third 
person (in order to determinate if the suffering is unbearable) but about the response of the 
health care professionals and family members, who draw attention to the suffering person 
and to the distress and misery of such a situation. As an act of humanity and showing mercy 
they terminate the life of the suffering person. The counter-argument is based on false 
interpretation of compassion and mercy: killing is not compassion. To show compassion in 
such a situation would mean to take care of the suffering person, but not to kill him/her 
(Schotsmans & Gastmans, 2009). 
2.4.3 Contextualization 
In animals it would be regarded as inhuman to allow a dog or horse to suffer not just a 
terminal illness but also conditions such as a broken leg in the wild. As such, one could use 
animal euthanasia as an argument, making it an a fortiori argument: if we euthanize animals 
on the grounds of compassion, all the more so we have to act with compassion towards 
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suffering humans by providing a merciful death. As such, euthanasia is an expression of 
humanity. 
2.4.4 Presuppositions 
The compassion argument comes from the general belief that the desire to relieve suffering 
and feeling compassion are highly regarded human values which also include volitional 
elements. Compassion by definition motivates one to action. Another presupposition is 
based on the old medical tradition of beneficence. At present the utilitarian arguments 
similarly presume beneficence as the justification for euthanasia (Kohl, 1975; Rosenblatt, 
1992). Compassion can also be a condition for legal assisted dying (Kay, 2006). 
2.4.5 Analysis  
Under the condition that there exist no effective means to relieve (unbearable) suffering, 
euthanasia may be justified as the only remaining option available, or even required by the 
principle of beneficence. The commitment to act with regard to the benefit of the patient is 
still one of the most relevant principles in medical ethics. Thus on such grounds of 
beneficence physicians would have to ensure that a peaceful and painless death is offered to 
patients who are suffering while dying in a horrible way. On such grounds physicians may 
be even obliged to administrate euthanasia due to the virtue of compassion, which seeks 
beneficence rather than to observe impassively and inactively as a patient dies in a horrible 
way with his/her painful death prolonged (Van Zyl, 2000). Such an “omission” could be 
qualified as contrary to basic human values such as sympathy and mercifulness. 
The beneficence argument can be reinforced by utilitarianism. The killing of a patient may 
be contrary to the sanctity of life doctrine but as such is morally good because the 
consequence of such an action is good: suffering has been eliminated and the death has been 
achieved in a desirable way (painless and peaceful). Naturally this moral assessment of an 
action in accordance with its good or bad consequences can be applied not solely to physical 
pain and suffering but also to mental suffering such as feelings of unworthiness, loss of self-
control and self-sufficiency or complete dependence on others for their assistance in daily 
activities starting with hygiene and food. Utilitarians argue “that frustration of being unable 
to perform everyday tasks for oneself, and the erosion of dignity as personal and previously 
private tasks have to be performed by someone else as one reverts to behaviour not 
experienced since infancy.” (Draper, 1998, p. 184). The utilitarian argument of beneficence 
will be potentiated in situations where no alternative exists to the miserable death the 
patient is experiencing, when the suffering is ceaseless and increasing by its protraction and 
death is imminent. Then compassion would override that little of (very miserable) life which 
is lost by the act of euthanasia. The utilitarian argument of beneficence caused by 
compassion is an external criterion for euthanasia: the autonomous patient is not making the 
decision to die but another person, on grounds of sym-pathy (etymologically to suffer with), 
decides about the death of the suffering patient. By this argument euthanasia of incompetent 
patients (both of adults and children) can be justified. The common utilitarian argument 
would not usually justify involuntary euthanasia of a competent person. Once liberty is 
granted as one of the basic values, then the autonomy of individuals has to be respected. 
However, once the patient is no longer able to express his/her autonomy and freedom, 
his/her way of dying can be determined by feelings of compassion. It is very valuable if a 
person, moved by compassion, is seeking to act and to defeat suffering and if the sense of 
compassion is not limited to feeling alone. (Ramsey, 1997). 
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A specific target of the relief of suffering is that of terminal suffering. It could be argued that 
since virtually all pain can be treated pharmaceutically, compassion is not an applicable 
issue. However, ‘virtually all’ pain is not ‘all’. Thus some pain and suffering remain to be 
treated though it cannot be treated medically and the usage of terminal sedation is justified. 
However terminal sedation as complete sedation is complete obtundation as well (the 
patient can no longer perceive and communicate) being almost the same as causing death, 
thus making their use questionable. Some people argue that pain and suffering as part of the 
dying process can be a valuable, positive and transformative experience leading to personal 
and spiritual growth. Nevertheless it should be said that there is no guarantee of such a 
positive, valuable and transformative experience. (Battin, 2003). Moreover experience of 
such terminal suffering is far more likely to become a very negative, horrifying experience. 
2.4.6 Evaluation 
Once compassion is taken as the competence which decides for the good of the patient, then 
the competence of the patient concerned doesn’t necessarily have to be taken into account, 
thus compassion becomes the normative upon which decisions are made and for the 
incompetent patient, even in some cases for the competent one, more for the other person’s 
self-esteem and peace of mind than for the good of the suffering patient, who did not 
express his/her wish to be terminated. Here the compassion argument is attacked by the 
slippery slope argument: from autonomous euthanasia to non-autonomous mercy killing. 
“The ethical acceptability of one person taking the life of another at the latter's request and 
based on a feeling of compassion will depend, as a minimum, on the situation involved 
being one of extraordinary suffering and agony that cannot be relieved” (The Danish 
Council of Ethics, 2006). 
The ethical evaluation of compassion directly depends on the understanding of the moral 
significance of compassion. If compassion is ranked as a primary human virtue then the 
compassion argument plays a different role in the euthanasia debate than when compassion, 
with a focus on its unsteady and non-rational nature, is ranked as a secondary moral faculty. 
2.4.7 Conclusion 
The compassion argument is surrounded by many emotions which place it between 
compassion as the response to unbearable suffering (only the suffering person can say what 
suffering is not bearable) and mercy killing based not on the patient’s perspective and 
request but on the feelings of mercy of the person who is providing a “good death”; the 
“good death” being interpreted exclusively by that other person. 
2.5 Human dignity 
2.5.1 Introduction 
Human dignity19 is an argument commonly used by both proponents and opponents in 
euthanasia debates. Its proponents use human dignity and the possible harm to dignity as 
an argument for euthanasia, mainly as a secondary argument next to the suffering and 
compassion arguments as the primary ones. For some people euthanasia coincides with 
human dignity in the sense that the administration of euthanasia is an expression of the 
respect for human dignity. (Humphry, 1992; Biggs, 2001). Consequently the law which 
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suffering humans by providing a merciful death. As such, euthanasia is an expression of 
humanity. 
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beneficence rather than to observe impassively and inactively as a patient dies in a horrible 
way with his/her painful death prolonged (Van Zyl, 2000). Such an “omission” could be 
qualified as contrary to basic human values such as sympathy and mercifulness. 
The beneficence argument can be reinforced by utilitarianism. The killing of a patient may 
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consequence of such an action is good: suffering has been eliminated and the death has been 
achieved in a desirable way (painless and peaceful). Naturally this moral assessment of an 
action in accordance with its good or bad consequences can be applied not solely to physical 
pain and suffering but also to mental suffering such as feelings of unworthiness, loss of self-
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will be potentiated in situations where no alternative exists to the miserable death the 
patient is experiencing, when the suffering is ceaseless and increasing by its protraction and 
death is imminent. Then compassion would override that little of (very miserable) life which 
is lost by the act of euthanasia. The utilitarian argument of beneficence caused by 
compassion is an external criterion for euthanasia: the autonomous patient is not making the 
decision to die but another person, on grounds of sym-pathy (etymologically to suffer with), 
decides about the death of the suffering patient. By this argument euthanasia of incompetent 
patients (both of adults and children) can be justified. The common utilitarian argument 
would not usually justify involuntary euthanasia of a competent person. Once liberty is 
granted as one of the basic values, then the autonomy of individuals has to be respected. 
However, once the patient is no longer able to express his/her autonomy and freedom, 
his/her way of dying can be determined by feelings of compassion. It is very valuable if a 
person, moved by compassion, is seeking to act and to defeat suffering and if the sense of 
compassion is not limited to feeling alone. (Ramsey, 1997). 
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self-esteem and peace of mind than for the good of the suffering patient, who did not 
express his/her wish to be terminated. Here the compassion argument is attacked by the 
slippery slope argument: from autonomous euthanasia to non-autonomous mercy killing. 
“The ethical acceptability of one person taking the life of another at the latter's request and 
based on a feeling of compassion will depend, as a minimum, on the situation involved 
being one of extraordinary suffering and agony that cannot be relieved” (The Danish 
Council of Ethics, 2006). 
The ethical evaluation of compassion directly depends on the understanding of the moral 
significance of compassion. If compassion is ranked as a primary human virtue then the 
compassion argument plays a different role in the euthanasia debate than when compassion, 
with a focus on its unsteady and non-rational nature, is ranked as a secondary moral faculty. 
2.4.7 Conclusion 
The compassion argument is surrounded by many emotions which place it between 
compassion as the response to unbearable suffering (only the suffering person can say what 
suffering is not bearable) and mercy killing based not on the patient’s perspective and 
request but on the feelings of mercy of the person who is providing a “good death”; the 
“good death” being interpreted exclusively by that other person. 
2.5 Human dignity 
2.5.1 Introduction 
Human dignity19 is an argument commonly used by both proponents and opponents in 
euthanasia debates. Its proponents use human dignity and the possible harm to dignity as 
an argument for euthanasia, mainly as a secondary argument next to the suffering and 
compassion arguments as the primary ones. For some people euthanasia coincides with 
human dignity in the sense that the administration of euthanasia is an expression of the 
respect for human dignity. (Humphry, 1992; Biggs, 2001). Consequently the law which 
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specifies provisions for physician assisted suicide in the state Oregon is called the “Death 
with Dignity Act”. Opponents argue that human dignity is contrary to euthanasia because it 
undermines human dignity, especially of elderly, disabled and dying persons. Obviously 
there is a diverse interpretation of human dignity beyond these controversies.  
2.5.2 Description 
The human dignity argument in euthanasia debates can be articulated in two simple but 
contradictory theses: 
a. Euthanasia is in line with human dignity. 
b. Euthanasia is a violation of human dignity. 
The first thesis supposes that human dignity has to be protected and harm to dignity should 
be avoided. Since the enormous suffering of a dying person would wound the dignity of 
that person, it is justified to protect human dignity by the act of euthanasia – either on 
grounds of autonomy and right to die (voluntary euthanasia) or on grounds of compassion 
(non-voluntary/involuntary euthanasia). 
The second thesis is similarly based on the preservation of human dignity, using a contrary 
argument: euthanasia is contrary to human dignity; euthanasia cannot be performed because 
not only the dignity of the person requesting euthanasia would be violated but also the dignity 
of the person who performs euthanasia (regardless of whether it was requested or not). 
2.5.3 Contextualization 
Human dignity is usually given as the philosophico-anthropological essence of human 
rights (Schachter, 1983). Thus one of the goals of human rights is to protect human dignity 
(respect for the inherent dignity of the human person). Consequently the right to die is not 
only a positive or negative right of self-determination but also a tool by which human 
dignity is protected. (Swarup, 2009; Cohen-Almagor, 2001). Once a person reaches the 
conclusion that his/her dignity would be affected by great (or unbearable) suffering and 
inhumane dying then the person has to take steps to protect his/her human dignity. There 
are plenty of historical examples of such scenarios starting with Stoa (autothanatos), when the 
person suffering in an indignant way was obliged to avoid or to end such a devaluing and 
dehumanizing situation by suicide. 
This becomes contextualized in the form of medical futility, whereby clinical situations arise 
in the form of reduced therapy such as withdrawing and withholding life-sustaining 
treatment or termination of artificial hydration and nutrition and the relevant decision-
making processes. It creates a paradigm of medically futile treatment which technically can 
be administrated and continued but also, from the patient perspective, such reduced 
treatment is justified by the respect for human dignity: it would be against human dignity 
(and against the patient’s best interest) to produce suffering and to prolong dying if there is 
no other perspective than the imminent death of the patient. Since there are areas within 
medical practice that are already governed by measures for the protection of human dignity 
(e.g. advance directives) (Cantor, 1993), this protection has to be extended to other areas of 
end-of-life decisions such as voluntary euthanasia (Hillyard& Dombrink, 2001). 
2.5.4 Presuppositions 
There are two completely different philosophical presuppositions in euthanasia debates 
about human dignity which are very rarely revealed and addressed. One presupposition 
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assumes that human dignity is by its nature a changeable faculty which can be developed 
during the life of human being. Thus human dignity is an empirical entity which can be 
assessed and measured by external criteria such as level of consciousness. So while for some 
people human dignity is given by birth (or even before); the newborn child already has its 
human dignity, other people assume that human dignity has to be acquired in the course of 
a lifetime (after birth), when the person has developed abilities of perception, awareness, 
self-interest etc. As an example of this philosophical assumption Peter Singer and his 
approach can be given. Within this understanding, human dignity is something what we 
gradually acquire, develop and lose. Thus the human dignity of a terminally ill or terribly 
suffering person who is devastated by his/her biological and physiological condition is “on 
retreat” because the person is in the process of loosing his/her dignity or may have lost it to 
a various extent. 
A different presupposition is grounded in the metaphysics of the person, which 
understands human dignity as a constant entity which human beings possess continuously: 
to be human means to have human dignity. So dignity does not belong to some aspect of a 
person but to the person as such, being that which is essential to the person (Ramsey, 1997). 
In this sense dignity is not what one has (diverse faculties and capacities) but what one is. 
Human dignity as a whole can be harmed (for instance by killing) but not taken away or 
lost. Thus both newborn child and dying person have the same human dignity which cannot 
be diminished or augmented.  
2.5.5 Analysis 
There is no doubt that as human beings are mortal, everybody wishes for a “death with 
dignity”. However there are huge controversies about the meaning of dignity and its 
implication for dying. So for one group, “death with dignity” means legal reform which 
accommodates active voluntary euthanasia as an appropriate response to a perceived need 
for the option called “death with dignity” (Paust, 1995).  While for the other group, “death 
with dignity” amalgamates with palliative care, hospice and spiritual care which have to 
replace the request for euthanasia; death with dignity seems a mutation of the original 
concept of human dignity and therefore euthanasia being indignant. 
For the first group “being dignified is having a sense of the importance of one’s life or 
achievements and appearing and behaving, before oneself and others, in the light of these. 
To lack this sense of importance or to fail to (or be unable to) present oneself in accordance 
with it is undignified. This lack of dignity is properly a humiliating thing for the subject, and 
connected to lack or loss of self-esteem, or even of the sense of self-worth.” (Ramsey, 1997, p. 
48). Then to live such a diminished life or to suffer such diminishment or impoverishment is 
sufficient to conclude that such life ought to be ended (Quill, 1993; Ramsey, 1997). Thus 
personal dignity is part of personal liberty which includes the ability to choose to die more 
or less quickly; dignity and self-determination are virtually interchangeable. It is matter of 
personal dignity to decide the time and way of one’s death. As a supportive argument, 
quality of life is used: if the person decides that the quality of his/her life is too low and not 
acceptable to him/her then he/she has the right to choose death while one’s dignity is still 
(relatively) intact. Some argue that dignity, being complex and unique to each person, 
includes not only physical and physiological aspects, but also emotional, intellectual, 
spiritual and existential ones (Quill, 1993). 
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specifies provisions for physician assisted suicide in the state Oregon is called the “Death 
with Dignity Act”. Opponents argue that human dignity is contrary to euthanasia because it 
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there is a diverse interpretation of human dignity beyond these controversies.  
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b. Euthanasia is a violation of human dignity. 
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be avoided. Since the enormous suffering of a dying person would wound the dignity of 
that person, it is justified to protect human dignity by the act of euthanasia – either on 
grounds of autonomy and right to die (voluntary euthanasia) or on grounds of compassion 
(non-voluntary/involuntary euthanasia). 
The second thesis is similarly based on the preservation of human dignity, using a contrary 
argument: euthanasia is contrary to human dignity; euthanasia cannot be performed because 
not only the dignity of the person requesting euthanasia would be violated but also the dignity 
of the person who performs euthanasia (regardless of whether it was requested or not). 
2.5.3 Contextualization 
Human dignity is usually given as the philosophico-anthropological essence of human 
rights (Schachter, 1983). Thus one of the goals of human rights is to protect human dignity 
(respect for the inherent dignity of the human person). Consequently the right to die is not 
only a positive or negative right of self-determination but also a tool by which human 
dignity is protected. (Swarup, 2009; Cohen-Almagor, 2001). Once a person reaches the 
conclusion that his/her dignity would be affected by great (or unbearable) suffering and 
inhumane dying then the person has to take steps to protect his/her human dignity. There 
are plenty of historical examples of such scenarios starting with Stoa (autothanatos), when the 
person suffering in an indignant way was obliged to avoid or to end such a devaluing and 
dehumanizing situation by suicide. 
This becomes contextualized in the form of medical futility, whereby clinical situations arise 
in the form of reduced therapy such as withdrawing and withholding life-sustaining 
treatment or termination of artificial hydration and nutrition and the relevant decision-
making processes. It creates a paradigm of medically futile treatment which technically can 
be administrated and continued but also, from the patient perspective, such reduced 
treatment is justified by the respect for human dignity: it would be against human dignity 
(and against the patient’s best interest) to produce suffering and to prolong dying if there is 
no other perspective than the imminent death of the patient. Since there are areas within 
medical practice that are already governed by measures for the protection of human dignity 
(e.g. advance directives) (Cantor, 1993), this protection has to be extended to other areas of 
end-of-life decisions such as voluntary euthanasia (Hillyard& Dombrink, 2001). 
2.5.4 Presuppositions 
There are two completely different philosophical presuppositions in euthanasia debates 
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assumes that human dignity is by its nature a changeable faculty which can be developed 
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assessed and measured by external criteria such as level of consciousness. So while for some 
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a lifetime (after birth), when the person has developed abilities of perception, awareness, 
self-interest etc. As an example of this philosophical assumption Peter Singer and his 
approach can be given. Within this understanding, human dignity is something what we 
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For the second group, dignity belongs to human nature: we posses it in the mode which is 
not limited and therefore dignity cannot be denied or damaged. They argue that the 
(rational) nature of humankind cannot be attacked as such, only some aspect can be hidden: 
an incurable disease affects one’s life but not one’s nature. Dignity to them consists of the 
intrinsic worth of human nature (Ramsey, 1997). So despite pain and heavy suffering, there 
is dignity in such a case; human dignity cannot be undermined. It is obvious that such a 
hermeneutic of dignity is based on certain metaphysical presumptions which can be taken 
as granted or refused as false.  
From a clinical point of view, contemporary medicine can impose medical technology on a 
dying person to the extent to which it can be seen as incompatible with and contradictory to 
human dignity. This has been recently described by an Iranian neurosurgeon in the 
following way: “Rob a human being of his dignity and you have robbed him of the essence 
of being human. Confine him, immobilize him, make him dependant, deprive him of hope 
and then inflict pain upon him and you have all the ingredients of the highest form of 
torture.” (Nayernouri, 2011, p. 55) 
2.5.6 Evaluation  
On one hand a patient’s choices, limited by existing legal constrains which do not allow a 
physician to comply with the patient’s request for euthanasia as a deliberately hastened 
death, result in a violation and/or loss of dignity. On the other hand a patient’s choices in 
many countries are limited by insufficient palliative care; this results in a violation of human 
dignity because persons have to die in indignant conditions. 
2.5.7 Conclusion  
Any conclusion regarding human dignity depends on the meaning given to the term 
“human dignity”. 
2.6 Patient’s best interest 
The argument of the patient’s best interest is related to the argument of dignity. In the later 
case it was human dignity which demanded a dignified death; in some situations the respect 
for human dignity could justify termination of the life of a person suffering in a way which 
violates human dignity (when understood as a changeable feature of human beings). Here it 
is on the grounds of the patient’s best interest that euthanasia is justified. It is either the 
patient self who is interpreting his/her best interest or another person (physician, nurse, 
relative) who is assessing the patient’s best interest and who acts in the patient’s best 
interest. Some people think that euthanasia does not go against the goals of medicine, 
considering it to be possibly in the patient’s best overall interest. Some authors relate 
euthanasia to eudaimonia (living well, flourishing) of the Aristotelian tradition, arguing that in 
virtue ethics, euthanasia can be regarded as a continuation of eudaimonia insofar as 
euthanasia facilitates good dying (dying is a part of life), avoiding bad dying which would 
be frustrating and not a vibrant way to finish life. (Begley, 2008). Therefore medical and 
other health care professionals have to balance their own integrity with professional 
concerns and patients’ interests. In this way they will recognize good and be able to realize 
it. Finally, helping another will lead, from a teleological perspective, to human flourishing. 
(Begley, 2008). So if euthanasia is understood as the upholding of a patient’s best interest, 
then it is a catalyst to human flourishing. 
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The counter-argument points out that if a patient’s best interest is interpreted by another 
person such as a health care professional, then such an interpretation will be paternalistic. 
Another objection does not deny the legitimacy of the patient’s best interest, however in 
scenarios involving killing, it is not given precedence. 
2.7 Quality of life 
The quality of life argument is related to the patient’s best interest argument in the way that 
it is the patient’s best interest to live a life which has certain qualitative features, which are 
valuable and worthwhile. Quality of life is therefore an indicator as to how these qualitative 
features can be assessed by the patient. In contrast to the patient’s best interest, quality of 
life is purely subjective and can be measured by the patient only. There is an affinity with 
the suffering argument: once suffering becomes unbearable, quality of life is very low, 
possibly so low that the patient does not want to live a life of such poor quality, giving 
euthanasia a role and upon the patient’s evaluation of his/her life, a good death can be 
administrated.  
Insofar as death is a part of life, quality of life can be referred to the quality of dying. As 
there has been an enormous emphasis on the quality of life in all areas of medicine in the 
last decades, the same impetus should be given to death and dying. (Hoffmann, 2009; 
Nordenfelt, 1994; Walter & Shannon, 1990). Quality of life can become a secondary 
argument of autonomy (as the primary argument): Once the quality of life or dying is too 
low and no longer acceptable or intolerable, the patient can express his/her autonomy by 
requesting euthanasia. 
The counter-argument to the quality of life argument is based on a critique of the concept of 
quality of life in health care. This critique emphasizes life as a gift which is valuable as such 
and which should not be measured by subjective criteria of quality. In a comparable way as 
the dignity of life cannot be measured, the value of life cannot be assessed. Although quality 
of life is very important both individually and for society as a whole, quality of life in itself 
cannot be the reason to terminate those suffering low quality of life or life which is not 
deemed worthy of being lived. And this line of counter-argument could continue with 
references to the Nazi period (the killing of people with low quality of life and with 
unworthy life).  
2.8 Health care costs 
It is a trivial statement that health care resources are limited. Since some treatments (e.g. 
intensive care or in oncology) are very expensive, they should be used with good 
justification in order to prevent that health care resources are not used in an unfair and 
irresponsible way but in the ways in which the criteria of social justice are satisfied.  
From an economic standpoint, one package of morphine costs a few Euros while one day in 
an Intensive Care Unit can cost thousands of Euros. On top of that if the treatment is futile 
anyway and the patient’s prospect is one mainly of pain, suffering and dying then not only 
principles such as autonomy or dignity apply but also principles like justice, solidarity 
(which would not justify futile treatment) and health care costs as distribution of limited 
resources criteria have to be taken into account. 
There are various scenarios for the economical calculation in this context; from very liberal 
ones to those based more on social coherence and social solidarity (which has its limits as 
well). Then euthanasia could become a smooth solution for generally expensive health care 
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For the second group, dignity belongs to human nature: we posses it in the mode which is 
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following way: “Rob a human being of his dignity and you have robbed him of the essence 
of being human. Confine him, immobilize him, make him dependant, deprive him of hope 
and then inflict pain upon him and you have all the ingredients of the highest form of 
torture.” (Nayernouri, 2011, p. 55) 
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The counter-argument points out that if a patient’s best interest is interpreted by another 
person such as a health care professional, then such an interpretation will be paternalistic. 
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euthanasia a role and upon the patient’s evaluation of his/her life, a good death can be 
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cannot be the reason to terminate those suffering low quality of life or life which is not 
deemed worthy of being lived. And this line of counter-argument could continue with 
references to the Nazi period (the killing of people with low quality of life and with 
unworthy life).  
2.8 Health care costs 
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intensive care or in oncology) are very expensive, they should be used with good 
justification in order to prevent that health care resources are not used in an unfair and 
irresponsible way but in the ways in which the criteria of social justice are satisfied.  
From an economic standpoint, one package of morphine costs a few Euros while one day in 
an Intensive Care Unit can cost thousands of Euros. On top of that if the treatment is futile 
anyway and the patient’s prospect is one mainly of pain, suffering and dying then not only 
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well). Then euthanasia could become a smooth solution for generally expensive health care 
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and for health care systems suffering from financial deficiency. It should be mentioned that 
palliative care is much less expensive than many medically aggressive, technically advanced 
and economically costly treatments.  
The counter-argument is based on the impropriety of a financial argument in the context of 
dying patients. The counter-objection stresses the fact of limited resources for health care 
and the validity of health care cost calculations. The middle-ground position argues that 
care for terminally ill and dying patient certainly cannot be limited to economic calculations 
however health care costs do have to be considered.  
2.9 Regulation - legalization 
The basic form of the regulation argument concerns the legalization of euthanasia. 
Proponents argue, while referring to autonomy, right to die, compassion and dignity, that 
euthanasia should be a legal right for everyone; the criminalization of euthanasia is contrary 
to the many arguments for which euthanasia should be decriminalized. The fear of 
decriminalization of euthanasia has the consequence that euthanasia will be practised “in 
the shadows”, beyond any social control. The legalization argument is more policy oriented, 
focusing more on social and legislative strategies than on morality as such. 
Opponents argue that the right to die cannot be legally acknowledged since such a right 
does not exist, moreover such a legal provision would violate human rights, in particular 
the right to life. Even opponents who would otherwise condone legal voluntary euthanasia 
under certain conditions argue that once legalized, euthanasia would be abused. Referring 
to the Dutch practice where not all performed cases of euthanasia have been reported, they 
argue that there is a slippery slope from active voluntary euthanasia to involuntary 
euthanasia which, again, can be proven empirically. (Keown, 1995, 2002). 
A pragmatic view on regulation appreciates a legal provision on euthanasia under the 
argument “regulation is better as no regulation at all”. Once regulated, obligatory rules have 
been established and they provide an enforceable framework. The alternative scenario of no 
regulation is much worse because euthanasia will be performed anyway but in the chaotic 
and confused setting of a grey zone. 
Those who hold euthanasia as wrong in principle argue that an immoral practice cannot be 
transformed into a moral one by legalization: immorality cannot be legalized. 
2.10 Transparency 
The transparency argument is associated with the regulation argument. As is generally 
known, euthanasia is being practiced in many countries in which it is illegal. So the 
transparency argument states as follows: let us be transparent, let us continue doing what 
we are doing anyway in the open and honest way, let us terminate hypocrisy (criticising 
euthanasia in Benelux, not being able to address the issue in our home countries, behaving 
as if euthanasia is not presently being practised in our cities). 
The argument to the contrary holds that if euthanasia is completely wrong, then transparency 
only serves to corrupt existing morality. A similar objection as above would apply. 
3. Conclusion 
In the analysis of this chapter, it became clear that for any argumentation on euthanasia, 
regardless of whether for or against, the first crucial step is clarity in terminology: what 
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exactly do we mean by the term “euthanasia”. So to avoid confusion, misunderstanding and 
frustration, it is crucial to start with clear semantics. Within this analytical study, euthanasia, 
having been distinguished from assisted suicide and from other instances of the end-of-life 
decisions such as withholding, withdrawing or terminal sedation, was defined as a 
deliberate act of termination of the life of B by A upon an explicit request of B for the sake of 
B. This means that the term euthanasia is understood to be so-called active voluntary 
euthanasia. Moreover, for a precise definition, some additional criteria apply such as 
terminal stage of the illness, unbearable suffering, enduring and voluntary wish to die 
(expressed repeatedly), and the act of euthanasia being performed by a physician.  
In the discussions on euthanasia various numbers of arguments are listed. Similarly 
different types of argumentations can be identified which use different or the same 
arguments taken from different fields and contexts; so one and the same argument is used 
within diverse argumentations. In summary, philosophical, legal, religious and social types 
of argumentations on euthanasia should be distinguished. So if, for instance, an argument is 
made on the basis of a “right”, while one argumentation uses the argument of “right” in the 
legal sense (e.g. human rights), another uses the argument of “right” in the sense of moral 
right (moral claim, not based on specific legislation). The next one uses the argument of 
“right” in a theological way (God’s right over life) or in a psychological way (one’s right to 
an authentic expression of his/her self).   
It became evident that there are no unequivocal arguments for or against euthanasia. Any 
list of arguments for euthanasia is, to a large extent, at the same time also a list of the 
arguments against euthanasia in the sense that another list of objections to these pro 
arguments has to be considered. Some of the pro arguments are simultaneously contra 
arguments and vice versa (e.g. dignity). Despite this fact, some arguments are prevalently 
arguments pro (e.g. autonomy) while the other ones are arguments against (e.g. slippery 
slope). If the argumentation is not to be biased, it has also to deal with the argument’s contra 
position in an intellectually honest way. 
The analysis demonstrated that some arguments which at first glance seemed quite 
convincing were found to be not so if questioned and analyzed critically, and once their 
weak points are also brought to light. So for instance the autonomy argument (autonomy of 
the dying person asking for euthanasia) is not as convincing as its proponents argue, being 
replaced or invalidated by the argument of compassion - unless there is clear evidence that 
euthanasia was the genuine choice and authentic option of the person concerned. While the 
autonomy argument has its justifications and explanatory powers, it is however diminished 
by other arguments such as competence or social pressure which affect the authenticity of 
an autonomous choice. 
As an auxiliary tool, a matrix of arguments (Fig. 1) demonstrating the interconnectedness of 
the individual arguments was provided. The matrix shows both the prevalent dichotomy 
“pro et contra” and complementariness. As the main arguments for euthanasia, autonomy, 
the right to die, unbearable suffering, compassion, dignity, the patient’s best interest, quality 
of life, health care costs, policy arguments of legalization (regulation) and transparency have 
been identified. By contrast, as the arguments against euthanasia, the following ones have 
been listed: competence, inviolability of human life, prohibition of killing, abuse, slippery 
slope, quality palliative care, physician’s role, vulnerability, and social pressure. All these 
arguments have to be placed into the operational framework of the proposed matrix whose 
purpose is to illustrate the correlation of individual arguments. Some arguments can be 
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under certain conditions argue that once legalized, euthanasia would be abused. Referring 
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euthanasia which, again, can be proven empirically. (Keown, 1995, 2002). 
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argument “regulation is better as no regulation at all”. Once regulated, obligatory rules have 
been established and they provide an enforceable framework. The alternative scenario of no 
regulation is much worse because euthanasia will be performed anyway but in the chaotic 
and confused setting of a grey zone. 
Those who hold euthanasia as wrong in principle argue that an immoral practice cannot be 
transformed into a moral one by legalization: immorality cannot be legalized. 
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The transparency argument is associated with the regulation argument. As is generally 
known, euthanasia is being practiced in many countries in which it is illegal. So the 
transparency argument states as follows: let us be transparent, let us continue doing what 
we are doing anyway in the open and honest way, let us terminate hypocrisy (criticising 
euthanasia in Benelux, not being able to address the issue in our home countries, behaving 
as if euthanasia is not presently being practised in our cities). 
The argument to the contrary holds that if euthanasia is completely wrong, then transparency 
only serves to corrupt existing morality. A similar objection as above would apply. 
3. Conclusion 
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having been distinguished from assisted suicide and from other instances of the end-of-life 
decisions such as withholding, withdrawing or terminal sedation, was defined as a 
deliberate act of termination of the life of B by A upon an explicit request of B for the sake of 
B. This means that the term euthanasia is understood to be so-called active voluntary 
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terminal stage of the illness, unbearable suffering, enduring and voluntary wish to die 
(expressed repeatedly), and the act of euthanasia being performed by a physician.  
In the discussions on euthanasia various numbers of arguments are listed. Similarly 
different types of argumentations can be identified which use different or the same 
arguments taken from different fields and contexts; so one and the same argument is used 
within diverse argumentations. In summary, philosophical, legal, religious and social types 
of argumentations on euthanasia should be distinguished. So if, for instance, an argument is 
made on the basis of a “right”, while one argumentation uses the argument of “right” in the 
legal sense (e.g. human rights), another uses the argument of “right” in the sense of moral 
right (moral claim, not based on specific legislation). The next one uses the argument of 
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arguments against euthanasia in the sense that another list of objections to these pro 
arguments has to be considered. Some of the pro arguments are simultaneously contra 
arguments and vice versa (e.g. dignity). Despite this fact, some arguments are prevalently 
arguments pro (e.g. autonomy) while the other ones are arguments against (e.g. slippery 
slope). If the argumentation is not to be biased, it has also to deal with the argument’s contra 
position in an intellectually honest way. 
The analysis demonstrated that some arguments which at first glance seemed quite 
convincing were found to be not so if questioned and analyzed critically, and once their 
weak points are also brought to light. So for instance the autonomy argument (autonomy of 
the dying person asking for euthanasia) is not as convincing as its proponents argue, being 
replaced or invalidated by the argument of compassion - unless there is clear evidence that 
euthanasia was the genuine choice and authentic option of the person concerned. While the 
autonomy argument has its justifications and explanatory powers, it is however diminished 
by other arguments such as competence or social pressure which affect the authenticity of 
an autonomous choice. 
As an auxiliary tool, a matrix of arguments (Fig. 1) demonstrating the interconnectedness of 
the individual arguments was provided. The matrix shows both the prevalent dichotomy 
“pro et contra” and complementariness. As the main arguments for euthanasia, autonomy, 
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been identified. By contrast, as the arguments against euthanasia, the following ones have 
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used simultaneously both ways, for or against euthanasia; each of them has its own different 
explanatory and justifying power; some of them remain mutually exclusive (e.g. autonomy, 
compassion). 
There is an immense interrelation between the arguments which sometimes goes unnoticed 
but what can be described by comparative analysis based on the proposed matrix. Many 
arguments rely on specific meaning or interpretations, as derived by the semantics of a 
singular term, or by a specific philosophical approach upon which the argument is based 
(e.g. dignity); last but not least the arguments also rely on their use in a particular cultural 
and/or religious context. 
Such an understanding of the backgrounds, mechanisms and strategies of the arguments on 
euthanasia contributes significantly to a meaningful and respectful discussion of the 
controversial issue of euthanasia, which will surely continue into the coming decades. 
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The Impact of the Dutch Euthanasia Act on  
the Number of Requests for Euthanasia  
and Physician Assisted Suicide -    
A Cohort Study in General Practice  
Between 1977 and 2007 
G.A. Donker and J.E. van Alphen 




In 2002 Euthanasia (E) and Physician assisted suicide (PAS) were legalised by passing of the 
Euthanasia Act in the Netherlands. In this law E was defined as the administration of drugs 
with death of the patient as the ultimate result, at the explicit request of a patient. PAS was 
defined as the prescription of drugs by a physician for the purpose of self-administration by 
the patient. Recent studies showed that the number of deaths in the Netherlands due to 
E/PAS has decreased after the implementation of the Euthanasia Act in 2002. E decreased 
from 2.6% of all deaths reported in 2001 to 1.7% in 2005.1,2 PAS decreased from 0.2% of all 
deaths in 2001 to 0.1% in 2005.1 Improved palliative care, including the use of deep 
continuous sedation at the end of life, and an increase of the average life expectancy are 
some of the possible explanations for this decrease.1,2 In addition, the general misperception 
that morphine shortens life is more and more condemned.1 This could also explain a 
decrease, as fewer palliative treatments are registered as E. Our main research question is, 
whether the number of requests for E or PAS has changed after the implementation of the 
Euthanasia Act in 2002. 
Few publications have reported on requests for E/PAS and the rate of these which is 
actually granted in the Netherlands.4-6 Van der Maas et al described an increase in the 
number of requests between 1990 and 1995 of 37% in terminally ill patients.4 Trend analysis 
by Marquet et al, on the incidence of requests for E/PAS with Dutch GPs in the period 1977 
to 2001 showed an increase which stabilised during the nineties.5 Other studies reported 
that about 44% of the requests actually results in E or PAS.6 The 56% of requests not 
resulting in an actual E/PAS was also evaluated. In 13% of the cases the patient passed 
before E, 13% of patients died even before completion of the preparation process.6 In 13% of 
the cases the patient withdrew the request and in 12% of the cases the physician considered 
the request not eligible.6 
Several studies examined patients’ reasons for requesting E/PAS, in the last decades.5,7,8 
Marquet et al found that hopelessness and deterioration are frequent reasons for a request 
 8 
The Impact of the Dutch Euthanasia Act on  
the Number of Requests for Euthanasia  
and Physician Assisted Suicide -    
A Cohort Study in General Practice  
Between 1977 and 2007 
G.A. Donker and J.E. van Alphen 




In 2002 Euthanasia (E) and Physician assisted suicide (PAS) were legalised by passing of the 
Euthanasia Act in the Netherlands. In this law E was defined as the administration of drugs 
with death of the patient as the ultimate result, at the explicit request of a patient. PAS was 
defined as the prescription of drugs by a physician for the purpose of self-administration by 
the patient. Recent studies showed that the number of deaths in the Netherlands due to 
E/PAS has decreased after the implementation of the Euthanasia Act in 2002. E decreased 
from 2.6% of all deaths reported in 2001 to 1.7% in 2005.1,2 PAS decreased from 0.2% of all 
deaths in 2001 to 0.1% in 2005.1 Improved palliative care, including the use of deep 
continuous sedation at the end of life, and an increase of the average life expectancy are 
some of the possible explanations for this decrease.1,2 In addition, the general misperception 
that morphine shortens life is more and more condemned.1 This could also explain a 
decrease, as fewer palliative treatments are registered as E. Our main research question is, 
whether the number of requests for E or PAS has changed after the implementation of the 
Euthanasia Act in 2002. 
Few publications have reported on requests for E/PAS and the rate of these which is 
actually granted in the Netherlands.4-6 Van der Maas et al described an increase in the 
number of requests between 1990 and 1995 of 37% in terminally ill patients.4 Trend analysis 
by Marquet et al, on the incidence of requests for E/PAS with Dutch GPs in the period 1977 
to 2001 showed an increase which stabilised during the nineties.5 Other studies reported 
that about 44% of the requests actually results in E or PAS.6 The 56% of requests not 
resulting in an actual E/PAS was also evaluated. In 13% of the cases the patient passed 
before E, 13% of patients died even before completion of the preparation process.6 In 13% of 
the cases the patient withdrew the request and in 12% of the cases the physician considered 
the request not eligible.6 
Several studies examined patients’ reasons for requesting E/PAS, in the last decades.5,7,8 
Marquet et al found that hopelessness and deterioration are frequent reasons for a request 
 
Euthanasia – The “Good Death” Controversy in Humans and Animals 
 
168 
and that pain and dyspnoea are declining in frequency as a reason.5 Emanuel et al 
considered pain, depressive symptoms and dependence as the most frequent reasons to 
consider E/PAS.7 Especially patients with depressive symptoms and pain are changing their 
minds over time.7  
This study examines the impact of the Euthanasia Act (2002) on the incidence and reasons 
for E/PAS in Dutch general practice during the period 1977 to 2007.  
2. Methods 
Data were collected annually by a standardized questionnaire on requests for E/PAS in 
Dutch general practice in the period from 1977 to 2007. The GPs included participate in the 
Dutch Sentinel Practice Network. This network of 45 general practices represents 0.8% of the 
Dutch population and is representative at a national level for age, gender, geographic 
distribution and population density. Annually the GPs were requested to report the number 
of and reasons for requests of E/PAS, they were consulted for in the past year. Definition for 
E and PAS were applied as formulated in the Dutch Euthanasia Act (2002). Only serious 
requests of terminally ill patients were noted. Therefore, requests for possible E/PAS in the 
future, not related to an existing disease, were excluded. Age, gender, underlying disease, 
reason for the request and presence of a living will were recorded on the questionnaire. GPs 
reported a maximum of three reasons per request by open question. No age group was 
excluded. Stemming from the period when euthanasia was not legalized in the Netherlands 
purposely there is no registration whether the requests were executed or not.  
Incidence was calculated as the number of requests per 10,000 patients on GP's lists. Diseases 
were classified using the International Classification of Primary Care (ICPC) system. Incidence 
analyses were stratified by patient and practice characteristics. Linear regression trend analysis 
was performed on the incidence of requests for E/PAS and presented in graphs. Data for the 
period 1997 to 2000 were adapted to fit in the regression analysis.  
The reasons for requesting E/PAS were classified into 22 different subcategories, e.g. pain, 
dyspnoea, deterioration, and hopelessness. For the most frequently claimed reasons the data 
were calculated into proportions per category and entered into graphs using linear 
regression analysis.  
3. Results 
In the period from 1977 to 2007 the GPs of the Dutch Sentinel Network were consulted for 
1011 requests for E/PAS; 54% (546) male and 46% (465) female. In 74.8% the patient was 
diagnosed with cancer and in 6.4% with a cardiovascular disease. The age distribution 
showed a peak between 70 and 79 years (28.8%); 26.6% of patients between 60 and 69 years, 
and 17.3% between 80 and 89 years of age. A rather large group (23.7%) is younger than 60 
years of age including 12.7% between 50 and 59, 6.5% between 40 and 49 and 3.3% between 
30 and 39 years of age.  
Requests for E/PAS, 1977-2007 
The number of requests per 10,000 patients (figure 1) shows an increase in the period until 
1990. After 1991 trends are slightly decreasing until 2004. After 2004 the incidence stabilised 
around 2.2 per 10,000 patients (P<0.05). No increase after the implementation of the 
Euthanasia Act in 2002 was observed. 
The Impact of the Dutch Euthanasia Act on the Number of  






Fig. 1. Annual requests for E/PAS to GPs in the Netherlands, per 10,000 patients (1977-2007). 
 
 B (SE) 95% CI P-value 
Intercept 1.434412 (0.152603) --- --- 
1977-1990 0.208166 (0.04684) 0.11127 – 0.305061 0.000186 
1991-2004 -0.012 (0.003834) -0.01993 – (-0.00407) 0.004693 
2005-2007 0.0002 (8.56E-05) 2.28E-05 – 0.000377 0.028625 
Table 1. Annual requests for E/PAS to GPs in the Netherlands, per 10,000 patients (1977-
2007).  Results from linear regression analysis. 
Reasons to request E/PAS 
The most frequently mentioned reason for requesting E/PAS was pain in 31.4% (table 2). 
Deterioration (26.1%), hopelessness (19.0%) and dyspnoea (12.6%) were also frequent 
reasons for patients to ask for E/PAS. Fear in general was in 9.7% a reason for the request; 
fear without a specific reason 4.0%, fear of pain 2.1%, fear of losing dignity 2.2%, fear of 
deterioration 1.8%, and fear of dependency in 0.7% of the requests. Loss of dignity was 
one of the reasons for requesting E/PAS in 7.9% of the cases and dependency in 5.1%. 
Metastatic disease, vomiting and depression were less frequently reported, respectively 
3.9%, 3.0%, and 2.8% of all requests in general practice in the Netherlands in the period of 
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Reason request N Percentage of requests 
Somatic reasons   
Pain 317 31.4% 
Deterioration 264 26.1% 
Dyspnoea 127 12.6% 
Metastatic disease 36 3.9% 
Vomiting 27 3.0% 
Bowel disorder 20 2.2% 
Swallowing disorder 19 2.1% 
Dementia 4 0.4% 
Pressure ulcers 3 0.3% 
 
Psychosomatic reasons   
Hopelessness 192 19.0% 
Humiliation 80 7.9% 
Dependency 47 5.1% 
Fear not specified 37 4.0% 
Depression 26 2.8% 
Fear of humiliation 20 2.2% 
Fear of pain 19 2.1% 
Fear of deterioration 16 1.8% 
Loneliness 11 1.2% 
Fear of dependability 6 0.7% 
   
Other medical disorders 112 12.3% 
Other reasons 72 7.9% 
* Combined group of Fear not specified, Fear of losing dignity, Fear of pain, Fear of 
deterioration and Fear of dependability. 
Table 2. Percentage of reasons for request E/PAS representing different subgroups. 
Through the years pain is declining in frequency as (one of) the reason(s) for a patient to 
request E/PAS (p<0.001) (Figure 2 and Table 3). In 1977 in almost half of the cases listed by 
the GPs (fear of) pain was mentioned as one of the reasons for the request; in 2007 in one fifth 
of the cases. Despite this decrease (fear of) pain is still the most frequent reason to request in 
2007. (Fear of) deterioration was increasingly one of the reasons until 1991, but during the last 
16 years this trend has decreased (p<0.01). Dyspnoea shows a declining frequency during the 
period 1977 to 2007 (p>0.05). Hopelessness as the reason for a request initially increased and 
later decreased during the years (p>0.05).  
4. Discussion  
The number of requests per 10,000 patients showed an increase in the first phase of the 
study 1977-1990, then slightly decreased and stabilised during the past three years. The 
number of requests remained low since the implementation of the Euthanasia Act in 2002 
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and through the years concerned a small proportion of all deaths in general practice. Three 
quarter of the patients that requested E/PAS were suffering from malignant diseases. 
Reasons for requesting E/PAS were changing over time. Pain was declining in frequency as 
the reason for a request over the years, but remained the most frequent reason for 
requesting E/PAS throughout the study period. Deterioration and other non somatic reasons 
for requesting E/PAS were increasing until the beginning of the nineties, whereafter these 
reasons declined again.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Reasons for requesting Euthanasia or physician assisted suicide with GPs in the 
Netherlandsin proportion per category (1977-2007)  
This study presents data collected over a 31 year period, partly before any regulation or law 
had passed. Some limitations need to be mentioned. First, the retrospective design of the 
study could have induced recall bias among the GPs and, therefore, could have influenced 
the results. However, we assumed serious consultations about E/PAS would be the 
consultations least subjective to such bias due to the impact of such consultations on the GP. 
In addition, the GPs know in advance they will be requested to report their cases of E/PAS 
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Reason request N Percentage of requests 
Somatic reasons   
Pain 317 31.4% 
Deterioration 264 26.1% 
Dyspnoea 127 12.6% 
Metastatic disease 36 3.9% 
Vomiting 27 3.0% 
Bowel disorder 20 2.2% 
Swallowing disorder 19 2.1% 
Dementia 4 0.4% 
Pressure ulcers 3 0.3% 
 
Psychosomatic reasons   
Hopelessness 192 19.0% 
Humiliation 80 7.9% 
Dependency 47 5.1% 
Fear not specified 37 4.0% 
Depression 26 2.8% 
Fear of humiliation 20 2.2% 
Fear of pain 19 2.1% 
Fear of deterioration 16 1.8% 
Loneliness 11 1.2% 
Fear of dependability 6 0.7% 
   
Other medical disorders 112 12.3% 
Other reasons 72 7.9% 
* Combined group of Fear not specified, Fear of losing dignity, Fear of pain, Fear of 
deterioration and Fear of dependability. 
Table 2. Percentage of reasons for request E/PAS representing different subgroups. 
Through the years pain is declining in frequency as (one of) the reason(s) for a patient to 
request E/PAS (p<0.001) (Figure 2 and Table 3). In 1977 in almost half of the cases listed by 
the GPs (fear of) pain was mentioned as one of the reasons for the request; in 2007 in one fifth 
of the cases. Despite this decrease (fear of) pain is still the most frequent reason to request in 
2007. (Fear of) deterioration was increasingly one of the reasons until 1991, but during the last 
16 years this trend has decreased (p<0.01). Dyspnoea shows a declining frequency during the 
period 1977 to 2007 (p>0.05). Hopelessness as the reason for a request initially increased and 
later decreased during the years (p>0.05).  
4. Discussion  
The number of requests per 10,000 patients showed an increase in the first phase of the 
study 1977-1990, then slightly decreased and stabilised during the past three years. The 
number of requests remained low since the implementation of the Euthanasia Act in 2002 
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and through the years concerned a small proportion of all deaths in general practice. Three 
quarter of the patients that requested E/PAS were suffering from malignant diseases. 
Reasons for requesting E/PAS were changing over time. Pain was declining in frequency as 
the reason for a request over the years, but remained the most frequent reason for 
requesting E/PAS throughout the study period. Deterioration and other non somatic reasons 
for requesting E/PAS were increasing until the beginning of the nineties, whereafter these 
reasons declined again.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Reasons for requesting Euthanasia or physician assisted suicide with GPs in the 
Netherlandsin proportion per category (1977-2007)  
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the results. However, we assumed serious consultations about E/PAS would be the 
consultations least subjective to such bias due to the impact of such consultations on the GP. 
In addition, the GPs know in advance they will be requested to report their cases of E/PAS 
each year which enhances correct registration. 
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formulated as deliberate use of a treatment that was assumed to be life shortening. This 
definition has not changed during the study period of more than 30 years. 
 
Pain B (SE) 95% CI P-value 
Intercept 0,491129 (0,038781) --- --- 
1977-2007 -0,00977 (0,002221) -0,01432 – (-0,00523) 0,000133 
Deterioration    
Intercept 0,171239 (0,046684) --- --- 
1977-1991 0,021448 (0,007203) 0,006693 - 0,036203 0,005938 
1992-2007 -0,00075 (0,000232) -0,00123 – (-0,00028) 0,003063 
Dyspnoea    
Intercept 0,177379 (0,027109) --- --- 
1977-2007 -0,00314 (0,001552) -0,00631 - 3,76E-05 0,052598  
Hopelessness    
Intercept 0,152416 (0,04465) --- --- 
1977-1991 0,007352 (0,006889) -0,00676 - 0,021464 0,295027 
1992-2007 -0,00025 (0,000222) -0,00071 - 0,0002 0,261701 
Table 3. Reasons for requesting Euthanasia or Physician assisted suicide with GPs in the 
Netherlands (1977-2007). Results from linear regression analysis. 
Furthermore, there are no data on the amount of granted requests for E/PAS. This variable 
was not  included in the past due to the illegal condition of E/PAS before the 
implementation of the Euthanasia Act in The Netherlands in 2002. Onwuteaka-Philipsen et 
al described 44% of the requests for E/PAS is granted by GPs in The Netherlands.6 In 12% of 
requests it was considered not eligible by the physician and in 13% it was withdrawn by the 
patient.6 The patient died before the E/PAS was actually carried out in the rest of the cases 
(31%).6  
Our study is unique in collecting data about E/PAS in general practice over a long time 
period, even before these practices were legalized. The major contribution of this study is 
the finding that requests for E/PAS in general practice did not increase after 
implementation of the Euthanasia Act in 2002. As The Netherlands was the first country 
worldwide to do so, a cohort study embracing a period of over 30 years assessing the impact 
of the implementation of a Euthanasia Act has not been performed elsewhere.  
For the interpretation of the results the representativeness of the network is important. The 
network is designed to be nationally representative for geographical distribution and 
distribution in population density.9 As far as type of practice is concerned, solo practices are 
slightly overrepresented.9 There is no indication, however, that this would bias the results. 
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This network is well-suited for reporting in retrospect, prospectively-collected data through 
a continuous morbidity registration (CMR) process. Results are typically used for 
monitoring and harmonising health information.9-12 In the Netherlands, registration with a 
GP is compulsory for access to health care.9,12 The Dutch primary care system is equally 
accessible to all socio-demographic subgroups.12 However, it is important to realize that in 
The Netherlands in general nursing home residents are not under the care of a GP. 
Therefore, we consider our data representative for euthanasia requests in general practice, 
but not for nursing homes and other institutions not cared for by GPs, such as prisons and 
mental health institutions.  
Earlier research showed that comparing the five years before and after the implementation 
of the Euthanasia Act did not show an increased demand for euthanasia after 
implementation of the new guidelines as well.13 However, some gender differences in the 
reasons for requesting euthanasia were revealed in that study. Loss of dignity as a reason 
declined especially in females. Excellent communication skills including gender sensitivity 
are important in exploring end of life wishes and underlying reasons for requesting for 
euthanasia with patients.13 
5. Conclusions 
The incidence of requests for E/PAS in Dutch General Practice increased considerably in the 
years between 1977-1990 after which it slightly decreased and stabilised in the period 2005-
2007. No increase during the first five years after the implementation of the Dutch 
Euthanasia Act in 2002 was observed. Pain has declined, but remained the most frequent 
reason for requesting E/PAS in Dutch General Practice despite improved palliative care.  
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1. Introduction 
Death, the end of life, is one of the most real things in life. Therefore it has always been the 
major concern of people to meet with it. It is not the death but the process of dying worries 
people. Although the moment of death may be at any time, for some reason, it has been 
perceived as identical with the old age. Much research has indicated that almost in every 
country, particularly in the developed countries, aged population increases, which brings 
extra burden to the health care systems and social services. The diseases encountered in old 
age are mostly chronic and long lasting, which necessitate the provision of health care 
services in long and costly manner. This, inevitably, brings the problem of the distribution 
of limited sources into discussion (Aksoy, 1998). Every country has its own priorities in 
health services. Although most attention in the West has focused on the elderly as terminal 
patients, in some countries the major focus might be on younger adult AIDS patients or on 
children dying from malnutrition or infectious diseases. Another important category, 
although much smaller in number, are critically ill or extremely low birth weight babies. In 
each of these categories, the issues might be similar but the solutions differ significantly 
from country to country. 
Before getting into detail on end of life decision-making, it is of benefit to give some basic 
information about the country. Turkey is a nation state with almost 68 million population 
comprising people from different ethnic backgrounds. The male and female populations are 
almost equal to each other. It has a young population with 55% under the age of 20 
(Republic of Turkey, Prime Ministry State Institute of Statistics, 2002). The major faith 
tradition in Turkey is Islam (95%). There are some Jews, Christians and others. Although 
Turkey is a secular state by its governmental system, since there is such a great majority of 
Muslims with a long tradition, religion plays a significant role in ethical reasoning in public 
mind, though not in official level. The rate of population over 65 is 8%, and the life 
expectancy at birth is 70.2. (Republic of Turkey, Prime Ministry State Institute of Statistics, 
2002) Turkey is a unique country in its region as a Muslim State officially committed to 
adapt western life style and tradition.  
Decision-making is an important process, especially in terminal stages of the illnesses. The 
moral quality of a clinical decision is dependent on the process of that decision and not only 
on the outcome. We are accountable and responsible for the way in which our decisions are 
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reached. Since our understanding of the patient's perspective will always be limited, good 
communication and acceptance of the patient's view is essential in reaching the desired goal 
of a consensus decision. (Randall and Downie, 1996) It is pretty easy to make the 'right 
decision' if the patient can involve to the decision making process. Autonomous patients can 
choose the extent to which they wish to participate in decisions about these treatments; if 
they wish to be fully involved they are adequately informed. However, non-autonomous 
patients are unable to participate in deriving the balance of benefits to burdens and risk in 
the particular situation. Advance statements are offered as a solution in case of non-
autonomous patients. 
There is not a proper advance statement in Turkey. Even it is not legal to put Do-Not-
Resuscitate (DNR) orders. However this does not mean that it is not practiced in clinics. 
Many doctors and nurses in anaesthesiology and reanimation departments reported to us 
that there are many voluntary and involuntary DNR orders are practiced in ICUs and the 
wards. Therefore there is no point to talk about the legal binding of advance statements and 
DNR orders. In recent years some Turkish bioethicists strongly suggested the necessity of 
advance statements and DNR orders. (Oguz, 2001) Oguz argues that a good application of 
DNR order, under the light of the concept of 'futility of treatment', the number of euthanasia 
requests will decrease.  
2. Information 
Euthanasia is a terribly troubling word, meaning literally, according to some, “a good 
death,” but according to others a morally outrageous death. According to some researchers  
euthanasia is the act of taking the life, for reasons of mercy, of a person who is hopelessly ill. 
A basic distinction is made between two kinds of euthanasia, namely passive and active.  
Active euthanasia is identical with mercy killing and involves taking direct action to end a 
life, for example, intentionally giving a person a lethal dose of a drug to end a painful and 
prolonged period of dying. Passive euthanasia is allowing a patient to die when he or she 
could have been kept alive by the appropriate medical procedures. Active euthanasia can be 
defined as any treatment initiated by a physician with the intent of hastening the death of 
another human being who is terminally ill and in severe pain or distress with the motive of 
relieving that person from great suffering.  
Passive euthanasia can be defined or considered as discontinuing or not starting a 
treatment at the request of the patient. Further distinction is made between voluntary, 
involuntary, and non-voluntary euthanasia. According to this distinction, voluntary 
euthanasia occurs when the decision to terminate life by the physicians corresponds with 
the patient’s desire to do so and the patient willfully gives consent of its implementation. 
Involuntary euthanasia occurs when the decision to end life is implemented against the 
patient’s wishes. Non-voluntary euthanasia refers to cases where patients are unable to 
make their wishes known, for example a person who is brain dead and in a permanent or 
irreversible coma. According to another researchers active voluntary euthanasia and 
physician-assisted suicide are often combined and mentioned in one breath. They defined 
active voluntary euthanasia as the deliberate termination of life, by someone other than 
the patient, at the patient’s request and physician-assisted suicide as intentionally helping 
a patient to end his or her life at his or her request. Euthanasia means ending a patient's 
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life according to certain principles and under certain circumstances, where medicine can 
not cure or provide a life of acceptable quality. In two different ways based on physicians' 
action and patients' consent. It can be active or passive according to physicians' actions, 
and it is important to separate DNR orders and physician-assisted suicide from them; 
especially in countries like Turkey that are debating the level of technological 
development and their values. According to patients' consent, it is necessary to emphasize 
voluntary, non-voluntary and involuntary types of euthanasia (Aksoy 2000,Aksoy 1998, 
Ozkara et al 2001).  
3. Attitudes towards euthanasia in Turkey 
Euthanasia has deep historical roots. Before Hippocrates, euthanasia was a routine 
procedure and physicians assumed that they had the authority to kill patients for whom 
they gave up the hope of recovery, without asking for their permission (Ney 1997). They 
accepted this as a part of their medical practice. Hippocrates regarded this procedure as a 
hindrance to the establishment of confidentiality between physicians and patients. Probably 
this is the reason for the words in The Hippocratic Oath, "I will give no deadly medicine to 
anyone if asked, nor suggest any such counsel." This guarantee which Hippocrates provided 
by his oath, established the basis of the confidence between physicians and patients for 2500 
years.  
The effects of the Hippocratic Oath were noticed in Anatolia in the 19th century after 
modern medical schools had been established. Written sources (Lequenne 1991) show that 
euthanasia continued to be widely used after Hippocrates and was a socially exalted 
procedure among Galatians who settled in Anatolia in 287 BC and some other 
civilizations followed them. During this period suicide was also exalted by the society, 
and had some similarities with the harakiri tradition in Japan. Islamic domination put an 
end to both the euthanasia practice and its high regard in society in Anatolia. Euthanasia 
was wiped out of the society's living conscience during the period when Anatolia used to 
be a part of Islamic civilization. But it has continued to be a part of the social 
subconscience. The contemporary situation of the concepts of death and euthanasia in 
Anatolia, which entered a new period after the establishment of modern Turkey, was 
determined by its culture which was considerably affected by this social subconscience 
and Islamic belief.  
Euthanasia is another ethical issue related to end of life decision making. The concept of 
euthanasia entered the agenda in Turkey in 1975. At the beginning, it was thought to be the 
problem of the countries where medicine was highly developed. The medical technology in 
Turkey was not very well-developed to make the euthanasia debate necessary at that time. 
Life sustaining systems rarely existed, intensive care and health care facilities were in poor 
conditions and hardly accessible. It has become an important problem in Turkey in the last 
decade, as the result of technological and medical developments. There are still some 
problems about the attainment and purchasing of health care facilities, and also about the 
level of medical care. But especially the developments in life sustaining systems and their 
efficient usage in daily practice made euthanasia an important subject for society. As 
physicians, patients, patients' relatives, insurance companies and jurists met the dilemma 
routinely, and as the mass media began to put it on the agenda more, a lot of discussions 
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reached. Since our understanding of the patient's perspective will always be limited, good 
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have taken place. This is an important pressure which forces the State to form some attitude 
about euthanasia.  
The first euthanasia discussions had started in 1990s in Turkey. Official religious authorities 
and medical associations declared euthanasia as unacceptable. In those days there were very 
few people who have supported euthanasia in Turkey (Oguz, 1996). However, during the 
course of the time the research conducted in different centers have indicated that health care 
professionals, especially nurses support the assisted suicide and euthanasia (Bahcecik et al, 
1998; Akcil et al, 1998; Ersoy and Altun, 2001). Despite these findings both passive and 
active euthanasia remain unlawful in Turkish Criminal Law. While passive euthanasia is 
considered as unintentional killing by law (Turkish Criminal Law. Article: 455), active 
euthanasia is punishable as intentional killing (Turkish Criminal Law. Article: 448) (Artuk, 
2001) Like in all divinely revealed religions euthanasia is absolutely forbidden in Islamic 
understanding. (Rispler-Chaim, 1993)  
In Turkey there is a great difference between the level of medical technology and the 
physician-patient relationship regarding the contemporary norms. Paternalistic attitudes are 
common and this also suits the expectations of society. Physicians rarely inform their patients 
about their diagnosis and treatment, even when it is not a fatal or hopeless situation. The 
primary reasons which physicians put forward about this fact are that they had to attend to 
too many patients and patients' educational level was not adequate (Hayran, 1994). 
Undoubtedly these are important factors, but there are evidences which indicate that they can 
not be the main ones. Even in private clinics where the number of patients per physician is 
very low, physicians' preferences regarding the relationship are quite similar to those of their 
colleagues in general hospitals. I think the main reason is the physicians' identity which is 
determined by medical education and social status. The physician-patient relationship in 
Turkey totally leans on the belief that a physician always does the best for their patient and 
always protects life. This belief established the myth of the "little god" physician. This view 
began to change and be corrupted dramatically in the last few years. The most appropriate 
word which describes the contemporary situation is chaos.  
Today, many social institutions especially the mass media severely criticize physicians' 
attitudes in Turkey. Sometimes these criticisms turn out to be unfair attacks on medicine. 
This is the result of corruption in the myth of "little god" physician, and social 
disappointment about that. The associations of medical professionals try very hard to avoid 
any harm to medicine as a social institution while passing through this chaotic period. They 
try to re-establish confidentiality in physician-patient relationships on a stronger basis like 
the "informed consent doctrine". The foundation of the associations for specialized doctors 
of medicine is one of the main positive steps in realizing this purpose.  
One of the most important factors which determines society's attitude towards euthanasia 
is religion. 90% of the Turkish population are Muslims. As there are various sects and 
tariqas that cause significant differences, it is important to begin with an overall review of 
Islamic approach to euthanasia. There are important differences between Islamic 
countries. The first group contains the countries which are governed by Islamic rules. 
These countries accept sheria as their legal and administrative code, like Iran and Saudi 
Arabia. In Iran Shia Muslims and in Saudi Arabia Sunni Muslims as sects of Islam, rule 
the State. The second group consists of countries which have secularly governed states, 
but their laws are based on sheria, like Egypt and Algeria. Actually this is the largest 
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group.  Turkey differs from these countries. Although the majority of the population is 
Muslim, the State is totally secular. Secularism in Turkey includes both the administrative, 
legislative and all other social systems. Despite a radical Islamic movement, which takes 
Turkey as its main target, cultural characteristics and historical background in 20th 
century led to a strong resistance in the society. Islam's approach to death is quite clear. 
Allah is the master of life and death. A Muslim is expected to know and accept that there 
are divine purposes in life's turning to be a painful one and in the delay of desired death. 
Ending life personally or asking somebody to do it instead, is regarded as an attempt to 
share Allah's power, so this is assumed to be an unforgivable sin. According to the Koran 
the wish for death is forbidden (Sahih-i Buhari, 1982; Nisâ sura of Koran). Suicide is the 
biggest sin (Sahih-i Buhari, 1982). No funeral prayer is made for such people, this means 
they can never be recipients of Allah's forgiveness. This situation affects the family as 
well, and causes isolation in society. Murder is a lighter sin. Even if there is no adequate 
reason found for tolerance, there is a chance for Allah's final forgiveness, because there is 
no rule which hinders his last prayer. When Islam's approach to death is examined with 
regards to the results of euthanasia, it is clear that in countries where sheria is in 
operation either totally or only legally, practicing euthanasia is impossible. Since Imam-i 
Gazali, an Islamic commentator (Karaman, 1971), Islamic rules have been assumed to 
have reached perfection, so there could be no additional rules except the interpretation of 
the existing ones. In Islam, rules about death are very clear that there is no place for 
interpretation. Islamic rules put every aspect of life in an order and health care issues are 
one of these aspects. Because of this, medicine in Islamic countries has developed 
according to these rules. This development has not reached the level of modern medicine 
yet, so euthanasia is not considered a real problem yet.  
4. Turkish heath professionals’ attitudes towards euthanasia 
The concept of euthanasia and heath professional’s attitudes towards euthanasia have been 
discussed in many research in Turkey. Mayda et al (2005) in their study reported that  43.8% 
of the oncologists did not object to euthanasia. Some 33.7% had been asked to perform 
euthanasia and 41.5% believed that euthanasia was performed secretly although it is against 
the law in Turkey. Forty-two doctors (50.6%) noted that they had withdrawn treatment in 
patients. The most frequently cited reasons for objecting to euthanasia were its unethical 
nature and the possibility of abuse. Although the overwhelming majority of the population 
in Turkey is Muslim, religious rules are not seen as the leading cause of objection to 
euthanasia. In fact, secularism and education may have influenced people’s attitudes toward 
euthanasia. This is clearly ref lected in the questionnaire completed by doctors, who have a 
high level of education. Doctors who encounter terminally ill patients with cancer should 
update their knowledge about patients’ rights and euthanasia. Doctors, who are often asked 
to perform euthanasia, especially in the cancer setting, can help to illuminate the debates 
about euthanasia.  
In Turkey several studies have shown the following to be the most frequently given reasons 
for objecting to euthanasia: the possibility of its abuse (41.6%–72.8%) and conf lict with 
ethical values (24.9% and %32.9) or with religious beliefs (18.7% and %21.7) (Ozkara et al 
2001,2002,2003,2004a,2004b). In another study from Turkey have been administrated by 
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Turla et al (2006). The study paticipants 43.5 % were medical doctor and 45.5% auxiliary 
health professionals. Of all participants, 33.6% did not object to euthanasia and 7.9% were 
asked to perform euthanasia. Eighty point seven percent of the participants noted that 
euthanasia could be abused even if a euthanasia law were passed. Only 7.9% of the health 
professionals were requested to perform euthanasia. This can be explained by that fact that 
the study included not only physicians but also other health professionals. It can be 
concluded that the health professionals should have a chance to discuss euthanasia and that 
their attitude toward and their expectations and worries about euthanasia should be taken 
into account when a euthanasia law is drafted.  
The one of cross-sectional study was evaluated health professional’s attitudes towards 
euthanasia in Manisa and Erciyes in Turkey (Karadeniz et al. 2008). Participants were 
doctors, nurses, and midwives in this study.  Whereas 38.4% of the health personnel 
utterly agree to the definition of euthanasia as an act or practice of painlessly putting to 
death a person suffering from an incurable disease at his or her will, 11.2% of them 
express their absolute objection to the definition. While 46.7% of them fully support the 
idea that religious beliefs affect the decision to undergo euthanasia, 28% support the idea 
simply, and 4.3% of them don’t support the idea at all. The idea that life support to a 
patient should be decreased if he or she expresses his wish to undergo euthanasia is 
rejected by 35.4% of them, but welcomed by 28.2%. However, 18.7% of them were 
undecided; 40.7% of them completely disagreed to the idea that a patient should not be 
fed if he or she expresses his wish to undergo euthanasia; 33.9% simply disagreed the 
idea; and 15% were undecided. The patient’s wish to undergo euthanasia if he or she 
cannot live without a life support is rejected by 27.9% of them, whereas 25% of them are 
undecided. The view that euthanasia should be a legal procedure in all countries is 
supported by 16.5% and rejected by 29.3%. However, 24.4% of them are undecided. Those 
who say they will not perform euthanasia at all even if it becomes a legal procedure 
comprise 43.4% of them; while 5.7% say they can; and 23.9% of them are undecided. That 
the decision to undergo euthanasia should be given by the patient himself or herself is 
completely rejected by 21.7%; supported by 24.8%; and 19.9% are undecided. The 
percentages of health personnel who utterly disagree and who simply disagree to the 
opinion that the life of a patient should be terminated if he or she is in the vegetative state 
are the same: 26.6%. Those who are undecided are 28.2%; 42.4% of them say that they 
themselves would undergo euthanasia, while 17.9% of them say they would not; 5.7% of 
them were undecided. In Turkey, the approach of the health professional groups related 
closely with the subject and patients is being researched in many studies.  
Another research investigates thoroughly the psychologists' approach to euthanasia 
practices in Turkey which is considered illegal in Turkey. The research participants were 
psychologists (n=100) who were working in Izmir (West Anatolia) and Ankara (Middle 
Anatolia). The participants were found to believe that euthanasia is being secretly practiced 
in Turkey despite being illegal and 85% view euthanasia as a legal right for patients with 
certain diseases (Ozkara 2004c).  
Other study has been carried out to determine the opinions of nurses working in intensive 
care units (ICU) of the several hospitals in Adana (South Anatolia). This descriptive study 
was performed on 186 nurses working in the ICUs. The mean age of the nurses who 26.9 
±3.9, 73.7% of them had graduated from vocationals schools, and themean duration of 
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professional experience was 6.6 ±5.1. Of all the nurses, 50.0% were married, 44.6% 
working at the ICU of internal medicine; 55.9% thought that euthanasia was the right of a 
patient as a human being, and 24.8% of them would ask for euthanasia if they were 
bedridden. Legal euthanasia in Turkey was not supported by 39.8% of the nurses, and 
there were more nurses supporting the legality of euthanasia (both active and passive). In 
case it becomes legal, 63.4% of the nurses think that euthanasia should be practiced by a 
team that determined by law, 81.7% would not want to take part in an euthanasia 
practice, 81.2% think that it could be exploited by people.of all the nurses 44.1% believe 
that euthanasia is being practiced in some conditions in our country. It was seen that 
nurses working in at ICU's support passive euthanasia rather than active euthanasia 
(Kumas 2005).  
Tepehan, et al (2009) have evaluated doctors' and nurses' attitudes to euthanasia in 
intensive care units and surgical, internal medicine and paediatric units in Turkey. A total 
of 205 doctors and 206 nurses working in several hospitals in Istanbul participated. 
Significantly higher percentages of doctors (35.3%) and nurses (26.6%) working in 
intensive care units encountered euthanasia requests than those working in other units. 
Doctors and nurses caring for terminally ill patients in intensive care units differed 
considerably in their attitudes to euthanasia and patient rights from other health care 
staff. Recently, physician assisted suicide has been the topic of much controversy. Some 
nurses may see assisted suicide as an ethical dilemma; other nurses assisted suicide is still 
illegal.  
A descriptive study investigated the current status of ethics instruction in Turkish nursing 
education programs. The sample for this study comprised 39 nursing schools, which 
represented 51% of all nursing schools in Turkey. The results revealed that 18 of these 
nursing schools incorporated an ethics course into undergraduate and three into graduate 
level programs. Most of the educators focused on the basic concepts of ethics, deontological 
theory, ethical principles, ethical problems in health care, patient rights and codes of ethics 
for nurses. More than half of the educators believed that students' theoretical knowledge of 
ethics is applied to their clinical experiences. The teaching methods used included 
discussion in class, lectures, case studies, small group discussion, dramatization and 
demonstration. Assessment was carried out by means of written essays and written 
examinations (Gorgulu & Dinc 2007).  
Another study were to give Turkish university students on attitudes to euthanasia, and to 
assess the impact of type of education on attitudes towards euthanasia and to determine 
the influence of socio-demographics on attitudes of the students towards euthanasia. In 
total, 878 volunteered undergraduate registered students with the mean age of 21.13±1.92 
year from six universities were surveyed. The students were divided into two groups 
according to education program as follows: Health Science students (HS) and Liberal Arts 
and Business students (LAB).Two students major groups-Health Science (n = 421) and 
Liberal Arts and Business (n = 457), were compared. 48.4% of the students were positive 
to euthanasia. The socio-demographic factors, including mother`s education level, 
family`s socio-economic background, religious belief and religiosity were seen to be 
influenced on attitudes towards euthanasia among the overall students. No significant 
difference regarding the acceptance of euthanasia between the Health Science majors and 
the Liberal Arts and Business majors. Mainly, 40% of the Muslim students are opposed to 
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professional experience was 6.6 ±5.1. Of all the nurses, 50.0% were married, 44.6% 
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euthanasia, whereas 86.7% of the atheist students are the most in favour of euthanasia. 
The religion was selected as the most important reason for being negative to euthanasia. 
The results showed that resistance to euthanasia is apparently associated with 
demographics and non-scientific reasoning among Turkish undergraduate students (Bas 
Aslan & Cavlak 2007).  
While a topic long debated in Western nations at a public level, euthanasia (Physician-
assisted suicide) in Turkey has been a subject relegated to debate among a small group of 
subject experts. For the first time, as a component of Turkey’s First Gerontology Atlas 
(GeroAtlas) research project, euthanasia has been investigated from the perspective of the 
elderly. Based on the analysis of gender specific data acquired in the project, a number of 
observations have been presented. The purpose of this research is not solely to present the 
perspectives of the elderly concerning euthanasia, but to call attention to the need to bring 
deliberation on this topic into the realm of public opinion, to go deeper and bring new 
perspectives to light, and emphasize the need for people from all segments of society to 
enter this debate (Tufan 2009).  
In other interventional study was undertaken to assess the impact of physiotherapy 
education on the knowledge and attitudes of physiotherapists (PTs) and physiotherapy 
students (PSs) toward euthanasia. The study, which included a total of 494 participants 
(311 PTs; 183 PSs) aged 18 to 52 y from the western and central portions of Turkey. 
Results indicated that PTs (48.9%) were more likely to approve of euthanasia than PSs 
(38.3%) (P<.05). The legalization of euthanasia was favored by 43.7% of PTs, compared 
with 29.5% of PSs (P<.05). On the other hand, PTs and PSs expressed similar views 
regarding euthanasia, including reasons for accepting or opposing euthanasia and 
acceptable conditions for its use (P> .05). Overall results showed that sex and age had no 
effect on whether euthanasia was accepted (P> .05); religiousness was found to have the 
greatest effect on attitudes toward euthanasia (P<.05). The findings of the current study 
suggest that (1) the attitudes of PTs are different from those of PSs, and (2) the Islamic 
point of view has a negative impact on the attitudes of PTs and PSs toward euthanasia 
(Cavlak, et al 2007).  
Kok, et al (2003) in their study to determine the approach and expectation of physicians at 
Erzurum (East Anatolia) on the subject of euthanasia. In this cross-sectional study, a 
questionnaire was applied to 69 physicians working at Erzurum. Out of 69 physicians that 
replied the questionnaire 55% was male, 63% of physicians declared that theyare against 
euthanasia practice to be legalised. 68 % of participants said that euthanasia discussion in 
our country is beneficial. In other study 87 physicians working at Duzce, an important city 
of Black Sea region. 72% of participants were male and the mean age is 33.147.29 years, and 
54% of participants were specialist. 48% of physicians declared that they are against 
euthanasia practice to be legalised. While only 12% of the doctors attending our study 
declared that they had come across formal request of euthanasia 42% said that they believed 
that euthanasia in our country has been practiced secretly although it is forbidden. 84 % of 
participants said that euthanasia discussion in our country is beneficial (Ozkara, et al 
2004d).   
Bilgen, et al (2009) in their study was to assess the attitudes and practices of doctors and 
nurses about end-of-life decisions and compare our results with those observed in 
different European countries. The data was collected from nurses and doctors, using a 
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standardized questionnaire adapted from the EURONIC study. A total of 250 structured 
questionnaires were delivered, and 135 (77%) of them were accepted for analysis. The 
end-of-life decision was taken in 39.4% of the hospitals and personal involvement was 
40%. Although an ethical committee was present in the hospitals of 61.5% of responders, a 
written policy was present in only 3.1% of the units. The mean attitude score was 6.5. 
Seventy-five percent of the contributors agreed that everything possible should be done to 
ensure a neonate’s survival regardless of the prognosis and 65.2% of responders believed 
that costs of health care should not affect nontreatment decisions. Most of the responders 
(65.2%) agreed that severe mental disability as an outcome was equal to or worse than 
death. In patients in whom medical intervention would be futile, or would not offer 
sufficient benefit to justify the burdens imposed, hospitals should set up a functional 
ethical committee in order to decide in matters of withholding or withdrawing 
intervention.  
Another study was to reveal what pneumologists who worked in oncology clinics thought 
about euthanasia. The mean age of the pneumologists included in the study (n=110) was 
32.90±7.01 years. Of the pneumologists, 40.8% were against euthanasia and 46.7% believed 
that euthanasia was performed in Turkey although it was illegal. Thirty-one point five 
percent of the pneumologists working in oncology clinics and 14.3% of the pneumologists 
working in clinics other than oncology clinics faced euthanasia requests. The opinions of 
health professionals taking care of terminally ill patients on euthanasia and patient rights 
are very important. Frequent requests for euthanasia and the health professionals' belief that 
euthanasia is performed secretly in Turkey demonstrate that euthanasia should be discussed 
openly and attitude and approach towards euthanasia should be investigated (Yalniz, et al 
2010). 
In many European countries, the last decade has been marked by an increasing debate 
about the acceptability and regulation of euthanasia and other end-of-life decisions in 
medical practice. Growing public sensibility to a 'right to die' for terminally ill patients 
has been one of the main constituents of these debates.  Cohen, et al (2006) have described 
and compared acceptance of euthanasia among the general public in 33 European 
countries. Results showed that the acceptance of euthanasia tended to be high in some 
countries (e.g. the Netherlands, Denmark, France, Sweden), while a markedly low 
acceptance was found in others (e.g. Romania, Malta and Turkey). A multivariate ordinal 
regression showed that weaker religious belief was the most important factor associated 
with a higher acceptance; however, there were also socio-demographic differences: 
younger cohorts, people from non-manual social classes, and people with a higher 
educational level tended to have a higher acceptance of euthanasia. While religious belief, 
socio-demographic factors, and also moral values (i.e. the belief in the right to self-
determination) could largely explain the differences between countries, our findings 
suggest that perceptions regarding euthanasia are probably also influenced by national 
traditions and history (e.g. Germany).  
5. Factors of affecting attitudes towards euthanasia 
According to several study of result have described various factors which have a great 
influence on most individuals’ view of euthanasia. These factors include cultural and 
religious beliefs, age, gender and socio-demographic factors. 
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Age has a very strong impact on people’s attitudes towards euthanasia. An elderly person 
with a terminal illness is vulnerable. They may lack the knowledge and skills to alleviate 
their symptoms, and may well suffer from fear about the future and anxiety about the effect 
of the illness on others. The elderly person’s decision making about euthanasia may be 
affected by confusion, dementia, depression or other related symptoms, which could be 
relieved with appropriate treatment and social support. Great pressure is experienced by 
elderly people to request euthanasia because many of them already feel a burden to their 
families and caregivers. Another study in India to determine the elderly’s attitude towards 
death, the majority were not afraid of death, due to their strong faith in God. About 61.5% of 
the elderly supported euthanasia, but expressed concern that euthanasia might be misused 
as a means of getting rid of invalid elderly persons and avoiding the responsibility of caring 
for them. In the study conducted by one researcher a significant association between age 
and the choice for euthanasia was found. It was also reported another study that support for 
voluntary euthanasia is even stronger among the elderly.  
5.2 Race 
Life-prolonging techniques became increasingly available and there were possibly 
generational and cultural changes in patients’ attitudes. According to several researchers 
attitudes towards the dying patient and the appropriate treatment approach are based on 
cultural and emotional factors.  A cross-cultural perspective on any aspect of the attitude 
process could enrich our understanding in that it could provide insights that reach to the 
very core of societal stability. The first process is the way we express our attitudes toward 
other people and secondly is attitude change. 
5.3 Religion 
It is simply assumed that most Christians are united in their opposition to assisted suicide 
and voluntary euthanasia. Although many regular churchgoers apparently agree with 
legalizing some forms of active euthanasia, most theologians and church leaders remained 
opposed. Some church leaders suggest that to accept that one is not going to get well and 
therefore to request help to die is an act of faithless misery, a decree of hopelessness, and as 
such an offence against two of the central theological qualities, faith and hope. In the study 
conducted by another researcher, it was reported that Buddhists ideas in relation to 
euthanasia converge with Christian views.  
In South Africa Muslims made a declaration that active euthanasia where patients may end 
their lives by lethal injection is impermissible under any circumstances and that passive 
euthanasia where patients may withhold treatment or artificial life-support is only 
permissible if a trustworthy, reliable opinion and specialist feels that there is no hope of 
survival. In the study to determine American attitudes toward the physician’s role were 
found that various religious groups have strong effects on attitudes toward many social, 
political and moral issues.  
Protestants have been found to hold different attitudes concerning active euthanasia than 
Catholics. Among Protestant clergy, 73.2% accepted active euthanasia as a viable option, as 
opposed to 63.1% of the Catholic clergy. Protestants tended to favour active euthanasia 
more often than Catholics.  
 




Patients’ choices for care in the event of terminal illness relate to a complicated set of 
demographic, educational and cultural factors. One of study found that women wanted life-
sustaining treatments less often than did men. In a study that was conducted by another 
researcher about euthanasia and women, when mercy killings occur they are usually 
administered by men for women, with two-thirds of those being female. She also reported 
that women are over represented in assisted suicide and euthanasia reports. In addition, 
women will be affected most by euthanasia simply because they live longer and have fewer 
resources than men.  
5.5 Socio-demographic factors 
Researchers found that social changes, such as circumstantial changes, have an effect on 
people’s attitudes towards euthanasia in South Africa. Another study was shown that 
economic factors play a role in the individuals’ request for euthanasia. They mentioned that 
as medical treatment at the end of life becomes more than ever expensive, health insurance 
above all in the USA are beginning to question the economic soundness of providing long-
term treatment to terminally ill patients. According to many researchers highly educated, 
politically liberal people with a less religious self-perception are most likely to accept active 
euthanasia in the case of a terminally ill patient (Ramabele 2004). 
Many countries display their approach towards euthanasia according to their own 
conditions. Euthanasia is legal only in Holland and Belgium. Legal status of euthanasia 
varies from country to country. In contrast, euthanasia is stil illegal in many countrys. It was 
defined as “murder on request” in criminal laws of some countries such as Germany and 
Austria and it was not clearly defined but prohibited in some other countries such as Japan 
and Turkey.  
In Japan, people who perform euthanasia are sentenced to six months to seven years 
imprisonment. In Turkey, active euthanasia is not clearly defined in the criminal law, but it 
is considered “murder.” There is not an agreement about passive euthanasia, but it is not 
thought to deserve strict punishment. Assisted suicide is considered a kind of help to 
commit suicide. 
6. Conclusions 
In this book chapter we want to discuss Turkish health professional’s attitudes towards 
euthanasia. Under these conditions, it is important to keep the discussion healthy and alive. 
Any effort which tends to reach a consensus on this subject will help us in finding a way 
towards a rational solution for the euthanasia debate in Turkey.  
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1. Introduction  
Euthanasia in laboratory animals is a routinely procedure to properly complete the tests and 
experiments in which these models have a key role for the precise evaluation of various 
issues during the development of a scientific activity (Van Zutphen, 2001). The term 
euthanasia is derived from the Greek terms eu meaning good and thanatos meaning death 
(Webster, 1990). It is a necessary and accepted procedure in all aspects of veterinary 
medicine and many aspects of scientific procedures involving animals (Reilly, 2001). A 
“good death” would be one that occurs with minimal pain and distress.    
It has been estimated that 75 to 100 million vertebrates are used per year worldwide in 
research, teaching and testing activities for a wide range of purposes. Only in Europe 10.7 
million vertebrates are used annually for research purposes (Van Zutphen, 2001). Drug 
research, testing of vaccines and other biologicals, and cancer research account for about 
70% of the animals used, while the remaining 30% are used for purposes such as 
fundamental research, for diagnostic purposes, for teaching, etc. (Fig. 1) (Baumans, 2005) 
therefore, animals need to be killed for various reasons, including the collection of blood 
and tissues, culling of breeding stock, disposal at the end of an experiment and in those 
circumstances where animals are experiencing pain and distress which cannot be alleviated 
(Reilly, 2001). 
Euthanasia techniques should result in rapid loss of consciousness followed by cardiac or 
respiratory arrest and the ultimate loss of brain function. In addition, the technique should 
minimize distress and anxiety experienced by the animal prior to loss of consciousness 
(AVMA, 2007). For these reason, if an animal has to be killed, death must occur with the 
least fear, anxiety, pain and distress. The method used for euthanasia must either kill the 
animal very rapidly or instantaneously render the animal unconscious so that death ensues 
before consciousness is regained (Reilly, 2001).  
Selection of the most appropriate method of euthanasia in any given situation depends on 
the species of animal involved, adequate methods of animal restraint, skill of personnel, 
number of animals, and other considerations. Available information focuses primarily on 
domestic animals, but the same general considerations should be applied to all species. 
For the best method of euthanasia, the following criteria must be considered: (1) ability to 
induce loss of consciousness and death without causing pain, distress, anxiety, or 
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apprehension; (2) time required to induce loss of consciousness; (3) reliability; (4) safety of 
personnel; (5) irreversibility; (6) compatibility with requirement and purpose; (7) 
emotional effect on observers or operators; (8) compatibility with subsequent evaluation, 
examination, or use of tissue; (9) drug availability and human abuse potential; (10) 
compatibility with species, age, and health status; (11) ability to maintain equipment in 
proper working order; and (12) safety for predators/scavengers should the carcass be 





Fig. 1. Distribution of the purposes of animal use in research (Baumans, 2005) 
In this chapter, attention is paid to provide investigators and technicians details of the 
current state of information relevant to the euthanasia of animals used for scientific 
purposes, so they can choose the better decision about the suitability of methods for 
euthanasia considering the welfare of animals.  
2. Objectives of the euthanasia  
The primary criteria for euthanasia in terms of animal welfare is that the method used 
should be painless, achieve rapid unconsciousness and death, require minimum restraint, 
avoid excitement, is appropriate for the age, species, and health of the animal, must 
minimize fear and psychological stress in the animal, be reliable, reproducible, irreversible, 
simple to administer (in small doses if possible) and safe for the operator, and, so far as 
possible, be aesthetically acceptable for the operator (Close et al., 1996). 
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Animals are killed in laboratories or 
breeding establishments for various 
reasons: 
Statements to consider when is necessary 
to kill an animal, 
At the end of an experiment or when there 
might be continuing adverse effects; 
Humane procedures must be used 
(avoiding distress, reliable, producing 
rapid loss of consciousness without pain 
until death occurs and procedures should 
also be compatible with the scientific or 
educational aims 
To provide blood and· other tissues for a 
scientific purpose; 
Procedures must be performed only by 
persons competent in the method to be 
used, or under direct supervision of a 
competent person. 
When levels of pain, distress and suffering 
are likely to exceed the designated level; 
The appropriate means must be readily at 
hand 
Where the health or welfare of the animals 
are grounds for concern; 
Animals should be killed in a quiet, clean 
environment and normally away from 
other animals. There should be no disposal 
of the carcass until death is established. 
When they are no longer suitable for 
breeding; 
Dependent neonates of animals being 
killed must also be killed or provision 
made for their care 
Unwanted stock or those with unsuitable 
characteristics, for example, type or sex, are 
not needed. 
When fertilized eggs are used, the method 
of disposal must ensure the death of the 
embryo. 
Table 1. Reasons to explain why the laboratory animals must be euthanatized and 
statements to consider for do it.  
2.1 Signs of pain or distress in animals 
When animals are killed, both the method of euthanasia, particularly the time taken to 
produce unconciseness, and how the technique is performed can result in animals 
experiencing pain, distress, fear and anxiety. Furthermore, the animal’s psychological 
response to the environment in which it is killed, including interactions with other animals 
and humans and how it is handled, can result in emotional distress. 
Pain may be defined as “an aversive sensory experience that elicits protective motor actions, 
results in learned avoidance and may modify species-specific traits of behaviour, including 
social behaviour” The use of the word pain implies a conscious awareness of the stimulus 
and not an unconscious reflex response (Close et al., 1996). 
Physiologically, pain is that sensation (perception) that results from nerve impulses reaching 
the cerebral cortex via ascending neural pathways. Under normal circumstances, these 
pathways are relatively specific, but the nervous system is sufficiently plastic that activation of 
nociceptive pathways does not always result in pain and stimulation of other (non-
nociceptive) peripheral and central neurons can give rise to pain. The term nociceptive is 
derived from the word noci meaning to injure and ceptive meaning to receive, and is used to 
describe neuronal input caused by noxious stimuli, which threaten to, or actually do, destroy 
tissue. These noxious stimuli initiate nerve impulses by acting at primary nociceptors and 
 
Euthanasia – The “Good Death” Controversy in Humans and Animals 
 
192 
apprehension; (2) time required to induce loss of consciousness; (3) reliability; (4) safety of 
personnel; (5) irreversibility; (6) compatibility with requirement and purpose; (7) 
emotional effect on observers or operators; (8) compatibility with subsequent evaluation, 
examination, or use of tissue; (9) drug availability and human abuse potential; (10) 
compatibility with species, age, and health status; (11) ability to maintain equipment in 
proper working order; and (12) safety for predators/scavengers should the carcass be 





Fig. 1. Distribution of the purposes of animal use in research (Baumans, 2005) 
In this chapter, attention is paid to provide investigators and technicians details of the 
current state of information relevant to the euthanasia of animals used for scientific 
purposes, so they can choose the better decision about the suitability of methods for 
euthanasia considering the welfare of animals.  
2. Objectives of the euthanasia  
The primary criteria for euthanasia in terms of animal welfare is that the method used 
should be painless, achieve rapid unconsciousness and death, require minimum restraint, 
avoid excitement, is appropriate for the age, species, and health of the animal, must 
minimize fear and psychological stress in the animal, be reliable, reproducible, irreversible, 
simple to administer (in small doses if possible) and safe for the operator, and, so far as 
possible, be aesthetically acceptable for the operator (Close et al., 1996). 
 
Medical and Bioethical Issues in Laboratory Animal 
 
193 
Animals are killed in laboratories or 
breeding establishments for various 
reasons: 
Statements to consider when is necessary 
to kill an animal, 
At the end of an experiment or when there 
might be continuing adverse effects; 
Humane procedures must be used 
(avoiding distress, reliable, producing 
rapid loss of consciousness without pain 
until death occurs and procedures should 
also be compatible with the scientific or 
educational aims 
To provide blood and· other tissues for a 
scientific purpose; 
Procedures must be performed only by 
persons competent in the method to be 
used, or under direct supervision of a 
competent person. 
When levels of pain, distress and suffering 
are likely to exceed the designated level; 
The appropriate means must be readily at 
hand 
Where the health or welfare of the animals 
are grounds for concern; 
Animals should be killed in a quiet, clean 
environment and normally away from 
other animals. There should be no disposal 
of the carcass until death is established. 
When they are no longer suitable for 
breeding; 
Dependent neonates of animals being 
killed must also be killed or provision 
made for their care 
Unwanted stock or those with unsuitable 
characteristics, for example, type or sex, are 
not needed. 
When fertilized eggs are used, the method 
of disposal must ensure the death of the 
embryo. 
Table 1. Reasons to explain why the laboratory animals must be euthanatized and 
statements to consider for do it.  
2.1 Signs of pain or distress in animals 
When animals are killed, both the method of euthanasia, particularly the time taken to 
produce unconciseness, and how the technique is performed can result in animals 
experiencing pain, distress, fear and anxiety. Furthermore, the animal’s psychological 
response to the environment in which it is killed, including interactions with other animals 
and humans and how it is handled, can result in emotional distress. 
Pain may be defined as “an aversive sensory experience that elicits protective motor actions, 
results in learned avoidance and may modify species-specific traits of behaviour, including 
social behaviour” The use of the word pain implies a conscious awareness of the stimulus 
and not an unconscious reflex response (Close et al., 1996). 
Physiologically, pain is that sensation (perception) that results from nerve impulses reaching 
the cerebral cortex via ascending neural pathways. Under normal circumstances, these 
pathways are relatively specific, but the nervous system is sufficiently plastic that activation of 
nociceptive pathways does not always result in pain and stimulation of other (non-
nociceptive) peripheral and central neurons can give rise to pain. The term nociceptive is 
derived from the word noci meaning to injure and ceptive meaning to receive, and is used to 
describe neuronal input caused by noxious stimuli, which threaten to, or actually do, destroy 
tissue. These noxious stimuli initiate nerve impulses by acting at primary nociceptors and 
 
Euthanasia – The “Good Death” Controversy in Humans and Animals 
 
194 
other sensory nerve endings that respond to noxious and non-noxious stimuli from 
mechanical, thermal, or chemical activity. Endogenous chemical substances such as hydrogen 
ions, potassium ions, ATP, serotonin, histamine, bradykinin, and prostaglandins, as well as 
electrical currents, are capable of generating nerve impulses in nociceptor nerve fibers. Activity 
in nociceptive pathways can also be triggered in normally silent receptors that become 
sensitized by chronic pain condition (Vierck et al., 1989; Wall, 1992). 
Nerve impulse activity generated by nociceptors is conducted via nociceptor primary 
afferent fibers to the spinal cord or the brainstem where it is transmitted to two general sets 
of neural networks. One set is related to nociceptive reflexes (eg, withdrawal and flexion 
reflexes) that are mediated at the spinal level, and the second set consists of ascending 
pathways to the reticular formation, hypothalamus, thalamus, and cerebral cortex 
(somatosensory cortex and limbic system) for sensory processing. It is important to 
understand that ascending nociceptive pathways are numerous, often redundant, and are 
capable of considerable plasticity under chronic conditions (pathology or injury). Moreover, 
even the transmission of nociceptive neural activity in a given pathway is highly variable. 
Under certain conditions, both the nociceptive reflexes and the ascending pathways may be 
suppressed, as, for example, in epidural anesthesia. Under another set of conditions, 
nociceptive reflex actions may occur, but activity in the ascending pathways is suppressed; 
thus, noxious stimuli are not perceived as pain. It is incorrect to use the term pain for 
stimuli, receptors, reflexes, or pathways because the term implies perception, whereas all 
the above may be active without consequential pain perception (Breazile & Kitchel, 1969; 
Zinnerman, 1984).  
Pain is divided into two broad categories: (1) sensory-discriminative, which indicates the 
site of origin and the stimulus giving rise to the pain; and (2) motivational-affective in which 
the severity of the stimulus is perceived and the animal’s response is determined. Sensory-
discriminative processing of nociceptive impulses is most likely to be accomplished by 
subcortical and cortical mechanisms similar to those used for processing other sensory-
discriminative input that provides provides the individual with information about the 
intensity, duration, location, and quality of the stimulus. Motivational-affective processing 
involves the ascending reticular formation for behavioral and cortical arousal. It also 
involves thalamic input to the forebrain and the limbic system for perceptions such as 
discomfort, fear, anxiety, and depression. The motivational-affective neural networks also 
have strong inputs to the limbic system, hypothalamus and the autonomic nervous system 
for reflex activation of the cardiovascular, pulmonary, and pituitary-adrenal systems. 
Responses activated by these systems feed back to the forebrain and enhance perceptions 
derived via motivational-affective inputs. On the basis of neurosurgical experience in 
humans, it is possible to separate the sensory-discriminative components from the 
motivational-affective components of pain (Kitchel et al., 1993).  
For pain to be experienced, the cerebral cortex and subcortical structures must be functional. 
If the cerebral cortex is nonfunctional because of hypoxia, depression by drugs, electric 
shock, or concussion, pain is not experienced. Therefore, the choice of the euthanasia agent 
or method is less critical if it is to be used on an animal that is anesthetized or unconscious, 
provided that the animal does not regain consciousness prior to death.  
An understanding of the continuum that represents stress and distress is essential for 
evaluating techniques that minimize any distress experienced by an animal being 
euthanatized. Stress has been defined as the effect of physical, physiologic, or emotional 
factors (stressors) that induce an alteration in an animal’s homeostasis or adaptive state 
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(Kitchen et al., 1989). The response of an animal to stress represents the adaptive process 
that is necessary to restore the baseline mental and physiologic state. These responses may 
involve changes in an animal’s neuroendocrinologic system, autonomic nervous system, 
and mental status that may result in overt behavioral changes. An animal’s response varies 
according to its experience, age, species, breed, and current physiologic and psychologic 
state (NRC, 1992). 
2.2 Identification and recognition of death 
It is essential that all personnel are trained to recognize and confirm death in the species 
they are working. The most important aspects in recognition of death include cessation of 
heartbeat and respiration, absence of reflexes, and in small laboratory animals, the lowering 
of the body temperature to below 25°C. The method chosen will depend on the species 
being handled. If there is any doubt about confirmation of death, a second method should 
be used to kill the animal (Close et al., 1996). 
2.3 Personal training 
All methods of euthanasia can be badly performed and therefore personnel carrying out 
euthanasia on animals must be suitably trained to carry out euthanasia in the most effective 
and humane manner. Professional advice should be sought (Close et al., 1996). Personnel 
who perform euthanasia must have appropriate certification and training, experience with 
the techniques to be used, and experience in the humane restraint of the species of animal to 
be euthanatized, to ensure that animal pain and distress are minimized during euthanasia. 
Training and experience should include familiarity with the normal behaviour of the species 
being euthanatized, an appreciation of how handling and restraint affects that behaviour, 
and an understanding of the mechanism by which the selected technique induces loss of 
consciousness and death. Prior to being assigned full responsibility for performing 
euthanasia, all personnel must have demonstrated proficiency in the use of the technique in 
a closely supervised environment (AVMA, 2007). Training programmes should include 
courses on the biology of the species to be used, suitable methods of euthanasia for each 
species and national and animal welfare regulations. Training must include aspects such as 
recognition of pain, fear, distress, anxiety, insensibility and death for all species to be used.  
Experienced personnel who have developed a trusting relationship with the particular 
animals should be used for euthanasia of these animals as this will minimize stress and 
anxiety in the animals. 
All people performing euthanasia should demonstrate professionalism and sensitivity 
for the value of animal life. The degree of distress experienced by those people observing 
or performing euthanasia in any form is dependent on their backgrounds and on their 
personal philosophies and ethical concerns about using animals in research. The stress of 
performing euthanasia is magnified when there are strong emotional bonds between 
personnel and individual animals or when large numbers of animals are killed on a regular 
basis (Close et al., 1996). 
2.4 Equipment and Instrumentation required 
Equipment, instruments and installations used for stunning or killing animals should be 
designed, constructed and maintained so as to achieve rapid stunning and death. They 
should be regularly inspected and cleaned to (Close et al., 1996). 
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2.5 Disposal of carcasses 
After death has been verified, the carcase must be disposed of appropriately (Reilly, 2001). 
The possible hazards to humans when animals are known to be carrying a zoonotic agent or 
were treated with radioisotopes or toxic chemicals must be evaluated and personnel 
handling such carcasses should take the necessary precautions to protect themselves and 
others (Close et al., 1996). This is particularly important for animal such as sheep, cattle, pigs 
and horses which may be used for human or pet food (Reilly, 2001). Care should be taken 
when disposing of carcasses and other waste, for example water in which agents have been 
dissolved that it does not provide any danger to others or the environment (Close et al., 
1996).  
2.6 Modes of action of euthanatizing agents 
Euthanatizing agents cause death by three basic mechanisms: (1) hypoxia, direct or indirect; 
(2) direct depression of neurons necessary for life function; and (3) physical disruption of 
brain activity and destruction of neurons necessary for life. 
Agents that induce death by direct or indirect hypoxia can act at various sites and can cause 
loss of consciousness at different rates. For death to be painless and distress-free, loss of 
consciousness should precede loss of motor activity (muscle movement). Loss of motor 
activity, however, cannot be equated with loss of consciousness and absence of distress. 
Thus, agents that induce muscle paralysis without loss of consciousness are not acceptable 
as sole agents for euthanasia (eg, depolarizing and nondepolarizing muscle relaxants, 
strychnine, nicotine, and magnesium salts). With other techniques that induce hypoxia, 
some animals may have motor activity following loss of consciousness, but this is reflex 
activity and is not perceived by the animal. 
A second group of euthanatizing agents depress nerve cells of the brain, inducing loss of 
consciousness followed by death. Some of these agents release inhibition of motor activity 
during the first stage of anesthesia, resulting in a so-called excitement or delirium phase, 
during which there may be vocalization and some muscle contraction. These responses do 
not appear to be purposeful. Death follows loss of consciousness, and is attributable to 
cardiac arrest and/or hypoxemia following direct depression of respiratory centers. 
Physical disruption of brain activity, caused by concussion, direct destruction of the brain, 
or electrical depolarization of neurons, induces rapid loss of consciousness. Death occurs 
because of destruction of midbrain centers controlling cardiac and respiratory activity or as 
a result of adjunctive methods (eg, exsanguination) used to kill the animal. Exaggerated 
muscular activity can follow loss of consciousness and, although this may disturb some 
observers, the animal is not experiencing pain or distress (AVMA, 2007). 
2.7 Acceptable methods of euthanasia in laboratory animals 
2.7.1 Physical methods 
These methods must cause immediate loss of consciousness through physical trauma to the 
brain. They are most useful when pharmacological methods would interfere with the 
purpose of the experiment. While physical methods may be aesthetically less pleasant for 
observers and those killing animals, in skilled hands they are quick and certain and possibly 
the least distressing for the animal. 
Specialist training is essential for all of these methods. These methods require restraint 
which may cause extra stress for some animals. If possible the animal should not be killed in 
the sight or smell of other animals (Close et al., 1996). 
 




Shooting in the head to ensure immediate destruction of the brain is an effective and 
humane way of killing large reptiles and mammals. This may be divided into two types: 
captive bolt or free bullet. The type of weapon used must be selected according to the 
species to be killed and the environment. 
Captive bolt: A penetrating captive bolt is used for euthanasia of ruminants, horses, swine, 
laboratory rabbits, and dogs. Its mode of action is concussion and trauma to the cerebral 
hemisphere and brainstem (Blackmore, 1985; Dennis et al., 1988; Daly and Whittington, 
1989). Captive bolt guns are powered by gunpowder or compressed air and must provide 
sufficient energy to penetrate the skull of the species on which they are being used 
(Blackmore, 1985). Adequate restraint is important to ensure proper placement of the 
captive bolt. A cerebral hemisphere and the brainstem must be sufficiently disrupted by the 
projectile to induce sudden loss of consciousness and subsequent death. Accurate placement 
of captive bolts for various species has been described (Clifford, 1984; Blackmore, 1985; Daly 
and Whittington, 1989). A multiple projectile has been suggested as a more effective 
technique, especially for large cattle (Blackmore, 1985). A nonpenetrating captive bolt only 
stuns animals and should not be used as a sole means of euthanasia (must be stunning 
under adjunctive methods). An advantage of the penetrating captive bolt is that could be an 
effective method of euthanasia for use in research facilities, in slaughterhouses, and on the 
farm when use of drugs is inappropriate or unavailable, but the disadvantages of this 
method is that is aesthetically displeasing and the death may not occur if equipment is not 
maintained and used properly. The use of the penetrating captive bolt is an acceptable and 
practical method of euthanasia in horses, ruminants, and swine, and it is conditionally 
acceptable in other appropriate species. However the non-penetrating captive bolt must not 
be used as a sole method of euthanasia. 
Free bullet: Special care must be taken to avoid danger to the operator using this method. All 
personnel must be trained in these techniques to ensure the correct positioning of the 
weapon to ensure a direct hit into the brain (Longair et al., 1991). Shooting using a free 
bullet must not be used inside a building because of danger to personnel from ricocheting 
bullets, but it may be used effectively in the field by skilled marksmen. When the animal can 
be appropriately restrained, the captive bolt method is preferable as there is less danger to 
personnel. A free bullet humane killer is preferred for example, on horses (Oliver, 1979; 
Blackmore, 1985; Dodd, 1985). 
2.7.1.2 Concussion 
This may be carried out by several means depending on the size of the animal. In smaller 
animals such as small rabbits, newborn kittens and newborn puppies, rats, mice, young 
guinea pigs, hamsters, birds, small reptiles, amphibians and fish (Clifford, 1984), a blow on 
the head may be sufficient to render the animal insensible (Green, 1987). Experience and 
training are essential for the correct choice of method to be used. 
In larger animals specialized equipment such as the non-penetrating captive bolt must be 
used. The use of the hammer or poleaxe is condemned as a method of stunning. These 
methods must always be followed immediately by exsanguination, removal of the heart or 
destruction of the brain to ensure death. Training is essential for all operators. If not 
performed correctly, various degrees of consciousness with concomitant pain can ensue. 
It is difficult to ensure consistency in performance by operators and therefore only a few 
animals should be killed using this method at any time. Death must be confirmed in each 
animal before the next animal is stunned. 
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High pressure water jet has been successfully used for the stunning of pigs and is an 
accepted method in Switzerland (Schatzmann et al., 1991, 1994). 
2.7.1.3 Electrical stunning 
Electrical current has been used for stunning species such as dogs, cattle, sheep, goats, hogs, 
fish and chickens (Warrington, 1974; Gregory & Wotton, 1986; Eikelenboom, 1986; Lambooy 
& Voorst, 1986; Anil & McKinstry, 1991). 
Experiments with dogs have identified a need to direct the electrical current through the 
brain to induce rapid loss of consciousness. In dogs, when electricity passes only between 
fore-and hind limbs or neck and feet, it causes the heart to fibrillate but does not induce 
sudden loss of consciousness (Roberts, 1954). For electrical stunning of any animal, an 
apparatus that applies electrodes to opposite sides of the head, or in another way directs 
electrical current immediately through the brain, is necessary to induce rapid loss of 
consciousness. Attachment of electrodes and animal restraint can pose problems with this 
form of stunning. Signs of effective electrical stunning are extension of the limbs, 
opisthotonos, downward rotation of the eyeballs, and tonic spasm changing to clonic spasm, 
with eventual muscle flaccidity.  
Electrical stunning should be followed promptly by electrically induced cardiac fibrillation, 
exsanguination, or other appropriate methods to ensure death (AVMA, 2007). 
2.7.1.4 Cervical dislocation 
Cervical dislocation is a technique that has been used for many years and, when performed 
by well-trained individuals, appears to be humane. However, there are few scientific studies 
to confirm this observation. 
This technique is used to euthanatize poultry, other small birds, mice, and immature rats 
and rabbits. For mice and rats, the thumb and index finger are placed on either side of the 
neck at the base of the skull or, alternatively, a rod is pressed at the base of the skull. With 
the other hand, the base of the tail or the hind limbs is quickly pulled, causing separation of 
the cervical vertebrae from the skull. For immature rabbits, the head is held in one hand and 
the hind limbs in the other. The animal is stretched and the neck is hyperextended and 
dorsally twisted to separate the first cervical vertebra from the skull (Clifford, 1984). For 
poultry, cervical dislocation by stretching is a common method for mass euthanasia, but loss 
of consciousness may not be instantaneous (Lambooy, 1986). 
Data suggest that electrical activity in the brain persists for 13 seconds following cervical 
dislocation (Vanderwolf, 1988), and unlike decapitation, rapid exsanguination does not 
contribute to loss of consciousness (Derr, 1991; Holson, 1992). 
2.7.1.5 Decapitation 
Decapitation can be used to euthanatize rodents and small rabbits in research settings. It 
provides a means to recover tissues and body fluids that are chemically uncontaminated. It 
also provides a means of obtaining anatomically undamaged brain tissue for study 
(Feldman & Gupta, 1976). Also, this procedure has been used for killing fish, amphibians 
and birds. Decapitation involves the severing of the neck of the animal, close to the head by 
using a sharp instrument. The use of scissors is discouraged unless they are suited to the 
species of animal (i.e. have sufficiently long blades) and the pressure is strong enough to 
sever the neck in one go with ease. Decapitation should be carried out using guillotines 
designed especially for that purpose to ensure rapid and quick severance in the correct 
position (Clifford, 1984). Guillotines that are designed to accomplish decapitation in adult 
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rodents and small rabbits in a uniformly instantaneous manner are commercially available. 
Guillotines are not commercially available for neonatal rodents, but sharp blades can be 
used for this purpose. 
Although it has been demonstrated that electrical activity in the brain persists for 13 to 14 
seconds following decapitation (Mikeska & Klemm, 1975), more recent studies and reports 
indicate that this activity does not infer the ability to perceive pain, and in fact conclude that 
loss of consciousness develops rapidly (Vanderwolf et al., 1988; Derr, 1991; Holson, 1992). 
The immediate lack of circulation of blood to the brain and subsequent anoxia is thought to 
render the head rapidly insensible (Derr, 1991) making prior stunning or sedation 
unnecessary. Use of the puntilla is not acceptable (Commission of the European 
Communities, 1993). Use of other methods is preferred where possible until further research 
can show rapid loss of consciousness (Close et al., 1996). 
The advantages described for this procedure, is that decapitation is a technique that appears 
to induce rapid loss of consciousness (Vanderwolf et al., 1988; Derr, 1991; Holson, 1992). It 
does not chemically contaminate tissues and it is rapidly accomplished. On the other hand, 
the disadvantages are that is a technique requiring handling and restraint to perform it, and 
could be distressful to animals. Also, it has been widely discussed about the presence of 
electrical activity in the brain following decapitation, creating controversy and for that 
reason its importance may still be open to debate (Mikeska & Klemm, 1975; Vanderwolf et 
al., 1988; Derr, 1991; Holson, 1992). Decapitation must be done by trained personnel to 
perform this technique, which should recognize the inherent danger of the guillotine and 
take adequate precautions to prevent personal injury. And finally, decapitation may be 
aesthetically displeasing to personnel performing or observing the technique. 
 The recommendations when decapitation has been chosen, is to consider that this 
technique is conditionally acceptable if performed correctly, and it should be used in 
research settings when its use is required by the experimental design and approved by a 
Bioethical Committee. The equipment used to perform decapitation should be maintained 
in good working order and serviced on a regular basis to ensure sharpness of blades. The 
use of plastic cones to restrain animals appears to reduce distress from handling, 
minimizes the chance of injury to personnel, and improves positioning of the animal in 
the guillotine.  
2.7.1.6 Maceration 
This method is acceptable for the destruction of chicks up to 72 hours old which often have 
to be killed in large numbers (Bandow, 1987; Commission of the European Communities, 
1993). Only macerators designed specifically for this purpose must be used and under no 
conditions should domestic appliances be used (Close et al., 1996). The designed mechanical 
apparatus have rotating blades or projections, which causes immediate fragmentation and 
death of day-old poultry and embryonated eggs. A review (American Association of Avian 
Pathologists Animal Welfare and Management Practices Committee, 2005) about the use of 
commercially available macerators for euthanasia of chicks, poults, and pipped eggs 
indicates that death by maceration in day-old poultry occurs immediately with minimal 
pain and distress. Maceration is an alternative to the use of carbon dioxide for euthanasia of 
day-old poultry. Maceration is believed to be equivalent to cervical dislocation and cranial 
compression as to time element, and is considered to be an acceptable means of euthanasia 
for newly hatched poultry by the Federation of Agriculture Canada (1989), World 
Organization for Animal Health (OIE, 2006) and European Council (1993). 
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High pressure water jet has been successfully used for the stunning of pigs and is an 
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rodents and small rabbits in a uniformly instantaneous manner are commercially available. 
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The advantage of this procedure is that death is almost instantaneous, the method is safe for 
workers and large numbers of animals can be killed quickly. But the disadvantages 
described for maceration are that special equipment is required and the macerated tissues 
may present bio-security risks. It is recommended to consider than maceration requires 
special equipment that must be kept in excellent working order. Chicks must be delivered to 
the macerator in a way and at a rate that prevents a backlog of chicks at the point of entry 
into the macerator and without causing injury, suffocation, or avoidable distress to the 
chicks before maceration. 
2.7.1.7 Microwave irradiation 
Heating by microwave irradiation is used primarily by neurobiologists to fix brain 
metabolites in vivo while maintaining the anatomic integrity of the brain (Stavinoha, 
1983). Only specialist equipment (this does not include domestic microwave ovens) 
designed for this purpose is to be used (Close et al., 1996). Microwave instruments have 
been specifically designed for use in euthanasia of laboratory mice and rats. The 
instruments differ in design from kitchen units and may vary in maximal power output 
from 1.3 to 10 kw. All units direct their microwave energy to the head of the animal. The 
power required to rapidly halt brain enzyme activity depends on the efficiency of the unit, 
the ability to tune the resonant cavity and the size of the rodent head (Stavinoha et al., 
1978). There is considerable variation among instruments in the time required for loss of 
consciousness and euthanasia. A 10 kw, 2,450 MHz instrument operated at a power of 9 
kw will increase the brain temperature of 18 to 28 g mice to 79o C in 330 ms, and the brain 
temperature of 250 to 420 g rats to 94 C in 800 ms. (lkarashi et al., 1984). It is only to be 
carried out on small animals such as amphibians, birds, mice, rats and small rabbits (less 
than 300 g) (Zeller et al., 1989). This method requires specialist expertise, but when carried 
out correctly is humane as death occurs in milliseconds (Andrews et al., 1993, Bermann et 
al., 1985, Olfert et al., 1993).  Care must be taken to ensure correct positioning of the 
microwave beam but time taken to restrain the animal should be kept to a minimum to 
reduce stress prior to euthanasia. 
The advantages for this procedure are that it cause loss of consciousness achieved in less 
than 100 ms, and death in less than 1 second. Besides, this is the most effective method to fix 
brain tissue in vivo for subsequent assay of enzymatically labile chemicals. The 
disadvantages mentioned for this technique are that the specific instruments are expensive 
and only small animals (with the size of mice and rats) can be euthanatized with commercial 
instruments that are currently available. 
2.7.2 Chemical methods 
Many anaesthetics are used in overdose as euthanasia agents. An anaesthetic is an agent that 
produces, in a controllable manner, a drug-induced absence of perception of all sensation. It 
produces unconsciousness, analgesia, and muscle relaxation sufficient to perform 
procedures painlessly (Close et al., 1996). 
2.7.3 Inhalational agents 
Any gas that is inhaled must reach a certain concentration in the alveoli before it can be 
effective; therefore, euthanasia with any of these agents may take some time. The suitability 
of a particular agent depends on whether an animal experiences distress between the time it 
begins to inhale the agent and the time it loses consciousness. Some agents may induce 
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convulsions, but these generally follow loss of consciousness. Agents inducing convulsions 
prior to loss of consciousness are unacceptable for euthanasia. Certain considerations are 
common to all inhalant agents: 
 In most cases, onset of loss of consciousness is more rapid, and euthanasia more 
humane, if the animal is rapidly exposed to a high concentration of the agent. 
 The equipment used to deliver and maintain this high concentration must be in good 
working order and in compliance with state and federal regulations. Leaky or faulty 
equipment may lead to slow, distressful death and be hazardous to other animals and 
to personnel.  
 Most of these agents are hazardous to personnel because of the risk of explosions (eg, 
ether), narcosis (eg, halothane), hypoxemia (eg, nitrogen and carbon monoxide), 
addiction (eg, nitrous oxide), or health effects resulting from chronic exposure (eg, 
nitrous oxide and carbon monoxide).  
 Alveolar concentrations rise slowly in an animal with decreased ventilation, making 
agitation more likely during induction. Other noninhalant methods of euthanasia 
should be considered for such animals.  
 Neonatal animals appear to be resistant to hypoxia, and because all inhalant agents 
ultimately cause hypoxia, neonatal animals take longer to die than adults. Glass et al, 
(1944) reported that newborn dogs, rabbits, and guinea pigs survived a nitrogen 
atmosphere much longer than did adults. Dogs, at 1 week old, survived for 14 minutes 
compared with a 3-minute survival time after a few weeks of age. Guinea pigs survived 
for 4.5 minutes at 1 day old, compared with 3 minutes at 8 days or older. Rabbits 
survived for 13 minutes at 6 days old, 4 minutes at 14 days, and 1.5 minutes at 19 days 
and older. The panel recommended that inhalant agents not be used alone in animals 
less than 16 weeks old except to induce loss of consciousness, followed by the use of 
some other method to kill the animal.  
 Rapid gas flows can produce a noise that frightens animals. If high flows are required, 
the equipment should be designed to minimize noise.  
 Animals placed together in chambers should be of the same species, and, if needed, 
should be restrained so that they will not hurt themselves or others. Chambers should 
not be overloaded and need to be kept clean to minimize  odours that might distress 
animals subsequently euthanatized  
 Reptiles, amphibians, and diving birds and mammals have a great capacity for holding 
their breath and anaerobic metabolism (AMMVA, 2007). 
2.7.3.1 Carbon dioxide 
At concentrations above 60%, carbon dioxide acts as an anaesthetic agent and causes rapid loss 
of consciousness (Green, 1987). It is effective and humane for euthanasia of most small animals 
above 70%. Carbon dioxide stimulates the respiratory centre which may cause anxiety and 
stress in the animal as well as being aesthetically unpleasant for the observer. Carbon dioxide 
may form carbonic acid when in contact with the nasal mucous membranes which could 
produce a fizzy or tingling effect which may be mildly irritating to some species when applied 
at lower concentrations (Lucke, 1979). In most animals it is recommended to place them 
immediately into > 70% CO2 where the animals lose consciousness very quickly due to the 
narcotic effect of the high intake of CO2 on the brain without causing hypoxia (Forslid et a1., 
1986; Blackshaw et a1., 1988). One hundred per cent CO2 may cause severe dyspnoea and 
distress in conscious animals (van Zutphen et a1., 1993). 
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convulsions, but these generally follow loss of consciousness. Agents inducing convulsions 
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survived for 13 minutes at 6 days old, 4 minutes at 14 days, and 1.5 minutes at 19 days 
and older. The panel recommended that inhalant agents not be used alone in animals 
less than 16 weeks old except to induce loss of consciousness, followed by the use of 
some other method to kill the animal.  
 Rapid gas flows can produce a noise that frightens animals. If high flows are required, 
the equipment should be designed to minimize noise.  
 Animals placed together in chambers should be of the same species, and, if needed, 
should be restrained so that they will not hurt themselves or others. Chambers should 
not be overloaded and need to be kept clean to minimize  odours that might distress 
animals subsequently euthanatized  
 Reptiles, amphibians, and diving birds and mammals have a great capacity for holding 
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At concentrations above 60%, carbon dioxide acts as an anaesthetic agent and causes rapid loss 
of consciousness (Green, 1987). It is effective and humane for euthanasia of most small animals 
above 70%. Carbon dioxide stimulates the respiratory centre which may cause anxiety and 
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The advantages described for this procedure include: the rapid depressant, analgesic, and 
anesthetic effects of CO2 are well established. Also, carbon dioxide is readily available and 
can be purchased in compressed gas cylinders. Carbon dioxide is inexpensive, 
nonflammable, nonexplosive, and poses minimal hazard to personnel when used with 
properly designed equipment. The euthanasia with carbon dioxide does not result in 
accumulation of tissue residues in food-producing animals and finally, carbon dioxide does 
not distort murine cholinergic markers (Bereger-Sweeney et al., 1994) or corticosterone 
concentrations (Urbanski & Kelly, 1991). 
On the other hand, the disadvantages for using this euthanasia procedure are that CO2 is 
heavier than air, and incomplete filling of a chamber may permit animals to climb or raise 
their heads above the higher concentrations and avoid exposure; some species, such as fish 
and burrowing and diving mammals, may have extraordinary tolerance for CO2. Reptiles 
and amphibians may breathe too slowly for the use of CO2. Euthanasia by exposure to CO2 
may take longer than euthanasia by other means (Coenen et al., 1995). Also, induction of 
loss of consciousness at lower concentrations (< 80%) may produce pulmonary and upper 
respiratory tract lesions (Iwarsson & Rehbinder, 1993; Danneman et al., 1997) and must be 
considered that high concentrations of CO2 may be distressful to some animals. 
Room air contains 0.04% carbon dioxide (CO2), which is heavier than air and nearly 
odourless. Inhalation of CO2 at a concentration of 7.5% increases the pain threshold, and 
higher concentrations of CO2 have a rapid anesthesic effect (Leake & Waters, 1929; 
Woodbury, 1958; Simonsen et al., 1981; Lecky, 1983; Matson et al., 1992; Klemm, 1994). 
Several investigators have suggested that inhalation of high concentrations of CO2 may be 
distressing to animals (Carding, 1968; Hoenderken, 1983; Gregory et al., 1987, Britt, 1987), 
because the gas dissolves in moisture on the nasal mucosa. The resulting product, carbonic 
acid, may stimulate nociceptors in the nasal mucosa. Some humans exposed to 
concentrations of around 50% CO2 report that inhaling the gas is unpleasant and that higher 
concentrations are noxious (Anton et al., 1992; Danneman et al., 1997). Carbon dioxide has 
been used to euthanatize groups of small laboratory animals, including mice, rats, guinea 
pigs, chickens, and rabbits (Kline et al., 1963; Breazile & Kitchell, 1969; Kocula et al., 1971; 
Jaksch, 1981; Raj & Gregory, 1990), and to render swine unconscious before humane 
slaughter (Hoenderken, 1983; Gregory et al., 1987). 
2.7.3.2 Carbon monoxide 
This causes rapid death as it combines with the red blood cells in preference to oxygen, thus 
causing hypoxia (Chalifoux & Dallaire 1983).There is little or no distress as there is no smell 
(Breazile & Kitchell, 1969; Smith et a1., 1986; Green, 1987; Blackmore, 1993). It is not 
acceptable for use in reptiles because of their low metabolic rate and hypoxic tolerance. It is 
acceptable for small animals, but in dogs and cats vocalizations and convulsions may occur 
after unconsciousness making it aesthetically unpleasant. Death should be confirmed by 
physical means.  
In the past, mass euthanasia has been accomplished by use of 3 methods for generating CO: 
(1) chemical interaction of sodium formate and sulfuric acid, (2) exhaust fumes from idling 
gasoline internal combustion engines, and (3) commercially compressed CO in cylinders. 
The first 2 techniques are associated with problems such as production of other gases, 
achieving inadequate concentrations of carbon monoxide, inadequate cooling of the gas, and 
maintenance of equipment. Therefore, the only acceptable source is compressed CO in 
cylinders. 
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The advantages for this procedure are: carbon monoxide induces loss of consciousness 
without pain and with minimal discernible discomfort; hypoxemia induced by CO is 
insidious, so that the animal appears to be unaware and death occurs rapidly if 
concentrations of 4 to 6% are used. 
The disadvantages are that safeguards must be taken to prevent exposure of personnel and 
any electrical equipment exposed to CO (eg, lights and fans) must be explosion proof. 
As recommendations, must be considered that carbon monoxide used for individual animal 
or mass euthanasia is acceptable for dogs, cats, and other small mammals, provided that 
commercially compressed CO is used and the following precautions are taken: (1) personnel 
using CO must be instructed thoroughly in its use and must understand its hazards and 
limitations; (2) the CO chamber must be of the highest quality construction and should 
allow for separation of individual animals; (3) the CO source and chamber must be located 
in a well-ventilated environment, preferably out of doors; (4) the chamber must be well lit 
and have view ports that allow personnel direct observation of animals; (5) the CO flow rate 
should be adequate to rapidly achieve a uniform CO concentration of at least 6% after 
animals are placed in the chamber, although some species (eg, neonatal pigs) are less likely 
to become agitated with a gradual rise in CO concentration (Lambooy & Spanjaard, 1980); 
and (6) if the chamber is inside a room, CO monitors must be placed in the room to warn 
personnel of hazardous concentrations. 
2.7.3.3 Volatile inhalational anaesthetics 
When using any liquid anaesthetic care must be taken to ensure that it is not allowed to 
come in contact with the animal. Sufficient air or oxygen should be provided during the 
induction period to prevent hypoxia (Andrews et al., 1993). Exposure to trace concentrations 
of anaesthetic gases is a recognized human health hazard and requires gas scavenging 
apparatus to be used in the work environment. Volatile inhalational anaesthetics are neither 
flammable nor explosive. 
Halothane is a commonly used anaesthetic agent for small laboratory animals and is quick 
acting and stress free in overdose for euthanasia. It has a depressant effect on the 
cardiovascular and respiratory systems (Green, 1987). 
Enflurane is a commonly used anaesthetic agent for small laboratory animals and is quick 
acting and stress free in overdose for euthanasia (Green, 1987). It has a depressant effect on 
the cardiovascular and respiratory systems. It may be preferred to halothane in situations 
where drug metabolism or toxicological work is being conducted as very little drug is 
metabolized in the liver. 
Isoflurane is a commonly used anaesthetic agent which is quick acting and stress free in 
overdose for euthanasia. Isoflurane causes respiratory and cardiovascular depression. 
However, it has a pungent odour and must therefore not be used on animals which may be 
able to hold their breath. It is particularly useful where tissues such as liver are to be used 
for toxicological or microsomal studies as it undergoes no hepatic metabolism. 
Nitrous oxide (N2O) may be used with other inhalants to speed the onset of anesthesia, but 
alone it does not induce anesthesia in animals, even at 100% concentration. When used by 
itself, N2O produces hypoxemia before respiratory or cardiac arrest. As a result, animals 
may become distressed prior to loss of consciousness. 
The advantages of choose euthanasia with someone of these options are:  Inhalant 
anesthetics are particularly valuable for euthanasia of smaller animals (< 7 kg) or for animals 
in which venipuncture may be difficult, and Halothane, enflurane, isoflurane, sevoflurane, 
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The advantages for this procedure are: carbon monoxide induces loss of consciousness 
without pain and with minimal discernible discomfort; hypoxemia induced by CO is 
insidious, so that the animal appears to be unaware and death occurs rapidly if 
concentrations of 4 to 6% are used. 
The disadvantages are that safeguards must be taken to prevent exposure of personnel and 
any electrical equipment exposed to CO (eg, lights and fans) must be explosion proof. 
As recommendations, must be considered that carbon monoxide used for individual animal 
or mass euthanasia is acceptable for dogs, cats, and other small mammals, provided that 
commercially compressed CO is used and the following precautions are taken: (1) personnel 
using CO must be instructed thoroughly in its use and must understand its hazards and 
limitations; (2) the CO chamber must be of the highest quality construction and should 
allow for separation of individual animals; (3) the CO source and chamber must be located 
in a well-ventilated environment, preferably out of doors; (4) the chamber must be well lit 
and have view ports that allow personnel direct observation of animals; (5) the CO flow rate 
should be adequate to rapidly achieve a uniform CO concentration of at least 6% after 
animals are placed in the chamber, although some species (eg, neonatal pigs) are less likely 
to become agitated with a gradual rise in CO concentration (Lambooy & Spanjaard, 1980); 
and (6) if the chamber is inside a room, CO monitors must be placed in the room to warn 
personnel of hazardous concentrations. 
2.7.3.3 Volatile inhalational anaesthetics 
When using any liquid anaesthetic care must be taken to ensure that it is not allowed to 
come in contact with the animal. Sufficient air or oxygen should be provided during the 
induction period to prevent hypoxia (Andrews et al., 1993). Exposure to trace concentrations 
of anaesthetic gases is a recognized human health hazard and requires gas scavenging 
apparatus to be used in the work environment. Volatile inhalational anaesthetics are neither 
flammable nor explosive. 
Halothane is a commonly used anaesthetic agent for small laboratory animals and is quick 
acting and stress free in overdose for euthanasia. It has a depressant effect on the 
cardiovascular and respiratory systems (Green, 1987). 
Enflurane is a commonly used anaesthetic agent for small laboratory animals and is quick 
acting and stress free in overdose for euthanasia (Green, 1987). It has a depressant effect on 
the cardiovascular and respiratory systems. It may be preferred to halothane in situations 
where drug metabolism or toxicological work is being conducted as very little drug is 
metabolized in the liver. 
Isoflurane is a commonly used anaesthetic agent which is quick acting and stress free in 
overdose for euthanasia. Isoflurane causes respiratory and cardiovascular depression. 
However, it has a pungent odour and must therefore not be used on animals which may be 
able to hold their breath. It is particularly useful where tissues such as liver are to be used 
for toxicological or microsomal studies as it undergoes no hepatic metabolism. 
Nitrous oxide (N2O) may be used with other inhalants to speed the onset of anesthesia, but 
alone it does not induce anesthesia in animals, even at 100% concentration. When used by 
itself, N2O produces hypoxemia before respiratory or cardiac arrest. As a result, animals 
may become distressed prior to loss of consciousness. 
The advantages of choose euthanasia with someone of these options are:  Inhalant 
anesthetics are particularly valuable for euthanasia of smaller animals (< 7 kg) or for animals 
in which venipuncture may be difficult, and Halothane, enflurane, isoflurane, sevoflurane, 
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desflurane, methoxyflurane, and N2O are nonflammable and nonexplosive under ordinary 
environmental conditions. 
As disadvantages, animals may struggle and become anxious during induction of anesthesia 
because anesthetic vapors may be irritating and can induce excitement. Ether is flammable 
and explosive. Explosions have occurred when animals, euthanatized with ether, were 
placed in an ordinary (not explosion proof) refrigerator or freezer and when bagged animals 
were placed in an incinerator. Another disadvantage to consider is that the induction with 
methoxyflurane is unacceptably slow in some species. Nitrous oxide will support 
combustion, and as well personnel as animals can be injured by exposure to these agents, 
with a potential for human abuse of some of these drugs, especially N2O. 
As final recommendations, in order of preference, halothane, enflurane, isoflurane, 
sevoflurane, methoxyflurane, and desflurane, with or without nitrous oxide, are acceptable 
for euthanasia of small animals (< 7 kg). Ether should only be used in carefully controlled 
situations in compliance with state and federal occupational health and safety regulations. It 
is conditionally acceptable. Nitrous oxide should not be used alone, pending further 
scientific studies on its suitability for animal euthanasia. Although acceptable, these agents 
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Table 2. Summary of Conditionally Acceptable Agents and Methods of Euthanasia - 
Characteristics and Modes of Action 
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2.8 Recommended methods of euthanasia in each species 
Below are described the main methods of euthanasia suggested for the various species that 
can be used in the laboratory. A summary of these recommendations indicating 
characteristics of the euthanasia methods is presented on table 2. 
2.8.1 Fish 
There are over 20 000 species of fish with enormously varying lifestyles which makes it very 
difficult to generalize on methods of euthanasia. Although fish may not have the same 
spinothalamic pathways as mammals for pain perception, there is evidence that they do feel 
pain and should therefore be killed with the same care and consideration. All fish are 
sensitive to changes in the physical and chemical parameters of their water (especially 
temperature, dissolved gas levels, salinity, pH, etc.) but some species are much more 
tolerant of changes in anyone of these factors than are others. Therefore unless the species' 
response is known it is advisable to practise euthanasia in the fish's normal water. If drugs 
are used the water level should be lowered to ensure rapid sedation but not so much as to 
distress the fish before the addition of the agent. Dosing is always preferable to injection as 
the latter technique involves handling the fish and thus induces stress. 
In general, larvae and adults can be euthanized by: 
Physical methods: Concussion, Cervical dislocation (Clifford, 1984) and Maceration. 
Cervical dislocation it is feasible and effective in small fish, but should be confirmed by 
exsanguination or destruction of the brain. The stress caused by handling reduces the 
acceptability of this method. It is not possible or humane in larger fish. Maceration must be 
choose only for small fish of less than 2 cm in length may be humanely killed by placing 
down a waste disposal unit. 
Chemical methods: Agents can be administered by dissolving the chemical in the tank 
water. Water temperatures often alter the efficacy of the drug and induction is often more 
rapid at higher temperatures. However, the temperature must not be raised so that it causes 
any stress to the fish. Drugs may also be administered by intramuscular or intraperitoneal 
injection. For euthanasia, anaesthetic drugs are generally used at double or triple the 
recommended anaesthetic dose.  
The most common chemical agents used are: Tricaine methane sulphonate (buffered MS-
222), Benzocaine (ethyl aminobenzoate), Etomidate, Metomidate, Quinaldine (2-
methylquinoline), Halothane, injectable agents (barbiturates). 
The methods considered as acceptable for unconscious fish are decapitation and 
exsanguinations. By other hand,  the methods not acceptable for euthanasia of fish are : 
removal from water, whole body crushing, electrical stunning, hypothermia, hyperthermia, 
carbon dioxide, diethyl ether, Urethane, Chloral hydrate, tertiary amyl alcohol, 
tribromoethanol, chlorobutanol, Methyl pentynol, pyridines. 
2.8.2 Amphibians 
Because amphibians are ectothermic and thus accustomed to fluctuations in body 
temperature, their central nervous system (CNS) is less sensitive to hypoxia and anoxia. 
Even when the cranial nerves and brain are deprived of blood supply these animals are able 
to respond to stimuli for some time. Although decapitation, by itself, does not produce rapid 
unconsciousness in the severed heads of amphibians, rapid destruction of the brain does 
extinguish responses usually thought to indicate consciousness (AVMA, 2007). 
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injection. For euthanasia, anaesthetic drugs are generally used at double or triple the 
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The most common chemical agents used are: Tricaine methane sulphonate (buffered MS-
222), Benzocaine (ethyl aminobenzoate), Etomidate, Metomidate, Quinaldine (2-
methylquinoline), Halothane, injectable agents (barbiturates). 
The methods considered as acceptable for unconscious fish are decapitation and 
exsanguinations. By other hand,  the methods not acceptable for euthanasia of fish are : 
removal from water, whole body crushing, electrical stunning, hypothermia, hyperthermia, 
carbon dioxide, diethyl ether, Urethane, Chloral hydrate, tertiary amyl alcohol, 
tribromoethanol, chlorobutanol, Methyl pentynol, pyridines. 
2.8.2 Amphibians 
Because amphibians are ectothermic and thus accustomed to fluctuations in body 
temperature, their central nervous system (CNS) is less sensitive to hypoxia and anoxia. 
Even when the cranial nerves and brain are deprived of blood supply these animals are able 
to respond to stimuli for some time. Although decapitation, by itself, does not produce rapid 
unconsciousness in the severed heads of amphibians, rapid destruction of the brain does 
extinguish responses usually thought to indicate consciousness (AVMA, 2007). 
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There is, however, a remarkably intact set of somatic responses to stimuli long continued 
body movements, foot withdrawals in response to toe pinching, etc., as well as continued 
heartbeat in many cases for hours following brain destruction. This continued somatic 
activity is attributed to: 
1. prolonged tolerance of the spinal cord, peripheral nerves and muscle (smooth, cardiac 
and skeletal) to hypoxic and hypotensive conditions, and  
2. a far greater degree of integration of somatic responses at the level of the spinal cord 
instead of the brain (Close et al., 1996) 
For those reasons, death may be recognized by cessation of heartbeat and respiration and in 
cases where this is not obvious; it may be confirmed by destruction of the brain. In larvae, 
Tadpoles and newts can be effectively killed by placing in a dish of water with MS-222 or 
benzocaine (dissolved in acetone). These produce rapid anesthesia, followed by death. For 
adults, it is important to obtain a firm hold, for example by wearing rough textured but non-
abrasive gloves or by holding them in coarse material. 
Cooling to 3-4°C will reduce metabolic and locomotory processes, thus facilitating handling 
prior to euthanasia. However, it must be remembered that cooling does not reduce the 
ability to feel pain. However, the physical methods for adult amphibians include: 
Concussion, microwave and electrical stunning.  The procedures where chemical agents are 
considered, usually are used:  Tricaine methane sulphonate (buffered MS-222), Benzocaine, 
sodium pentobarbitone, T-61.  The methods considered as acceptable for unconscious 
amphibians are:  Pithing and decapitation. Contrarily, the methods not acceptable for 
euthanasia of amphibians are: hypothermia, hyperthermia, exsanguinations, strangulation, 
carbon dioxide, ether, chloroform, volatile inhalational anesthetics, chloral hydrate, 
ketamine, hydrochloride, chlorbutanol, methylpentynol, 2-phenoxyethanol, tertiary amyl 
alcohol, tribromoethanol, and urethane (Close et al., 1996; Reilly, 2001). 
2.8.3 Reptiles 
Similarly to the amphibians, reptiles are also ectothermic and even when the cranial nerves 
and brain are deprived of blood supply following decapitation; they are able to respond to 
stimuli for some time. Although decapitation, by itself, does not produce rapid 
unconsciousness in the severed heads of reptiles (Warwick, 1990) rapid destruction of the 
brain does extinguish responses usually thought to indicate consciousness. For that reason, 
good methods of restraint are important to ensure minimal stress prior to carrying out 
euthanasia. 
Particular care must be taken when handling venomous species, such as many types of 
snake, especially when they are not used to being handled (Close et al., 1996). Padded 
grasping implements are useful in handling lizards and snakes to ensure a firm but non-
damaging restraint. Cooling of most reptiles to 3-4°C will reduce metabolic and locomotory 
processes (this temperature may kill some tropical species), thus facilitating handling prior 
to euthanasia. In tortoises, turtles and terrapins, retraction of the head and protection by the 
carapace can cause difficulty for euthanasia. To assist in exposing the head, land tortoises 
can be placed in shallow, tepid water large marine species may be put on a frame at 45° 
head up, inducing neck extension and soft-shelled species can be placed on their backs to 
induce neck extension. Rough textured but non-abrasive gloves may be worn when 
handling aquatic species to facilitate handling (Reilly, 2001). 
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Effective restraint of the jaws and tail is the key factor to' operator safety for restraining 
crocodilians and this should only be done by experts. As it is difficult to determine whether 
reptiles are unconscious or dead, it is recommended that death be confirmed by destruction 
of the brain. Usually, but by no means always, a lack of pupillary-blink-nictitating 
membrane responses, except in snakes which do not possess movable eyelids, implies a lack 
of consciousness. Rigor mortis is a reliable indicator of death as is the prolonged absence of 
a heartbeat and/or circulation (Close et al., 1996). 
For eggs of reptiles, are recommended methods would include disruption of the egg and 
killing of the embryos by injection of sodium pentobarbitone, anaesthetic overdose or an 
appropriate physical method to destroy the brain or whole egg or early life form. For all 
practical purposes, all newly hatched reptiles can be treated inthe same way as adults. As 
the class Reptilia is varied, it is best to consider three main groups: the snakes and lizards 
(Squamata); tortoises, turtles and terrapins (Testudines); and crocodiles and alligators 
(Crocodilia). Larger reptiles may need to be sedated before being killed. Physical accepted 
methods include the captive bolt, concussion and shooting.  The chemical method 
considered is to overdoses of pentobarbital by intraperitoneal route. The methods acceptable 
for unconscious reptiles are phithing and decapitation; contrarily between the methods not 
acceptable for euthanasia of reptiles are: spinal cord severance, hypothermia or 
hyperthermia, exsanguination, chloroform, and tricaine methane sulphonate (MS-222). 
Because reptiles are capable of holding their breath for a relatively long period of time and 
therefore inhalational methods cannot be considered as practicable or humane due to slow 
induction (Close et al., 1996; AVMA, 2007). 
2.8.4 Birds 
Birds have a complex respiratory system comprising the lungs and numerous air sacs with a 
one-way flow of air. This may influence the rate of absorption of inhalational agents and 
thus increase their efficiency. The dead of birds, Death may be recognized by the absence of 
signs of breathing, cardiac arrest and absence of reflexes in the head (Close et al., 1996). 
Reflexes to be checked would include pinching of wattles or blink reflexes. The most 
commonly used method of destroying eggs is cooling or freezing. The recommended 
temperature is<4°C for 4 h. In cases where the embryo has been exposed to experimental 
conditions for studies, decapitation is considered an acceptable method of euthanasia as is 
an overdose of anaesthetic (AVMA, 2007). 
For adult birds, the physical methods considered are: cervical dislocation, maceration, 
concussion, microwave and electrical stunning (Reilly, 2001). The chemical methods for 
euthanasia in birds are inhalational agents (carbon dioxide, volatile inhalational anaesthetics, 
carbon monoxide) and injectable agents (Sodium pentobarbitone, T-61). The acceptable 
methods for unconscious in birds include decapitation, pithing and potassium chloride. And 
the methods not acceptable for euthanasia of birds are neck crushing, exsanguination, 
decompression creating a vacuum, nitrous oxide, ether/chloroform, cyclopropane, hydrogen 
cyanide gas and must be consideder that there are other agents which have not to be used 
(methoxyflurane, trichlorethylene, chloral hydrate, strychnine, nicotine, magnesiumsulphate, 
ketamine alone and neuromuscular blocking agents)(Close et al., 1996). 
2.8.5 Rodents 
Rodents are the most commonly used animals for experimental purposes and include mice, 
rats, hamsters, guinea pigs, gerbils, shrews, and dormice (Close et al., 1996; AVMA, 2007).  
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Physical methods for rodents include concussion, cervical dislocation (only animals under 
150 g), decapitation, and rapid freezing (only for fetus and neonates) (Reilly, 2001). There are 
many chemical methods including: the use of Inhalational agents, as volatile inhalational 
anaesthetics (Halothane, enflurane, isoflurane), carbon dioxide. Also are used injectable 
agents like sodium pentobarbitone (diluted, because it can cause irritation of the 
peritoneum). The methods acceptable for unconscious rodents are: rapid freezing (only for 
rodents <4g), exsanguination, air embolism, potassium chloride and ethanol. The methods 
not acceptable for euthanasia of rodents are hypothermia, nitrogen, nitrous oxide, 
cyclopropane, ether, chloroform, decompression, asphyxia, drowning, trichlorethylene, 
methoxyflurane, hydrogen cyanide gas, carbon monoxide, strychnine, nicotine, chloral 
hydrate, magnesium sulphate, curariform drugs and other neuromuscular blocking agents 
(see table 3) (Close et al., 1996, Reilly, 2001). 
 
Techniques Recommended Acceptable with reservations Not acceptable 
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dam for longer to ensure that the anesthetic has crossed placenta. The foetuses that are not 
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clyclopropane, ether and chloroform and ketamine hydrochloride. Other agents not to be 
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Recognition and confirmation of death must be verified. Cessations of respiration and 
heartbeats, as well loss of reflexes are good indicators of death in carnivores. To euthanize 
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Neonate carnivores should generally be treated as adults. Sodium pentobarbitone is the 
preferred method, but CO2, cervical dislocation and concussion may be considered (Hall, 
1972).  
For adults, the physical procedures includes: Captive bolt, shooting and electrocution.  The 
chemical methods used for carnivore adults are: Inhalational methods (with volatile 
inhalational anaesthetics), injectable agents (sodium pentobarbitone, secobarbital/dibucaine 
and T-61). The acceptable methods for unconscious carnivores includes: exsanguination, 
dislocation of neck, and potassium chloride; and the not acceptable methods for carnivores 
are stricking of chest of cats, decompression, carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, nitrogen, 
ether and chloroform (AVMA, 2007).  The following agents are also not to be used for killing 
carnivores: drowning, concussion (adults), decapitation, asphyxia, strangulation, nitrous 
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Personnel using and having to kill any large mammal must receive special training in the 
handling, restraint and techniques of euthanasia of these animals. It is important to avoid 
actions which may increase the animals' awareness of the unusual situation. The animal is 
best killed in a familiar environment. It may be necessary to take the animals to approved 
slaughterhouses where specialized equipment is available for humane euthanasia of these 
animals. Euthanasia may have to be carried out by a person who has been trained and holds 
a certificate under national slaughter legislation or by a veterinarian with appropriate 
training (Close et al., 1996). 
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Cessation of respiration and heartbeat, and loss of reflexes are good indicators of irreversible 
death in these species. Death should be confirmed by exsanguination. The foetuses of these 
large mammals are well developed at birth and therefore considerable care must be taken to 
ensure that they are killed humanely if removed from the uterus (Reilly, 2001). Foetuses 
may also be large and in general any method used on an adult is considered acceptable. 
Because the neonates of large mammals are born in an advanced stage of development, they 
should be treated as adults. 
Physical methods for adults must be considered: captive bolt, free bullet, shooting, 
concussion and electrical stunning (Blackmore, 1979). The chemical methods include: 
inhalational methods, with volatile inhalational anaesthesics (halothane, isoflurane, 
enflurane using a mask for kids and lambs) and carbon dioxide –only for pigs - (death must 
be confirmed by exsanguination) but other methods are considered preferable and carbon 
dioxide must not be used on any other large animal (AVMA, 2007). Other methods 
acceptable for unconscious large mammals are exsanguination, potassium chloride and the 
intravenously administration of chloral hydrate in conjunction with magnesium sulphate 
and sodium pentobarbitone. The methods not acceptable for euthanasia of large mammals 
are methoxyflurane, trichlorethylene, strychnine, nicotine, magnesium sulphate, 
thiopentone sodium, ketamine hydrochloride, curariform drugs and other neuromuscular 
blocking agents (Close et al., 1996). 
2.8.8 Non-human primates 
Personnel handling primates should be specially trained for these purposes. It is preferable 
that if primates have to be killed, that this be carried out by someone familiar to them in 
order to reduce stress and anxiety. For all larger primates, sedation (e.g. ketamine) should 
be administered prior to euthanasia (Reilly, 2001). Cessation of heartbeat and respiration, 
and absence of reflexes may be considered as indicators of death. The only recommended 
method for killing primates is by overdose of anaesthetic. Sodium pentobarbitone injected 
intravenously is the most acceptable agent. Exsanguination under inhalation anesthesia is 
also considered acceptable, but this must be followed by perfusion (Close et al., 1996; 
AVMA, 2007). 
2.8.9 Other animals not commonly used for experiments 
As vertebrate animals vary so much in size and physiology, the method chosen to kill any 
animal not included above should be chosen from those methods for animals that are most 
similar biologically. Advice should be obtained from a veterinarian. In general, an overdose 
of sodium pentobarbitone injected intravenously may be considered as a humane method of 
killing most animals. It is advisable in most cases to sedate the animal prior to euthanasia 
(Close et al., 1996). 
3. Conclusion 
The use of animals in the laboratory is very useful as these are excellence models for the 
evaluation and development of multiple scientific studies. It is for this reason that 
researchers need to consider that in the course of these animal experiments, assure that they 
have a good quality of life and likewise, must choose the right method to perform 
euthanasia in order to avoid stress, anxious or pain when it is done. 
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1. Introduction 
With regarding to public health, there are two major zoonoses in which is recommended 
euthanasia for dogs, rabies and visceral leishmaniasis. There are government agencies 
responsible for the control of these diseases as the Center for Zoonoses Control (CZC), 
which develops prophylactic programs such as: anti-rabies vaccination in urban and rural 
population of pets, public awareness, and monitoring and tracking of cases positive. 
According to the CZC of São Paulo, despite the human and canine rabies being virtually 
eradicated in the city, all infected animals should be euthanized after clinical signs such as 
paralysis. This decision comes by the fact of dog becomes a potential transmitter, there are 
no available treatment and the neurological disorders caused by the disease are progressive 
and irreversible, both in man and animals. 
In relation to the visceral leishmaniasis, the treatment of canine disease is prohibited in 
Brazil, with drugs used for humans disease and are not registered in the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Livestock and Supply; on the grounds of risk of resistance developing for the 
causing agent of the disease, Leishmania, and increased risk of death to human patients 
suffering from disease. In spite of, the law is incisive with regarding to the requirement of 
euthanasia for seropositive dogs there is considerable discussion and controversy about the 
constitutionality and effectiveness of implementation. 
2. Leishmaniasis 
The leishmaniasis are represented by a group of diseases with zoonotic character that affects 
humans and several species of wild and domestic animals. Caused by a protozoan digenetic 
belonging to Trypanosomatidae family (DOFLEIN, 1991) Leishmania genus (ROSS,1903), have 
their biological cycle performed on two hosts, a vertebrate and invertebrate. Vertebrate 
hosts include wide variety of mammals, among them: rodents, edentulous, marsupials, 
primates, including canids and humans. The invertebrate hosts are small insects belonging 
to Psychodidae family, Phlebotominae subfamily, Lutzomyia genus in the New World and 
Phlebotomus in the Old World. 
According to estimates by the World Health Organization, the global prevalence of the 
different clinical forms of the disease, cutaneous and visceral, exceeds 12 million cases with 
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primates, including canids and humans. The invertebrate hosts are small insects belonging 
to Psychodidae family, Phlebotominae subfamily, Lutzomyia genus in the New World and 
Phlebotomus in the Old World. 
According to estimates by the World Health Organization, the global prevalence of the 
different clinical forms of the disease, cutaneous and visceral, exceeds 12 million cases with 
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a population of 350 million individuals in areas at risk of contracting the infection (WHO, 
2001). The leishmanioses are endemic on five continents, in 88 countries located in tropical 
and sub-tropical regions. The notification is mandatory only in 32 of 88 countries where the 
disease is prevalent. Thus, the two million new cases are estimated annually, only 600 
thousand are officially notified, which shows a high rate of sub-notification (WHO, 2001). 
Socio-economic changes and behavioral arising from the globalization process hamper not 
only the control of the illness but also increase the number of victims. Good examples refer 
to the process of urbanization course of leishmanioses, a process closely related to rural 
exodus, unemployment, the expansion of slums, wars, among others. 
Parasites belongs to the Leishmania genus present two main forms: the promastigote, found 
in the digestive tube of invertebrate hosts females, and amastigote, observed inside cells of 
the Phagocytic Mononuclear System in the tissues of vertebrate hosts (Genaro, 2002). The 
evolutionary cycle of these parasites includes a phase in invertebrate hosts where the 
promastigotes multiply by binary division in the digestive tube of sand fly female, and 
another stage in vertebrate hosts, reservoirs mammals, in which the amastigotes forms 
survive, live and multiply, also by binary division within the parasitophorous vacuoles of 
macrophages (Figure 1). 
 
 
Source: TDR Welcome/Trust 
Fig. 1. Biological cycle of Leishmania parasite. 
Infection occurs when the sand fly female bite the vertebrate, blood feeding and ingests 
infected macrophages. In the gut of sand flies, these macrophages released de amastigotes, 
which are rapidly converted into promastigotes which multiply adhered to the peritrophic 
matrix secreted by cells of the stomach of the insect. After the blood digestion, the 
peritrophic matrix breaks releasing the promastigotes that colonize different parts of the 
digestive tube of the vector depending on the species of the parasite. The promastigotes 
remain anchored to the gut epithelium in the process of binary division. After that, 
 
Euthanasia for the Zoonosis Control Program  
 
221 
biochemistry changes occur in the parasite surface, called metacyclogenesis. The parasites 
migrate to the anterior part of the vector alimentary tract. The vertebrate host infection is 
established when the sand fly female infected bite another vertebrate host and regurgitates 
the promastigotes in the mammalian skin. On that occasion, it is believed that most parasites 
are eliminated by lytic action of the complement system and by the action of neutrophils 
and eosinophils present in inflamed skin (Laurenti et al., 1996). However, some 
promastigotes that escape to nonspecific defense mechanisms of the host are phagocytized 
by macrophages in the skin, surviving and multiplying in the parasitophorous vacuoles. 
After successive binary divisions, the countless parasites cause increased on the pressure 
inside the macrophage lysing the host cell. The released amastigotes are phagocytized by 
other macrophages initiating an inflammatory reaction that is responsible for maintaining 
Leishmania in the skin or escape to viscera, depending on the species of the parasite (Genaro, 
2002). 
2.1 Cutaneous Leishmaniasis (CL) 
The pathogenesis of cutaneous leishmaniasis is heavily influenced by two fundamental 
factors: first, related to the immunogenetic background of the vertebrate host and the 
second, related to virulence of Leishmania species, since there are several species Leishmania 
parasites causing cutaneous leishmaniasis. As a result of these interactions a spectrum of 
clinical histopathologic and immunological manifestation could be observed (Silveira et al., 
2009) (Figure 2). 
 
 
Fig. 2. New World cutaneous leishmaniasis: clinical and immunopathological classification 
according to Silveira et al., 2004. 
The immunopathogenesis of American cutaneous leishmaniasis (ACL) has been regarded 
one of most interesting features concerning this parasitic protozoal disease in viewing of the 
complex interaction process between the variety of Leishmania species causing the disease 
and the human immune response. Actually, there are, at least, fourteen recognized 
Leishmania parasites within the subgenera Viannia and Leishmania which can give rise to 
clinical ACL (Lainson & Shaw, 1998; Lainson & Shaw, 2005). Recently, following new 
findings on the clinical and immunopathological spectrum of the disease caused by 
Leishmania (V.) braziliensis and Leishmania (L.) amazonensis there has been increased the 
interest on the immunopathogenic competences of these two Leishmania species; i.e. they are 
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biochemistry changes occur in the parasite surface, called metacyclogenesis. The parasites 
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implicated not only with the localized cutaneous leishmaniasis (LCL), the most common 
ACL form placed at the centre of the clinical spectrum and supported by a moderate T-cell 
hypersensitivity, but also with the mucocutaneous leishmaniasis (MCL) and anergic diffuse 
cutaneous leishmaniasis (ADCL), the more severe ACL forms respectively. In this regard, 
while MCL represents the extreme expression of T-cell hypersensitivity pole, linked to a 
strong species-specific T-cell immune response against to L. (V.) braziliensis, ADCL means, in 
contrast, the extreme expression of T-cell hyposensitivity pole, associated to a high 
Leishmania-specific inhibition of T-cell response (Silveira et al., 2004). Moreover, these 
Leishmania parasites can also induce an intermediary form between the central LCL and the 
two polar MCL and ADCL, the borderline disseminated cutaneous leishmaniasis (BDCL), 
which is distinguished by a partial inhibition of T-cell response (Silveira et al., 2005). 
Furthermore, as BDCL can be caused by parasites belong to both subgenus of Leishmania, 
Viannia and Leishmania, as well as there are some clinical and immunological characteristics 
that differ between Viannia and Leishmania cases, then BDCL can occupy the two places 
between the centre (LCL) and the two polar forms (MCL and ADCL) in the clinical spectrum 
of disease (Silveira et al., 2009). 
2.1.1 Control and prophylaxis of CL 
The control of cutaneous leishmaniasis is difficult, since their cycle happens mainly in 
forests, often extensive, preventing the use of insecticides in large-scale. Deforestation for 
agriculture and livestock development reduces the endemic areas, but determines the 
appearance of large number of cases during the process. The use of repellents and 
musketeers of fine mesh, in some situations it becomes possible, as individual protection to 
avoid the bite of sand flies. Recent colonization areas near forests, can avoid transmitting 
intra-and peri-domestic with the construction of houses at a minimum distance of 500 m 
from the forest, due to the low flight capacity of these vectors. But the ideal solution for 
control of CL would produce an effective vaccine (Genaro, 2002). 
3. Visceral Leishmaniasis (VL) 
Visceral leishmaniasis is a widespread chronic infectious illness, characterized by irregular 
fever, hepatosplenomegaly, lymphadenopathy, anemia with leukopenia, 
hypergammaglobulinemia with hypoalbuminemia, lost weight, edema and progressive 
weakness leading to cachexia and, finally, to death if the patient is not subjected to special 
treatment. The human visceral leishmaniasis can assume a spectral character, which 
determines different clinical forms, ranging from a silent asymptomaatic or subclinical 
forms to oligosymptomatic, acute up to the classical form (Figure 3) of the disease (Badaró et 
al., 1986). American and European visceral leishmaniasis are considered zoonosis, while in 
India it is considered an anthropozoonosis. 
3.1 Geographic distribution of VL 
Visceral leishmaniasis occurs in several countries of the Old and New World and it is caused 
by L. (L.) donovani, L. (L.) infantum and L. (L.) chagasi. The L. (L.) donovani is found in regions 
of India, Bangladesh, Sudan, Pakistan, Nepal and parts of Eastern China. This species of the 
parasite can cause dermal leishmaniasis post-calazar, besides to classical visceral 
leishmaniasis, which is transmitted from man to man, characterizing an anthroponosis. It is 
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possible that in Sudan the transmission occurs in a similar way to India, but other mammals 
were found parasitized; among them, three species of rodents (Arvicanthis niloticus, Acomys 
albigena, Rattus rattus) and two carnivorous (Genetta genetta and Cat felis). The vector of 
leishmaniasis in India is the Phlebotomus argentipes and in the region of China is the 
Phlebotomus alexandri. The L. (L.) infantum show extensive distribution by the Old World, 
occurring in Central Asia, North and Northeast China, West Asia (Iraq, Yemen, Saudi 
Arabia, Iran and Afghanistan), Africa (Algeria, Ethiopia, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Central 
African Republic, Congo, Chad, Gabon, Kenya, Nigeria, Malawi, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, 
Somalia, Sudan, Zaire and Zambia). In Europe, L. (L.) infantum is found in countries 
belonging to the Mediterranean basin, extending to Hungary and Romania. The main host is 
the domestic dog, Canis familiaris, considered the primary reservoir of infection for humans. 
Wild hosts are identified as the jackal, Canis aureus, wolf, Canis lupus, and the fox, Vulpes 
vulpes. In China was also mentioned the canid, Nyctereutes procyonides, as reservoir. In 
Georgia and Azerbaijan infection affects the badgers, Meles meles, and the fox, Vulpes corsak. 
The sand fly responsible for the transmission and spread of the disease, according to the 
region, are Phlebotomus perniciosus, P. ariasi, P. major, P. alexandri, P. chinensis, P. perfiliewi, P. 
tobbi, P. longicuspis, P. mongolensis, P. kandelaki and P. caucasicus (WHO, 2001). The L. (L.) 
chagasi shows wide distribution in the New World, occurring in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Colombia, Paraguay, Venezuela, Guatemala, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Mexico, Honduras 
and El Salvador. The wild hosts in Brazil are the foxes, Dusicyon vetulus and Lycalopex 
vetulus, in the Northeast, Cerdocyon thous, Amazon, and skunks Didelphis marsupialis. The 
domestic dog is considered as the main source of infection for humans and the main vector 
is Lutzomyia longipalpis (Brazilian Health Ministry, 2006). 
 
 
Fig. 3. Classical clinical form of visceral leishmaniasis characterized by hepatosplenomegaly. 
Photo kindly provided by Dra. Monica Elinor Alves Gama. 
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3.1.1 Ecology and epidemiology of VL 
Visceral leishmaniasis is currently emerging and reemerging diseases, both in rural areas as 
in urban areas. The World Health Organization estimates a global annual incidence of 500 
thousand cases. Although the VL is known even today as a disease typically rural, several 
urban epidemic outbreaks have been reported, due to the favorable epidemiological 
conditions, mainly in function of the expansion of slums with high population density that 
have poor sanitary conditions where individuals and infected dogs from endemic areas are 
your choice of housing in major cities. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Leishmania (Leishmania) chagasi wild reservoir (A) and domestic reservoir showing 
typical clinical features of the disease such as: weight loss (B), onychogryphosis (C), skin 
lesions: ulcer (D), hyperkeratosis (E) and alopecia (F). 
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Currently, what call attention is the increase in the number of cases of HIV co-infection, 
especially in southern Europe. This region of Europe HIV infection occurs in rural and 
suburban areas where visceral leishmaniasis is endemic. Many of these cases are associated 
with injection drug due to the habit of some groups of users to share disposable syringes 
and needles. This type of transmission has expanded to Europe's Nordic countries such as 
Germany, Finland, Norway, changing the classic epidemiological profile of transmission, 
without the presence of the insect vector and reservoir dogs. 
Another aspect relevant in this context of expansion and urbanization of visceral 
leishmaniasis in the World and especially in Brazil is the possibility of contracting the 
disease through blood transfusion. This fact is aggravated since serological diagnosis for 
visceral leishmaniasis is not yet included in the screening of donors in all countries 
(Brazilian Health Ministry, 2006). 
Two distinct epidemiological cycle of VL is observed, a wild cycle and domestic or per-
domestic cycle. In the wild cycle are involved as vector, Lutzomyia longipalpis, and as a 
reservoir, the foxes (Figure 4A), which inhabit niches still undisturbed by man in forest or 
wilderness areas. Dogs are considered the domestic reservoir and have been found infected 
in all outbreaks of human disease; they are considered the main source of parasites in the 
chain of transmission of VL (Figure 4B). While the wild reservoir shows no clinical signs of 
the disease pointed to an adaptative relationship between parasite-host, the domestic 
reservoir shows important clinical manifestations of the disease with severe visceral 
involvement that causes the animal death. Among the main clinical features observed in 
canine visceral leishmaniasis, it is observed weight loss, lymphadenopathy, 
hepatosplenomegaly, onychogryphosis, skin lesions (ulcers, hyperkeratosis and alpecia), 
among others (Figure C-F) (Feitosa et al, 2000). The domestic cycle can occurs on rural or 
peri-urban environment, where Lutzomyia longipalpis is involved as the vector, which breeds 
and remains in the peri-domestic environment transmitting the infection to man and dog. 
The dog has an important role in maintaining of local infection, serving as a source of 
infection to the sand fly. The transmission occurs subsequently to the man, who is also able 
to serve as a source of infection for the vector. These two cycles can overlap, since man and 
the dog into wild environment may acquire the infection by the sand fly bite, and when 
return to domestic environment serves as a source of infection to local sand fly, starting the 
transmission in the domestic area. The reservoir presented intense cutaneous parasitism, so 
they are excellent source of infection to the sand fly, favoring the maintenance of the cycle of 
the disease (Genaro, 2002). 
3.1.2 Prophylaxis of VL 
If the control of visceral leishmaniasis is continuous and well conducted, can produce good 
results; however to the results obtained are durable, there is a requirement of permanent 
and effective epidemiological surveillance, otherwise gradually the outbreaks arise avoiding 
previous work. Since that the epidemiological role of dog is established as domestic 
reservoir and Lutzomyia longipalpis as vector, the control can be based on three fundamental 
points: treatment of human cases, elimination of infected dogs and combating vector. 
The use of euthanasia to the control of canine visceral leishmaniasis began with Adler and 
Tchernomoretz, 1946 after failing to succeed with human treatment and concluded that the 
best form to disease control would be the elimination of dog. The program carried out in 
China (Leng, 1982) was based on a triad: the treatment of positive human cases, use of 
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insecticides (DDT) and disposal of dogs in some locations. Using these methods for the 
control, the anthroponotic leishmaniasis almost finished and the zoonotic leishmaniasis 
continued and continues in China. They concluded that the removal of dogs helped in the 
control of leishmaniasis, but it was only one of the control measures. 
The Brazilian program for control of VL advocates the canine serologic surveys, targeting to 
know canine epidemiological situation of the disease in areas with active transmission or 
with potential to transmission and at the same time, identify the positive dogs to later 
disposal. However, there are controversial data concerning to this subject. Some studies 
showed that there are no significant differences between regions where euthanasia was only 
used as a control measure, when compared to others in which the dog was not eliminated 
(Dietze et al., 1997), by the other side another study related the reduction of human VL 
incidence correlated to dog euthanasia but not exclude the possibility to consider other 
factors that may influence this relationship (Nunes et al., 2010). The difference is the use of 
the insecticide that presents good results in the control of leishmaniasis. Another point was 
emphasized by Braga et al. (1998), the importance of sensitivity and specificity parameters of 
the diagnostic assay, when evaluating the impact of the dog elimination in front of the 
employed methodology. 
After two decades of attempts to control of VL in Brazil, the number of cases in the country 
increased sharply and broke into urban areas. The Brazilian program, started more than 40 
years, is composed by integrating three measures of public health: the free distribution of 
specific treatment to human patients, the control of domestic reservoirs and the control of 
the vector. The control of reservoirs has been done by serological diagnosis of domestic dogs 
where transmission of L. (L.) chagasi for human occurs. For this, was structured a network of 
immunofluorescence assay (IFA) using eluate of filter paper; all dogs with positive result 
have been euthanized. However, dogs evaluate by IFA employing eluate when reevaluated 
by IFA using serum samples, 72% of the animals were negative (Silva et al., 2011). This 
result can be partially explained by the sample tested, serum and eluate, as previously 
reported by Figueiredo et al., (2010). Moreover, 59% of animals identified by IFA using 
eluate showed negative results for L. (L.) chagasi infection, characterizing a false positive 
result by IFA employing eluate. However, in areas where the circulation of other 
trypanosomatids occurs, parasitological confirmation of seropositive dogs is of great 
important in several aspects to avoid cross reaction. By the other side, according to 
Figueiredo et al. (2010), dogs infected by Leishmania could not be identified by IFA in dried 
blood on filter paper, possibly maintaining the transmission cycle in endemic area.  
In respect of serologic methods employed in epidemiological investigations with the aim of 
knowing the prevalence of the disease in endemic areas or with potential for transmission of 
the VL, the parameters of sensitivity, specificity and predictive values of serological 
techniques employed are of the extreme importance to avoid erroneous interpretations, with 
false positive or negative. Although the serology is only an indirect method of measuring 
the infection, not defining the degree of parasitism, the presence of the disease, or even the 
potential for transmission that the dog may have to the vector. Decrease the number of false 
positive results would be very important for the efficiency and reliability of the program, 
avoiding the elimination of the dogs that do not provide risk in the transmission of 
infection. 
The correlation between the clinical status of the dogs and its infectivity for the vector 
should also be considered in the discussions for the adoption of measures to the control of 
VL since Pinelli et al.(1994) observed that asymptomatic and symptomatic animals had 
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severe immune response, quite distinct, favor or not the vector infection. Anyway, it is 
important to mention the report of Barata et al. (2005) showed infection in the laboratory 
reared vector which feeding in seropositive dogs from different clinical forms of the disease. 
Cutaneous parasitism in found in intact skin of dogs naturally infected by L. (L.) chagasi, 
irrespective of the presence or absence of clinical signs suggestive of visceral leishmaniasis 
(Madeira et al., 2004).  
According to the technical report of the Ministry of Health of Brazil (Costa & Vieira, 2001), 
the program for the disposal of domestic dogs presents the lowest scientific-technical 
support between the three strategies of control program, and recommends that the 
systematic serological screening followed by dogs elimination should be suspended. 
Serological examination was recommended for dogs only from endemic areas who presents 
suspicious symptoms; however the serological test in eluate of blood on filter paper should 
be replaced by conventional serology; and that the elimination of dogs should be restricted 
only to the situations in which the diagnosis of visceral leishmaniasis was confirmed by 
parasitological exams. In addition, the treatment of dogs with drugs available for the human 
patients is not recommended, both for inefficiency as a measure of public health due to 
infectivity of treated dogs to the sand fly as for the risk of developing resistance to long-term 
medication. 
Another point to be considered is that the elimination of the seropositive animals for the 
control of human VL provides the increase in the dog younger population, which is more 
susceptible to Leishmania infection (Nunes et al., 2008). Thus, it is necessary to investigate other 
methods for this zoonosis control in addition to the euthanasia of ill animals. The simple 
sacrifice itself proves to be ineffective and injure the owner and the life of the animals. 
The increase in the number of VL cases and transmission of L. (L.) chagasi in metropolitan 
areas indicate the existence of factors that could contribute to the inefficiency of control 
programs, which have suffered questions, mainly on the adoption of measures such as the 
elimination of dogs serologically positive. 
4. Rabies 
Rabies is transmitted by an anthropozoonosis deposition of contaminated material and 
inoculation with the rabies virus by biting, scratching or licking the skin in healthy animals 
or humans. This infectious agent is a RNA virus of the Rhabdoviridae family, Lyssavirus genus 
present in saliva and secretions of infected animals. 
This virus is composed of two units in its structure: ribonucleoprotein and viral envelope. 
There are also five proteins, including the viral envelope glycoprotein, of the most 
important due to stimulation of the immune system and production of neutralizing 
antibodies, which are able to confer protection against the disease. The virus affects the 
central nervous system (CNS) causing encephalitis, leading to around 100% of lethality and 
the high cost in preventing individuals at risk of illness and death. Despite being a disease 
studied since antiquity is still a public health problem. All mammals are considered sources 
of infection and therefore can transmit it to humans. The main animal species evolved in the 
transmission are: dogs, cats, bats, wild dog, marmosets, foxes, cattle, horses, pigs, goats, 
among others. Until a few years ago it was considered three transmission cycles (urban, 
rural, and wild) and is currently included another cycle observed among bats, denominated 
the air (Figure 5). Rabies is an urban problem in developing countries is characterized by the 
presence of disease in domestic animals such as pet dogs and cats. Rabies is mainly rural 
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transmitter the hematophagous bat (Desmodus rotundos) that transmits the disease to 
herbivores, as these are the most common food source. Cycle in wild disease is transmitted 
to animals like fox, wolf, monkey, coon, skunk, among others. These animals can be a source 
of food for the hematophagous bat. It can capture bats and suffer injury or attacked by 
domestic animals. The air cycle is important for virus among species of bats, because these 
are the only mammals that fly. All species of bats, sucking are not susceptible to the virus. 
This disease has worldwide distribution. Only a few islands like Japan or Hawaii, there is no 
movement of the virus, even among the wild species considered natural reservoirs. 
The incubation period is variable between different species of mammals. In humans this 
period can vary from two to ten weeks, on average 30 to 45 days. This variation is justified by 
the extent of the injury, viral inoculation and the virus strain. The infected animal usually 
begins transmission before presenting signs and symptoms of this disease. This period is well 
characterized in dogs and cats beginning two to four days prior to clinical manifestations and 
death occurring after five days of observation of clinical manifestations of disease. 
The rabies virus multiplies in the initial period, at the site of inoculation and then reaches 
nerve endings. Dissemination occurs by retrograde axonal flow in centripetal movement to 
reach the CNS. That path remains protected by the sheath of nerves, not by stimulating an 
immune response. On reaching the CNS can replicate at various locations in the dog and cat, 
the target region is the hippocampus (Ammon's horn) and dentate gyrus (pyramidal neurons), 
spinal cord horses and cattle in the cerebellum (Purkinje cells). Only when a large amount of 
virus is produced stimulates the immune system and spreads to several sites, particularly the 
salivary glands, can also be found in the eyes, hair follicles and sweat glands. 
 
 
Source: Pasteur Institute –SES/SP 
Fig. 5. Epidemiological cycles of rabies transmission in Brazil 
 
Euthanasia for the Zoonosis Control Program  
 
229 
4.1 Signs and symptoms in animals 
The clinical condition of the animal is divided in podromic phase, furious rabies, paralytic 
and atypical. The podromic phase is characterized by a period of one to two days, the 
animals are uneasy with mild or apparent changes in behavior, dogs and cats, do not 
answer the call of the owners, have attention deficit, do not feed and can be isolated, seek 
hideouts. Large animals can move away from the group, not eating and isolate themselves. 
Passing this stage enter into a framework known as furious anger, where they show 
aggression, attack other animals that commonly live together and even the owner that are 
used to entertain. Other changes such as hunting boats and giving imaginary flies bite in the 
air, wander aimlessly, howling incessantly, unable to drink water by the pharyngeal nerve 
palsy recurrent, drooling, biting and attacking the cages, make changes as ophthalmic 
strabismus can also be observed. This phase is marked by aggressiveness and 
hyperexcitability due to encephalitis. The stage called paralytic rabies is characterized by the 
development of paralysis, especially in the hind limbs, followed by the jaw and forelimbs. 
When atypical rabies, characterized by slight changes in the behavior, is observed, there are 
difficulties to diagnose. 
4.2 Signs and symptoms in humans 
In humans the clinical picture may be divided into the following phases: neurology 
podromic, coma and death. The symptoms are nonspecific in early stages such as fever, 
headache, malaise, anorexia and sore throat. Sensitivity can occur at the site of biting, 
burning, numbness and itching. Then there are the manifestation in the CNS such as 
anxiety, restlessness, disorientation, hallucinations and seizures. It is commonly 
characterized by hydrophobia and spasms of swallowing difficulty, in which the person is 
thirsty, but cannot drink water. Struggling to swallow the saliva occurs which enhances 
dehydration. The disease progresses to severe psychomotor agitation, altered by seizures. 
The patient goes into coma, failure occurs breathe and death within five to eight days after 
onset of symptoms. Rabies is a notifiable shown. 
4.3 Control rabies  
The control of rabies in pets (dogs and cats) requires a series of measures such as: periodic 
vaccination against rabies; keep post vaccination against rabies fixed for the second dose in 
primed; vaccination of cats, among others; seize animals, keep them with quality of life and 
vaccinate them against rabies right away or when the redemption will be donated; 
performing euthanasia ethical method, the dogs that do not fit the above mentioned items; 
send material for laboratory diagnosis Rabies in quantity and frequency appropriate for 
observing the behavior of this virus; making epidemiological research in positive cases 
headed for prophylaxis of exposed persons; performing with focus lock vaccination actions 
and seizure of stray animals, within 72 hours; promote observation of aggressive dogs and 
cats for ten days from the date of the accident; stimulate the development of education 
initiatives and health promotion, using the held responsible. 
Rabies is a fatal disease and only the development of the disease will take the animal to 
death, but euthanasia, conducted in an ethical manner, will alleviate the suffering of this 
animal is affected because this disease has no treatment in veterinary medicine. 
The measure of control with greater relevance to rabies control is population control. This 
control should be accomplished through the castration of domestic animals, especially those 
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who are wandering the street and placed collected for donation and mainly awareness of 
people to understand the true meaning of responsible ownership. The criteria of responsible 
ownership should be widely disseminated mainly in schools, because children will 
disseminate information to family practice and charge what they learned. The possession 
charge means: giving attention and affection for the animal; the animal out on the street 
should be conducted with collar and leash with individual controls and the strength to stop 
him; offering food and good quality water; bathe regularly; from three months to take the 
animal to receive the rabies vaccine and implement a booster dose after 30 days; routinely 
take the animal to the vet; take the animal with two months to vaccine other diseases; 
keeping the animal in space and where appropriate cannot attack other people or animals; if 
the animal impairs a person performs his observation for ten days; occur when mating these 
animals get homes for all puppies and not abandon them. 
So we can decrease the use of the method of euthanasia to control and combat rabies 
Some reports in Brazil, the USA and other countries approach a satisfactory response to 
treatment in human patients who had the disease. The research evaluating of the treatment 
effectiveness associated with awareness, the vast majority of people collaborate to minimize 
the euthanasia of pets.  
5. Conclusions 
From what has been discussed in this chapter with regard to leishmaniasis, we can conclude 
that euthanasia of dogs as one of the main measures used in the control of human disease 
has not proven very effective. Even with sacrifice of a high number of animals, the number 
of human cases has not decreased and the disease has spread even to urban areas. This is 
because other reservoirs may be involved in the biological cycle of the parasite and also 
because the very fast replacement of the dogs. It shows the need to establish other policies 
for control of the disease, associated or not to the euthanasia of dogs, such as vector control. 
In addition, efforts should be made towards prevention of the dog disease, such as the use 
of repellents to prevent the sand fly bite, and the development of effective vaccines 
candidates. Regarding to the rabies, the main control measure, animals vaccination has been 
shown effective in controlling the zoonosis, and the euthanasia is conducted only for sick 
animals since the treatment is not recommended. 
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who are wandering the street and placed collected for donation and mainly awareness of 
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disseminate information to family practice and charge what they learned. The possession 
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1. Introduction 
Dogs share the same environment of humans and play an important role in their 
ecological adjustment. Since its domestication 12,000 to 15,000 years ago, they have been 
part of human evolution with increases on its population as humans settle down.  Dogs 
provide social and health benefits to humans but they may also be involved in social 
conflicts such as bites, zoonosis, destruction of ecosystems, etc. As consequence of its 
uncontrolled and logarithmic growth on its population, several strategies have been taken 
in both developed and developing countries. Under these two scenarios, euthanasia is 
employed as part of the strategy to overcome the surplus of this species. However, ethical 
issues arise when healthy dogs are killed or methods used for euthanasia are inhumane 
and against international standards. Besides, euthanasia as a method to control the dog 
overpopulation has shown to be expensive and ineffective on long term. In humans 
euthanasia is restricted to compassion or “mercy” killing to relief the patient of an 
terminal disease or when life become too painful and with poor life expectative. In 
veterinary medicine the term euthanasia is broader since it also includes healthy animals 
such as dogs, for elective euthanasia considering owner convenience, reasons of 
overpopulation, for behavior problems or research purposes. 
Canine overpopulation arises when uncontrolled breeding of dogs and irresponsible 
ownership act together. Dogs are promiscuous species by nature and since not a well 
defined seasonality occurs in this species, are ready to mate all through the year. Owners 
frequently claim their rights to own a dog but may be reluctant to take care of their 
responsibilities. If no laws to regulate dog ownership exist or if they exists but are not 
reinforced, the imminent consequence will be a surplus of the species ending on the streets 
or shelters. Even in shelters, it is estimated that 2 out of 3 animals entering a shelter won’t 
have a chance to be adopted and have to be euthanized. 
Several methods for euthanasia in dogs have been used. Some are recommended by 
international associations and others are considered illegal in some countries. Barbiturates 
(pentobarbitone or pentobarbital sodium) are by most the more common used drug for 
euthanasia in dogs; barbiturates cause deep anesthesia and unconsciousness before leading 
to respiratory failure. However, in case of anesthetized animals other methods such as 
Magnesium sulfate, potassium salts, carbon monoxide gas and even captive bolt shots can 
be administrated. Some inacceptable methods, still used in some countries are the use of 
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strychnine, electrocutation, cyanide, decapitation, drowning and curariform drugs (for 
example, succinylcholine). 
This manuscript describes the situation of canine overpopulation and strategies to control it 
with special reference to the use of euthanasia. The use of mass euthanasia of stray dogs in 
developing countries and euthanasia performed in dog shelters will also be addressed. A 
fair description of methods used for euthanasia will be described. A general discussion 
about ethical and moral issues about the use of euthanasia methods to control the 
population of dog over plus and better strategies to address the problem will be generated. 
2. Canine overpopulation and welfare 
Dogs may be classified according to the level of supervision as restricted or supervised dogs 
(Fully dependent and fully restricted or supervised), family dogs (fully dependent; semi-
restricted) which can have access to the streets,  neighbourhood dog (semi-dependent, semi-
restricted or unrestricted) and feral dog (independent, unrestricted, nobody takes 
responsibilities for it) (World Health Organization [WHO], 1990). Neighbourhood dogs are 
recognized as the most common kind of dog present in urban and rural areas from 
developing countries (Brooks, 1990; Orihuela & Solano, 1995; Fielding & Plumridge, 2005); 
those dogs are not necessary straying since may be allowed for freely roaming. In figure 1 an 
owned free roaming dog can be seen. Dog populations are very dynamics; after an initial 
exponential growth, the birth rate begins to decrease and the rate of death increases 
reaching equilibrium depending on the capacity of the environment to keep this balance 
(carrying capacity of the environment). The carrying capacity of the environment varies 
with habitat and it depends on the availability, distribution, and quality of the resources 
(shelter, food, water). In most cases if no control measures are taken, the density of a 
population of dogs is near the carrying capacity of the environment (WHO, 1990). The 
increasing in the number of dogs in a community may vary according to different habitats, 
cultures, and socio-economical structures of human rural and urban populations and to 
different epidemiological situations (Brooks, 1990; Margawani & Robertson 1995; Fielding & 
Plumridge 2005). Attitudes towards dogs have a great impact on its abundance and welfare. 
In developing countries dogs are relinquished and abandon to the streets by several reasons 
and become part of a stray population. India has one of the highest densities of stray dogs 
due to a large amount of edible litters on the streets, cultural tolerance of dogs and lack of 
consistently employed, sustained control programs (Butcher, 1999). As consequence, general 
health status of stray dogs is bad with thin to emaciate body condition, skin conditions and 
tick infestation (Totton et al., 2011).  One of the critical factors leading to a fast growth of the 
canine population is the lack of control of birth rates as a result of failure to spay and 
castrate or to supervise pets. Free-roaming dogs, as a consequence, have indiscriminate 
promiscuity and a high birth rate achieving their maximal breeding efficiency. As result, 
most dogs are donated to other owners. These low or no cost pups can be responsible for a 
high number of the abandoned dogs (Hsu et al., 2003) or high number of unwanted dogs 
sent to the pounds.  In developed countries few dogs become stray but are relinquished to 
dog shelters including pure breeds. Although it is assumed that paying  a large amount of 
money for a pure breed dog will ensure good care an permanent home, this is untrue and 
frequently the most popular breed are relinquished in greatest numbers (Available at: 
www.isaronline.citymax.com). A population model based on dogs in the USA, used a birth 
and death rate of 12% and a turnover rate of 14%, which included stray dogs returning to 
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the population of owned dogs. Of the dogs that died in this model (6.2 million), over a third 




Fig. 1. An owned free roaming dog in a city 
3. Methods of dog control population 
There are many strategies to control dog populations but whatever the method used it 
should be based on ethical standpoints and/or practical experiences according to 
national/local situation avoiding animal suffering and when possible killing through 
effective, preventative programs. This ensures humane and sustainable solutions. Any 
program that only concentrates on the ‘end result’ such as euthanasia is provisional and do 
not solve the original problem. Strategies to control the overpopulation of free-roaming dogs 
include enforcement of law, education of owners and sterilization of pets. Dog-control 
programs are more widely used among the more-developed countries. In less-developed 
countries, dog control programs (when they existed at all) tended to employ killing methods 
(including poisoned baits), that are not recommended on animal-welfare grounds (Dalla 
Villa et al., 2010). Mass culling of stray dog population has historically been used to control 
rabies in India (Reece, 2007). Rabies has a high incidence in dogs in areas where dog 
populations reach high densities and where animals are poorly supervised (Wandeler & 
Bingham, 2000). Recommended control measures for dog rabies control include movement 
restriction, reproduction control, habitat control and removal of straying dogs. The removal 
of straying dogs by killing strategies cannot be effective in long term without the 
enforcement of laws and education of people. Free ranging domestic dogs are non-
cooperative populations, i.e. they are not dependant on other animals of the same species to 
survive so any reduction in the population density through additional mortality is rapidly 
compensated by better reproduction and survival, and removal of the population to its 
maximum carrying capacity. In many developed countries stray dogs is a problem that has 
never risen because of different sanitary and ecological conditions but most important 
because of licensing programs, public education for responsible ownership and well-
developed re-homing shelters. 
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Reducing birth rates may have a great influence in reducing dog relinquishment and 
consequently euthanasia. Surgical neutering is by far the most common method of birth 
control in dogs but it’s too expensive to be performed at large scale so in many countries 
because of it costs it may be restricted or even prohibited. Neutering and release strategies 
for stray dogs have been recommended similarly as used in the TNR for cats known as 
Animal Birth control (ABC) program (Totton et al., 2011). The ABC program involve the 
capture, surgical sterilization and rabies vaccination of stray dogs with the whole idea to 
replace the sexually intact, unvaccinated stray dog population with a smaller population 
of infertile healthier dogs in order to reduce the population of dogs in a given area. To be 
effective in that, the work has to be intensive, 70% of the dogs should be neutered during 
one breeding cycle, which is approximately about the next six months (Butcher, 1999; 
Reece, 2007). Success of ABC program in controlling the stray dog population has been 
state in India (Reece and Chawla, 2006; Totton et al., 2010). However, dogs are always 
dependent on humans and releasing them back to the streets, although a progressively 
reduction in its numbers may occurs, that does not improve their health and still have the 
potential risk to bites and transmission of diseases. Under this panorama, euthanasia may 
be necessary considered. Besides, free-roaming cat populations have a high intrinsic 
growth rate, and euthanasia has proved to be more effective at reducing its populations 
than trap-neuter-return programs (Andersen et al., 2004). Overcrowd of dog shelters 
because of recruitment of many dogs and lack of adoptions is also a reason of mass dog 
euthanasia.  
A special mention is the dog meat consumption in Asian countries such as South Korea, 
China, Vietnan and Phillipines. In these countries eating dog is a socially acceptable 
practice. In South Korea for instance dog meat is eaten nationwide all year round. Their 
industry involves about 1,000,000 dogs killed yearly to supply the approximately 6,000 
restaurants serving this food. A typical Korean dog slaughterhouse could have dogs ranging 
from poodles to beagles to Korean Jindo dogs; dogs are also imported from Laos to cover 
the demand. In China the Saint Bernard breed is becoming popular for food consumption 
for the fast growth of the puppies and animals are slaughtered between 6 and 12 months of 
age for best size and tenderness. Under these circumstances, the population of dogs may be 
dramatically reduced. The controversy in this case is not because of the consumption of dog 
meat itself or the results of this practice on reduce the population, but factors like cruelty 
involved with the killing. No country in the world consuming dog meat has developed a 
humane method of dog slaughter under intensive farming practices. Currently, cruel 
methods are being used including beating, strangling, boiling and bleed to death (by cutting 
holes in their paws) and sometimes dogs are skinned while still alive. 
4. Euthanasia in dogs 
In veterinary medicine the alternative to euthanasia is in many cases considered as a 
“clinical act”; it doesn’t mean a failure in veterinary practice, but rather a prudent 
withdraws in time to avoid further suffering, when we know that there is no alternative to 
ensure an adequate quality of life.  In general, euthanasia of dogs is banned except in special 
justified cases such as seriously or incurably ill or proven to be dangerous dogs. However, 
in many countries due to the legal classification of animals as personal property, the owner 
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has the right of ownership over his animal so that the pet can selling or killed (Passantino et 
al., 2006). In this view a request for euthanasia is licit, whatever the animal’s state of health 
may be. Euthanasia must be carried out exclusively by an experienced veterinarian. When 
euthanasia of a healthy owned dog is requested by its owner, the veterinarian should 
reproach such a request based on their professional ethic code and look for more 
appropriate options. Veterinarians counsel pet owners on daily basis and have the 
knowledge and “authority” to heal human culture so they may have an important role in 
reducing dog euthanasia (Scarlett et al., 2002). Relinquishing of dogs is the beginning to the 
“euthanasia route” and in many cases behavioral problems such as inappropriate 
elimination (Voith & Borchel, 1982; Patronek et al., 1996), aggressive behavior (Patronek et 
al., 1996), and other behavioral problems are involve in the relinquishment. A study of dog 
euthanasia from Denmark in 1997-1998 showed that, of the 2,493 euthanized dogs surveyed, 
23.6 % were euthanased in response to behavioural problems (Mikkelsen & Lund, 1999). A 
high proportion of adopted stray dogs from pounds are bringing back to the pounds for 
several reasons. In a dog pound from Italy, from 1,789 adopted dogs, 271 (15%) where 
brought back because of behavioral problems (Mondelli et al., 2002) 
Several societies such as the World Society for the Protection of Animals does not condone 
mass destruction as a control population measure of dogs and cats when there are 
circumstances when euthanasia is the most humane option. Animals considered for 
euthanasia should include those sick or dangerous. However, euthanasia can also be 
acceptable in animals unsuitable for homing or returned to the streets or to alleviate shelter 
overcrowding which compromise the welfare of animals held there (World Society for the 
Protection of Animals [WSPA], 2000). In Italy since 1991, national legislation does not permit 
euthanasia of unwanted roaming dogs unless they have an incurable condition or are 
proven to be dangerous. Unattended dogs are placed in long-term shelters in questionable 
conditions where they often remain for most of their lives (Dalla Villa et al., 2008). 
Consequences of such decisions may alter the dynamic of dog populations if no other 
control measures are considered to reduce the number of dogs, especially those stray. For 
instance, in animal shelters from Barcelona Spain in 2003 routine euthanasia of unclaimed 
stray animals was discontinued, due to a political decision of the city council. However the 
suspension of routine euthanasia was associated with a marked increase in the number of 
stray dogs. Canine distemper became endemic in the shelter until late 2004, due to a certain 
unwillingness to use euthanasia to control infection transmission (García-Rodríguez et al., 
2008). 
When euthanasia is considered, several methods are available for dogs but not all are 
considered acceptable (Close et al., 1997). However, because of the safety for personnel, 
efficacy and costs, the preferred method is the intravenous injection of sodium 
pentabarbitone (Table 1). Different methods for euthanasia in dogs are well described 
elsewhere however some methods remain controversial (Andrews et al., 1993). A reliable 
method will produce rapid loss of consciousness until death occurs. Regardless of the 
method used, it is important to minimize distress, anxiety and pain. It is compulsory to 
confirm the death of dog when euthanasia is performed before the body is disposed or left 
unattended. If an animal is not dead, another method of euthanasia should be performed. 
Finally the carcass should be disposed according to the local ruling legislation avoiding the 
risk of residues. Incineration is considered the safest way of carcass disposal. 
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Sodium Pentobarbitone Best option for intravenous injection. Intracardiac or 
intrapulmonary routes of injection should not be used as they 
are extremely painful, unless under full anaesthesia. 
T61 Very effective agent but only to be injected very slowly 
intravenously. Animals may require sedation prior to 
administration. It may cause convulsions in the unconscious 
animal, which may be aesthetically unpleasant. 
Secobarbital/dibucaine Secobarbital is a short-acting analogue of thiamylol sodium, 
whereas dibucaine is a highly toxic local anaesthetic causing 
rapid loss of consciousness, loss of respiration and cardiac 
arrest. The combination product produced a quiet and rapid 
death. Dibucaine alone is not desirable for use for euthanasia. 
Halothane, isoflurane, 
enflurane 
These are all acceptable methods of euthanasia for carnivores. 
Appropriate gas scavenging apparatus should be used to 
prevent 
operator exposure. 
Captive bolt Can be inhumane if shot is inaccurate and dog is only 
wounded. Animal should be restrained. Personnel must be 
trained in these techniques to ensure correct positioning of the 
pistol and immediate death.  No risk to operator (see free 
bullet) unless risk of dog infected with rabies, due to potential 
contact with brain issue. 
Electrocution This method may produce severe pain due to cardiac 
fibrillation before onset of unconsciousness. Pain can also be 
caused by violent extension of the limbs, head and neck and 
may not be effective if insufficient current applied (a 
considered lethal shock is 1 kV passing from the ear to 
hindleg) so the equipment must be regularly checked and 
maintained to ensure correct voltage. Dogs should be 
unconscious before being electrocuted by electrical stunning 
(current through the brain to produce an instantaneous stun) 
or anaesthesia. Death would result from current passed 
through the heart of an unconscious. animal. Proper 
equipment and trained operator is essential. May be hazardous 
for operator, who should use protective equipment (boots and 
gloves). Low cost. Death must be confirmed. 
Concussion Only to be considered in small neonates
Shooting Can be inhumane if shot is inaccurate and dog is only 
wounded; dog may also escape. Skilled operator essential. Risk 
of injury to operators and spectators. Not necessary to handle 
or capture dog. 
Brain tissue may be unavailable for rabies diagnosis. Shooting 
of carnivores using a free bullet is only acceptable under field 
conditions when no other methods can be used. Only 
specialized marksmen should be used. 
Table 1. Must accepted methods for euthanasia in dogs 
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All the above mention agents or methods are in general fast and highly efficient. The 
following agents are unacceptable and are condemned for use as euthanasia agents in dogs: 
strychnine, nicotine, caffeine, magnesium sulfate, potassium chloride, cyclopropane, 
hydrogen cyanide gas, methoxyflurane, trichloroethylene, nitrous oxide cleaning agents, 
solvents, disinfectants and other toxins or salts, and all neuromuscular blocking agents. 
Other methods such as drowning, concussion (adults), decapitation, asphyxia, strangulation 
or air embolism are also not considered as euthanasic methods. When euthanasia is 
considered, besides the appropriate method used The World Organisation for Animal 
Health [OIE] (2010) suggests special attention to: 
a. Restraint. When a dog needs to be restrained for euthanasia, this should always be done 
with full regard for operator security and animal welfare. Some euthanasia methods 
should be used in association with sedation or anaesthesia in order to be considered 
humane. 
b. Special equipment. When special equipment is needed to perform euthanasia (e.g. gas 
chamber), the system should be designed for the purpose and regularly maintained in 
order to achieve operator security and animal welfare. 
Because neonates and adults with impaired breathing or low blood pressure are resistant to 
hypoxia, methods that depend upon achieving a hypoxic state (e.g. CO2, CO, N2, Ar) 
should not be used. These methods should not be used in dogs aged less than 2 months, 
except to produce loss of consciousness and should be followed by another method to cause 
death. In general, neonates form carnivores should be treated as adults. Sodium 
pentobarbitone is the preferred method but concussion and cervical dislocation may be used 
in very small neonatal dogs and only in cases of emergency (OIE, 2010). However, operators 
must be well trained in the physical techniques to ensure that they are correctly and 
humanely carried out. When ovarian hysterectomies are performed, euthanasia of feti 
should be accomplished as soon as possible after removal from the dam. 
5. Ethical concerns of euthanasia in stray dogs and animal shelters 
Although in veterinary practice euthanasia in dogs is reasonably common, these “end of life 
decision” provoke an emotional period and in many instances ethical concerns occurs. For 
these reason, methods such as the undisclosed standardized client (USCs) and the measure 
of patient-centered consideration (MPCC) may reduce animal suffering and enhance the 
satisfaction and well-being of both clients and veterinarians (Nogueira et al., 2010).  
However, when a healthy dog has to be euthanized a moral dilemma occurs in the 
profession. Dogs may be consider animals as sensitive beings, so they have the capacity to 
perceive pain and pleasure and are worthy of being under the protection of a law. Killing a 
healthy animal have legal consequences and may be considered a crime. In contrast 
euthanasia is legal in specific cases. For these reasons, people involved in dog pounds and 
dog shelters need to be aware of the use of euthanasia as part of the strategy dealing with 
dog overpopulation and be aware of the moral dilemma involved. Euthanasia only treats 
the symptoms but not the causes of the problems of overpopulation and should be 
considered as the last resource. 
Three different scenarios of mass euthanasia of dogs to control its population may be found, 
dog pounds, animal shelters and municipal campaigns of dog population control. 
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5.1 Dog pounds 
Also called “public shelters” or “animal control agencies” are common in many developing 
countries where laws regulate and justify the mass euthanasia. Dog pounds activities are 
generally limited to the custody and euthanasia of stray animals and are commonly finance 
by tax found from the municipalities. The pickup and reception of surplus and stray o 
relinquished animals have the objective to avoid damage to the community. The OIE (2010) 
considers euthanasia as a method to reduce the number of stray dogs to an acceptable level 
in order to reduce the risk of rabies and other zoonotic diseases and to prevent harm to the 
environment and other animals. 
An example of dog pound facilities is shown in Figure 2. Dog are protected for 3-10 days to 
give them the opportunity to be re-homed to their original owners or being adopted. 
However in dog pound, very few dogs are claimed and the adoption rate is very low or 
practically non-existing. Under these situation an overflow of dogs rapidly occurs and the 
quickest way to obtain space is by eliminate them by “strategic euthanasia”. Since 
practically all dogs are euthanized, no moral conflicts arise by selecting candidates. 
 
 
Fig. 2. A municipal dog pound building 
Dogs that arrive in very bad conditions without few possibilities to be adopted should be 
immediately euthanized. In Figure 3 two typical case of dog going to immediate euthanasia 
are shown; in these cases there is no chance of treatment. It is estimated that 75% of the 
world’s dog population are strays. Managing them presents a problem in many countries, 
and has serious implications for public health and animal welfare. Killing stray dogs often 
produces a short term effect, even when maximal catching rates (up to 24% of dog 
population/year) make no significant impact (WHO, 1988, 1990). Efforts of dog pounds 
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should be focus on preventing these problems by public education including the 
supervision of breeding, management of behavioral problems and promoting the culture of 
adoption. In Barcelona Spain, with the formulation of a city Plan for Pet Animals, the 
activities were redirected, concentrating on services within the city limits and stimulating 
adoption. Participation of both professional and humane organizations was sought, 
premises were renovated, responsible ownership of animals was promoted, controlled 
urban colonies of cats were established, and adoptions become the cornerstone of policy, 
centering the activity of the pounds toward its clients. Changes in the dog pound's activity 
since 1998 reflects a clear decrease in the number of animals retained, as well as in the 
proportion subjected to euthanasia (from 83.4% of euthanasias of animals entered in 1993 to 
47.2% in 2001). This decrease may reflect an improvement in the problem of stray animals. 
Besides, these developments have also resulted in a positive change in the relationship with 
the media and animal welfare organizations (Peracho et al., 2003). 
 
 
Fig. 3. Stray dogs from a dog pound apt for euthanasia 
5.2 Dog shelters 
Also called human agencies are usually non-profit agencies depending on charities and 
donations to fund their operations. In these agencies relinquished animals are accepted and 
educational programs on animal care and welfare to public are offer. Adoptions of dogs are 
also offered and this is fundamental for the flow of animals through the shelter. Ideally, no 
healthy, adoptable animal should be euthanized. However, euthanasia in dog shelters 
occurs frequently because of the flow of dogs is altered by the high income number of 
animals and limitations of space and funds, or when old age and terminal diseases requires 
to end a poor life quality. An estimation of euthanized rates in North American dog and cat 
shelters indicates figures of 10 to 20 million each year (Olson, 1990; Caras, 1993). In 2003, 
Michigan shelters discharged 140,653 dogs: Of these, 56,972 (40%) were euthanized and 
40,005 (28%) were adopted (Bartlett et al., 2005). In Colorado shelters, after considerable 
efforts centered in increasing adoptions, increasing the number of dogs returned to owners 
by implementing licensing requirements and improving identification methods, education 
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by implementing licensing requirements and improving identification methods, education 
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of public on animal welfare issues and subsidizing spay neuter programs, the number of 
unwanted dogs have decreased but after almost a decade, no changes in the euthanasia rate 
of dogs (3.7/1000 residents/year) have been observed  indicating that the shelters dynamics 
of dogs appeared to reached an equilibrium with respect to euthanasia (Morris et al., 2011). 
A model suggests that the balance between supply and demand for dogs can be achieved 
such that euthanasia is never required (Frank, 2004). 
 
 
Fig. 4. A dog from a shelter considered for euthanasia 
However, euthanasia is always required for the animals difficult to adopt (old, sick, 
unpopular breed, behavioral problem). As seen euthanasia in shelters is a used resource but 
it also generates moral issues. No kill shelter dog should be defined as one in where no 
adoptable dog is euthanize but where this resource may be used in old and dying dog in 
pain or suffering. In figure 4 an old dog in pain with bad life quality is shown. Although 
veterinarians have the professional knowledge and experience to euthanize dogs, other 
professionals, such as animal shelter workers, may also be trained to euthanize dogs.  
Killing shelters may bring a moral stress to their workers when dealing with euthanasia. 
Although workers realize that euthanasia of dog as a police to deal with over-population, 
this will not diminished the problem and they have to rationalize it even when they become 
enrolled to shelters with the idea of interacting and love caring of dogs. Euthanasia training 
for shelter workers also includes seminars on dealing with the irony that responsible animal 
care sometimes includes killing animals (Arluke, 1991).  
The concept of canine health management is accord with the concept Shelter medicine or 
population medicine. Population medicine is based on setting production goal, identifying 
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risk factors of disease, preventive disease and maximizing production.  Production goals in 
companion animals would be an acceptable level of welfare and considerations of the 
incidence and prevalence of clinical and behavioral disease (Hurley, 2004). The implement 
of the shelter medicine in two Italian shelters (where laws do not currently allow euthanasia 
as a suitable method to control shelter population or used for scientific purposes) during 
three years and without admission of new dogs “closed system” resulted in improved dog 
health and welfare, as indicated by the significant reduction in both the prevalence and 
incidence of major pathologies during the next two years (Dalla Villa et al., 2008). 
 
 
Fig. 5. Stray dogs poisoned during a municipal campaign 
5.3 Municipal campaigns 
Other scenario of mass destruction of dogs in order to control its population, specially stray 
dogs, is sometimes carried out in small rural municipalities using poisonous baits with 
strychnine or cyanide; strychnine causes violent convulsions and painful muscle 
contractions whereas cyanide pose extreme danger to personnel and the manner of death is 
aesthetically objectionable. Use of such method is totally unacceptable since are not 
considered euthanasic agents. In figure 5 an example of stray dogs poisoned during a 
campaign in Yucatán Mexico is shown; baits with strychnine were placed in the main streets 
were dogs were free roaming. Cats an opossums are also victims of the baits.  Other variety 
of inhumane methods used in such campaigns include shooting, hanging and electrocution 
in a futile attempt to control the number of stray dogs. Such strategies are inhuman and 
potentially dangerous specially in kids and wild life consuming the baits and should be 
condemn. The prevention culture through education of the public should be considered by 
the local authorities to deal with this kind of problem. 
In extreme situations for instance in provinces of Argentina, a recently promulgate law 
prohibit the function of dog pounds and euthanasia was banned in small animals, including 
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animals with cases of terminal diseases or serious injuries (La Nación, 2011), these may result 
morally questioned because of the unnecessary suffering of the dog. In Mexico, despite the 
existence of laws regulating dog pounds and management of stray dogs (NOM-042-SSA2-
2006), these are in most cases not conforming for several reasons. Many cases of mass killing of 
dogs and cats are reported throughout the country and condemned by the society. In some 
circumstances like in a small town in Mexico (Tlaxiaco, Oaxaca), with the increasing number of 
stray dogs (considered as pests), the Municipal Health Bureau announced that it expects the 
slaughter of over a thousand dogs in the streets because they are a source of pollution and the 
number of attacks to humans have been increasing for the large population of these pets. The 
sterilization campaigns which are made in order to prevent further proliferation of stray dogs 
in Tlaxiaco has been very erratic and no more than 55 animals had neutered, not even 10% of 
the estimated population. This is an example of municipal mismanagement and the 
consequent failure of campaign to sterilize dogs and cats, and most of all, a failure of public 
education about responsible pet ownership. In a different context in the Jaltenco municipality 
of Mexico city, were massacred with machetes and beaten to death around 30 dogs and cats 
that were under guard in a separate animal protection. Hooded men in black, with the 
approval of municipal police and some neighbors, the animals were attacked, leaving them 
very badly wounded amputees under cries of pain and fear. Only 12 of them managed to 
recover. This is an example of irresponsible brutality of ignorant authorities dealing with the 
problem of dog overpopulation.  
 
 
Fig. 6. Signal of protest against the decision of killing dogs in the city of Neuquen, 
Argentina. From the text “Why is my fault? No to the euthanasia law against stray dogs. 
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Fortunately, the society and animal protection associations are aware of these activities and 
accuse and expose the authorities responsible of such strategies to control stray dog 
populations. An example of society claims against massive dog killing is seen in the 
province of Neuquen in the Patagonia region of Argentina. After an outbreak of 
leptospirosis, a municipal resolution to sacrifice over 1100 dogs was announced. The 
resolution planned for the coming five days sacrificing 220 dogs, many of them delivered by 
their owners. These woke up the action from neighbors and animal welfare groups across 
the country. Authorities said that they will not kill animals, but called the neighbors to take 
charge of homeless pets. An example of protest and call to the society against this resolution 
is showed in figure 6.  
6. Conclusion 
The use of euthanasia in control programs of the canine population generally tends to 
generate controversy and misinterpretation of the criteria recommended by different 
agencies. In general society strongly opposes to euthanasia and condemns governments that 
employ this strategy as a means of dog population control. Euthanasia is only a temporal 
remedy to cure the symptoms rather than causes of the problem of overpopulation, and 
should be the last resource to use at the end of a long process of evaluation. Euthanasia may 
be required in specific scenarios to balance the flow of dog overcrowd, to reduce the risk of 
zoonotic transmission and damage to the environment and to avoid unnecessary suffering. 
However, ethical concerns come about when healthy animals have to be killed. Nothing is 
going to solve the dog overpopulation problem except the capacity of humans to 
understand the situation and take actions avoiding the born of unwanted puppies and 
become responsible owners avoiding the relinquishing of their pets. 
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